As a warning for warning systems, the "Letter to the Editor" below from the 
journal "Disasters" 
http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0361-3666 (vol. 31, no. 
1, pp. 113-114) usefully summarises key issues for warning systems--and not 
just for tsunamis.  Thank you to the authors for taking the time to do so.

As the authors imply:  Beware the technological fix.  Technology is often 
necessary, but it is rarely sufficient; technology is only one component 
amongst many.

Ilan

Are tsunami warning systems hanging by a wire?

With the 26 December 2004 tsunami still fresh in people's minds, urgent 
action to
minimise the effects of future events is well under way. In May 2006, a 
tsunami warning
system was tested in more than 30 Pacific countries [endnote 1]; coordinated 
by the US National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, it marked the culmination of months 
of
preparation and international cooperation. The Pacific Tsunami Warning 
Center, which
is based near Honolulu, Hawaii, US, and which monitors seismological and 
tidal stations
throughout the Pacific Basin, initiated the warning system. In the event of 
a
potentially tsunamigenic earthquake, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center is 
responsible
for supplying a series of alerts to national disaster coordinating bodies, 
which
should, in turn, communicate with regional and local warning facilities. The 
overall
aim is to give vulnerable coastal areas, many of which may be situated 
hundreds of
kilometres from the epicentre of the earthquake, the time necessary to 
conduct timely
evacuations. The added advantage of such a system, according to its 
developers, is that
it permits the implementation of evacuation drills, preparing authorities 
and communities
by highlighting the problems and realities that may be encountered during a
full-scale evacuation.

However, while this system represents a milestone in global communication 
and
hazard preparedness, such great reliance on the 'technological fix' does not 
come without
its own inherent risks. This was exemplified in the May tests when a crucial 
link in
the communications chain designed to alert people in Thailand failed to 
work. Further
weaknesses in the 'top-down' communication protocol were identified on 17 
July 2006
when a 7.7 magnitude earthquake struck around 180 kilometres (112 miles) off 
the Java
coast. The resulting tsunami killed more than 520 people and forced an 
estimated
50,000 to leave their homes [endnote 2]. Despite receiving warnings about a 
possible tsunami
after the earthquake, top officials in some of the worst hit areas failed to 
turn predictions
into warnings by raising the alarm, prompting concerns that over dependence 
on
bureaucratic chains of command slows and complicates warning systems while 
also
reducing overall levels of preparedness.

Although it is likely that such glitches will ultimately be resolved, 
incidents like this
inevitably raise questions about the great reliance on monitoring and 
prediction systems.
Following the detection of a tsunami, the system produces predictions that 
have
to be issued in a form useful to those expected to take action. Properly 
functioning
warning systems therefore provide a reference case for the integration of 
technology
and society, underpinned by an understanding of both natural phenomena and 
human
behaviour. Those issuing the warning and those expected to act on it must 
share their
understandings of the meaning of the warning messages. It is clear that 
although major
investment in a high profile system may have answered the calls of many in 
the post-
disaster malaise, its fallibility and doubts about its long-term 
effectiveness are issues
that should now be considered in more detail.

As memories of the 26 December 2004 tsunami fade and life returns to 
'normal',
the social, systemic and physical barriers to full-scale evacuation are 
likely to increase,
even if the technological prediction and warning system works well. This 
view is
supported by socio-psychological research that demonstrates that people will 
often
ignore advice to evacuate. Thus, rather than seeing the successful operation 
of a siren
or alarm bell as the end game of the warning system, it should be regarded 
as the first
element of an inclusive and integrated warning system that is linked to 
community
values, beliefs, knowledge and trust. As a result, people are more likely to 
learn from,
reinforce and trust unofficial messages, spread through and among personal 
networks.
These networks are very much in tune with people's needs, priorities and 
'language'.
During the 26 December 2004 tsunami, there were no official warnings and 
only some
limited informal warnings, showing that sometimes, the informal will provide 
the only
avenue for warning messages.

Tapping into and increasing the efficacy of these unofficial warning 
mechanisms is
the first challenge facing risk communicators. The second is to make sure 
that this
knowledge, awareness and readiness remains a background element of people's 
daily
lives. There is no doubt that early warning systems play a major role in 
hazard mitigation,
yet increasing people's resilience to such disasters should be the ultimate 
goal. It
is our view that disaster risk reduction activities should become synonymous 
with
development, for example through improved livelihood security and safer 
building
practices and by constituting a component of ongoing disaster education. 
Informal
and captivating ways of utilising existing knowledge, such as associating 
earthquakes
or peculiar observations of the sea with danger, should be combined with 
important
and relevant areas of new knowledge. This can be instilled in the cultural 
psyche and
passed on to future generations whose needs should be supported through 
local cultural
conduits such as theatre, music, poetry, art and internet media. In 
conclusion, we
believe that the enormous cost of the tsunami detection system and the high 
expectations
accompanying it demand that equal attention is given to ensuring that the
predictions generate effective and long-lasting results on the ground.

Tom Lowe, Kat Haynes and John Handmer

The authors are researchers at the Centre for Risk and Community Safety, 
School of
Mathematical and Geospatial Sciences, RMIT University, GPO Box 2476V, 
Melbourne,
Victoria 3001, Australia. For further details contact 
[log in to unmask]

Endnotes
1 http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/4988492.stm
2 http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/JAK221631.htm

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