This is good.
Rui
________________________________________
Dr. Rui Carvalho
http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/rui/
Senior Research Fellow
Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis
University College London
1-19 Torrington Place
Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, U.K.
On Wed, 13 Dec 2006 23:04:19 -0000, Alan Penn <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>David,
>
>
>
>I think I go along with most of what you are saying. Part of my worry with
>environment as 'background' is that it casts it into a passive role with
>respect to society, where I believe that it actually has an active causal
>role. Undoubtedly that is largely unnoticed and concealed - that is until
it
>goes wrong when it comes directly to the front of ones mind like the
broken
>hammer.
>
>
>
>I think it worth noting that there are no people or environment separately
>in space syntax as a social theory either, except in so far as they are
>separated analytically. Yes, we represent spatial morphology separately,
>just as we separately observe human behaviours through ethnography and
human
>interactions through social network mapping. But each is only explicable
and
>made meaningful/valuable alongside the others. Perhaps this is where the
>overlap with phenomenology as a programme lies, with the difference that
our
>explication of the lifeworld has recourse not only to language, but also
to
>graphic and numeric representations of environments, behaviours,
>interactions and relations between these (both statistical and graphical).
>There are clearly other differences, for example syntax often concentrates
>on the aggregate and the 'common between people' rather than the
individual
>and 'different between people', but this stems from our interest as
>architects who seldom have the opportunity to build for a single user, or
>even to know who the users will be.
>
>
>
>I think where I was trying to get with the deformed grid argument was to
>propose a social as opposed to an individual level of phenomenology - that
>is not to deny the importance of the latter, but to say that the social
>operates at a different scale and on a different timeframe, and is
>consequently different to just the sum of individual experiences. A simple
>thought experiment might illustrate this. I am alone in a space - my
>experience is phenomenological. A second person enters. Their experience
and
>mine now include both aspects of the environment and each other. This is
>more than just the sum of our individual experiences of ourselves in the
>environment, but is qualitatively different. Let's say that we interact
with
>each other. A third person enters. Their experience is qualitatively
>different again - they get environment, others and the interaction between
>others. Their presence affects our interaction. damn! This is 'waiting for
>Godot' isn't it?
>
>
>
>Anyway, the point is that large spatial scale configuration - the
network -
>affects movement, co-presence, land uses and economies, and these in turn
>affect local place and individual experience. Movement and co-presence
>happen over experiential timescales, but landuse and economy emerge over
>much longer timeframes. My experience now is shaped in part by others
>present or absent here and now, but it is also shaped in part by the
>emergent effects of those who were here in the past through the effects of
>the aggregate population over time. It is the regularity of the aggregate
>behaviour - its essential predictability - which allows me to make
>predictions on which basis I as an individual can determine my behaviour
>with respect to others. Predictability of aggregate behaviour allows the
>individual autonomy for meaningful action.
>
>
>
>The deformed grid seems to me to be one such structure - it is
intelligible
>and predictable in ordering co-presence, and so social communication and
>economic transaction, and so forms a basis for individual self
determination
>and autonomy. Interestingly, and here perhaps is a paradox, it seems to be
>this stable predictable basis in aggregate behaviour that gives the
>background required for differentiated and idiosyncratic individual
>expression and different experience of the individual lifeworld.
>
>
>
>Thanks for the pointer to Kemmis - I will look him up. He sounds directly
>relevant to the UrbanBuzz project we are just starting up.
www.urbanbuzz.org
><http://www.urbanbuzz.org/>
>
>
>
>Alan
>
>
>
>
>
>Alan,
>
>
>
>The "environment" is background or context phenomenologically only in the
>sense that it is typically taken for granted and in that sense unnoticed
and
>concealed. One definition of phenomenology is the unconcealment of the
>typically unnoticed-in other words, explicating the lifeworld, which is
>usually "out of sight" experientially.
>
>
>
>Also remember there are no people or environment separately in the
>phenomenological perspective-rather, there is only people-in-environment
or
>person/world immersion or being-in-the-world-whatever one chooses to call
>the inseparable wholeness of human-living-in-the-world (and language here
is
>crucial, since the lived immersion is so difficult to keep whole and
>articulate in a language of the whole. As I said in the last email, Henri
>Bortoft's work is an eye opener on this topic).
>
>
>
>I have always found Heidegger's descriptions of the lifeworld immersion
>incomplete and opaque, including presence-to-hand and readiness-to-hand. I
>agree with you that, ultimately, there is a certain amount of lived
>continuum between the two modes. I would also point out that there are
>various "submodes" of the two-for example, an emotional presence-to-hand
is
>a much different kind of lived contact and encounter than an intellectual
>presence-to-hand. In addition, there might be other lived modes of the
>person/world encounter. Sadly, Heidegger did little to explicate in wide
>detail this range of experiential possibilities. In this regard, Edward
>Relph's modes of place experience as identified through modes of
insideness
>and outsideness in his PLACE AND PLACELESSNESS (1976) are helpful and
>provide a language for separating objectivist aspects of place from its
>lived aspects. His language also provides a simple way for articulating
why
>the same place can be experienced differently for different experiencers
and
>why the experience of a place for the same experiencer can shift over
time.
>
>
>
>I still cannot agree with you that the deformed grid structure is somehow
>more of people, equipment, and "social" than of the world, "environment,"
>and physical space. I see intellectually your argument for emphasizing
what
>you call the "social level" but I would point out that, in the particular
>moment, it is the spatial configuration that is sustaining, say, lots of
>co-presence, co-awareness, perhaps interpersonal encounter and place
>ballet-or not. Granted, the sociability generated in turn can strengthen
the
>physical place but IN THE PARTICULAR MOMENT of a place's events and
>situations, the sustenance is largely supported by a particular spatial
>configuration that, in turn, helps or does not help the virtual community
to
>become actual. I don't think this interpretation is causal or dualistic-
it's
>simply recognizing that aspects of the world contribute to the
people/world
>intimacy, sometimes in powerful ways as, for example, demonstrated by the
>potential of spatial configuration.
>
>
>
>One interesting take on this lived relationship between people and place
is
>political thinker Daniel Kemmis's insightful writings: COMMUNITY AND THE
>POLITICS OF PLACE (1991?) and THE GOOD CITY AND THE GOOD LIFE (1995).
>Fascinating presentation of how the person/place intimacy can become a
>virtuous circle through a "civilized" involvement of citizens putting
their
>place first before themselves. A hopeful vision of a revitalized civility.
>
>
>
>David
>
>
>
>Dr. David Seamon
>
>Architecture Department, Kansas State University
>
>211 Seaton Hall
>
>Manhattan, KS 66506-2901
>
>785-532-1121
>
>[log in to unmask]
>
>
>
>
>
>Dr. David Seamon
>
>Architecture Department, Kansas State University
>
>211 Seaton Hall
>
>Manhattan, KS 66506-2901
>
>785-532-1121
>
>[log in to unmask]
>
>
>
>
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