Dear Rosan, Erik, and All,
It is a quiet Sunday afternoon in my little village overlooking the
Oslo fjord, the first Sunday in Advent. Padding to the computer to
check in on the list, I discovered Rosan's question to Erik on
philosophy of design and Erik's answer. The question is important.
What is philosophy of design?
I am going to offer a few reflections on Rosan's questions. In doing
so, I am going to disagree politely with Erik. In my view, Erik
Stolterman and Harold Nelson have indeed written a philosophy of
design. While it is heuristic rather than dogmatic, open rather than
closed, and systemic rather than linear, many philosophies meet those
criteria. As I will demonstrate, it meets the key definitions for a
"philosophy of."
I hope Erik won't be terribly upset if I try to demonstrate that he
and Harold are "real" philosophers where it comes to the description
of this book.
Rosan suggested that Erik and Harold might have done better to avoid
the word philosophy in describing The Design Way. She suggested
replacing it with a vaguely cheerful term such as "narrative" or
"story." In effect, she suggest that Harold and Erik are telling a
story, a nice story much like any other story in this nice world of
ours.
This is not the case as I see it. Harold and Erik are not narrating a
"story" or proposing a "scenario." Their book is an attempt to
develop a philosophy of design in the strict meaning of the term.
What, strictly speaking, is a "philosophy of" a field? In this case,
they develop a philosophy of the design field. Whatever the field may
be, large or small, anchored in art-and-design or wider and more
pluralist, they clearly propose a "philosophy of design." They key
question is what we mean when we speak of a "philosophy of [design]".
Let's start with the relevant definition in Merriam-Webster's, the
desk dictionary use by most university presses, academic publishers,
and journals. Merriam-Webster's (1990: 883) defines philosophy as:
"2 a : pursuit of wisdom b : a search for a general understanding of
values and reality by chiefly speculative rather than observational
means c : an analysis of the grounds of and concepts expressing
fundamental beliefs 3 a : a system of philosophical concepts <Kantian
philosophy> b : a theory underlying or regarding a sphere of activity
or thought <the philosophy of cooking> <philosophy of science> 4 a :
the most general beliefs, concepts, and attitudes of an individual or
group <the hippie philosophy>."
The Oxford English Dictionary, that most comprehensive dictionary of
English language dictionaries, supports this view with the first and
main definition. The OED (2002: Unpaged) defines the relevant aspects
of the word philosophy the same way:
"1. a. (In the original and widest sense.) The love, study, or
pursuit of wisdom, or of knowledge of things and their causes,
whether theoretical or practical." To speak of a "philosophy of" is
to discuss "The study of the general principles of some particular
branch of knowledge, experience, or activity." OED cites this usage
example, "Expressions like 'philosophy of science', 'philosophy of
history', 'philosophy of government', 'philosophy of law',
'philosophy of religion', and so forth creep into the language,
indicating that after scientists, historians, statesmen, jurists,
priests, and the rest have said all they have to say, there is still
need of a special kind of knowledge to inform us what it is all
about."
The Design Way fits these definitions. The Design Way is not a
"scenario," a "narrative" or a "story." It may be a "'design' of
design," helping people to "design" their use and practice of design.
That is partly what a "philosophy of" does in any field.
Another definition may explain the reason for Rosan's discomfort.
Rosan often rejects crisp terms and clear definitions in favor of
labeling any contribution as a "narrative" or "story." These terms
sound gentle and democratic, leveling distinctions and making them
sound the same. That's probably why I think twice before using them.
The larger Webster's International Dictionary (1913: 1077) defines
philosophy as "1. Literally, the love of, including the search after,
wisdom; in actual usage, the knowledge of phenomena as explained by,
and resolved into, causes and reasons, powers and laws. When applied
to any particular department of knowledge, philosophy denotes the
general laws or principles under which all the subordinate phenomena
or facts relating to that subject are comprehended."
Erik and Harold have written a book that is too systematic and
comprehensive to pass as a simple story. Nevertheless, the term
"philosophy" is not "loaded." It is a precise and clear description
of their aims. While Harold and Erik develop a new range of issues
and perspectives, this is more than a narrative or a story or a
scenario. They attempt to develop a philosophy exactly as
Merriam-Webster and the Oxford English Dictionary define the term.
The cataloguers at the Library of Congress and the British Library
seem to agree. The first term in the catalogue entry is
"Design-philosophy." This cataloguing description translates into
everyday English as "philosophy of design."
There are five conclusions here.
1) Rosan could relax her critique by allowing people to use their own
vocabulary, particularly when their vocabulary states what they set
out to do. Erik was right earlier on when he described his book as a
philosophy of design. While the expanded vocabulary of his answer to
Rosan also makes sense, this does not render the earlier label wrong.
Reading The Design Way, it seems to me that Harold and Erik wrote a
philosophy of design. So do the cataloguing experts at the Library of
Congress and the British Library. While Erik's modest reply allows us
to relax, I prefer vigilance to relaxation where clarity is
concerned. I'd argue that the proper use of the word philosophy makes
the critique irrelevant.
2) Allowing for a wider range of contributions would invite the
diverse range of voices Rosan requests. Many researchers use a
vocabulary of distinctions within a pluralist conceptual framework.
In contrast, Rosan frequently asks people to label many different
kinds of contribution as narratives, stories, or scenarios.
Reducing everything to scenarios, narratives, and stories erases the
qualities of distinction. Describing every contribution as a story
reduces pluralism. It suggests that all things are of the same
nature. This, in turn, reduces diversity.
There is another problem in designating a scholarly and scientific
contribution as a mere "story." If I were to parody this position,
I'd say it leads to the notions that there are no significant
differences between the different "stories" of the universe as
Ptolemy, Copernicus, Kepler, Newton, and Einstein tell them. They are
all stories. This particular construction of the world offers clear
advantages to poor fellows like me. In a world where all scientific
accounts are simply stories, I have just as much to say about the
universe as Einstein! Lucky me.
There are problems here, too. Saying that all accounts are stories
offer political advantages to the rich as well as to the poor. In
this world, George Bush and his fundamentalist friends have just as
much to say about the universe as I do. That does not please me
nearly as much as taking my place next to Albert Einstein.
Mr. Bush seems to believe that the creationist account of the
universe is a valid story, and that we ought to be teaching
creationism along with, say, the theory of evolution. In the gospel
according to Bush, these are both stories. Darwin narrates one story
and the Bible narrates another. Mr. Bush believes that good education
and good science require us to teach both stories on an equal basis.
Now that is the kind of line I'd pursue if I were to write a parody
of the position that all we really do in research is narrate stories.
The unfortunate reality is that this is not a parody in some parts of
the world. It is a reality. If all the business of research required
of us was an opportunity to vote on the stories we like, we could
forget about Darwin and move to Kansas.
Admittedly, the kind of scholarship that Erik and Harold have done in
The Design Way is different than the scholarship required for
cosmology, evolution, or even social psychology. The philosophy, in
contrast, is reasonably similar and it lies on the continuum of
scientific and scholarly inquiry designated as research. This
continuum is different than the continuum on which we find the
Genesis story, or the story of the Spider God, or the story of how
the world began when Apsu created the heavens.
Theologians now distinguish between the creation account of the Bible
and the accounts developed in scientific research. Unfortunately, Mr.
Bush is as ignorant of theology as he is of science. I'd like to
think that we can do better than George Bush. One was to begin is by
distinguishing among the different kinds of accounts. Not all
accounts are "stories," not even accounts that narrate an event or
position.
3) In an earlier post, Rosan asked whether philosophy of technology
subsumes design research. That post suggests that "philosophy of
technology" is acceptable as a "philosophy." In contrast, the current
post suggests that "philosophy of design" is merely a "narrative."
This puzzles me.
In the earlier post, Rosan points to the possibility of a specific
philosophy of design. She offered David Sless's Common Ground paper
as an example. (The version posted to the CRIA web site was presented
at the Design Education Association, but the paper is essentially the
same.)
It seems odd to me that Rosan labels David's propositional sketch as
"philosophy of design" while labeling Harold and Erik's systematic
and carefully developed book as a "story."
4) These designations suggest two problems. The first is confusion on
what a "philosophy of design" is or might be. The second neglects the
literature of our field.
The past five years have seen two widely accessible collections of
articles on philosophy of design. The La Clusaz conference (Durling
and Friedman 2000: 3-132) addressed philosophies of design in one of
four sessions. Two years later Per Galle and Peter Kroes (2002)
edited a special issue of Design Studies on this topic.
Many articles in Design Issues and Design Studies deal with
philosophy of design. So do such books as Bucciarelli (2003), Fry
(1999), Simon (1969, 1982, 1998), or, in a slightly different frame,
Margolin (2002).
One reason I describe David's paper as a propositional sketch is that
he overlooks the literature. His paper offers interesting
propositions whole bypassing a decade of contributions on the topics
he explores.
If we're going to discuss the philosophy of design, we ought to dig
more deeply, especially if we're going to describe philosophical
propositions as philosophy while describing reasonably systemic
efforts as stories.
5) This leads to my response. This topic has interested me enough
over the past decade and a half to publish several papers. (See, for
example, Friedman 2000, or Friedman and Olaisen 2000. There are
more.) In addition to organizing the La Clusaz conference with David
Durling, I organized a conference on the philosophy of design and art
with my colleagues at the Design Research Center at Denmark's Design
School and the Royal Danish Academy School of Architecture. I also
took part in several others, including one that Anders Ekholm
organized at Lund University and two that Mark Palmer and Robin Durie
organized at Staffordshire University before the "Staffordshire
Exodus."
What I have not done is to attempt some kind of systematic overview.
I have been working slowly toward something systematic without making
as much progress as I should. Rather than simply grumble about the
neglected literature, I will follow this note with a research request
to gather an overview of the literature.
Before saying much more on this, I think I will find out what others
have been thinking and writing.
Yours,
Ken
References
Bucciarelli, Louis L. 2003. Engineering Philosophy. Delft: Delft
University Press Satellite.
Durling, David, and Ken Friedman, editors. 2000. Doctoral Education
in Design. Foundations for the Future. Proceedings of the La Clusaz
Conference, July 8-12, 2000. Stoke-on-Trent, United Kingdom:
Staffordshire University Press.
Friedman, Ken. 2001. "Creating Design Knowledge: From Research into
Practice." In Design and Technology Educational Research and
Development: The Emerging International Research Agenda. E. W. L.
Norman and P. H. Roberts, eds. Loughborough, UK: Department of Design
and Technology, Loughborough University, 31-69.
Olaisen, Johan and Ken Friedman. 2000. "Toward a philosophy of
science for design research. An heuristic approach." In Doctoral
Education in Design. Foundations for the Future. Proceedings of the
La Clusaz Conference, July 8-12, 2000. David Durling and Ken
Friedman, editors. Staffordshire, United Kingdom: Staffordshire
University Press, 101-108.
Fry, Tony. 1999. A New Design Philosophy. An Introduction to
Defuturing. Sydney: UNSW Press.
Galle, Per and Peter Kroes, editors. 2002. Special issue: Philosophy
of Design. Design Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3. (May).
Margolin, Victor. 2002. The Politics of the Artificial. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1990. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary. Springfield, Massachusetts.
OED. 2002. OED Online. Oxford English Dictionary. Ed. J. A. Simpson
and E. S. C. Weiner. Second edition, 1989. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Oxford University Press. URL: http://dictionary.oed.com/ Date
accessed: 2002 January 18, verified 2005 November 27.
Simon, Herbert. 1969. The Sciences of the Artificial. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Simon, Herbert. 1982. The Sciences of the Artificial. Second edition.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Simon, Herbert. 1998. The Sciences of the Artificial. Third edition.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Webster's. 1913. Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (G & C.
Merriam Co., 1913, edited by Noah Porter). ARTFL (Project for
American and French Research on the Treasury of the French Language).
Chicago: Divisions of the Humanities, University of Chicago. URL:
http://humanities.uchicago.edu/orgs/ARTFL/forms_unrest/webster.form.html
Date accessed: 2002 January 18, verified 2005 November 27.
--
Rosan Chow wrote:
Based on what you said below, isn't that more appropriate to
charactarize "The Design Way" as a 'scenario', 'narrative', 'story',
or even a 'design' of design...rather than seeing it as a philosophy
of design .... 'philosophy' is such a loaded word.
For me, the criticisms of De Vries on "The Design Way" (or my
questions) could be relaxed or even rendered irrelevant if we see
"The Design Way" not as a philosophy, but as a truly 'design'
discourse ... a discourse that is fresh, energizing, and
complementary to other discourses ... not only in what it says but
also the approach it takes to say it.
The most important of what you said below, for me, is "to find new
ways of thinking that might help and support designers" ... this is
such a different approach (or 'intention') to discourse that i would
not like to call it a philosophy. It is a very brave 'design'
disourse that comes out from Design Research.
It is extremely difficult to begin a different FORM of discourse (and
to legitimize it) and there are still much work to do...but we should
be proud of "The Design Way". What do you think?
Erik Stolterman wrote:
Dear Rosan and list
(even if this answer is about your question about our book, it is
more general than that)
Yes, you are right. the book is a design of design. In the Prelude of
the book (page 3) we actually write: "What is presented in this book
is a composition of what we believe a broad and deep understanding of
design--and designing as a tradition of inquiry and action--should
include. This composition, is, in itself, a design."
So, it is (as you correctly states) not a "real" philosophy. The
problem is of course how to describe this kind of work. The text is
on a level of abstraction that people recognize as "philosophical"
and we also deal with concepts commonly used in "real" philosophy".
So, it easily becomes a book on "philosophy of design" ;-) We have
really tried in the "Prelude" to make this clear and to argue for
such an approach. For instance, we end the "Prelude" with --- "We do
not try to provide universal definitions of these concepts that would
apply across other traditions of inquiry and action. They are defined
through use in pragmatic design ways, with the specific purpose of
revealing our grasp of design as a whole".
The issue you raises is a sign of what our field (design research)
has to deal with. If we as design researchers want to promote
scientific approaches to design then we have to accomodate to the
principles of the scientific tradition and "school of thought" we
assign ourselves to. If we (as with "The Design Way") try to create a
conceptual framework that would be useful for designer as a tool for
reflection, we are entering the tradition of design, with other
claims of success. For instance, I would be more worried if I heard
that designers could not in any way be inspired in their design
thinking by "The Design Way" than I am from criticism that states
that the book does not comply with specific scientific standards. (I
have no problems with a scientific perspective on design, but that
has another purpose and should be evaluated in a different way. I do
that kind of work too ;-) Best
--
Ken Friedman
Professor of Leadership and Strategic Design
Institute for Communication, Culture, and Language
Norwegian School of Management
Design Research Center
Denmark's Design School
email: [log in to unmask]
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