Many thanks for these interesting papers

Ian Davis
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Peiser, Benny" <[log in to unmask]>
To: <[log in to unmask]>
Sent: Monday, September 05, 2005 12:48 PM
Subject: Re: Some larger issues raised by Hurricane Katrina


I have attached a few less knee-jerk and more pragmatic responses to the
disaster management failures. If we really want to learn the key lessons
from the Katrina tragedy, which seems crucial in light of incessant
hurricane activity, it will be vital to grasp the underlying problems of
disaster mitigation and management.

Benny Peiser
http://www.staff.livjm.ac.uk/spsbpeis/

----------

INTELLIGENCE FAILURE

Science Policy, 4 September 2005
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheus/archives/environment/000555intelligence_failure.html

Roger Pielke Jr.

The Bush Administration's complete lack of preparedness for responding to 
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans is one of the most significant intelligence 
failures in history, ranking right up there with Pearl Harbor and 9/11. It 
will be important in the coming months for Congress to investigate this 
policy failure with every bit of effort that it did after 9/11. Let me say 
that I have every expectation that the government professionals now fully 
engaged in the rescue and recovery operations will do an outstanding job. 
The question that needs to be asked, and it is not too soon to begin asking, 
is why was the federal government so unprepared for the disaster in the face 
of robust scientific knowledge about the disaster at all time scales? This 
is especially in light of the fact that the government completely 
reorganized itself after 9/11 to improve the nation's preparedness and 
response to catastrophes.

Like many people, I too was buoyed by the reports in the immediate aftermath 
of Katrina that New Orleans had dodged another bullet. It is understandable 
that government officials not involved with disaster preparedness and 
response (including the President) might have seen these reports and felt 
the same way. But to learn that the federal government agencies responsible 
for disaster preparation and management had taken very little action in the 
days and hours before Katrina's landfall to prepare for the possibility of 
flooding of New Orleans is simply amazing. I study disasters and find this 
incredible.

Statements by Bush Administration officials reveal the depth of this 
intelligence failure. Consider the following comments from Homeland Security 
Secretary Michael Chertoff and FEMA's Michael Brown:

Of Katrina resulting in the failure of the New Orleans levees Chertoff 
said -- " "That 'perfect storm' of a combination of catastrophes exceeded 
the foresight of the planners, and maybe anybody's foresight." He called the 
disaster "breathtaking in its surprise." ... Chertoff argued that 
authorities actually had assumed that "there would be overflow from the 
levee, maybe a small break in the levee. The collapse of a significant 
portion of the levee leading to the very fast flooding of the city was not 
envisioned."" Wrong. It is now well established that what has occurred was 
foreseeable and foreseen.

Of the time available to prepare, "Chertoff also argued that authorities did 
not have much notice that the storm would be so powerful and could make a 
direct hit on New Orleans." Wrong this storm was forecast perfectly and 
there were days of notice that an extremely powerful storm would hit along 
the gulf coast. Forecasts cannot get any better. And again, the disaster has 
been predicted for 30 years.

Chertoff explains on Wednesday that the government was betting on the come: 
"... in terms of this storm, particularly because it seemed to move to the 
east at the last minute, and I remember seeing newspaper headlines that 
said, you know, New Orleans dodged the bullet, on Tuesday morning, and even 
as everybody thought New Orleans had dodged the bullet Tuesday morning, the 
levee was not only being flooded, which is, I think, what most people always 
assumed would happen, but it actually broke."

Two things here. First, planning for the best case scenario is not a good 
approach to disaster policy. One wobble in a hurricane's path can make a big 
difference. And second, the Secretary of DHS was getting his information 
about the storm's impact on Tuesday from newspaper headlines? Are you 
kidding me?

Then there is the bizarre episode last Thursday of Chertoff arguing with 
NPR's Jeremy Siegel about whether or not there were in fact people stranded 
at the New Orleans Convention Center, and calling the news reports "rumor." 
Do these folks not watch cable news? Is it possible that I had better 
intelligence at the foot of the Rockies thousands of miles away than the 
Secretary of Homeland Security?

Later that day FEMA director Michael Brown told CNN on Thursday that they 
had only learned of people at the convention center on that day, presumably 
via the questions put to Chertoff:

"ZAHN: Sir, you aren't just telling me you just learned that the folks at 
the Convention Center didn't have food and water until today, are you? You 
had no idea they were completely cut off?

BROWN: Paula, the federal government did not even know about the Convention 
Center people until today."

Chertoff explains the intelligence failure on Sunday by placing blame on 
state and local officials:

"Well, I mean, this is clearly something that was disturbing. It was 
disturbing to me when I learned about it, which came as a surprise. You 
know, the very day that this emerged in the press, I was on a video 
conference with all the officials, including state and local officials. And 
nobody -- none of the state and local officials or anybody else was talking 
about a Convention Center. The original plan, as I understand it, was to 
have the Superdome be the place of refuge, of last resort. Apparently, 
sometime on Wednesday, people started to go to the Convention Center 
spontaneously. Why it is that there was a breakdown in communication, again, 
I'm sure will be studied when we get to look at this afterwards. FEMA, of 
course, did not have large -- is not equipped to put large masses of people 
into an area. FEMA basically plugs into the existing state and local 
infrastructure. What happened here was essentially the demolishment of that 
state and local infrastructure. And I think that really caused a cascading 
series of breakdowns. I mean, let's be honest. This stressed the system 
beyond, I think, any prior experience anybody's had in this country."

Let me explain why these comments are significant. Chertoff and Brown are 
the respective heads of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and within 
DHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). These are the federal 
agencies with lead responsibility for being prepared for and responding to 
disasters. Understanding and mitigating risk is their jobs.

This commentary is not a cheap political shot at the Bush Administration. 
They did have the bad luck of being in office when Katrina stuck, but they 
are nonetheless accountable for government performance in such situations. 
And there has been a significant policy failure on their watch. Furthermore, 
in the aftermath of 9/11 the Bush Administration completely reorganized 
itself to improve the nation's ability to secure itself. Under this new 
reorganization, DHS has comprehensively failed its first test. Congress 
needs to find out why, and fix it. We will have more disasters, that is for 
sure. The time to start asking hard questions is right now.

================
BUREAUCRATIC FAILURE: TO UNDERSTAND KATRINA'S PROBLEMS, READ THE 9/11 REPORT

The Wall Street Journal, 2 September 2005
http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/dhenninger/?id=110007201

BY DANIEL HENNINGER

Imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies.
--The 9/11 Commission Report

The response to Hurricane Katrina suggests we are not very good at it. The 
stark images of bereft people in New Orleans and Mississippi are said to 
reveal inadequate preparation by the agents of government--from elected 
officials to bureaucracies--whose duties include commanding the vast 
resources and authority of government to provide help when it is most 
needed.

To be sure, the scale of Katrina's force and devastation overwhelms the 
notion of a rationally organized response. The grim fact remains that 
disasters are relatively commonplace in the world. Swiss Re, the big 
reinsurance group, annually publishes a compendium called "Natural 
catastrophes and man-made disasters" listing the human and economic toll. In 
2004, it recorded 116 natural catastrophes, with the Dec. 26 Asian tsunami 
leaving more than 280,000 dead or missing. Less well-remembered, often the 
case with Third World disaster, a June monsoon killed 1,845 in Bangladesh 
and Hurricane Jeanne in September left some 3,000 dead in Haiti, whose 
flooded city of Gonaives looked like New Orleans.

An industry of experts has emerged, dedicated to mitigating disasters, both 
their imminence and aftermath. Science magazine just dedicated its cover to 
"Dealing with Disasters." We know quite a lot.

Specialists in disaster mitigation hold annual conferences to share 
knowledge. In January in Japan, the U.N. held the five-day World Conference 
on Disaster Reduction, with numerous representatives from member states. A 
week earlier in Mauritius, Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for "a global 
warning system" for tsunamis and "all other threats." Specialized disaster 
Web sites exist, such as the Pan American Health Organization's site on 
Disasters and Humanitarian Assistance." The U.S. oceanographic 
administration has created the Center for Tsunami Inundation Mapping 
Efforts, a sophisticated modeling program to help vulnerable nations in the 
Pacific.

So if we're so smart, why are Louisiana and Mississippi sinking beneath 
water and red tape?
It has been reported in past days how the relief agencies, such as the Army 
Corps of Engineers and FEMA are struggling; basics such as food distribution 
are in disarray. On paper anyway, many of these problems had already been 
addressed. By law, FEMA requires all states, if they are to receive grant 
money, to file both pre- and post-catastrophe mitigation plans. Experts in 
Louisiana, and indeed New Orleans, have been drafting one for several years.

We know what to do. We have many specialists in the arcane disciplines 
relevant to understanding natural and man-made disasters. We know what to 
do, but we are not good at using what we know. Why not?

We fail to use well what we know because we rely too much on large public 
bureaucracies. This was the primary lesson of the 9/11 Commission Report. 
Large public bureaucracies, whether the FBI and the CIA or FEMA and the 
Corps of Engineers, don't talk to each other much. They are poorly 
incentivized, if at all. Budgets, the oxygen of the acronymic planets, make 
bureaucracy's managers first responders to constant political whim. 
Real-world problems, as the 9/11 report noted, inevitably seem distant and 
minor: "Once the danger has fully materialized, evident to all, mobilizing 
action is easier--but it then may be too late."

Homeland Security, a new big bureaucracy, has struggled since 2001 to 
assemble a feasible plan to respond to another major terror event inside the 
U.S. The possibility, or likelihood, of a bird-borne flu pandemic is 
beginning to reach public awareness, but the government is at pains to 
create a sufficient supply of vaccine or a distribution system for 
anti-viral medicines. Any bets on which will come first--the flu or the 
distribution system?

Big public bureaucracies are going to get us killed. They already have. One 
may argue that this is an inevitable result of living in an advanced and 
complex democracy. Yes, up to a point. An open political system indeed 
breeds inefficiencies (though possibly the Jeb Bush administration that 
dealt with the 2004 hurricanes is more competent than Gov. Blanco's team in 
Louisiana). And perhaps low-lying, self-indulgent New Orleans understood its 
losing bargain with a devil's fate.

But we ought to at least recognize that our increasingly tough First World 
problems--terrorism, viruses, the rising incidence of powerful natural 
disasters--are being addressed by a public sector that too often is coming 
to resemble a Third World that can't execute.

I'll go further. We should consider outsourcing some of these functions, for 
profit, to the private sector. In recent days, offers of help have come from 
such companies as Anheuser-Busch and Culligan (water), Lilly, Merck and 
Wyeth (pharmaceuticals), Nissan and GM (cars and trucks), Sprint, Nextel and 
Qwest (communications gear and phone cards), Johnson & Johnson (toiletries 
and first aid), Home Depot and Lowe's (manpower). Give contract authority to 
organize these resources to a project-management firm like Bechtel. Use the 
bureaucracies as infantry.

A public role is unavoidable and political leadership is necessary. But if 
we're going to live with First World threats, such as the destruction of a 
major port city, let's deploy the most imaginative First World brains--in 
the private sector and academia--to mitigate those threats. Laughably 
implausible? Look at your TV screen. The status quo isn't funny.

======
REVIEW OF HURRICANE EVACUATION PLANS AND POLICIES IN THE U.S.

Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Volume 37, Issue 3 , 
March 2003, Pages 257-275
http://tinyurl.com/d3z9f

National review of hurricane evacuation plans and policies: a comparison and 
contrast of state practices

Elba Urbina a), and Brian Wolshon b)

a) Chiang, Patel, & Yerby, 1820 Regal Row, Suite 200, Dallas, TX 75235, USA
b) Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, LSU Hurricane Center, 
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA

Abstract
The events of recent hurricane seasons have made evacuation a leading 
emergency management issue. In 1998 and 1999, Hurricanes Georges and Floyd 
precipitated the two largest evacuations in the history of the United States 
and perhaps, its two largest traffic jams. In response to the problems 
experienced during these events, many state departments' of transportation 
have begun to take a more active role in the planning, management, and 
operation of hurricane evacuations. This is somewhat of a departure from 
prior practice when emergency management officials directed these tasks 
almost exclusively. Since the involvement of transportation professionals in 
the field of evacuation has been a fairly recent development, many of the 
newest practices and policies have only been used once, if ever. They also 
vary widely from state-to-state. To determine what the latest policies and 
strategies are and how they differed from one location to another, a 
national review of evacuation plans and practices was recently undertaken. 
The study was carried out from a transportation perspective and included 
both a review of the traditional transportation literature and a survey of 
department of transportation and emergency management officials in coastal 
states threatened by hurricanes. This paper highlights the findings of the 
survey portion of the study. It focuses mainly on current state practices, 
including the use of reverse flow operations and intelligent transportation 
systems. It also summarizes current evacuation management policies, methods 
of information exchange, and decision-making criteria. This paper presents 
the general similarities and differences in practices and gives particular 
attention to unique, innovative, and potentially useful practices used in 
individual states.

doi:10.1016/S0965-8564(02)00015-0
Copyright © 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

============
PUBLIC ORDERS AND PERSONAL OPINIONS: U.S. HOUSEHOLD STATEGIES FOR HURRICANE 
RISK ASSESSMENT

Global Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards, Volume 2, Issue 4 
, December 2000, Pages 143-155
http://tinyurl.com/d5cfd

Public orders and personal opinions: household strategies for hurricane risk 
assessment
Kirstin Dow,  and Susan L. Cutter
Department of Geography, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208, 
USA

Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between household evacuation decisions 
and official emergency management practices in light of recent increases in 
the availability and diversity of hurricane-related information. While we 
focus on Hurricane Floyd in South Carolina, we incorporate findings of our 
longitudinal research effort covering the last four years and six post-1995 
hurricane threats to the state. While only 64% of residents in the mandatory 
evacuation zone complied with the Hurricane Floyd evacuation order, over 80% 
agreed that calling an evacuation was an appropriate precautionary response 
given the uncertainties of the storm. Longitudinal surveys indicate that 
Horry County residents have developed a fairly robust strategy in making 
evacuation decisions. This "hurricane savvy" population depends more heavily 
on individuals' assessments of risks than on official orders. Individual 
assessment practices differ from official orders in that greater weight is 
given to household circumstances and preferences, the diligent monitoring of 
a variety of information sources, and the incorporation of past experiences 
into the decision-making process. Surveys indicate differences between the 
general public and officials in terms of priorities and preferences about 
hurricane evacuations. The public demands more information about the 
hurricane threat. Officials place more emphasis on planning evacuation 
routes and public safety measures.

doi:10.1016/S1464-2867(01)00014-6
Copyright © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

=============
HEADING FOR HIGHER GROUND: FACTORS EFFECTING HURRICANE EVACUATION BEHAVIOUR

Global Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards, Volume 2, Issue 4 
, December 2000, Pages 133-142
http://tinyurl.com/a6qrl

Heading for higher ground: factors affecting real and hypothetical hurricane 
evacuation behavior*1

John C. Whitehead a), Bob Edwards b), Marieke Van Willigen b), John R. 
Maiolo b), Kenneth Wilson b) and Kevin T. Smith a)

a) Department of Economics, East Carolina University, Brewster Building, 
Greenville, NC 27858-4353, USA
b) Department of Sociology, East Carolina University, Brewster Building, 
Greenville, NC 27858-4353, USA

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to assess the determinants of hurricane 
evacuation behavior of North Carolina coastal households during Hurricane 
Bonnie and a future hypothetical hurricane. We use the data from a telephone 
survey of North Carolina coastal residents. Hypothetical questions are used 
to assess whether respondents will evacuate and where in the case of a 
future hurricane with varying intensities. We examine the social, economic, 
and risk factors that affect the decisions to evacuate and whether to go to 
a shelter or motel/hotel relative to other destinations. The most important 
predictor of evacuation is storm intensity. Households are more likely to 
evacuate when given evacuation orders, when they perceive a flood risk, and 
when they live in mobile homes. Households who own pets are less likely to 
evacuate. Non-white households, pet owners and those with more education are 
less likely to go to either a motel/hotel or shelter, preferring instead to 
stay with friends or family.

doi:10.1016/S1464-2867(01)00013-4
Copyright © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.