Here is the full report from The Independent on Sunday, 17th April 2005
Rose F
Ricin: The plot that never was
Severin Carrell and Raymond Whitaker
A deadly poison said to be at the heart of a terrorist conspiracy
against Britain led to a dire warning of another al-Qa'ida attack in
the West. The Government was swift to act on the fear that such a find
generated. But, as Severin Carrell and Raymond Whitaker report, far
from being a major threat, the real danger existed only in the mind of
a misguided individual living in a dingy north London bedsit
17 April 2005
It was a weapon of mass destruction, a warning that we all needed to be
"vigilant and alert". Weeks before the invasion of Iraq, it was
presented as the final proof that Saddam Hussein was in league with
al-Qa'ida. Anyone wanting to exploit the politics of fear could
scarcely conjure up anything more potent than the news that a suspected
terrorist cell had been making ricin, one of the deadliest poisons
known to man, in a north London flat.
But there was no ricin - a fact suppressed for more than two years.
There was no terrorist cell, just one deluded and dangerous man who
killed a police officer during a bungled immigration raid. Kamel
Bourgass (probably not his real name; he used several aliases) is
serving life for the murder of Special Branch detective Stephen Oake,
but despite more than 100 arrests and months of investigation which
took detectives to 16 countries, no al-Qa'ida plot ever materialised.
Last week at the Old Bailey, the Algerian was convicted and sentenced
to 17 years for "conspiracy to cause a public nuisance by the use of
poisons and/or explosives to cause disruption, fear or injury". Four
other alleged co-conspirators were acquitted, and charges against four
lesser figures, whose trial was due to start tomorrow, were dropped.
Yet the authorities remained undaunted. Peter Clarke, the Metropolitan
police deputy assistant commissioner in charge of anti-terrorism, said
a "real and deadly threat" had been averted, adding that it would be
hard to overestimate "the fear and disruption this plot could have
caused across the country". His chief, Sir Ian Blair, said it supported
the argument for compulsory identity cards, echoing the Home Secretary,
Charles Clarke. Mr Clarke's immediate predecessor, David Blunkett,
claimed that the case showed the need for more anti-terrorism laws,
while Conservative leader Michael Howard took it up as an election
issue, arguing that it demonstrated immigration was out of control.
A terrorism trial which was spun from start to finish, abetted by many
senior elements of the security establishment and much hysterical
coverage in the media, is still being manipulated, regardless of the
evidence in court. The "ricin plot" was used before the Iraq war by
Tony Blair as evidence of the danger from weapons of mass destruction,
and by Colin Powell, then US Secretary of State, before the UN Security
Council as proof that Iraq was aiding al-Qa'ida terrorism. Linked to an
equally illusory "poison gas" threat to the London Underground, it was
kept alive throughout a series of genuine attacks in places such as
Istanbul and Madrid as a reminder that Britain too was a target.
The gulf between rhetoric and reality, between what was alleged and
what was established as fact, was only slightly greater than the
distance between the twisted ambitions of Kamel Bourgass, who
undoubtedly wanted to cause "disruption, fear or injury", and what he
actually achieved, which was to cause loss and distress to the family
of one wholly innocent police officer.
Far from being an al-Qa'ida mastermind dispatched by Osama bin Laden
and his lieutenants to destroy the British way of life, Bourgass
emerges as an embittered loner who alarmed even other members of the
marginal world he inhabited, one of illegal immigrants whose petty
criminality was constrained by their poverty and poor English. Many of
Bourgass's co-accused knew him, but not intimately. Only one actually
claimed to be a close friend. One expert on the case said: "The
Algerian community in London are pretty much all young men and away
from home. They all cling to each other, and overlook all sorts of
political differences, just for the company. But he wouldn't. He was a
bit of a loner and considered by them to be a loner. He would say
inappropriate things, and was generally just a bit odd."
In the dingy bedsits they occupied, using poison manuals downloaded
from American survivalist websites, Bourgass used a pestle and mortar
to try to obtain poison from castor beans, cherry stones and apple
pips. But the only evidence that he produced any was a botched
"nicotine poison" in a Nivea jar.
All the other claims against Bourgass - that he had military training
in Afghanistan and was linked to al-Qa'ida, that he planned to smear
poisons on car door handles in London's Holloway Road - came from a
fellow illegal immigrant and alleged co-conspirator, Mohammed Meguerba,
arrested when he went back to Algeria. Although Britain refuses to
return detainees, including Bourgass, to Algeria because of its use of
torture and the death penalty, British politicians and prosecutors were
happy to use evidence from there. And when British investigators went
to Algeria and asked Meguerba to repeat his claims, defence lawyers
point out, he withdrew most of them.
Nobody disputes that Britain had to act on the information it received
from Algeria late in 2002. Sophisticated attacks on Western targets in
Bali and Kenya a few weeks earlier had shown that al-Qa'ida and its
affiliates remained lethal, more than a year after the 11 September
2001 atrocities. British security services were also known to be
concerned that they did not have a handle on North African émigrés in
this country, among whom there were thought to be hardline al-Qa'ida
sympathisers. At least some of the criminal activity in the circles in
which Bourgass and the others moved was believed to be aimed at raising
money for possible terrorist activity.
On the face of it, official fears appeared justified. After the series
of raids and arrests, four sets of recipes, two lists of ingredients,
the equipment for a homemade chemistry lab and basic bomb-making
instructions on a CD were seized. And on each item were several
different fingerprints, tying in most of the nine accused men, and
directly implicating Meguerba.
The key problem for the prosecution was making these inferred but
inconclusive links into proof of membership of an al-Qa'ida cell. In
the event, after one of the longest trials in recent legal history, and
74 hours of deliberation, the jury decided they had wholly failed.
Four of the five main alleged conspirators were cleared last week, and
the jury refused to convict Bourgass, the acknowledged owner of the
incriminating bedsit lab, of the most serious charge of all: conspiracy
to commit acts of Islamist terrorism by killing innocent civilians.
But in January 2003 Britain and the US were also on the verge of war on
Iraq, and the facts of the case were soon subordinated to political
necessity. Even if ricin had been produced - and expert evidence at the
Old Bailey was that the "recipes" Bourgass had were all but useless -
it is not by any description a weapon of mass destruction. Quite the
opposite: it is effective only as a means of individual assassination,
as demonstrated by the Bulgarian secret service, which used ricin to
kill the dissident Georgi Markov on the streets of London in 1978. One
or two newspapers realised this in the immediate aftermath of the
arrests in January 2003, and speculated that Tony Blair was the target
of an al-Qa'ida assassination mission.
But as we now know, there was no ricin in any case. Professor Alistair
Hay, one of Britain's foremost authorities on toxins, said Bourgass's
attempts to construct toxic weapons from his small supplies of
ingredients and ramshackle "laboratory" were "incredibly amateurish and
unlikely to succeed".
He was scathing about Meguerba's allegations that ricin would be
smeared on door handles. Ricin, he said, had to be injected straight
into a victim to be a reliable weapon. Swallowing ricin could kill, but
was a thousand times less effective. Simply touching crudely made ricin
was even less likely to kill.
His expert report was so damning that the prosecution dropped
Meguerba's claims. Instead, they focused on three identical
toothbrushes found in Bourgass's flat and suggested he planned to smear
ricin on the brushes, and put them back on a shop's shelves - an
attempt to kill someone at random. Again, Professor Hay told The
Independent on Sunday this was a highly ineffective method. "The claims
made before the trial about this major ricin plot were very, very
questionable," he said.
More sinister, however, was the expert's discovery when he looked
through the analysis of the seized material by the Porton Down chemical
weapons laboratories in Wiltshire. On 7 January 2003 - the same day
that two cabinet ministers claimed ricin had been found in north London
- Porton scientists had realised there was no ricin there at all. Their
first results at the flat had been a "false positive".
What happened to that profoundly important discovery is still the
subject of intense controversy. Porton officials were unable to tell
Professor Hay when they told the police or Home Office. The Old Bailey
heard claims that an overly cautious Porton Down official had delayed
passing the information on. Defence lawyers, however, believe ministers
knew at an early stage that the claimed ricin find was wrong.
Gareth Peirce, the human rights lawyer who acted for three of the
acquitted men, claims that as ministers built up the fear of terrorist
attack on Britain and prepared the public for the invasion of Iraq, the
Government twice allowed largely unfounded scare stories to dominate
the headlines - the ricin conspiracy and the alleged "poison gas"
attack on the London Underground.
The alleged plot to target the Tube first broke with a sensational
story in The Sunday Times, which claimed in November 2002 that the
intelligence services and police had thwarted a major al-Qa'ida plot to
gas the Underground. The paper claimed the alleged plotters would
appear in court the next day, leading to a frenzy of press reports
citing MI5 and police sources claiming a "terrorist attack had been
nipped in the bud".
In fact, no such plot had been discovered. Three men were actually
charged with using false passports. Two have since pleaded guilty,
under ordinary criminal laws, to passport offences. One was an alleged
al-Qa'ida ringleader, Rabah Kadre, the then librarian at Finsbury Park
Mosque, where many of the alleged ricin conspirators worshipped.
According to Ms Peirce, the ricin plot was similarly exploited for
political ends.
As for Meguerba, the trial threw up equally disturbing questions. There
was no signed or recorded confession, just a memo or briefing drafted
by Algerian security police which was given to the British. The
prosecution would give defence lawyers only extracts from that memo.
Eventually, 10 months after the raids revealed Bourgass's apparent
poisons experiments, anti-terrorism branch officers interviewed
Meguerba in Algeria in the presence of a local investigating magistrate
and Algerian intelligence officers. At that point his story changed
significantly - producing so many contradictions that Nigel Sweeney QC,
the chief prosecution barrister in the Old Bailey trial, refused
repeated requests by defence lawyers to allow him to give evidence.
Mr Sweeney, a veteran of terrorism trials, told the Old Bailey when the
jury was absent that Meguerba was a liar and was unreliable. Defence
attempts to visit him in his Algerian prison cell were also rejected.
Ms Peirce believes that Meguerba's highly contentious evidence was
extracted under torture. "This is the most disturbing aspect of it
all," she said. "This man had clearly been tortured and was actually
trying to save his own neck by passing on whatever he thought might be
of interest, clearly making a great deal up."
Even if every word of Meguerba's confession had been believed, it was
clear that the plot he was describing was ludicrous compared to the all
too serious carnage of Madrid, Istanbul and Bali. All these were
carried out with conventional explosives, yet the British Government
has consistently dwelt on more exotic threats, such as "dirty bombs", a
possible poison gas attack in the Tube, which was the subject of a
civil defence exercise - and ricin.
One reason for the use of such lurid scenarios, in the view of
Christopher Boucek, editor of Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor,
a journal produced jointly by the Royal United Services Institute and
Jane's, is to justify higher public spending. But he added: "It could
also distract attention from the fact that the authorities have no real
answers to more conventional threats. There is not much you can do
about a Madrid-style bombing."
Ms Peirce is scathing about the political use made of the ricin "plot",
saying: "We had a find in a London flat of something that could be
poison, with a number of lists or recipes. A very early announcement
was made that ricin had been found. From then on, people became aware
of a poison they'd never heard of before, and that then created a major
alarm - something on which the Prime Minister felt impelled to speak
that very evening.
"Yet within 48 hours, Porton Down knew that ricin had not been found.
If enormous public concern and fear has been generated, then the
responsibility clearly of the Government is to reassure people that it
was in fact a false alarm, that no poisons were found. But at no stage
has any public correction been made."
But if the Government was seeking to use the politics of fear, the
strategy went badly wrong in one crucial respect. The truth of the
affair came out in the midst of an election race in which the
Opposition is waging a fear campaign of its own, over immigration and
asylum, and Mr Howard was quick to exploit the news of DC Oake's murder
by a man who should not have been in the country. All the politically
motivated claims over the dangers uncovered in January 2003 simply
helped to reinforce the Conservative leader's case.
Recognising that in electoral terms this was an unquestionable own
goal, two senior Labour figures, Alan Milburn and Charles Clarke, were
deployed within hours to apologise for the failures in the system which
had led to the policeman's death. "Of course the Government has to take
responsibility," said the Home Secretary. But there was no sign that
the Government would take any responsibility, far less apologise, on
the wider issue - misleading the public about the undoubted threats
that exist to the country's security.
Key Figures
Kamel Bourgass
An illegal immigrant, the Algerian arrived in Britain, hidden in a
truck, in 2000. Using several false names, he remained in the country
after failing to get asylum, despite being fined for shoplifting in
2002. Accused of masterminding a ricin terror attack, he was found by
chance in hiding in Manchester, where he killed DC Oake.
DC Stephen Oake
A popular, experienced policeman, DC Oake had no inkling of the risks
he faced on his first Special Branch raid, on a Manchester bedsit on 14
January 2003. During the botched operation, he was stabbed to death by
Kamel Bourgass, an Algerian illegal immigrant convicted last week of
conspiring to use poisons.
Dr Pat Troop
The Government's deputy chief medical officer issued a statement with
the police on 7 January 2003 revealing that material seized in north
London "tested positive for the presence of ricin poison". The same
day, Porton Down scientists discovered that claim was wrong, a finding
not released for two years.
Mohammed Meguerba
An alleged al-Qa'ida sympathiser, the Algerian named Kamel Bourgass as
the head of an al-Qa'ida plot to use ricin against Londoners. Meguerba
had entered the UK as an illegal immigrant. After being bailed for
alleged identity fraud, he fled Britain in October 2002.
Gareth Peirce
The lawyer for three men cleared of the ricin plot, Ms Peirce was voted
human rights lawyer of the year for fighting the detention of Britons
at Guantanamo Bay. She was played by Emma Thompson in the film In the
Name of the Father, which was loosely based on the Guildford Four whom
Ms Peirce helped to free.
Charles Clarke
The Home Secretary had to apologise for the Government's failure to
deport Kamel Bourgass, who was wanted for immigration offences. Mr
Clarke claims it proves the need for ID cards, but faces demands to
explain why ministers failed to withdraw false claims that ricin was
found in Bourgass's flat.
ANATOMY OF A 'CONSPIRACY'
18 September 2002 An alleged mastermind of "ricin plot", Algerian
Mohammed Meguerba, arrested in north London and fake IDs found. Bailed
after suffering an epileptic fit, he absconds.
16 December 2002 Mohammed Meguerba is arrested in Algeria by security
police after allegedly being smuggled in by Islamist militants.
28 December 2002 Algerian security police begin interrogating Meguerba.
Within two days, he allegedly reveals poisoning plot in north London,
names Kamel Bourgass as ringleader and other Algerians as
co-conspirators.
5 January 2003 Police raid flat in Wood Green, north London, and arrest
several men. They discover Bourgass's alleged "poisons laboratory"
including recipes for ricin and toxic nicotine and cyanide gas weapons,
but Bourgass is not found. Other flats raided over following days.
Seven North Africans arrested, including a 17-year-old. Incriminating
"poison recipes", false papers and CDs with bomb-making instructions
found.
7 January 2003 David Blunkett, then Home Secretary, and John Reid,
Health Secretary, issue joint statement claiming "traces of ricin" and
castor beans capable of making "one lethal dose" were found in Wood
Green flat. "Ricin is a toxic material which if ingested or inhaled can
be fatal," they add. "Our primary concern is the safety of the public."
Tony Blair (pictured below) says the discovery highlights the perils of
weapons of mass destruction, adding: "The arrests which were made show
this danger is present and real and with us now. Its potential is huge."
7 January 2003 Chemical weapons experts at Porton Down discover in more
accurate tests that the initial positive result for ricin was false:
there was no ricin in the flat. Porton Down is unable to say when it
alerted the police or ministers to the error.
14 January 2003 Police raid flat in Crumpsall Lane, Manchester, seeking
another terror suspect. They instead find Bourgass and alleged
conspirator Khalid Alwerfeli. After a violent struggle, Bourgass
murders DC Stephen Oake and wounds several other police officers.
6 February 2003 Colin Powell (pictured far right), US Secretary of
State, tells UN Security Council of direct link between British "ricin
plot" and alleged al-Qa'ida "poisons camp" in Iraq. He says al-Qa'ida
commander Abu Musab al-Zarqawi "has sent at least nine North African
extremists ... to Europe to conduct poison and explosives attacks ...
The plot also targeted Britain ... When the British unearthed a cell
there just last month, one British police officer was killed."
31 March 2003 US commanders in Iraq claim to have destroyed "poison
factory", but no chemicals or laboratories found. General Richard
Myers, US commander-in-chief, claims: "It is from this site that people
were trained and poisons were developed which migrated to Europe. We
think that's probably where the ricin found in London came from."
29 June 2004 Bourgass sentenced to life for murdering DC Oake after
11-week trial at the Old Bailey. Sentence kept secret because of
impending trial for "ricin plot".
13 September 2004 After two months of legal argument in court, Old
Bailey case begins against Bourgass, Mouloud Sihali, David Khalef,
Sidali Feddag and Mustapha Taleb.
8 April 2005 After one of Britain's longest criminal trials and four
weeks of deliberation, jury acquits Sihali, Khalef, Feddag and Taleb.
12 April 2005 Jury acquits Bourgass of the most serious charge -
conspiracy to carry out a chemical attack - but finds him guilty of
"conspiracy to commit a public nuisance by the use of poisons or
explosives to cause disruption, fear or injury". Judge sentences him to
17 years. Government admits no ricin was found, only 20 castor beans,
some cherry stones, apple pips and botched "nicotine poison" in a Nivea
jar. Director of Public Prosecutions Ken Macdonald abandons trial - due
to start tomorrow - of another four men accused of the conspiracy.
Khalid Alwerfeli, Samir Asli, Mouloud Bouhrama and Kamel Merzoug
formally declared innocent. Meguerba has yet to stand trial in Algeria
and remains in custody.
www,independent.co.uk
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This email has been scanned by the MessageLa
On Friday, April 22, 2005, at 10:51 pm, Antony Wright wrote:
> Looks like it may be a D notice. The details are possibly that Porton
> Down scientists cannot be named. That would affect the following lines.
>
> A few days later in the lab, Dr Martin Pearce, head of the Biological
> Weapons Identification Group, found that there was no ricin.
>
> Nevertheless, claimed Porton Down chemistry chief Dr Chris Timperley,
> they showed a "common origin and progression" in the methods, thus
> linking the London group of north Africans to Afghanistan and Bin
> Laden.
>
> The weakness of Timperley's case was that neither he nor the
> intelligence services had examined any other documents that could have
> been the source.
>
> The article may well re-appear with the above removed.
>
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