I find it impossible to read this piece below from The Independent (London)
today without impulsively asking, saying, "Did we (USA) have to do this?"
Let alone why or for what? This war was obviously initiated by folks who
were - based on all available and present evidence in our hands now -
("innocently" or not, crackers from the start, and remain so. Adorno's
admonition re writing lyric poetry after World War II (and one assumes
during the war) again sounds pungently clear. Unless someone takes some odd
delight in the now signature images of congealed blood on Iraq's streets and
on the floors and walls of homes, the imagined "treasures" ("democracy" or
"oil") from the masters who concocted this war will never come 'home.'
Why - with articles like this one - the likes of Bush, Rumsfeld, Cheney,
Wolfolitz, Gonzales et al are not out on their heels in disgrace remains a
scary mystery to many of us, of that I am sure. It's hard to imagine -
without sounding counter-lyrical - that this country is not headed for a
major shakeout, or, alternatively, and increasingly serious period of
Government suppression. Though the former will be painful - and no doubt
with casualties of its own kind - it (liberation from these folks) will be
radically better than being gradually or quickly victimized on all levels by
the latter.

Disgusting, disgusted.

Stephen V

Iraq: A bloody mess

By Patrick Cockburn

28 June 2005


A year ago the supposed handover of power by the US occupation authority to
an Iraqi interim government led by Iyad Allawi was billed as a turning point
in the violent history of post-Saddam Iraq.

It has turned out to be no such thing. Most of Iraq is today a bloody
no-man's land beset by ruthless insurgents, savage bandit gangs,
trigger-happy US patrols and marauding government forces.

On 28 June 2004 Mr Allawi was all smiles. "In a few days, Iraq will radiate
with stability and security," he promised at the handover ceremony. That
mood of optimism did not last long.

On Sunday the American Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, told a US news
programme that the ongoing insurgency could last "five, six, eight, ten,
twelve years".

Yesterday in London, after meeting Tony Blair, the new Iraqi Prime Minister,
Ibrahim al-Jaafari, tried to be more upbeat, commenting: "I think two years
will be enough and more than enough to establish security".

Tonight President George Bush will make his most important address since the
invasion, speaking to troops at the US army base at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina. He is expected to seek to assure increasingly sceptical Americans
that he has a plan to prevail in Iraq, and that the US is not trapped in a
conflict as unwinnable as the one in Vietnam, three decades ago.

The news now from Iraq is only depressing. All the roads leading out of the
capital are cut. Iraqi security and US troops can only get through in
heavily armed convoys. There is a wave of assassinations of senior Iraqi
officers based on chillingly accurate intelligence. A deputy police chief of
Baghdad was murdered on Sunday. A total of 52 senior Iraqi government or
religious figures have been assassinated since the handover. In June 2004
insurgents killed 42 US soldiers; so far this month 75 have been killed.

The "handover of power" last June was always a misnomer. Much real power
remained in the hands of the US. Its 140,000 troops kept the new government
in business. Mr Allawi's new cabinet members became notorious for the amount
of time they spent out of the country. Safely abroad they often gave
optimistic speeches predicting the imminent demise of the insurgency.

Despite this the number of Iraqi military and police being killed every
month has risen from 160 at the handover to 219 today.

There were two further supposed turning points over the past year. The first
was the capture by US Marines of the rebel stronghold of Fallujah last
November after a bloody battle which left most of the city of 300,000 people
in ruins. In January there was the general election in which the Shia and
Kurds triumphed.

Both events were heavily covered by the international media. But such is the
danger for television and newspaper correspondents in Iraq that their
capacity to report is more and more limited. The fall of Fallujah did not
break the back of the resistance. Their best fighters simply retreated to
fight again elsewhere. Many took refuge in Baghdad. At the same time as the
insurgents lost Fallujah they captured most of Mosul, a far larger city.
Much of Sunni Iraq remained under their sway.

At the handover of power the number of foreign fighters in the insurgency
was estimated in the "low hundreds". That figure has been revised up to at
least 1,000 and the overall figure for the number of insurgents is put at
16,000.

The election may have been won by the Shia and Kurds but it was boycotted by
the five million Sunnis and they are the core of the rebellion. It took
three months to put together a new government as Sunni, Shia, Kurds and
Americans competed for their share of the cake. For all their declarations
about Iraqi security, the US wanted to retain as much power in its own hands
as it could. When the Shia took over the interior ministry its intelligence
files were hastily transferred to the US headquarters in the Green Zone.

To most ordinary Iraqis in Baghdad it is evident that life over the past
year has been getting worse. The insurgents seem to have an endless supply
of suicide bombers whose attacks ensure a permanent sense of threat. In
addition the necessities of life are becoming more difficult to obtain. At
one moment last winter there were queues of cars outside petrol stations
several miles long.

The sense of fear in Baghdad is difficult to convey. Petrol is such a
necessity because people need to pick up their children from school because
they are terrified of them being kidnapped. Parents mob the doors of schools
and swiftly become hysterical if they cannot find their children. Doctors
are fleeing the country because so many have been held for ransom, some
tortured and killed because their families could not raise the money.

Homes in Baghdad are currently getting between six and eight hours'
electricity a day. Nothing has improved at the power stations since the
hand-over of security a year ago. In a city where the temperature yesterday
was 40C, people swelter without air conditioning because the omnipresent
small generators do not produce enough current to keep them going. In recent
weeks there has also been a chronic shortage of water.

Some Iraqis have benefited. Civil servants and teachers are better paid,
though prices are higher. But Iraqis in general hoped that their standard of
living would improve dramatically after the fall of Saddam Hussein and it
has not.

Adding to the sense of fear in Baghdad is the growth of sectarianism, the
widening gulf between Sunni and Shia. Shia mosques come under attack from
bombers. Members of both communities are found murdered beside the road, in
escalating rounds of tit-for-tat killings.

The talks between US officials and some resistance groups revealed in the
past few days probably does not mean very much for the moment. The fanatical
Islamic and militant former Baathists and nationalists who make up the
cutting edge of insurgency are not in the mood to compromise. They are also
very fragmented. But the talks may indicate a growing sense among US
military and civilian officials that they cannot win this war.

Patrick Cockburn was awarded the 2005 Martha Gellhorn prize for war
reporting in recognition of his writing on Iraq over the past year

Then and now

Average daily attacks by insurgents

Pre-war March 2003: 0

Handover June 2004: 45

Now: 70

Analysis:

Figures should be viewed with caution because US military often does not
record attacks if there are no American casualties.

Total number of coalition troops killed

Pre-war March 2003: 0

Handover June 2004: 982

Now: 1,930

Analysis:

Number of US troops killed increased sharply during Fallujah fighting in
April and November 2004.

Iraqi civilians killed

Pre-war March 2003: n/a

Handover June 2004: 10,000

Now: 60,800 (includes 23,000 crime-related deaths)

Analysis:

Estimates of Iraqi civilian deaths have varied widely because the US
military does not count them.

Electricity supply (megawatts generated)

Pre-war March 2003: 3,958



Handover June 2004: 4,293

Now: 4,035

Analysis:

Coalition is way behind its goal of providing 6,000 megawatts by July 2004.
Most Iraqis do not have a reliable electricity supply.

Unemployed

Pre-war March 2003: n/a

Handover June 2004: 40%

Now: 40%

Analysis:

More than a third of young people are unemployed, a cause for social unrest.
Many security men stay home, except on payday.

Telephones

Pre-war March 2003: 833,000 (landlines only)

Handover June 2004: 1.2m (includes mobiles)

Now: 3.1m

Analysis:

Landlines are extremely unreliable and mobile phone system could be
improved.

Primary school access

Pre-war March 2003: 3.6m

Handover June 2004: 4.3m

Now: n/a

Analysis:

83 per cent of boys and 79 per cent of girls in primary schools. But figures
mask declining literacy and failure rate.

Oil production (barrels a day)

Pre-war March 2003: 2.5m

Handover June 2004: 2.29m

Now: 2.20m

Analysis:

Sustainability of Iraqi oilfields has been jeopardised to boost output. Oil
facilities regularly targeted by insurgents.