Dear ACORNers,

Generalizability .... It is one thing to make reasonable or useful
statements by doing aesthetic research.

It is another to use the word "generalizable" in the sense that we
might use it in other kinds of research. There are several meanings
to the term general. Let's use  one of the main desk dictionaries for
university presses and scholarly publishing to explore the term.
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (1990: 510) defines to
generalize as to "1: to give a general form to, 2 a: to derive or
induce (a general conception or principle) from particulars, b: to
draw a general conclusion from, 3: to give general applicability to
<generalize a law>".

It is clear that we can use the different senses of this word in very
different ways. To speak of drawing general conclusions from a work
of art or music involves questions of taste or culture that make it
difficult to use the word in the same sense that we might to draw
general conclusions from the analysis of a social structure or a
ceremony. (Some also question the kinds of general statements we can
make in these kinds of cases.)

Beethoven's symphonies are not simply unique with the virtues and
their flaws. The FORM of the symphony is embedded in a cultural
context that makes it difficult to draw general conclusions. An ideal
symphony is ideal only by definition in the same way that the the
definition of a triangle establishes the nature of an ideal triangle.

This is why so many assertions about issues of all kinds by art
critics are flawed. The problem is that a chain of deductive or
inductive reasoning based on the supposedly general character of
initial premises may be logically reasonable while failing because of
invalid premises.

Imagine, for example, that I state, "Beethoven's [x] Symphony means
[2 + 2]." Then I may reasonably say that  "Beethoven's [x] Symphony
means [4]." The problem is not the logical validity of the
conclusion, but the empirical validity of the premise.

This is a crude cartoon argument, but it is not much cruder than many
of the cultural and historical claims I have heard art critics make
based on their interpretation of individual works. Even a deep,
serious critic such as Clement Greenberg, with his deep learning and
broad sensibilities in everything OTHER than visual art, has an
occasional tendency to unwarranted general conclusions that are
unwarranted in empirical terms. Just read the essays in his critical
masterpiece, Art and Culture, for examples of this tendency.
Greenberg's (1965: 129-132) essay on primitive art is filled with
interesting, even illuminating ideas on primitive painting that may
not hold up as generalizable statements. This doesn't make Greenberg
less interesting or illuminating, but it does limit the ways in which
we may use his claims.

Another crude cartoon can be derived from some of the poorly managed
hermeneutical inquiries that assign meanings based on interpretive
inquiry to then use those meanings as the basis of truth claims.
These kinds of research assign values draw conclusions based on the
assigned values. Let's say that an automobile means 5, a pencil 2,
and a chicken 7. Even if it were true that a significant number of
people believed this to be so or ascribed these values to
automobiles, pencils, and chickens, it would not follow that we could
add a pencil to an automobile and cook the result for dinner.

The symphony that may seem "ideal" as a defined form is also "real"
in the sense that it is a specific cultural construction. It is a
specific cultural form arising from and embedded in a culture or
group of cultures. The symphony as an ideal form is bounded by time
-- there were no symphonies before a certain era, and the form began
to vanish as a general musical mode at another time. One can make
enough similar statements to demonstrate that the ideal symphony is
ideal only by definition, and real in terms of its functions and
locations.

Some years ago, I was having dinner with an artist when Michelangelo
came up. He argued that his friend so-and-so was a great artist,
comparing him to Michelangelo as proof of the claim. My answer was
that despite Michelangelo's importance and greatness, I do not like
his work. That is, I do not respond to it with the same feelings and
interest that I have in viewing the work of other artists. To me,
therefore, using Michelangelo as the touchstone and comparative proof
of so-and-so's greatness was somewhat meaningless. The general
conclusion my interlocutor drew from this was that I was an oaf and
an ignorant fellow. Who, after all, can deny the general and
universal greatness of Michelangelo? While recognizing the deep
sensitivity and keen eye of my dinner companion, I pointed out that
one could easily imagine dropping the Pieta into places where it
would have no meaning for the people who might come across it. In
some cultures, in fact, the conventions of looking at and
understanding representations are so different than our own that it
might not be possible for some groups of people to assign any kind of
meaning at all to a work that my dinner companion saw as a product of
universal genius.

We never managed to agree on the general conclusions one might draw
from Michelangelo or the application of these conclusions to a young
artist whose universal greatness lasted only a bit longer than Andy
Warhol's proverbial fifteen minutes. (We did manage to agree that I
am an ignorant fellow, a condition that I strive to remedy by
observation, experience, and learning.)

The challenge we face in understanding organizations is that
understanding what the ideal might be is a difficult proposition. We
can't define the ideal organization.

One of the challenges we face in aesthetics and creativity in
organizational research is figuring out what kinds of statements we
can make about what kinds of issues, and developing ways to
understand, talk about, and learn from what we see, do, and
experience. (Along with figuring out how we can use the imaginary and
the ideal.)

These are a few thoughts early on a Sunday morning as the dawn begins
on Vrengesund. I feel that the thread on generalizability raises
useful issues -- I am not sure that I have useful answers yet. I am
aware that these thoughts diverge a bit from some of the other
comments -- I wanted to reflect on the concept of generalizability
before going further.

Yours,

Ken Friedman



References

Greenberg, Clement. 1965. Art and Culture. Critical Essays. Boston:
Beacon Press.

Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1990. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary. Springfield, Massachusetts.