Johnson's Russia List
#8034
27 January 2004
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A CDI Project
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#10
From: "Vlad Sobell" <[log in to unmask]>
Subject: The origins and future of Putin's "managed democracy"
Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2004

Daiwa Institute of Research Ltd.
23 January 2004
The origins and future of Putin's "managed democracy"
By Vlad Sobell
Daiwa Institute of Research
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·         The ascendancy of pro-Putin United Russia in Russia's
parliamentary elections and President Putin's unassailable position ahead
of the presidential poll in March has been the triumph of his "managed
democracy". This paper acknowledges that Putin's domination has distorted
Russia's political scene, lending credibility to interpretations of
Russia's contemporary development as rising authoritarianism.
  ·         However, the paper argues that the undeniable parallels with
the Soviet regime are apparent rather than real and that they are an
inescapable product of Russia's transition. Putin's dominance is rooted in
Russia's spectacular recent turnaround, rather than in the regime's
authoritarian machinations.
  ·         Furthermore, the "one-dimensional" nature of the managed
democracy is bound to gradually evolve into a standard multi-dimensional
system, as managed democracy is no match for a society which has slipped
out of the clutches of Soviet totalitarianism.
  ·         The emergence of centre-left Rodina and Sergei Glazyev's
presidential candidacy is an example of how this is likely to happen.

Russia's distorted democracy

The dominant view of Russia's evolution under President Vladimir Putin has
been that, following the decade of "creative anarchy" and "real democracy"
under his predecessor, the president has over the last four years put into
place "controlled democracy", where nothing significant can happen without
the Kremlin's approval.

The parliamentary elections in December and the forthcoming presidential
poll in March can be interpreted in the same light, with the overbearing
system taking ever-deeper roots: the president's "pedestal party", United
Russia (UR), has secured firm control over the State Duma, while Putin's
position ahead of the March presidential elections is unassailable: the
president's support comes up to 80%, with the nearest rival managing a
somewhat more modest 3% at best. In fact, the situation has reached new
levels of absurdity, with the Kremlin's "political technologists"
reportedly encouraging more candidates to run to endow the elections with
some credibility.[1]

It is widely believed that Putin will use his dominant position to change
the constitution to permit him to run for another term in 2008, if not make
himself president for life. Thus, many commentators depict the president's
controlled democracy as the final triumph of Russia's long-standing
authoritarian tradition over genuine democracy, with some going as far as
to see it as the first step in the imminent arrival of a new totalitarian
system ­ the Evil Empire Strikes Back!

This characterisation is not without substance, as Putin's controlled
democracy does, indeed, possess numerous and significant Soviet-like
features. Over the last four years, the president has made it exceedingly
clear that, unlike in the Yeltsin period, "not everything goes": his
clampdown on the oligarchs has certainly generated enough fear to convince
all who needed convincing that any major political or business initiatives
will not see the light of day unless it is first cleared with the Kremlin.
While the press seems to be as robust as ever, it cannot be denied that
elements of "self-censorship" have re-emerged. (The Communist regime would
not have been able to function were it not relying on this "voluntary"
fealty). The UR, with its strong saturation by officialdom, does, indeed,
resemble the Communist Party and is reminiscent of the nomenklatura ­ the
brotherhood of "mutually approved" government officials and party
apparatchiks who ran the Communist regime and reaped access to chronically
scarce goods as a reward. Not unlike his Communist predecessor, Putin's
apparatus has, indeed, used its formidable "administrative resources" (such
as preferential access to the media or selective manipulation of technical
rules) to the hilt, with the Council of Europe describing Russia's
parliamentary elections as "free, but certainly not fair". And, finally,
Putin's incredibly high popular support does, indeed, look suspicious. In
any case, it does suggest an unhealthy, totalitarian-style link between the
"leader" and the "masses".

In the face of these phenomena, it would seem inescapable to conclude that
contemporary Russian political scene ­ and Russia's new democracy ­ is,
indeed, abnormal and distorted. President Putin may well claim, as he has
done, that the December parliamentary elections were a triumph for
democracy, but scepticism is in order ­ after all, no dictator worth his
salt would publicly claim to be anything but a democrat. Furthermore,
genuine democracy is supposed to have robust, or at least reasonably
functioning, political parties, with mass membership and structures,
representing the entire political (right-left) spectrum as well as the
major social groups and classes. Democracy is supposed to have credible
competing programmes, derived from mutually exclusive ideologies. Democracy
is not an embodiment of a tribal nexus between a leader and the people, but
a system in which the leader interacts with competing ideologies, interests
and power centres.

Russia's democracy is "one-dimensional"

It cannot be denied that Putin's Russia fails to match this picture. The
country does possess the key institutions of democracy, such as the
parliament, political parties and free media. But these institutions do not
determine outcomes at the system's commanding heights. President Putin has
not emerged "from below", but was appointed by his predecessor and
subsequently democratically rubber-stamped in March 2000 elections. As
noted above, essentially the same procedure is taking place this time around.

Furthermore, Russia's democracy lacks the proper party-political system
supposed to animate it ­ existing parties are either movements dominated by
the personality (such as Yabloko or the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)),
the president's pedestal and regime nomenklatura party (United Russia) or
the progressively decaying relic of the ancien regime ­ the Communist Party
of the Russian Federation (KPRF). The newly established and successful
Motherland (Rodina) headed by Sergei Glazyev and Dmitri Rogozhin, which won
a substantial chunk of the vote from the KPRF, appears to be a similar such
entity, although it could yet mark a significant new departure (more on
Motherland and Glazyev below). The programmes of these movements are not
derived from distinctly divergent analyses of reality deployed in the
service of competing grand visions of the future, but merely constitute
different variations on the same overarching theme.

United Russia is "centrist" not only because it is a vehicle for regime
officials, but also because it embraces all sections of the political
spectrum. It is both liberal and state interventionist, left and right wing
(in its support for the government's liberalising reforms on the one hand
and the strengthening of the state, the promotion of social justice and
clampdown on the oligarchs on the other), as well as being adequately
nationalistic or, rather, patriotic, as befits the activists of a regime
aiming at rebuilding Russia as a great power.

The remaining parties cannot help but act as mere satellites to this
all-embracing structure and reform ideology ­ their leaders may well have
radically different personal histories and Weltanshauung, but their
parties' recipes for action cannot radically depart from the centrist
consensus as embodied in the UR. (The reasons for this trap are analysed
below).

Given this "one dimensional" (or satellite) character of Russia's political
system, it should come as no surprise that contemporary Russia is
persistently misrepresented as a neo-Soviet structure. Unlike the Soviet
system, Putin's Russia has all the trappings of genuine democracy and
appears to be "multi-dimensional"; but very much like the Soviet system,
these trappings seem to be just that ­ not much more than ineffectual
democratic ornaments.

On the face of it, this would seem a very depressing conclusion: having
ditched communism and enjoyed a brief spell of real democracy and freedom
in the 1990's under President Yeltsin, Russia is reverting to its tradition
of autocracy and totalitarianism.

Distortion is the product of post-Soviet transition, not Putin's machinations

Fortunately, it is possible to provide a radically different, more hopeful
and more credible interpretation. We can accept that Putin's Russia is
one-dimensional and that its democracy is distorted, but there is no need
to identify the causes of this distortion in evil designs of a presidential
dictator. On the contrary, the distortion flows from decidedly positive
circumstances ­ the collapse of totalitarianism a decade and a half ago and
the resounding success of Russia's market economy and democracy.
Furthermore, there is no reason why these distortions should not be
expected to gradually wither away. This conclusion is based on facts, which
appear as blindingly obvious once an analyst is prepared to look at them.

In his well-balanced and sober appraisal of UR's dominance at the
elections, the leading US-based analyst Leon Aron, under a heading of "It's
the Economy, Stupid!" notes that: "Virtually absent from the election
commentary is the single largest explanatory variable: the economy".[2]
Aron then proceeds to recount the evidence of spectacular upturn during
Putin's tenure, which, in his words "has lifted enough boats to secure
election or re-election of any party or president associated with it".

In the context of this paper, Aron's point can be taken significantly
further. Apart from "It's the Economy, Stupid!" we should really be saying
"It's Russia's Arrival for the First Time Ever, Stupid!"

After periods of relative prosperity in the early part of the 20th century,
Russia plunged into forced Communist-driven modernisation. While this
turned it into an industrialised country, the effort never translated into
actual adequate welfare for the populace, despite requiring untold
sacrifice, including the widespread use of slave labour. The edifice that
emerged was structurally misconceived, generating chronic shortages of
everything and finally biting the dust in 1992 in the face of imminent
starvation. (Sending rockets to the Moon and having stockpiles of nuclear
missiles may well have been a source of pride, but that could be no
substitute for decent consumer goods and reliable supplies of food).

On the heels of this disaster followed the decade of brutal, kleptocratic
capitalism, which, while starting to deliver consumer goods for the first
time in generations, was also associated with massive socio-economic
upheavals and dislocation, as the ancien regime disintegrated. The
stabilisation programme launched in 1992 generated rampant inflation, as
prices were freed for the first time in decades. The preservation of the
new regime dictated that the fruit of the labour of generations of Soviet
citizens be captured by a relatively narrow coterie of lucky and/or
sufficiently unscrupulous individuals, which subsequently became known as
the oligarchs. (Swift privatisation was the only realistic way to
politically and economically buttress the new market economy and generate
political support for the regime). All along the way, the promised benefits
seemed elusive. Early signs of economic growth and macroeconomic stability
were extinguished in August 1998, as Russia finally succumbed to the global
emerging markets' crisis and historically low prices of oil.

Seemingly miraculously, Putin's presidential term has coincided with the
first ever reversal of Russia's economic fortune. Russia's economic growth
has exceeded expectations, with its macroeconomic environment and critical
risk ratios staging a spectacular improvement. For the first time in modern
history Russia is firmly placed on the path of sustainable economic
regeneration.

While President Putin cannot be credited with the post-1998 reversal ­
recovery simply became inevitable after a decade of decline and massive
structural change, devaluation and the strengthening prices of oil ­ he has
certainly avoided moves that might have extinguished it. He has achieved
this by soliciting advice from wide-ranging quarters, establishing policy
consensus, pragmatism and avoidance of potentially destabilising personnel
changes. Putin may well have offended the purists and Western ambassadors
by opting for his "controlled democracy" in preference to the exuberance of
the Yeltsin period, but ordinary citizens see this as inescapable
consequence of a necessary clampdown on the rampant power of the oligarchs.
For them it is an issue of elementary justice, rather than an attack on
their civil liberties. And whatever his critics may say, Putin controlled
democracy ­ an expression of his cautious and deliberate approach ­ has
delivered reassuring political stability after a decade of severe upheavals.

In an uncanny way, the youthful, and by all accounts very capable,
president also seems to impersonate this dramatic change in Russia's
identity, having come after generations of ageing and/or physically ailing
leaders (with the obvious exception of the last Soviet president, Mikhail
Gorbachev).

Since these considerations comfortably explain Putin's extraordinary
popularity, there is no need to seek its causes in the machinations of a
"totalitarian regime" or immaturity of the Russian electorate. The
distortion of the political scene caused by the overarching Putin's figure
is the consequence of positive, not negative factors.

The origins of the one-dimensional party-political structure should also be
sought in Russia's point of departure (following the last breath of Soviet
totalitarianism in 1991) and the immediate post-Soviet period. Even a
cursory look reveals that Russia could not have had a well-balanced
(left-right) political spectrum, simply because its dominant political
issues have flowed from its process of transition and not from a stable
class structure normally associated with the left-right spectrum.
Logically, Russia in transition simply could not already have had the
things to which it was transferring. Time cannot be compressed and miracles
do not normally happen.

In terms of standard theory, the left-right spectrum is ultimately the
reflection of the underlying social structure ­ briefly, the existence in
most countries of prosperous middle (and professional) class on the one
hand and the less prosperous unionised working class on the other.[3] But
Russia's post-Soviet society was not, and could not have been, organised in
this way. Instead of issues arising from the class structure, the dominant
issue was the management of the transition from a discredited and decayed
communist system to a market economy and democracy. The dominant division
was between the forces pushing for change and those opposing change ­ the
reaction. This division cut across all layers of the Soviet society (which
was, in any case, comparatively homogeneous), dividing it into the
supporters of change and those fearing it. Any attempt to interpret this
essentially unique revolutionary situation through the prism of the
standard left-right spectrum would be futile.

Much of the transitional period of the 1990s was spent in a tug-of-war
between the reaction, most directly embodied in the KPRF, and the reform
regime of President Yeltsin, whose pool of talent was drawn from the ranks
of youngish figures associated with the so called "liberal" parties, such
as Yabloko and, currently, the Union of Right Forces (SPS). The major
milestones were the 1996 presidential elections, when Yeltsin managed to
avert a looming Communist victory following a late-minute deal with the
oligarchs (chiefly Boris Berezovsky), who supplied the financial means
needed to see off the formidable KPRF machine. Another was the denouement
of the August 1998 financial crisis, after which the KPRF was revealed as
having no credible economic policies, leaving the pursuit of market reforms
as the only option. This culminated in the arrival of President Putin,
initially as Prime Minister in August 1999 and eventually as Acting
President as of 1st January 2000. (Those suspicious of Putin's alleged
reactionary instincts should, instead, marvel at the historic irony, when
the victory of a liberal-democratic programme came to be consolidated by a
former KGB officer).

Despite this terminal blow to the reaction, the last four years should
still be considered as transitional, with the conditions for the emergence
of the left-right spectrum still remaining elusive and the reform-reaction
spectrum losing its shine only slowly. This has been a period of
consolidation of the new order and its fragile stability and the delivery
of its first tangible goods ­ the spectacular economic turnaround noted above.

Russia's political system under Putin, therefore, could not help but remain
one-dimensional. As with his popularity, it is obvious that this is not the
result of Putin's devilish machinations to destroy democracy, but an
inevitable outcome of recent changes in Russia. Once again, this feature is
due to positive, rather than negative factors ­ the final victory of the
forces of change and a growing consensus on what needs to be done in the
years ahead.

Is the system growing multi-dimensional?

Nevertheless, while applauding this successful turn, it cannot be denied
that the model of standard market economy and democracy, to which Russia
has been moving, must entail the evolution of the right-left spectrum and
party-political system reflecting it. The one-dimensional "centrist" system
with Putin as its personal embodiment must gradually dissolve into a more
diverse entity, both in terms of ideology and organisational structure.
Have there been signs of this happening?

Those willing to take notice can be reassured. Apart from the anticipated
triumph of the RU, the December parliamentary elections were memorable for
the defeat of the long-standing liberal parties (Yabloko and SPS), whose
presence in the Duma collapsed, as well as the KPRF (whose share of the
vote fell to 12.6% and whose parliamentary presence was reduced from 113 to
52 seats). The KPRF's traditional protest vote was severely eroded chiefly
by the newly formed Rodina, led (as noted) by the economist Sergei Glazyev
and foreign affairs expert Dmitri Rogozhin. The latter won 9% of the vote
and 37 Duma seats, making it the third largest group in the parliament.

Most commentary has sounded alarm over these shifts, interpreting them as a
setback for democracy in the face of alleged "leftist nationalism" of
Rodina (the impression of resurgent nationalism was also generated by the
relative success of the Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a
specialist in outlandish populist/nationalist stunts). Since Rodina's
launch in the summer had reportedly been sanctioned, if not initiated, by
the Kremlin (as a ploy to weaken the KPRF), the headline story has been
that, while engineering the ascendancy of the "new nomenklatura" in the
shape of RU, the regime would stoop as low as to create a
leftist-nationalist satellite to help it finish off the KPRF. (Some
political rivals of Rodina have even described it as "national-socialists",
a label associating it with the German Nazi Party).

However, a below-the-headline look at Rodina and its leaders, in particular
Glazyev, points to a somewhat different story. As is usual in Russia,
Glazyev cannot be easily characterised in terms of the standard categories.
Relatively young (now 42), he participated in the first reformist
government in 1992. In 1993 he left the government and spent much of his
time within the KPRF/patriotic orbit. However, he never felt comfortable
with this essentially reactionary camp. In the words of a leading Western
analyst he was "in but not of the KPRF", while he could also be presented
as a holder of liberal and traditional Christian values.[4] Given this
background, it is not surprising that Glazyev has jumped at the opportunity
to abandon the Communists and co-lead Rodina.

Buoyed by Rodina's success, Glazyev has moved on to position himself as a
candidate in the presidential poll, independently of his party (this was
due to his disagreement with Rogozhin, who argued that Glazyev's candidacy
would anger the Kremlin, thus causing it to clampdown on their
newly-established party). Being a credible and popular figure, it has been
speculated that he could win as much as 20% of the vote, seriously denting
the one-dimensional shape of the system.

The reason why Glazyev seems to be a real "out of the system" challenger is
that, apart from his evident ambition and refusal to play by the Kremlin
script, he also has a credible, genuinely alternative programme. He argues
that Putin's government has been drifting along the "status quo", failing
to speed up structural changes, needed to free the Russian economy from its
current excessive dependence on the energy and raw materials sector.

Not only is this a justifiable and constructive attack on the regime (as
indeed, the Russian "economic miracle" will not be properly tested until
the prices of oil turn weak), Glazyev is, moreover, delivering it from a
very appealing left-leaning and anti-oligarch platform. Far from being an
oligarch-basher, Putin, in Glazyev's view, has been too soft on the
oligarchs, failing to extract appropriate revenue from Russia's energy and
raw-materials sector. Glazyev is not calling for more persecution and
arrests, but for a systematic increase of taxation of what he calls the
sector's "rent", directed especially at the "super-profits" generated by
the windfall of strong global energy prices and the rising value of oil
companies' assets. The increased flows to the state budget would be
channelled to neglected sectors such as social security, health, education
and research and development. Glazyev correctly maintains that a robust and
healthy market economy cannot function unless it is accompanied by a strong
dose of social justice, with the state taking responsibility for social
security.

In short, Glazyev has come up with a credible, distinctly social-democratic
alternative to President Putin. It is notable for its emphasis on the
management of Russia's recent success and more rational and equitable
distribution of its fruits, rather than on the protest at the transition to
a market economy. It is, therefore, a thoroughly post-transition political
programme. Furthermore, the focus of Glazyev's programme ­ the economic and
political management of the energy sector ­ cuts right into the heart of
Russia's complex political economy.

Intriguingly, there is some evidence that, far from exploiting primitive
nationalism, Rodina seems to be appealing to the educated and professional
sections of the electorate, as well as the rising business class. The party
performed particularly well in Moscow and St Petersburg, the traditional
bastions of the reform-liberal parties. While some analysts have ascribed
this to the appeal of Rogozhin's "nationalism", others have noted that
Rodina's social-democratic message has found some resonance among Russia's
emerging middle-class.[5]

On the face of it, this would seem very odd, while undermining the above
claim that Rodina/Glazyev programme is essentially social democratic.
Surely the successful and prosperous social strata would be expected to
support the liberal/reformist parties. However, this phenomenon need not
necessarily be as puzzling as it appears, as several factors can explain
it. First, the liberal parties suffered from a catastrophic failure to
present a unified programme and coalesce into single organisation (they are
now taking appropriate lessons from their failure). Secondly, their key
ideas have now become a part of the post-transition consensus, being
embraced by the RU as well as Rodina (with different emphasis). Finally,
the politics of post-industrial societies can no longer be analysed in
simplistic class-based terms; a serious social-democratic programme need
not necessarily be unappealing to the emerging middle class, especially in
the absence of a credible centre-right alternative.

Conclusions: Glazyev and his likes should be the ones to watch

Having analysed the "one-dimensional" nature of Russia's political system
under Putin and its prospects of becoming "multi-dimensional", this note
does not necessarily claim that Glazyev/Rodina is the agent to perform the
trick. The claim is, rather, that Glazyev/Rodina has the potential to do
so. Other groups and figures, most likely from a reconstructed centre-right
are bound to emerge in due course. The key point is that even if we accept
that Putin is running a "controlled democracy", with the Kremlin
orchestrating the creation of Rodina and other political developments,
events will ultimately slip out of control. Glazyev has already provided
sufficient ammunition to prove this point. The opposing notion ­ that
having overcome Soviet totalitarianism, the Russian political culture is
unable to slip out of the "controlled democracy" ­ is simply implausible.

[1] Long-standing familiar faces on the Russian political scene ­ the
Communist leader Gennadi Zyuganov, Yabloko leader Grigori Yavlinsky and the
Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky ­ have apparently
opted to "boycott" the elections, passing their candidatures to lesser
known figures.
[2] Leon Aron, "The Duma Election", American Enterprise Institute.
[3] This description is of necessity extremely sketchy and we do recognise
that the structures of modern post-industrial societies can no longer be
described in this simplistic way. Nevertheless, the shorthand used here is
adequate for the specific purposes of the present note.
[4] A Russian observer has made the following characterisation of Glazyev:
"Lengthy association with the Communists has given his rhetoric a
persistent leftist tone, but he can still be presented to voters as a
fairly ambivalent "academic", "clever guy", "economist" ­ or even a
right-winger, given his Orthodox faith and support for traditional values".
[5] As noted, press commentary has characterised Rodina as
"leftist-nationalist". While a careful and objective examination would be
beyond the scope of the present note, this is likely to be yet another
misleading label so frequently applied in the analysis of Russia. Greater
national assertiveness and emphasis on careful husbandry of a country's
natural resources (which may imply justified efforts to ensure that these
assets do not fall under foreign control) does not necessarily add up to
nationalism. As argued in the main text, the most significant strain of
Rodina/Glazyev political philosophy appears to be social democracy.

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