http://magazines.russ.ru/oz/2003/5/


In this issue, we address the subject of Islam. Since 9.11 it has become a
dominant theme at the global level in political and media discourse. The
quality of the discourse, however, is far from being unbiased or profound.
While avoiding a theological perspective, we aimed to collect diverse
viewpoints that would help us better understand the nature of current
political and cultural processes that involve or counter Islam. What is the
nature of the Islamic worldview? Is Islam a real threat to world stability
or a mere figure of political rhetoric? Is there a way for both the Islamic
and Western civilizations to overcome their mutual resentment and learn to
respect opinions of those who think differently? Is there an alternative to
the Western Eurocentrist vision of the world? Could Islam adapt itself to
modernity without sacrificing its basic values? How should Russia’s policy
toward its own Muslim population and the outer Muslim world be shaped?

In the foreword, Vitaly Kurennoi explains the specificity of the issue and
suggests a guide to it. Dealing with the subject turned out to be far more
complicated than expected. Although Russia has a developed Orientalist
tradition, it is mainly focused on the achievements of the Islamic culture,
whereas domestic research of Islam in various fields of social science has
not yet taken shape. Besides, there are some things in Islam that tend to
escape the attention of Western researchers; thus the issue appears not as a
structured picture but rather as a “mosaic.”

Is there anything amiss in today’s Islamic world? Although no one could
agree with defining Islam as a “religion of hatred and hostility,” the fact
cannot be ignored that most of the international terrorist acts have been
committed by Muslims who justified them as a means of defending Islam.
Georgiy Mirsky endeavors to correlate Islamic civilization, Islamic
politics, and terrorism. First of all, according to Mirsky, today’s Muslim
spiritual leaders are to blame. They failed to avert the growth within the
body of their religion of a malignant tumor that is now threatening the
future of the great Islamic civilization.

Yuri Tikhonravov questions whether Islam and modern civilization are
incompatible and to what extent they can influence each other. Although
Islamic doctrine does not contain anything that would impede the formation
of a liberal version of the religion, it is the authoritarian version of it
that prevails. This version of Islam is the cause of existing conflicts.
Tikhonravov deplores the incapability of today’s Islam to fit the new
tendencies of modern religious thinking, including theistic one. He sees the
reason of this incapability “not in the Muslim religion as such but in the
culture of nations professing the religion. ”Tikhonravov suggests the ways
of “painless integration” of Islam into the post-Modern civilization.

Alexander Ignatenko examines the phenomenon of propagation of Islamic
religious and political groups and organizations that began in the second
half of the 20th century. Ignatenko views the phenomenon in a wide cultural
and historical context. He argues that the Eurocentrist approach should be
rejected for the sake of the “neoclassical” analytical method epitomized by
qutub almaqaalat, the classical Islamic doxographies, or articulations of
opinions that have served as foundations of the sectarian split. This is the
only true perspective for adequate understanding of processes going on in
the contemporary Muslim world.

Alexey Malashenko examines the problem of radical Islam that has become so
critical at the turn of the century. Islam generates various radical
movements as “side effects” of interpreting the Quran. Modernism and
fundamentalism are the limits of this variety. Between them lies a large
range of political movements; the extreme tendencies overlap and supplement
each other. The Western world will have to deal with each of them.
Globalization, which on the one hand will stimulate the process of reforming
Islamic ideology, will promote the constant emergence of reactive backward
movements on the other. The radicals, however small in numbers they may be,
are an active and influential force in Muslim society. To deal with them in
terms of fight to the death would be neither not too clever nor too safe.
The earlier the Western alliance finds an acceptable mode of interacting
with Islam, the more human lives it will save.

Russian Minister for Ethnic Policy Vladimir Zorin tells of peculiarities of
Russian Islam in his interview to an OZ correspondent. The mentality of
Russian Muslims who live in a multi-confessional country is different from
that of entirely Muslim countries. The confessional diversity of Russia
generates substantial problems only when the authorities neglect or lack
adequate knowledge of religion. Passing a new law of Church- State relations
is expected to ease the situation.

For the first time in the last decade, accurate sociological polls have been
conducted in Chechnya. Professor of the Higher School of Economics Sergey
Khaikin who performed the study in his interview with Vitaly Kurennoi
asserts that despite the great role Shariat plays in the Chechen society, it
is far from being commonly accepted. Despite all the recent changes,
Chechens remain typical “Soviet” people. Regardless of tradition, they take
independent decisions on many issues. According to polls, the majority of
Chechens think that Chechnya must stay a part of Russia. However, it must
enjoy a wider autonomy compared to other subjects of the Federation. Islamic
principles could play a constructive and consolidating role in the internal
Chechen dialogue.

Mikhail Roshchin tells a story of the spreading of Islamic fundamentalism in
the Northern Caucasus starting in 1980s: from Dagestan to Chechnya and then
back to Dagestan. Roshchin tells details of organizing a raid of Shamil
Basaev’s and Khattab’s troops upon Dagestan in 1999 and their attempt to
reestablish an imam-ruled Islamic state in the region.

The issue of Islamophobia and Muslims’ persecution is becoming an
increasingly noticeable component of the domestic political discourse.
Alexey Krymin and Georgiy Engelgardt assert that even despite the absence of
actual discrimination, the “counter-Islamophobic” campaign is used as an
effective political technology of advancing the interests of Muslim
communities and their leaders in Russia. It helps them to consolidate and
gain prestige of Islamic organizations in non-Islamic political and social
realms. Russian muftis, who professionally use modern social technologies,
are highly competitive compared to state machinery, and are very much aware
of that. Quite naturally, they strive to increase their political weight and
their influence at both regional and federal levels. Another article by
Mikhail Roshchin traces the development in Dagestan of one of the moderate
Sufi Islam versions. Roshchin views this Islamic branch as a healthy
alternative both to the official “state” Islam and radical Islamic
fundamentalism. Much of the data found in both Roshchin’s primary-source
articles are important documents collected by the author in his interviews
with characters of his stories.

Nikolai Mitrokhin postulates that friendly relations between the Russian
Orthodox Church and Russian Muslims are an incontestable fact. However,
things do not go as smoothly as clergy on both sides assert. Mitrokhin
analyzes the current situation in various regions of the Russian Federation
and in neighboring countries and aims to draw a more complicated and
realistic picture.

In his interview with OZ, chairman of the Council of Russian muftis, Mufti
Sheikh Ravil Gainutdin explains the Russian Islam standpoint on vital
social, cultural, and political issues. The Islamic revival has been a part
of the general religious resurgence in the former Soviet republics. Russian
Muslims today want to build a new relationship with the state based not on
involvement of Islam in politics but on social partnership. Gainutdin warns
against the anti-Muslim bias of some officials: Islam does not uphold but
rather opposes terrorism. He speaks of modernization of Islam, establishing
Shariat in the Northern Caucasus, relations with the Russian Orthodox
Church, Russia’s prospective joining OIC, and other vital issues.

Svetlana Chervonnaya reviews the history of Russian pan-Turkism that emerged
in 1880s as a liberal cultural movement of Tatar intelligentsia and to a
great extent due to the social and scientific work of the prominent Crimean
Tatar enlightener Ismail Gasprinsky. Chervonnaya concludes that pan-Turkist
ideology may become a cornerstone of a new Russian State organization. It
could be of indispensable use for the Russian people, democratic movements,
and progressive forces of other nations. This could only be possible if
pan-Turkism became an open, tolerant, and humanistic system oriented to the
values of international peace and based on the foundation of liberal Turkism
laid by its originator.

Yaroslava Zabello, Igor Alexeev, Sergey Pereslegin, and Alexander Sobyanin
argue for Eurasian politics as the only political ideology suitable for
economic and political integration of the post-Soviet country. (The
ideology, however, remains merely a product of cultural propaganda that
suggests convergence of Russians and Muslims.) The authors list particular
political and economic steps that should be taken to aid Russia’s “third
advancement into Central Asia.”

Sergey Lunev examines the problem of Russia’s relationship with the Muslim
world in general, and above all, with the former Muslim Soviet republics.
What Russia should be guided by in the new geopolitical situation? Lunev
supposes that Russia must not play by the rules of the “developed countries”
that pursue their selfish interests. Contrariwise, it is rather important
for Russia to normalize its relationships with the Muslim world while
strongly resisting Muslim extremism and radicalism inside Russia and around
its borders.

Pyotr Kusliy juxtaposes existing knowledge of the Medieval Shiah (Shiite)
Assassins movement whose members were the first to use terror as a massive
and routine political practice with actual activities of their successors
Ismailites headed by Aga Khan IV, leader of one of the largest charitable
institutions.

Diplomat Veniamin Popov explains motives of Russia’s intention to join the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) proposed by Vladimir Putin.
Popov argues that in today’s multifaceted world where extremists of all
sorts strive to draw Russia into the so-called clash of the civilizations,
it becomes one of Russia’s priorities to confront the polarization of the
world on the grounds of religion. Russia is a great Eurasian power that is
experienced in maintaining dialogue with different ethnic and confessional
entities and can indeed play a historical role in this respect.

Elena Suponina weighs perspectives of Russia’s joining the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC) proposed by President Vladimir Putin. According
to Suponina, OIC has long become a hollow institution. Interests of Russian
Muslims could be represented by a special organization. Joining the forum
will neither help protect Christian minorities living the Muslim countries
nor attract investments from rich Arab nations. Muslim countries give a
priority to building relationships with the Americans, even if they feel a
lack of affinity, so Putins’s pledge is merely a pre-election move.

Alexey Malashenko points at the two opposing versions of Islam in Russia.
The Tatar version that is spread throughout the Russian territory save for
North Caucasus is relatively apolitical. The North-Caucasian version is
politicized; it became a tool in both reaching internal regional goals and
confronting the Federal authorities.

Vladimir Volkov argues that Islamic radicalism is not a religious but rather
a political movement: it aims not to reform religion itself but to change
the role of religion in society while confronting dominant social, cultural,
and political norms. Volkov asserts that the Islamic revival in the former
Soviet Union has been a part of a larger religious boom that resulted from
the country’s collapse.

Alex Alexiev aims to demonstrate that the spiritual and proselytizing
organization of Tablighi Jamaat (Teaching Societies) have long been used as
a cover for training of terrorists.

Igor Dobaev of Rostov State University states that in the Northern Caucuses
Islam is used as ideological and organizational tool to promote absolutely
non-Islamic forces, namely separatist, nationalist, and criminal structures.
Dobaev lists measures that he thinks are necessary to take to block the
spread of Islamic extremism and terrorism in the region.

We present a synopsis of Graham E. Fuller’s The Future of Political Islam.
Fuller examines the phenomenon of political Islam and main tendencies of its
development. Islamism is a religious, cultural, and political setting of
politically engaged Muslims. It is the most dynamic political force in the
contemporary Islamic world. Muslim elites with their Western education do
not have any significant influence on people. Today Islamic movements are
the main actors of executing reforming programs. They participate in
building the civil society in their countries, and they do it more actively
than other parties.

We present excerpts from Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam: A
Reader edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof.

In the fragment from Islam and the Fundamentals of Authority by Ali Abd
al-Raziq, the author argues that no form of government including Caliphate
follows from the basic principles of Islam and is commanded by Prophet
Muhammad. The Prophet founded a new creed, not a new state.

Another fragment is from the article by Sayyid Qutb, one of spiritual
leaders of the modern radical Islam. Along with other Islamic notions, Qutb
sets forth his interpretation of jihad and its necessity.

In the fragment from Khumeini [Khomeini] Speaks Revolution, Imam Ruhullah
Khomeini explains the nature and properties of the Islamic state. It is
neither a dictatorial nor a parliamentary or presidential form of government
since the state imposes upon other people not rules made by men but the Will
of Allah. Khomeini names the qualifications of the Islamic head of state.

To really appreciate the spirit and nature of the Islamic ideology, one has
to understand that Islam is not a “jumble of unrelated ideas and incoherent
modes of conduct” but a coherent system where all the major canons and rules
of conduct are all logically derived from its basic principles. We introduce
a fragment from Political Theory of Islam by Sayyid [Sayed] Abul A’la
Maududi.

Sharif and Rustam Shukurov assume that creativity understood as a perpetual
readiness to transform itself and the outer world, as transcending itself is
a basic feature of true Islam. Russia lacks such brilliant centers of
Islamic cultures as Bukhara, Samarkand, Isphakhan, Damask, Baghdad, Cairo,
or Cordova. The country never possessed multi-confessional urban space that
is essential for the birth and maturing of authentic Islam. Central regions
of Russia and Northern Caucasus that adopted basics of Islamic faith
throughout the medieval period did not have enough time to build an
independent urban culture that could be compared with that of the cities of
the Near East, Middle Asia, Iran, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and even
Indonesia and Malaysia. The Russian “steppe” version of Islam is far from
being perfect. Both Russia and Russian Islam could recover only if they
included themselves into the Mediterranean universe that presents a sort of
cultural and geographic unity that is branded by the authors as an
“Alexandrian space” (ad memoriam Alexander the Great who amalgamated Europe
and Asia in Hellenism).

Rafael Khakimov argues on the ways of Islam development. He explains a
notion of ijtihad as critical thinking as a necessary condition of
contemporary interpretation of Quran. In ijtihad, a man upholding truth is
worth a community, according to Tatar theologian of 19th century Gabdennasyr
Kursavi. Speaking of distortions in interpreting khadiths, Khakimov argues
that some of harsh Quran commandments were historically determined. Whereas
jihad by the sword was understandable in the Middle Ages when Islam had to
defend itself against adversaries, in the times of arms of mass destruction
Muslims must turn to superior form of jihad – one by preaching Quran.
Russian Islamic sub-civilization is not an inferior part of the global
Muslim community. It rather forms a successful European model of Islam that
can survive in its unique historical situation and maintain peace with other
cultures. Khakimov warns against islamophobia that became popular after 9/11
that is capable of splitting the world. He argues for new values that should
be neither purely liberal nor traditionally Islamic.

In the introduction to Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Respond,
Derek Hopwood gives a brief definition of modernity as a phenomenon of
European consciousness that manifests itself in constant search for
innovation. Hopwood describes intricate ways by which the culture of social
modernization makes its way into the Muslim Orient.

Sayyid Ahmad Khan who represents the modernist Islamic school opposes those
who fear competition of ideas and seek to limit freedom of opinion
validating it by the so-called “judgment of majority” or “common good.”

Andrey Zhuravlev analyzes traits of the functioning of Islamic banks.
Understandably, economics, just as physics, cannot be Muslim, Christian,
Judaic, or Buddhist. The author understands the term “Islamic economy” as a
standard economic system that differs from any other in only one way: it
must follow a religious commandment to use moral principles as a necessary
premise of the system stability. In practice it includes the use of
principles of financial management prescribed by the Shariat.

Liubov Goryaeva gives a brief outlook of Muslim education in today’s Russia.
The essay is prefaced by a reference on the system of Muslim education in
Russian empire and its reforming (the history of the so-called “new-method”
schools).

Russian authorities and domestic Islam have to find a way of sound
interaction, Leonid Siukiyainen states. Islamic political and legal teaching
should aid not extremists but democratic society. It should help society and
state consolidate. This, however, cannot be achieved without government’s
consistent effort to cooperate both with domestic Muslims and Muslim
nations. This is the only chance to dismantle those who use Islamic
conceptions against true values of Islam.

Vladimir Bobrovnikov overviews the history of Shariat courts in the Northern
Caucasus. First used by the Bolsheviks for diverse political purposes, they
were then outlawed for more than 50 years. Since the1990s, Shariat courts
have been brought back into the regional life. Bobrovnikov discerns between
true Shariat courts that, although unrecognized by the federal authorities,
help to prevent crime in some localities, and pseudo-Shariat establishments.
The latter are branded by terrorists and strikingly resemble the infamous
early Soviet tribunals.

Sergey Abashin opposes the argument of legalization of some norms of Shariat
in Russia and other countries with Muslim population. Abashin asserts that
this could become a source of numerous conflicts and lawsuits. Ultimately,
the legalization could drastically change the entire family life and
restructure many institutions in Middle Asian society.

Alexander Ignatenko suggests a metaphor of Mirror that draws us near
understanding the mystery of the central divergence between the Oriental and
the Western civilizations. Malashenko calls the former fundamentally
concrete and imaginative whereas the latter is based on an abstract verbal
discourse. Madjnun and Don Quixote are both out-of-world characters that are
archetypal for their civilizations.

Art critic Faina Balakhovskaya reviews “Islamic Project” by the Russian
pop-art group called AES. In a series of collages, the project authors
“embellished” famous architectural sights of the West with details of
Islamic architecture such as minarets and domes. By filling photographs of
central Western squares with Oriental bazaar crowd, caravans, and armed
mojaheddins, AES destroys the individualistic sterility of traditional
tourist scenes. The authors had come up with their “Orientalist” vision of
the West in 1996 but it was not much exhibited until 9/11. Now it is a
staple of numerous presentations.

Andrey Ashkerov in a biographical essay about eminent Palestinian-American
scholar Edward Said forewords the fragment from Said’s Orientalism that we
publish. According to Ashkerov, Said’s main achievement is explaining
Orientalism as a complex discourse of the Western ambition to exercise power
over Orient. This orthodoxy not only supports power but also is itself a
form of power. Any particular cluster of ideas – the Orientalist idea of
Orient in this case – is a historical phenomenon, which Said demonstrates.

We present an excerpt from Orientalism by the distinguished
Palestinian-American scholar of Middle East and colonialism, activist,
former president of the Modern Language Association, literary, musical, and
cultural critic, musician, professor of English and Comparative Literature
at Columbia University Edward Said who died this year. In this classical
work Said analyzes origins and implications of the dominant Western
comparativist approach to studying Orient and Oriental cultures.

The Bolsheviks must have imagined themselves adherents of a new religion. If
they could abolish the institution of death as a bourgeois prejudice, they
would be a success. In the Archeological book review section, Olga Edelman
critiques Soviet anti-religious literature of 1920-1930s.

In this issue, we start discussing the subject of local government. Is local
government a civil right or a civil responsibility? To what extent are
people living in the Russian Federation ready to advocate their own
interests and participate in solving local problems? What is the right
formula of working local government that will be good for all the vast
federal territory? Simon Kordonsky, Irina Starodubrovskaya, Sergey
Artobolevsky, Evgeny Saburov, Sergey Maiorov, and Vyacheslav Glazychev
discuss the problem.

Common people in Russia usually do not know the difference between the
municipal and federal state government. Now federal authorities apparently
aim to gain prestige by improving the performance of municipal institutions,
on the one hand, and give a momentum to civil activity, on the other. Sergei
Maiorov analyzes the new bill on the system of local self-government.

In the OZ discussion section, Valeriy G.Volkov asserts that presented by
Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov the so-called public version of the
Russian military doctrine is indeed an endeavor in public outreach, and it
should be appreciated merely as an institutional openness precedent.

In the Country of OZ section, Liudmila Sinitsyna describes customs, morals,
and traditions of a small town of Toropets located in the North-West of
Russia. Old symbols and connotations of the town life that used to hold it
intact are now extinct. The population flees. Nevertheless, the author is
full of optimism: Toropets has survived a number of similar transformations.

Folklorist Kirill Maslinsky reconstructs the appearance of the ancient
Russian manor house based on notions of a Russian peasant dwelling on the
house ruins. It appears that the image does not differ much from the picture
drawn by nostalgic art critics and enthusiastic scholars of the Russian
manor: both conceive the manor as a bountiful and ideally ordered cosmos in
a world of chaos.