I attended a meeting on identity cards at the LSE yesterday
( http://www.stand.org.uk/mistakenidentity.php3 ) at which the final speaker was the Assistant Information Commissioner. I hope the following notes do not misrepresent him; in any case, the Information Commissioner is preparing a response to the Home Office consultation document on identity cards.
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It is impossible to judge the ID scheme fairly until full details of its implementation are specified. However, the draft Bill delays this by leaving much to secondary legislation.
The ID scheme will consist not just of cards but a central National Identity Register and a National Identity Registration Number linking the two. There is a risk if an existing identifier is reused for this purpose, such as the National Insurance number, which people seldom protect.
You will be added to the Register when applying for any 'designated document', such as a passport or a driving licence. There is no alternative: if you want a passport, you have to join the 'voluntary' Register.
Much depends on the arrangements for issuing cards / adding people to the Register. What happens if someone impersonating you claims your identity first?
Will the information held on the card be encrypted when transmitted by a reader/scanner? Otherwise there is a risk of unauthorised parties accessing them.
Why is there a need to record previous addresses and addresses other than your current main address?
'Function creep' is a concern for the Information Commissioner. Identity cards were introduced in Britain during the Second World War for three stated purposes. By the time the scheme was abolished, they were being used for 39 administrative functions, including the prevention of bigamy.
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One potential data protection issue which he didn't mention is data sharing between government departments, between government and private agencies, or across borders within EU institutions. As a polemic in The Register magazine put it:
"They are, without, clearly grasping it, proposing the ID Register as the focus around which an ever-increasing number of personal information databases revolve ... By pitching the ID card as 'watertight proof of identity for use in daily transactions and travel' the Home Office is essentially begging for the satellite databases to be produced. So, small piece of government control-freakery possibly under the commissioner's control, potential hordes of escaped privacy monsters enabled by said small database."
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/05/05/complete_idcard_guide/
I think there is scope for constructive criticism from CILIP here without taking an ideological stance on the worth or otherwise of an identity register.
Owen Massey
London
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