Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2003 07:25:43 +0100
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Subject: 17.163 a philosophy of tools?
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Humanist Discussion Group, Vol. 17, No. 163.
Centre for Computing in the Humanities, King's College London
www.kcl.ac.uk/humanities/cch/humanist/
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Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2003 07:13:04 +0100
From: Willard McCarty <[log in to unmask]>
Subject: a philosophy of tools?
In his essay "The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science"
(1961), reprinted in The Essential Tension (1977), Thomas Kuhn argues
that
"a quite highly developed body of theory is ordinarily prerequisite to
fruitful measurement in the physical sciences" (201). To put a complex
argument crudely, theory is needed to tell the researcher where and how
to
look and what sorts of numbers to expect; contrary to the popular
notion,
measurement seldom if ever leads to discovery. In consequence, it may
seem
to follow "that in these sciences theory must always lead experiment and
that the latter has at best a decidely secondary role". But, as he
notes,
"that implication depends upon identifying 'experiment' with
'measurement'", which he disavows and which would seem obviously false.
"It
is only because significant quantitative comparison of theories with
nature
comes at such a late stage in the development of a science," he
continues,
"that theory has seemed to have so decisive a lead." If instead we were
to
focus on "the qualitative experimentation that dominates the earlier
developmental stages of a physical science and continues to play a role
later on, the balance would be quite different. Perhaps, even then, we
would not wish to say that experiment is prior to theory (though
experience
surely is), but we would certainly find vastly more symmetry and
continuity
in the ongoing dialogue between the two" (201).
Thomas K Burch, in "Computer Modelling of Theory: Explanation for the
21st
Century", (in The Explanatory Power of Models, ed. Robert Franck,
Methodos
Series, vol. 1. Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2002), notes that the word
'theory' varies widely in meaning across writers, disciplines and
disciplinary groups (245); so also 'experiment'. So we have to be
cautious
in drawing conclusions for our own field(s) from Kuhn's argument. At the
same time, however, we encounter the broad effects of what Ian Hacking
calls a "theory-dominated" philosophy of science both in the classroom
and
in conversation with our colleagues. So mutatis mutandis: is our
function
(I can imagine being rhetorically asked) not to verify ideas thought by
others about digitally represented cultural artifacts, events &c?
Somehow, it seems to me, we have to get our idea of mind out of its bony
cage right to the cutting edge of the tool, or as Edwin Hutchins says in
Cognition in the Wild (MIT Press, 1995), move the boundary of the unit
of
cognitive analysis out beyond the skin of the individual so that we
might
begin dealing with what he calls "cognitive ecologies" (1995: 287). One
of
the greatest strengths of our practice is that through it we preside,
more
or less made self-aware by it, over the encounter of mind with stubborn
data. In the encounter, as Kuhn suggests, theory does not always come
first. Sometimes we come to it with no theory at all, or nothing worthy
of
being called a coherent idea. Sometimes -- is it not so? -- we find the
ideas there, in that encounter. How?
One thing that would seem to follow from this is the epistemological
importance of the tool. Does not the person who designs and crafts the
investigative instrument play a crucial, intellectual role? Our tools
realize ideas in themselves. How might we begin to undestand the
'philosophy' (if you will) in and of tools? How might we begin to
explain
it to those who cannot read the tool? How might we communicate it?
Comments?
Yours,
WM
Dr Willard McCarty | Senior Lecturer | Centre for Computing in the
Humanities | King's College London | Strand | London WC2R 2LS || +44
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