Dear Rosan,

Thanks for your note.

Let me answer the relatively easy questions first. I will return to
the other issues in another note.

There were more questions in my note to you. Perhaps the first
question did not seem like a question, but it was.

Just before you raised the issue of language slippage and history,
you wrote, "No offence, I have read your work on design theory, and I
am sure it is MY PROBLEM but I regret to say that reading them seldom
clarifies my own thoughts on the issue. Now, don't take this comment
too far please. I can't stand another round of misunderstanding. A
comment is a comment is a comment. Take it lightly please, and no
hard feelings, my friend. (I can see someone smiling)."

I responded by asking you to point directly to the parts you do not
understand. I offered to answer any questions, and to explain
anything that seems unclear.

Technically, that is a request rather than a question. It was a
declarative sentence asking you to point to what is unclear in my
writings on theory.

Let me rephrase this request as a question with the same meaning:

Would you please quote the passages in my writings on theory that
seem unclear to you? Please point to what you question or challenge.
I will be happy to give a fair answer. I will appreciate a precise
reference so that I can find and review the unclear passage in
context.

That was the first question. The second is easy to clarify.

I did not use the word "simple" to qualify the term "history." I used
the phrase "simple histories"

What I wrote about history is this:

"It is easier to raise a large issue in a few short sentences than to
discuss it. If I understand you, you are saying that design theory is
impossible because design involves a process. You seem further to say
that what one can posit is a history of design rather than a theory
of design.

[ . . . ]

"I will argue that there are such things as useful kinds of design
theory. I will demonstrate that these are not simple histories, but
that these theories have features that are understood as theory in
all research fields. I will offer information for those who wish to
read further."

There is no slip in language here, and certainly no Freudian slip.

Let me explain. First, I will locate this specific response in
relation to your own earlier note. Then I will answer in a larger
sense.

In an earlier post on March 10, you seemed to posit something that
you labeled "histories of design."

You wrote, "Designing as a social process (and I imagine as a
cognitive process as well, and terry, please correct me if I am
wrong) is not fixed. It is moving if not evolving. Observing it,
examining it, analyzing it and articulating it freeze it momentarily."

You concluded, "The results strictly speaking, are not theories of
design, but histories of design. Thus the title the impossibility of
design theory by observation. No?"

My answer made two points. First, I took it that you were positing a
history of design as preferable to theory for understanding the
design process. As I read this, you were describing what you
characterized as "histories" in contrast to theories.

In using the phrase " < a > history of design," I distinguished this
from the history of design as a design historian or art historian
would use the term, and I distinguished this from the term history as
an historian or historiographer would use it.

You apparently used the term "histories" in the sense of descriptive
accounts of observations. It was to the collation of such histories
that I referred in stating that you seemed to say that one could
posit < a > history of design rather than a theory of design.

The term was "simple HISTORIES" not "simple history."

It is unlikely that this would insult an historian. I did not refer
to the field of history but to the use of simple descriptive accounts
as a substitute for theory.

This leads me to the second issue. Descriptive accounts are valuable
in the act of research and theory construction. They are the heart of
the case study method. They are central to many kinds of qualitative
research. They form key sources of data and information for many
forms of inquiry. One of the important distinctions between the
tradition that leads from Dilthey to Blumer and beyond is the
willingness to use historical data, both large-scale historical data
and historical data at the individual level. I have no argument
against descriptive accounts. My argument is that one cannot mistake
descriptive accounts for theory. This involves category confusion.
They are different kinds of concepts and they work different ways.

For that matter, one should not confuse simple histories (descriptive
accounts based on observation) with history. While I am not an
historian, I often use simple histories (descriptive accounts) and
history (social and individual history) in my work. Anyone who
engages in both kinds of work realizes the distinctions between these
two genres immediately.

A simple history or a descriptive account functions at a low level of
analysis. It contains a certain amount of information and no more.
The work of the historian takes places on a high, analytical level
when he or she subjects a collection of histories or other kinds of
information to analytical inspection. Once we begin to do the work of
history, we do not accept descriptive accounts as single or complete.
The wok of history requires evaluating sources, placing facts in
context, identifying themes, and locating issues. To undertake the
practice of history, a scholar is inevitably required to understand
and work with theory: histories are no substitute for theory, not
even for an historian.

All historical research involves the selection and critical
examination of courses, description, explanation, classification,
generalization, and other issues. This work rests on - and requires -
a theoretical, methodological, and epistemological perspective that
each historian must develop to practice the art and science of
historical research and writing.

My statement about "simple histories," argues that even a descriptive
account that has been observed, examined, analyzed, and articulated
is not a substitute for theory. There are also important classes of
design theory that inform specific areas of professional design
practice that do not arise from history or observation at all. That
is another issue, but it is relevant to the fact that theory and
observation play different and distinct roles in understanding and
practicing design. This is why observation (even observation with
analysis) is no substitute for theory.

If you wish me to make this clear by giving examples, I'll be happy to do so.

Best regards,

Ken


--

Ken Friedman, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Leadership and Strategic Design
Department of Leadership and Organization
Norwegian School of Management

Visiting Professor
Advanced Research Institute
School of Art and Design
Staffordshire University