Hi everyone,

John Foster previously wrote:

>Before we begin a discussion regarding Iraq-US conflicts it
>would be appropriate to bring in some factual information
>regarding the risks associated with war. Here is a good
>source regarding the current basis of the conflict and who
>is 'ultimately responsible'. In order to apply the
>precautionary principle it is always appropriate to
>investigate 'causes' and then make suitable inferences as to
>causality. The application of the  precautionary principle
>is justified where there are adequate assessments of the
>risk. Risk first has to be 'characterized' prior to a 'risk
>management' plan being implemented.

John, I have to admit I don't understand what you're saying here.
"The application of the precautionary principle is justified where
there are adequate assessments of the risk."  I thought the point of
the precautionary principle was to act as if the worst case scenario
could happen in the *absence* of an adequate assessment of that risk.
Perhaps you could explain your meaning further.

John continues:

>
>In the case of Iraq the risks associated with war (whether
>morally justified or unjustified) have to be addressed. The
>risks are obviously greater for the innocent and the
>environment of Iraq than they are for the US, and the UK.
>

I think reasonable people disagree on this issue that the "risks are
obviously greater for the innocent . . . of Iraq than they are for
the US."  I don't think there's anything at all obvious about that.

Take for example Catholic theologian Michael Novak's recent remarks
on just-war doctrine (available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/novak/novak021003.asp ).  In an
excerpt, Novak argues as follows:

"How does Iraq fit into that picture? From the point of view of
public authorities who must calculate the risks of action or inaction
vis-à-vis the regime of Saddam Hussein, two points are salient.
Saddam Hussein has the means to wreak devastating destruction upon
Paris, London, or Chicago, or any cities of his choosing, if only he
can find clandestine undetectable 'foot soldiers' to deliver small
amounts of the sarin gas, botulins, anthrax, and other lethal
elements to predetermined targets. Secondly, independent terrorist
assault cells have already been highly trained for precisely such
tasks, and have trumpeted far and wide their intentions to carry out
such destruction willingly, with joy. All that is lacking between
these two incendiary elements is a spark of contact.

     "Given Saddam's proven record in the use of such weapons, and
given his recognized contempt for international law, only an
imprudent or even foolhardy statesman could trust that these two
forces will stay apart forever. At any time they could combine, in
secret, to murder tens of thousands of innocent and unsuspecting
citizens.

     "Please note: Were such an attack to come, it would come _without
imminent threat_, without having been signaled by movements of
conventional arms, without advance warning of any kind.

     "Somewhere between 0 and 10, in other words, there already is a
probability of Saddam's deadly weapons falling into al Qaeda's
willing hands. (There are also other branches of the international
terror network). Reasonable observers can disagree about whether that
risk is at 2 or 4 or 8. But this much is clear: Those who judge that
the risk is low, and therefore allow Saddam to remain in power, will
bear a horrific responsibility if they guessed wrong, and acts of
destruction do occur.

    "It is one thing for other observers to calculate these risks; it
is another for duly constituted authorities, responsible for
protecting their people from unprovoked attack.

     "Of course, those who today choose the path of war will bear
responsibility for all the bitter fruits of war to come. The moral
question here, as in so many areas in which prudence must be invoked,
requires the responsible weighing of risks. To settle this moral
question also requires knowledge of information from intelligence
services, which monitor terrorist networks and their activities.

     "In brief, some persons argue today (as I do) that, under the
original Catholic doctrine of _justum bellum_, a limited and
carefully conducted war to bring about a change of regime in Iraq is,
as a last resort, morally obligatory. For public authorities to fail
to conduct such a war would be to put their trust imprudently in the
sanity and good will of Saddam Hussein."

Jim again:
Please note that Novak states the issue in terms of risk:  "Somewhere
between 0 and 10, in other words, there already is a probability of
Saddam's deadly weapons falling into al Qaeda's willing hands.  .  .
. Reasonable observers can disagree about whether that risk is at 2
or 4 or 8. But this much is clear: Those who judge that the risk is
low, and therefore allow Saddam to remain in power, will bear a
horrific responsibility if they guessed wrong, and acts of
destruction do occur."

This to me seems to be an argument whose *logic* is dictated by the
application of the precautionary principle.  I have participated in
discussions about the precautionary principle on this list for
several years now and have listened to many impassioned arguments
*for* the precautionary principle.  I am interested in hearing
peoples' thoughts about the application of the precautionary
principle in *this* case, either on or off the list.  (For what it's
worth, I am involved in doing some writing on the precautionary
principle, and it would be a big help to me if I could hear peoples'
thinking on this issue.)

Furthermore, do people think Novak correct in his broader arguments
about government paternalism?  Novak writes: "This is the context in
which the _ad bellum_ question concerning a limited and careful war
upon Iraq is properly raised today.  The primary duty of public
authorities in well-ordered democracies is to protect the lives and
rights of their people.  .  .  . Moreover, in assessing the many
circumstances that must be weighed in moving toward a decision _ad
bellum_, those public authorities who bear the immediate
responsibility and who are closest to the facts of the case, have
moral priority of place."

Jim:  Novak's reasoning here in this latter passage interests me as
well.  Many on this list have argued previously in the case of
climate change, for example, that we ought to trust climate
scientists, presumably "who are closest to the facts of the case,"
rather than rank amateurs who are not climate scientists (a certain
Danish statistician comes to mind).  I would welcome any thoughts
folks might have on this question of expertise and whom to trust by
virtue of "being closest to the facts of the case."

many thanks in advance.
Jim T.