Dear Barry,
I used an example from economics because the formalizations are
standardized in this discipline more than in sociology. The example
which comes to mind is Axelrod's work. But your email did not sound very
inviting for an extension.
Perhaps, it is a way forward if you point to one of your articles (at
the Internet). Then I can read and see whether I can explain things to
you in your own terms. The article should contain a simulation specified
in the form of computer code and/or equations.
With kind regards,
Loet
> -----Original Message-----
> From: News and discussion about computer simulation in the
> social sciences [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of
> Barry Markovsky
> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2003 5:26 PM
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: Theory and Simulation
>
>
> Loet,
>
> I'm not sure whether it's my ignorance or your word-choices
> and metaphors, but I seem unable to understand key portions
> of your reply. The economics example doesn't help me because
> I don't know enough about that field. I do appreciate you
> taking the time to respond.
>
> Barry
>
> >>> Loet Leydesdorff <[log in to unmask]> 11/23/03 04:38AM >>>
>
>
>
> Dear Barry and colleagues,
>
> {...]
> > I think you've lost me from here on. Maybe it's your distinction
> > between "formal theory" and "substantive theory"
> > -- as though formalizing necessarily eliminates
> "substance"? If that's
> > what you mean, I'd disagree. I've heard it said that formalizing
> > squeezes all of the substance out of a theory. To me, formalization
> > means using a formal language (with clearly-defined terms)
> and formal
> > logic (with rules for deriving new statements), making the
> *substance*
> > of the theory as clear and parsimonious as possible.
> >
>
> The formalization of the substantive theory, in my opinion,
> is still part of the substantive theory. The integration of
> the formal result in the program requires a reflexive turn
> (of 90 degrees) which abstracts from the substantive
> variation explained by the first-order theory. The simulation
> results can be intuited as being directly relevant for the
> substantive system(s) under study, but this substantive
> appreciation can be deconstructed as making a turn back.
>
> Perhaps, a network metaphor is helpful. The first-order
> theories can be considered as processors at the nodes that
> run their own routines. The program provides a network of
> links among them. As the latter produces a result (on the
> basis of a specific representation of the former), the former
> may have to update.
>
> For example, neo-classical economists tend to study
> equilibrating markets. Evolutionary economists are interested
> how markets are upset by innovations (Schumpeter). The
> innovations take place along the time axis (change and
> stabilization), while the markets operate at each moment in
> time (variation and selection). The two theories thus take
> different (nearly incommensurable) perspectives. Proponents
> of these two theories therefore tend to disagree.
>
> In the simulation, we can recombine the formalizations, for
> example, by considering interaction terms between market
> mechanims and technological evolution in terms of
> technological trajectories and regimes. The two competing
> (first-order) theories will try to annex these results as
> relevant explanations because both of them wishes to be the
> one comprehensive theory. However, we are able to recognize
> their perspectives as partial from the algorithmic
> perspective. The two first-order perspectives can be
> considered as attempts to stabilize a geometrical narrative
> about the more complex system under study. In other words, we
> gain a degree of freedom for the explanation in the
> combination of the first-order (node) and the second-order
> (link) perspective.
>
> The two perspectives do not have to be recombined because
> both are legitimate programmes in themselves. The
> recombination, however, may require the development of
> another discourse for the translation (at 45 degrees between
> them). This discourse then serves the stabilization of the
> mutual shaping between the first-order discourse and the
> second-order discourse into a coevolution. In the above
> example of neo-classical and evolutionary economics, for
> example, the discourse of self-organization may serve this
> purpose (Paul Krugman, The Self-Organizing Economy, 1996).
> The various routines can then be considered as subroutines
> that develop competitively and disturb one another.
>
> With kind regards,
>
>
> Loet
>
>
> _____
>
> Loet Leydesdorff
> Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
> Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam
> Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681
<mailto:[log in to unmask]> [log in to unmask] ;
<http://www.leydesdorff.net/> http://www.leydesdorff.net/
<http://www.upublish.com/books/leydesdorff-sci.htm> The Challenge of
Scientometrics ; <http://www.upublish.com/books/leydesdorff.htm> The
Self-Organization of the Knowledge-Based Society
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