Johnson's Russia List
#6218
1 May 2002

#9
Jamestown Foundation
30 April 2002 - Volume III, Issue 13
CHECHNYA WEEKLY: News and analysis on the crisis in Chechnya

PAVEL FELGENHAUER SEES CHECHNYA AS RUSSIA'S ALGERIA.
The April 24 issue of the weekly Moskovskie Novosti carries an
article by well-known military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, who
sees Chechnya as representing Russia's Algeria. In his recent
State-of-the-Nation address to the Russian parliament,
Felgenhauer recalls, President Putin asserted that it was no
longer important how many "bandits and terrorists" there were in
Chechnya. What was important was to determine "where they are."

The problem with this statement, Felgenhauer noted, is that
there is absolutely no problem in determining where the
separatists are located in Chechnya. "Chechnya," he pointed out,
"is by Russian standards a small republic--160 kilometers long
and 80 kilometers wide." Moreover, "the military actions are not
being conducted throughout the entire territory [of the
republic]. The mountain third in the south is relatively
peaceful... In the barren mountains there is little food, and
aviation can reach its targets. And in the even more barren
steppes north of the Terek [River], quiet in general reigns."

Where, then, is the military activity occurring? "In Grozny,"
Felgenhauer responds, "and in the thickly settled hilly lowlands
region. In the area between the Terek ridge to the north and the
foothills of the Caucasus mountains to the south--that is, in a
narrow ribbon of territory thirty kilometers wide and sixty
kilometers long, extending from Samashki in the west to
Kurchaloi in the east. In this zone, there is a pair of forests
smaller than Izmailovsky Woods Park in Moscow, and there are
bushes here and there. There are also villages and cities." It
is in this territory, "comparable to the size of the city of
Moscow," that separatists are fiercely contesting the
80,000-strong Combined Group of Federal Forces. The
concentration of Russian forces in the zone of conflict is 1,000
or more soldiers per square kilometer.

The dilemma for the Russian forces, Felgenhauer went on,
"consists in the fact that the separatists are actively
supported by a significant part of the populace while, it
appears, the overwhelming majority sympathize with them. World
experience has shown that, in such a situation, military
successes can by themselves resolve nothing." New fighters
emerge to take the place of partisans who are killed.

In an effort to break the ties linking the Chechen resistance to
the mass of the population, the Kremlin, Felgenhauer recalled,
has for a second year now been spending money on a
"normalization" of the economic and political situation in the
republic. As the Russian Audit Chamber has reported, these funds
often "disappear." But the situation has in fact somewhat
improved, with some pensions being paid, some jobs being
created, some refugees returning and so forth. "However, the
more thickly settled the populace of Chechnya becomes, the more
the human resources of the rebels will increase." The rebels,
too, will inevitably receive a part of the federal funds
allocated for Chechnya.

What has happened, Felgenhauer concludes his analysis, is that
"a closed circle of violence" has been formed, such as France
once faced in the case of Algeria. "If cleansing operations are
not conducted, then the rebels grow impudent, but if they are
conducted, then the poorly trained, undisciplined soldiers of
our unreformed [Russian] armed forces behave themselves so
repugnantly and aggressively with the inhabitants that the
operations serve only to strengthen the resistance."

Moving on to the subject of Algeria, Felgenhauer writes: "In its
time Algeria was for France, like Chechnya is for Russia,
considered to be a part of sovereign national territory and
millions of French people lived there. The French forces
confidently controlled a majority of the country.... But General
Charles de Gaulle--who was no pacifist--understood that, in
continuing an endless and hopeless war, France was being
transformed into a third- or fourth-rate power, and he
decisively withdrew from Algeria, even though they had to
evacuate the entire French populace, as well as a large number
of Arabs who were adherents of France."

The situation in Chechnya is similar. "As long as senseless and
hopeless attempts to 'return Chechnya to the political and legal
space of Russia' continue, Russia will never become competitive,
and no one will consider her to be a 'solid and predictable
business partner.' Our country will never be recognized as a
full-fledged ally by civilized, wealthy countries, when every
day all who wish to do so can see what kind of armed forces we
have in reality, and how they are trained and armed."

The crux of the problem, Felgenhauer summed up bluntly, is that
Russia's present leaders are dim and benighted. "Putin and his
team of reformers, it seems, have up till still now not grasped
the direct connection between economic growth and the foreign
policy authority of a country with the unrealized military
reform [of Russia] and the situation in Chechnya. But one who
doesn't get it will have to stay back yet another year in
school."

To conclude, Felgenhauer believes that De Gaulle's high
intelligence and political courage served to rescue France at a
time of acute national crisis. Russia, by contrast, does not
seem to have a De Gaulle.

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