Dear Nik,
Thanks for this very interesting message leading up to your question: "Does
EWG adopt the autonomy of syntax 
>hypothesis while rejecting the autonomy of grammar?" It's a long time
since I read EWG, and even longer since I wrote it, but I can tell you what
I hope I said - i.e. what I think now. I think you're absolutely right: 
a. I do accept the autonomy of syntax simply because I do distinguish words
from their meanings, and distinguish the (syntactic) relations between
co-occurring words from the (semantic) relations between their meanings -
and I point out that syntactic and semantic relations don't always match
each other.
b. I do reject the autonomy of grammar (as defined by Newmeyer in your
quotation). Although I (obviously) accept that the primitives of language
are peculiar to language (otherwise they wouldn't be primitives of language
- so this is just a matter of defining language e.g. as "words and their
parts"), I deny that the relevant "principles of combination make no
reference to system-external factors". E.g. I argue that the principles of
word order, and indeed the before/after relation between words, are the
same as the ones that order our other kinds of behaviour. 
Hope that helps. 

You're right in saying EWG is confusing in relation to the
formalist/functionalist divide, and presumably that's because I myself am
confused - I find my loyalties divided between the two camps and think this
division may be the most pernicious and unhelpful one in linguistics. 
                Dick

At 17:25 15/10/2002 +0100, you wrote:
>In EWG, Dick argues against the encapsulation hypothesis, a specific genetic 
>endowment for lg, and for lg being seen as part of general cognition. These 
>three claims go together (tho’ perhaps they need not). In Language Form and 
>Language Function (1998) Newmeyer discusses 3 autonomy hypotheses (23-4),
which 
>he sees as discrete.
>
>1.      The autonomy of syntax. “Human cognition whose primitive terms are 
>embodies a system whose primitive terms are nonsemantic and nondiscourse- 
>derived syntactic elements and whose principles of combination make no 
>reference to system-external factors.”
>2.      The autonomy of knowledge of lg wrt knowledge of lg use.
“Knowledge of 
>language (‘competence’) can and should be characterised independently of 
>language use (‘performance’) and the social, cognitive, and communicative 
>factors contributing to use.”
>3.      The autonomy of grammar wrt cognition. “Human cognition embodies a 
>system whose primitive terms are structural elements particular to
language and 
>whose principles of combination make no reference to system-external
factors.”
>
>N adopts / argues for all of positions 1-3. He also says (1998: 24) “The 
>relationship among these three hypotheses is therefore rather complex. [The 
>autonomy of syntax] necessarily entails [the autonomy of grammar].”
>
>In discussing the autonomy of syntax, N (p. 28) draws on Bill Croft’s 1995 
>Language paper where C puts forward the following three diagnostics for 
>debating the issue of whether syntax is autonomous.
>
>a.      At least some elements of syntax are arbitrary.
>b.      The arbitrary elements participate in a system.
>c.      That system is self-contained.
>
>N observes that everyone – generativist and functionalist alike – agrees on 
>(a), and that everyone rejects a strong version of (c) (and indeed,
Chomsky in 
>his 1986 Knowledge of Language argues that c-selection could be reduced to s-
>selection), so the core issue for linguists to argue over is (b): …the
question 
>is whether the relationship between purely formally defined elements is so 
>systematic that a grammar should accord a central place to formalizing the 
>relationship among these elements without reference to their meanings or 
>functions. … The former [mainstream generativist linguists] accept 
>systematicity in this sense, the latter [mainstream functional linguists] 
>reject it.
>
>The question I have is: what does this mean for WG? If N is right, then
the EWG 
>model of grammar, syntax and cognition is potentially confusing. As far as I 
>recall (and EWG is in the office, whereas I am at home, and the office and
home 
>are far apart) EWG rejects N’s (3) above, while embracing his autonomy of 
>syntax hypothesis (1), at least as he defines it. So the EWG treatment of WH 
>interrogatives and relatives treats them as entirely syntactic phenomena, 
>composed over the arbitrary elements that participate in a system. That’s to 
>say, EWG delivers the syntactic practice of a generative grammarian,
within a 
>highly articulated view of grammar that adopts a world view at odds with the 
>world view usually underlying this kind of grammar.
>        You could say that it is not all as clear cut as that – and I might 
>agree. Take the building blocks of grammar. The EWG definitions of certain 
>dependencies include semantic information, for example, although the EWG 
>criteria for word-classes reject semantic information.
>        But first, have I got it right. Does EWG adopt the autonomy of
syntax 
>hypothesis while rejecting the autonomy of grammar? Is it not the case then, 
>that the autonomy of grammar is entailed by the autonomy of syntax?
>        N’s arguments are not fine-grained: is it possible to argue for a
view 
>of grammar where it belong in general cognition, except to the extent that
it 
>isn’t?
>
>
>Nik.
>
>

Richard (= Dick) Hudson

Phonetics and Linguistics, University College London, 
Gower Street, London WC1E  6BT.
+44(0)20 7679 3152; fax +44(0)20 7383 4108;
http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/dick/home.htm