Hi Chirag,
I did not intend to 'demonize' von Hayek. On the contrary I intended to
introduce the economic thinking, perhaps my own subjective 'first
impression' response, to list readers here. My first impression regarding
Hayeks' model of economic efficieny was of 'demonic intrusion' along time
ago. Perhaps because of the thrust of the economist's own reports regarding
the necessity to have prices and ownership of resources reflect all and
sundry value in the world.
There seems to be an implicit presumption in economic thought which is never
stated in any of the economic treatise's which I have read. That presumption
is that humans can know everything from ecological laws to theological laws.
Everything expressed as value in economic theory is predicated on human
knowing. Thus it would appear for instance that something important and
vitally critical could be left out of human knowing without humans eing
aware of this epistemic lack, which I would describe as the apophantic, and
I do not mean solely the 'lack value' of which Sartre bout in his
existential writings. The lack value which I refer to may be commensed by
simply asking what is meant by the word 'value'. What does the word value
mean to anyone who uses this word? I have not read of any definitions which
would cover in all cases what value means, and thus I assume that I know
what value means implicitly as a working definition.
It was Seneca - I think -who wrote about instrumental value in describing
values which have some function in terms of utility, or use value. I don't
know of any clear definitions regarding the term value (unpredicated of
things) which could be applicable in all cases. I know where the word came
from: it came from the Latin <valor> which can be used to refer to the
desireable or desired, and it can be applied to 'intangible' desireable
entities or qualities like 'religious freedom', artist freedom. The word
value is therefore a 'concatenation' or 'infinite series' derived from the
recognition of the 'best part' of something which ultimately derives itself
from the word 'divine' or simply that which is the best part.
In economics the use of the term value has been of a solitary nature in that
no economic discussion can be accounted unless there is a proprietary sense
given to something of worth. In this regard there is a deep underlying issue
of clarity which needs to be resolved in terms of the necessary additional
terms such as ownership and allocation. In fact it would be practically
impossible to express an economic valuation unless there was an objective
'free from bias' sense of what what is desired and desireable, and thus
economics is restricted to those values which can have either an
'unconditional' meaning in the exclusion of all subjective values. Hence the
critical important of the role of 'monetization' of human desire, and
ultimately in a 'free from bias' quantification of the desire in the
economic account of human occupation of the plant earth. Thus value <
holistically> becomes dependent on fixed (instrumental) value solely.
When I myself use the term value I implicitly mean to 'intend' some meaning
in an obvious 'relation' that which I am knowledgeable about which is either
a mix of some cognitive or emotive content in my sensibility and
understanding, or a singular intuition of some emotive or the cognitive (as
in pure math, as in pure exstacy with no corresponding physical object). So
by clarifying what I mean when I use the expression < value> I am also
intending to use language by indicating a 'contradiction' and a 'similarity'
or rather a 'unity', the apophantic. The word value thus refers to my own
understanding and sensibility regarding something which is desired,
preferred and sometimes which I regard as 'the best part' or actually is
divine, even if that value is within myself. The problem therefore is that
human knowing (grasping, holding, and appetition) become prior forms of
knowing what value is and consists in.
Where in nature oppositions are observed, in language those oppositions
denote 'contradictions' according to Heraclitus. In language all kinds of
originary dichotomies are introduced by the understanding but not
necessarily by sensibility which is about as close as we can get to nature
which is the ultimate reference and fact. Whereas nature is 'constitutive'
of human understanding, on the other side of the spectrum sensibility is for
the most part human 'expression'. Thus what is known about the fullness and
extent of nature is therefore satisfied as a perceived 'lack value' or more
cogently as a concealment. And this is where much of economic thinking is in
situated, entirely in the arena, the sands, of what is known, and economics
professes to be an 'exhaustive science' of human relationships only,
excepting writings by detractors like Odum, Thoreau, Dillard, et cetera.
Kant had something to say about the apophantic, what appears in nature is
ultimately manifold as in a 'manifold of appearances'. No observer in nature
can every know the manifold due to perspective and organic restrictions due
to limitations accorded sensate knowing. Secondly nature is infinite, and
the time of the observer is limited, so knowledge becomes artifact as soon
as it arises. In the science of ecology, even human ecology, a manifold is
presented which the observer simply perceives as a series or manifold of
appearances. These appearances are essentially states in dynamic setting.
Whereas in nature the series, or successions, are never completed because
the observer is finite, and relies on only the sense in detecting the full
appearances in nature, for the observer the series is percieved as static,
or as enstasis, an imaging. One part of human knowing is said to be divine
because it is a knowedge of the eternal, and Plato even described 'time as a
moving image of eternity.' Ecologists have tried to understand what are the
functions which occur extantly in the processes of nature, which they
collectively assert are independent of the observer (to a certain extent) or
are partly influenced by the observer (cf. disturbed anthropic ecosystems
such as agro-pastoral ecosystems, commercial fisheries, et cetera).
For instance, the problem which economists like Hayek try to resolve is
improve the ability of a collective in sorting out the valuations which
occur within discrete human exchanges. The model presented is one based on
full knowlege about the appearance of the things in nature, but not the
intangible values of humans, which function in the organic realm of food,
clothing, and other material strictly 'utilitarian' purposeful commodities.
The idea of course is that improvements can be made in terms of
distribution, efficeincy, as long as something serving as a commodity is
valued 'more closely' by those that depend on them. The primary claim which
ecologist make in terms of human valuations is pressing in that nature, the
environment and ecosystems take precendence to all human estimations of
objective value and no amount of polity (excluding ecosystem based or
ecological accounting) can improve the efficiency of human valuations in
increasing the distribution and amount of objective value in a market based
economy. The theory that ownership will solve all the problems associated
with use of a natural resource such as depletion cannot resolve disfunction
in an ecosystem if the basic laws of that ecosystem are disrupted
sufficiently (example of course is the cod fisheries of the northern
Atlantic which have been depleted). The primary cause of the depletion of
the cod stocks in the North Atlantic (Newfoundland and Iceland) is ecosystem
related, not necessarily economic related. The cause of the depletion of the
cod was perhaps proximally related to overfishing but more importantly the
cause of the collapse was more likely related to 'allocation' and
'technology'. Most rational observers would agree that if the extension of
Canadian and Icelandic property rights to a 200 mile offshore limit would
restrict non-national commercial fisheries to the less abundant areas which
were still 'exploitable' and result in a 'manageable' inshore fisheries
which could be sustained, that these countries would limit their own
exploitation which would be also economical provident and possibly
sustainable. What I am saying here is that simply protecting and limiting
access to the fish did not improve the cod stocks. Simply stated, the
problem was not resolved by ownership rights as such. Even now with a
moratorium on cod fishing in Canada the cod stocks have not rebounded, and
scientists remaind uncertain if the cod stocks will recover. The cause of
the decline has something to do with ecological functioning and the proxy
cause of was overfishing.
The collapse of the cod stocks was more importantly caused by a failure to
allocate the resource based on a sound knowledge of the ecology of the
resource, and just as importantly the use of a new fishing technology which
enabled large trawlers to exploit previously unused cod habitats. The
problem therefore was completed unpredicted by scientists whose models and
estimation techniques failed to obtain the critical data regarding this
fisheries, AND it could not be stated that open access to the stocks was at
fault. Simply introducing fair and equitable rules on ownership such as
'grandfathering' or 'homesteading' prior fishing rights based on historic
use were inadequate. These measure did not work in Canada, even though this
form of property ownership derives from 'central planning' by a Federal
Agency like the Department of Fisheries.
There are some credible theories that implicate the recent use of trawlers
in removing the ground stock of prey which the cod feed on. This is perhaps
the most credible ecological justification for the very sudden collapse of
the cod. Secondly no matter what policies are in place, ownership rights,
quotas, the possibility exists that the cod cannt recover unless the ground
stock population improves, and there is no way to predict, or to anticipate
these primary foods for the cod of recovering, and they may not recover if
climate change has cause these from dissappearing.
In contrast with Hayek's economic solutions to the management of natural
resources (or his followers) another type of solution must be obtained that
does not rely on political relations alone (such as centralized planning,
and calculative quota assignments). The solution has to be much deeper than
this, it must be obtained by the recognition that human knowing regarding
nature as the ultimate reference and fact (C. S. Lewis) is limited to
appearance, to often one-sided interpretations of the manifold. Which is not
to say that human knowing is and always will be limited, but that nature
cannot appear as a manifold all at once, it is too much 'infinite' in her
appearances to complex to be understoond in the short time frame that humans
would like to impose on nature's functions and purposese which are
incredibly teleological, or ramified by ends not serving of human means or
needs. Nature, her functions and purposes, are not artifacts of human
understanding but miraculously humans are endowed with enough rationality -
it is hoped - to be more sensitive and understanding of the processive
functions in nature (eg. trophic and environmental interactions at many
levels, holoarchic fullfillment).
The one example which I have is from my own research. This research involved
a MSc thesis which investigated the causes of the Western White Pine Weevil
which is currently ravaging the spruce plantations in BC, Canada. I found
that the problem was occurring in the fully committed (ie, full owned
tenured commercial forests) forests. The causes was not a lack of ownership
and rights but more importantly one of the causes of the insect epidemic.
The reality was that it was a management model which caused the problem:
short rotation forests, single species plantations of young spruce, and in
general the failure of forest science to see or detect a future appearance.
The failure was derived from a strictly utilitarian value system which was
not challenged in any way by the science of ecology of disturbed forests. In
short it was a failure fo technology and a complete failure to allocate the
forest for a multiple purposes which overlapped the exclusive use of the
forests by humans, based on best use which was strictly lumber manfacturing.
All I can say at this point is that economic and political relations cannot
resolve these much deeper problems unless they are informed extensively by a
more complete valuation which includes the intrinsic, non-utilitarian,
ecological sensibility. The response to the problem of resource depletion
cannot be solved by simply restrictin access to the resource but rather by a
more radical revision of the value of the resource or natural function. That
valuation must include assessing the ecological cost of depleation and
utilzation of any amount of the resource which is to say that when we make
lumber for houses, we should also be evaluating non-wood substitutes to
determine if wood is really justified when there is a better use for the
wood and a better form of materials which does not impact the whole
ecosystem such as modern adobe, or areated insulating concrete, et cetera.
The same principle applies to cod. As consumers we should investigate other
forms of food which are equivalents to the cod, such as ecosystem based
fisheries.
chao
john foster
----- Original Message -----
From: Chirag Kasbekar <[log in to unmask]>
To: <[log in to unmask]>
Sent: Wednesday, December 26, 2001 8:42 PM
Subject: Re: Hayek
> This is quite a coincidence... there was recently a hot debate on the
> Hayek-L list on the compatibility of deep ecological thinking with
Austrian
> economics. Gus diZerega, also on this list, was one of the chief
> participants in that one.
>
> I think the discussion here does not really do justice to Hayek. It's
really
> no help to demonise someone like him. Criticise him, yes, but I think deep
> ecologists should pay greater attention to this thinker.
>
> I think you should consult Gus diZerega's very important work to
appreciate
> how a somewhat Hayekian perspective can enrich environmental ethics and
> political discussion in general. (And some of the areas in which Hayek
> erred.) Check out the material on his website:
>
> http://www.dizerega.com
>
> Also his book on democratic self-organisation: "Persuasion, Power and
> Polity: A Theory of Democratic Self-organisation." And some other
> forthcoming work on the similarity between the arguments Hayek and Mises
> made against central planning and the arguments against human control of
> natural processes.
>
> Essentially, Hayek and his associates had a pretty evolutionary/ecological
> perspective on human society, even if they focussed too much on market
> institutions and ignored the potential of democratic self-organisation.
>
> And I don't think Hayek really claimed that "everything" should have a
> price. I think he did admit that there are some values (for example those
> expressed in small intimate communities) that cannot rely on the price
> mechanism for expression.
>
> And I also don't think he was a libertarian. He thought a great deal of
> government action appropriate -- even a minimim guaranteed income for
those
> that cannot make it in the market. He also donated some of his Nobel prize
> money to the WWF and offered his name for their use, even if he definitely
> was not overtly deep ecological in his thinking. He characterised his
> political stance as "evolutionary liberalism" or classical liberalism
(which
> is not really libertarian). But you can detect a type of gradualism in his
> thinking that could be taken for a form of conservativism, even he
disavowed
> conservatism in his 1960 preface, "Why I am not a conservative."
>
> Warm regards,
> Chirag Kasbekar
> The Information Company,
> New Bombay, India
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