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Subject: Somalia, Nuclear Unilateralism, Pakistan's Military
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The Progressive Response 18 January 2002 Vol. 6, No. 2
Editor: Tom Barry
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The Progressive Response (PR) is a weekly service of Foreign Policy in
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I. Updates and Out-Takes
*** SOMALIA AS MILITARY TARGET ***
By Stephen Zunes
*** SOMALIA: ERRORS OF FACT AND ANALYSIS ***
By Ken Menkhaus
*** ROADMAP TO UNILATERALIST NUCLEAR POLICY ***
By Michelle Ciarrocca
*** NEW SELF-DETERMINATION ANALYSIS FROM FPIF ***
II. Outside the U.S.
*** FIGHTING TERRORISM, UNDERMINING DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN ***
By Najum Mushtaq
III. Letters and Comments
*** THE TERRORISM TRIANGLE ***
*** SURPRISED ***
*** LEFTIST RUBBISH ABOUT INDIA ***
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I. Updates and Out-Takes
*** SOMALIA AS MILITARY TARGET ***
By Stephen Zunes
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF Global Affairs Commentary, posted
in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2002/0201somalia.html .)
The east African nation of Somalia is being mentioned with increasing
frequency as a possible next target in the U.S.-led war against
international terrorism. Somalia is a failed state--with what passes for
the central government controlling little more than a section of the
national capital of Mogadishu, a separatist government in the north, and
rival warlords and clan leaders controlling most the remainder of the
country. U.S. officials believe that cells of the Al-Qaeda terrorist
network may have taken advantage of the absence of governmental authority
to set up operation.
Before the U.S. attacks that impoverished country, however, it is important
to recognize how Somalia became a possible haven for the followers of Osama
bin Laden and what might result if America goes to war.
In November 1992, the outgoing Bush administration sent 30,000 U.S.
troops--primarily Marines and Army Rangers--to Somalia, in what was
described as a humanitarian mission to assist in the distribution of relief
supplies that were being intercepted by armed militias without reaching the
civilian populations in need. The United Nations Security Council endorsed
the initiative the following month.
Many Somalis and some relief organizations were grateful for the American
role. Many others expressed skepticism, noting that the famine had actually
peaked that summer and the security situation was also gradually improving.
As U.S. troops began arriving, the chaos limiting food shipments was
constrained to a small area, with most other parts of the country
functioning as relatively peaceful fiefdoms. Most food was getting through
and the loss from theft was only slightly higher than elsewhere in Africa.
In some cases, U.S. forces essentially dumped food on local markets,
hurting indigenous farmers and creating greater food shortages over the
longer term. In any case, few Somalis were involved in the decisions during
this crucial period.
Most importantly for the U.S., large numbers of Somalis saw the American
forces as representatives of the government that had been the major outside
supporter of the hated former dictatorship. Such a foreign presence in a
country that had been free from colonial rule for only a little more than
three decades led to growing resentment. Contributing to these concerns was
the fact that the U.S. troops arriving in Somalia were elite combat forces,
and were not trained for such humanitarian missions. (Author and journalist
David Halberstrom quotes the U.S. Defense Secretary telling an associate,
"We're sending the Rangers to Somalia. We are not going to be able to
control them. They are like overtrained pit bulls. No one controls them.")
Shootings at U.S. military roadblocks became increasingly commonplace, and
Somalis witnessed scenes of mostly white American forces harassing and
shooting black countrymen.
In addition, the U.S. role escalated to include attempts at disarming some
of the warlords, resulting in armed engagements, often in crowded urban
neighborhoods. This "mission creep" resulted in American casualties,
creating growing dissent at home in what had originally been a widely
supported foreign policy initiative. The thousands of M-16 rifles sent,
courtesy of the American taxpayer, to Barre's armed forces were now in the
hands of rival militiamen who had not only used them to kill their fellow
countrymen and to disrupt the distribution of relief supplies, but were now
using them against American troops. Within the U.S. ranks, soldiers were
heard repeating the slogan, "The only good Somali is a dead Somali." It had
become apparent that the U.S. had badly underestimated the resistance.
In May 1993, the U.S. transferred the failing mission to the UN. This was
the first time the world body had combined peacekeeping, peace enforcement,
and humanitarian assistance, as well as the first time the UN had
intervened without a formal invitation by a host government (because there
wasn't any.) Within Somalia there was little trust of the United Nations,
particularly since the UN Secretary General at that time was Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, a major supporter of Barre when he led Egypt's foreign
ministry.
Even though the UN was technically in control, U.S. forces went on
increasingly aggressive forays, including a major battle in Mogadishu that
resulted in the deaths of 18 Marines and hundreds of Somali civilians,
dramatized in the highly fictionalized thriller Black Hawk Down. The
U.S.-led UN forces had become yet another faction in the multisided
conflict. Largely retreating to fixed position, the primary American
mission soon became protecting its own forces. With mounting criticism on
Capitol Hill from both the left and the right, President Bill Clinton
withdrew American troops in March 1994. The UN took its last peacekeeping
forces out one year later.
The U.S. intervention in Somalia is now widely considered to have been a
fiasco. It is largely responsible for the subsequent U.S. hesitation around
such so-called humanitarian intervention (outside of high-altitude
bombing.) It was the major factor in the tragic U.S. refusal to
intervene--either unilaterally or through the UN--to prevent the genocide
in Rwanda during the spring of 1994.
Most likely, the Somalia intervention was an another ill-advised assertion
of well-meaning liberal internationalism in U.S. foreign policy. But there
may have been other factors prompting the American decision to intervene as
well: perhaps as a rationalization for increased military spending despite
the end of the cold war, perhaps as an effort to mollify the Islamic world
for American overkill in the war against Iraq and the inaction against the
massacres of Muslims in Bosnia, and/or perhaps as a preemptive operation
against possible Islamic extremists rising out of the chaos. If the latter
was the goal, it may have backfired. Islamic radicals were able to find
some willing recruits among the Somalis, already upset by the U.S. support
for Barre, now with additional anger at the impact of direct U.S. military
intervention in their country.
In subsequent years, there has been only marginal progress toward
establishing any kind of widely recognized national government. Somalia is
still divided into fiefdoms run by clan leaders and warlords, though there
is rarely any serious fighting. Some officials in the current Bush
administration believe that Al-Qaeda has established an important network
or cells within this factious country.
If this is indeed the case, it begs the question as to how the U.S. should
respond. It is possible that U.S. forces could obtain highly accurate
intelligence that would allow them to pinpoint and take out the cells
without once again becoming embroiled in messy urban counterinsurgency
warfare, like that of 1993-94, or relying on air strikes in heavily
populated areas, resulting in large-scale civilian casualties. Based on
recent history, however, this is rather doubtful. The result of renewed
U.S. military intervention in Somalia, then, could be yet another debacle
that would only encourage the extremist forces America is trying to destroy.
(Stephen Zunes <[log in to unmask]> is a senior analyst with Foreign Policy
In Focus (online at www.fpif.org) and associate professor of Politics and
chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San
Francisco.)
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*** SOMALIA: ERRORS OF FACT AND ANALYSIS ***
By Ken Menkhaus
Among the most common and potentially dangerous errors of fact and analysis
about Somalia include the following:
**Somalia's Islamist movement, al-Ittihad, is synonymous with al-Qaeda.
This is wildly wrong. Al-Ittihad is a small, relatively weak organization,
with a mainly domestic agenda. Some individual members have had links to
al-Qaeda which merit close scrutiny, but the group as a whole is in no way
a subsidiary of al-Qaeda.
**Somalia's Transitional National Government (TNG) is a front for
al-Ittihad. The TNG is not the Somali equivalent of the Taliban government.
It is extremely weak, controlling only half of the city of Mogadishu, and
while it has some al-Ittihad members in its parliament, it is by no means a
front for Islamists. An attack against the TNG would be a serious error.
**Somalia is home to terrorist bases and camps. This is the rationale for
considering a bombing campaign there. But Somalia's al-Ittihad movement
abandoned the few towns and rural outposts it once controlled, and has
since integrated into local communities as teachers, health workers, and
businessmen. Bombing abandoned outposts would be a pointless exercise in
rearranging rocks.
**Somalia will be a likely safe haven for fleeing al-Qaeda members. On the
surface, this concern has merit. Somalia is a collapsed state with no
functional central government; global outlaws there could presumably escape
the reach of law. In reality, Somalia is a lousy refuge for non-Somali
radicals. Foreigners cannot operate in secrecy in Somalia; everyone knows
who you are and what you're doing, and the Somalis would be delighted to
hand over a non-Somali.
(Dr. Ken Menkhaus <[log in to unmask]> is associate professor of
political science at Davidson College, NC. He is a specialist on the Horn
of Africa and has served as a consultant to the UN and the U.S. government.)
Also see:
Warlordism and the War on Terror
By Ken Menkhaus
http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0112quidproquo.html
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*** ROADMAP TO UNILATERALIST NUCLEAR POLICY ***
By Michelle Ciarrocca
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF Global Affairs Commentary,
available in its entirety at:
http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2002/0201nuke.html .)
In the past year and a half, we've heard George W. Bush talk about the need
to move beyond the cold war paradigm of U.S. security policy. Specifically,
Bush repeatedly discussed reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the
U.S. arsenal to "the lowest possible number consistent with our national
security" and taking these weapons off hair-trigger alert. In mid-November,
Bush reiterated that position in meetings with Russian President Vladimir
Putin saying, "We are talking about reducing and destroying the number of
warheads to get down to specific levels."
The congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR, not to be
confused, even for a second with "National Public Radio"), released last
week, was an opportunity for President Bush and his team to do just that.
The NPR is suppose to provide a framework for formulating a U.S. nuclear
strategy for the post-cold war world--something the Clinton administration
failed to do with its own nuclear review in 1994.
However, much like the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review,
which was described by Senator Carl Levin as "full of decisions deferred,"
ambiguity prevails.
Assistant Defense Secretary J.D. Crouch held a special briefing with
reporters on Wednesday, January 9, 2002 to highlight portions of the
classified review delivered to Congress that same day. How does this new
approach change U.S. nuclear strategy? In short, the review's
recommendations could push the U.S. into a more dangerous security
environment than at the height of the Soviet/American rivalry.
As predicted last year, much of the Bush administration's nuclear review
echoes an earlier report released by the National Institute for Public
Policy (NIPP). The NIPP report was directed by Dr. Keith Payne, whose main
claim to fame is coauthoring a 1980s essay on nuclear war entitled "Victory
Is Possible." Bush National Security Council staffers Robert Joseph and
Stephen Hadley were involved in the production of the NIPP study, as was
William Schneider, an informal adviser and ideological soul mate of Donald
Rumsfeld. (See Bill Hartung's "Bush's Nuclear Doctrine: From MAD to NUTS?"
http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0012nuclear.html.)
In general, the NIPP report calls future security threats to the U.S.
unknown and unpredictable. Therefore, the report concludes that the U.S.
must maintain its nuclear arsenal, as well as the ability to design, build,
and test new nuclear weapons. The report asserts that conventional weapons
are inadequate replacements for nuclear weapons because they do not have
the same "destructive power." As a solution the report recommends the
development of "low-yield, precision-guided nuclear weapons"--in other
words, a nuclear weapon the U.S. can actually use.
Not surprisingly, the NIPP panel frowns on arms control treaties because
"U.S. policymakers today cannot know the strategic environment of 2005, let
alone 2010 or 2020. There is no basis for expecting that the conditions
that may permit deep nuclear reductions today will continue in the future."
Explaining the administration's nuclear policy, Assistant Defense Secretary
Crouch said, "I think one of the things that came out of the NPR is that
there is not a single solution to the problem of weapons of mass
destruction. It is not entirely a military problem; it also is a diplomatic
problem. It is also a problem that will involve other aspects of national
power," Crouch said. By and large, however, the Bush administration has
chosen to deal with weapons of mass destruction militarily--not politically.
The Nuclear Posture Review is the roadmap to a unilateralist U.S. nuclear
policy. The review makes no mention of the U.S. commitment under Article VI
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to take concrete steps toward
eliminating its nuclear arsenal, a commitment that was reaffirmed at the
2000 NPT review conference. The U.S. and 186 other countries came to a
global consensus on nuclear disarmament, declaring it the "only absolute
guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons." The U.S.
must lead the way toward this goal.
(Michelle Ciarrocca <[log in to unmask]> is an analyst with the Arms
Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute.)
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*** NEW SELF-DETERMINATION ANALYSIS FROM FPIF ***
*KOSOVO CONFLICT PROFILE
By Fred Abrahams
http://www.selfdetermine.org/conflicts/kosovo.html
The newly elected Kosovo parliament should work closely with UNMIK to
facilitate the return of the Serb and Roma population. The international
community should make it clear that an independent Kosovo state will never
be accepted until certain democratic standards are attained.
*U.S. TAKES ANTITERRORISM WAR TO THE PHILIPPINES
By John Gershman
http://www.selfdetermine.org/crisiswatch/0201philippine.html
The danger of growing U.S. involvement in the military campaign against the
Abu Sayyaf is that it displaces attention from the much broader struggles
for effective development and political self-determination on the part of
other Muslim Filipino political groups.
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II. Outside the U.S.
(Editor's Note: FPIF has a new component called "Outside the U.S.," which
aims to bring non-U.S. voices into the U.S. policy debate and to foster
dialog between Northern and Southern actors in global affairs issues.
Please visit our Outside the U.S. page for other non-U.S. perspectives on
global affairs and for information about submissions at:
http://www.fpif.org/outside/index.html.)
*** FIGHTING TERRORISM, UNDERMINING DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN ***
By Najum Mushtaq
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF Outside the U.S. commentary,
posted in full at:
http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2002/0201pakistan.html .)
The Pakistani public, by and large, appreciates the many pressures under
which General Musharraf must operate. For us, it is a familiar story of a
Pakistani military ruler parroting a script written in Washington. All of
the previous military rulers--Field Marshal Ayub Khan, and Generals Yahya
Khan and Zia ul-Haq--thrived in power because of their alignment with the
United States. With the cold war long over and the war on terrorism in
vogue, seeking U.S. support makes more sense than ever. Pakistanis, in
general, are convinced that the United States makes or breaks Pakistani
governments and that the military does Washington's bidding.
As long as the United States backs Musharraf, few will challenge his hold
on power, and on the home front there appear to be no serious challenges to
his rule. The military's control over state institutions and the country's
resources is virtually unchallenged. The norm of military supremacy over
civilian authority is well established. Public resistance to the military's
ascendancy is conspicuous by its absence. The much-feared backlash to
General Musharraf's decisions to back the U.S. war in Afghanistan and crack
down on jihadi militant groups operating in Kashmir has not happened and
does not look like it will occur very soon, if at all. A mutiny by the
Islamists in the military, a favorite scenario among those who take
military rhetoric at face value, has no historical precedent, nor does one
seem imminent. These so-called "errant" elements within the military
establishment may not be as widespread or resourceful as feared, not least
because of discreet pruning of Islamist officers since the October 1999
coup that brought Musharraf to power.
The military as an institution is well entrenched and in firm control of
the state machinery. Many long years of direct military rule have
diminished its mystique and charisma, but not its ability to curb dissent
or crush any threat to its rule. So it won't be surprising if General
Musharraf comes out on top and unscathed in this confrontation with the
religious extremists.
But if Musharraf actively pursues his stated aim of turning Pakistan into a
modern, progressive, and tolerant society, he will find the military itself
standing in the way. The institution has grown in mammoth proportions at
the expense of development in other sectors. It is precisely because of how
the military has run this country over the years that Pakistani political
culture remains weak and civil society virtually non-existent. When all is
said and done, the fate of Pakistan will eventually hinge upon the question
of military reform.
Can the military submit itself to popular will and abide by the notion of
civilian supremacy? If an elected civilian government had taken the recent
decisions on Afghanistan and Kashmir, would the military have supported it?
Will it ever forego its self-assumed right to rule without the consent of
the people? Shouldn't General Musharraf also redefine the role of the
military?
General Musharraf has already made it clear that he plans to stay on as
president indefinitely. It will be a pity if the United States, in pursuit
of its short-term objectives in the "war on terrorism," repeats the errors
of the cold war and again provides unqualified support for undemocratic
forces in Pakistan. History, however, suggests it is likely.
(Najum Mushtaq <[log in to unmask]> is an assistant editor at the News in
Rawalpindi/Islamabad.)
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III. Letters and Comments
*** THE TERRORISM TRIANGLE ***
Excellent article. Thank you. In the very first paragraph of section 4
(entitled "Attacking Root Causes") in FPIF's four-part policy framework "A
New Agenda to Counter Terrorism" http://www.fpif.org/justice/tobedone.html
you state that "because terrorism is a political act, a preventive strategy
must address its political roots." This is certainly true. I submit that in
so doing we uncover a paradigm that seems to be shared by the countries
that provide the kinds of social, economic, and political opportunities for
terrorism organizations to take widespread root. The paradigm looks like a
triangle: Education, by developing human capacity, enables people to
participate in Economic Growth. And, by bringing about a more informed
citizenry, Education also strengthens civil society. We know also that
economic growth enables more citizens to become stake-holders in the market
and economic system. This triangular relationship between Education,
Economic Growth, and Civil Society reflects a deeper relationship between
people's capacity, people's access to capital, and people's voice
(influence on policy).
In countries where these links are broken--or are tenuous--(i.e. where an
increase in people's capacity does not result in an increase in their
means, or where economic groups are disenfranchised, or where "education
gaps" thwart citizens' opportunities to participate) conditions seem to be
quite conducive to exploitation by terror organizations. Such countries
range from Afghanistan to Angola, Pakistan to Haiti, Somalia to Chechnya.
Again, thank you for a most informative article.
- Bertrand Laurent <[log in to unmask]>
Civil Society Specialist & Development Strategist
The Africa-America Institute
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*** SURPRISED ***
I have hardly ever seen an article by an Indian which is not biased and
arrogant. This article, "India's Policy of Brinksmanship"
http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2002/0201kashmir.html is very
unusual in this sense as it is based on the concepts of equal rights and
justice.
- Ameer Hassan <[log in to unmask]>
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*** LEFTIST RUBBISH ABOUT INDIA ***
The author, Mr. Achin Vanaik, could hardly be called an "independent
journalist." His accounts in "India's Politics of Brinksmanship on Kashmir"
http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2002/0201kashmir.html are factually
false and illogical. His bias against India's ruling BJP could not be more
evident than the following unsubstantiated and baseless assertions.
He writes: "The BJP, which leads the current coalition government, has long
been determined to transform the Indian polity and society into a more
authoritarian and anti-secular direction." Patently false. Has the author
read BJP's party constitution, election manifestos, or any of the major
speeches by BJP leaders? BJP is as unequivocally committed to a secular,
democratic India as any in India's body politic. What BJP opposes is a soft
state of apologists who, as their main political agenda, pander to
minorities and win elections through divide and rule of India's electorate.
BJP rejects such shameful "vote bank" politics and NOT the secular
democratic ethos. As a matter of fact, the only period of
"authoritarianism" in India's commendable democratic history came under the
so-called pseudo-secularist Congress party which has a history of
"sleeping" with the leftists and the communists.
The author then asserts: "This government (BJP-led coalition) has used the
developments since September 11 and December 13 to curb civil liberties,
harass its domestic opponents, further communalize the Indian education
system, spread anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan sentiments, and promote a more
belligerent and aggressive elite nationalism in keeping with its general
political ideology." Without a doubt, this author lives in a fantasy world
that only a communist apologist of India has the capacity to conjure up.
Or, under the guise of "independent journalist" of some leftist Nehruvian
think tank, he is deliberately deceiving the readers and perpetuating
falsehood.
Another example. The author claims: "What's more, it (BJP) has diverted
attention away from its political failure in Kashmir. The Kashmiri
population has been alienated not only by the brutalities inflicted by
Pakistan-supported terrorist groups but also by the terrorist repressions
carried out by the Indian armed forces in the region." What rubbish.
Kashmir problem and Pakistani intransigence is decades old. That's a fact.
For almost all of this period, right up to 1998, the so-called Hindu
nationalists of BJP was out, and left-leaning secularist Congress was in
power.
Criticize and denounce India's politics by all means. But at least get your
facts straight. Shouldn't you?
- Tarun K. Seam <[log in to unmask]>
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