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CTHEORY THEORY, TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE VOL 25, NO 3
*** Visit CTHEORY Online: http://www.ctheory.net ***
Article 114 02/10/09 Editors: Arthur and Marilouise Kroker
_____________________________________________________________________
Hyper-Heidegger
===============
~Arthur Kroker~
Uncanny Thinking
----------------
Martin Heidegger is the theorist par excellence of the digital
future.
Probably because Heidegger's was a deeply embittered vision of the
ruins of modernity to the extent that he wrote in a spirit of
desolation about the "gods having abandoned the earth," retreating
back into an impenetrable shroud of "forgetfulness," Heidegger was
the one thinker who did not shrink from thinking through to its
deepest depths the unfolding horizon of a culture of "pure
technicity." While Heidegger began his writing with a deconstruction
of conventional ontology in _Being and Time_, his lasting gift to the
tradition of critical metaphysics was to perform in advance an
intense, unforgiving and unremitting deconstruction of his own life
in _The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude,
Solitude_. [1] After the latter book, having nowhere to go other than
to wander in the shadowland between a reflection on Being that in
its retreat into forgetfulness was admittedly impossible to
concretely realize and a future driven forward by the "will to
technicity," Heidegger was the one thinker who literally
deconstructed his own project to a point of self-nihilation. With
nothing to save, no hope to dispense, and no critique that did not
fall immediately into the dry ashes of cultural cynicism, Heidegger's
fate was to make of his own life of thought a simulacrum of the will
to technology. More than Marx who remained wedded to the biblical
dream of proletarian redemption and more so than Nietzsche who
countered the nihilism of the "will to power" with the possibilities
of reclaimed human subjects as their own "dancing stars," Heidegger
was the one thinker without hope in the dispensations of history.
Not broken by the vicissitudes of history, Heidegger was and is the
contemporary historical moment. In his thought, the new century is
already "overcome" at the very moment of its inception. Not overcome
in the sense of abandonment, but overcome to the extent that
Heidegger summons up in his thinking the anxieties, fears, and
methods of the will to technicity. A futurist without faith, a
metaphysician without the will to believe, a philosopher opposed to
reason, Heidegger is the perfect representative of the technological
trajectory at the outer edge of its parabolic curvature through the
dark spaces of the post-human future.
If it be objected that we should not read Heidegger because of his
political complicity with German fascism, I would enter the dissent
that Heidegger's momentary harmony, but harmony nonetheless, with the
politics of fascism makes of him a representative guide to the next
phase of fascism -- virtual fascism. More than liberal critics who
fault Heidegger for taking advantage of the fascist upsurge in
pre-War Germany to gain a University rectorship as well as to betray
his philosophical mentor -- Husserl -- I would go further, noting
that in breaking with National Socialism, Heidegger did not refuse
fascism on the grounds of an oppositional political ethics, but
because its strictly political determination in the historically
specific form of National Socialism in the Germany of the 1930s and
40s was not a sufficiently "pure" type to fully represent the
metaphysical possibility that was the German "folk." [2] For
Heidegger, National Socialists were not sufficiently self-conscious
metaphysically, too trapped in the particularities of politics, to be
capable finally of realizing the ontology of the fascist moment:
delivering the metaphysical possibilities of (German) folk-community
into concrete historical realization. To the tribal consciousness of
fascism, Heidegger remained a metaphysician of dasein. Ironically,
his prescience concerning the fading away of second-order (National
Socialist) fascism before the coming to be of first-order (virtual)
fascism ultimately made of his thought a historical
incommensurability: too metaphysically pure for the direct action,
"hand to mouth" politics of German fascism; and yet too radically
deconstructive of the claims of technological rationality to find its
home in liberalism. "Homeless thought."
An idealist in the tradition of German nationalism, Heidegger's fate
was to be that of the faithless thinker, ultimately disloyal to
German fascism because it was not sufficiently metaphysical, yet
unable to reconcile himself to western liberalism because it was, in
his estimation, the political self-consciousness of technicity. For
this reason, Heidegger ended the war digging ditches, having been
ousted by German university authorities acting at the behest of state
fascism as the University of Freiburg's "most dispensable Professor."
It is also for this reason that Heidegger in the post-war period was,
except for a brief period before retirement, expelled from university
teaching. Always a metaphysician, always in transition to the next
historical stage of the "will," always in rebellion against the
impurities of compromised philosophical vision, Heidegger's mind was
fully attuned to the restless stirrings of the will as its broke from
its twin moorings in ethnic fundamentalism and industrial capitalism
and began to project itself into world-history in the pure
metaphysical form of the "will to will." [3] Beyond time and space,
breaking through the skin of human culture, respecting no national
borders, an "overcoming" that first and foremost overcomes its own
nostalgic yearnings for a final appearance in the theatre of
representation, the will to will, what Heidegger would come to call
the culture of "pure technicity," was the gleam on the post-human
horizon, and Heidegger was its most faithful reporter. In Heidegger's
writings, the main historical trends of the 21st century have their
prophet and doomsayer.
Heidegger's mind lies between past and future.
Technology as a "Danger" and a "Saving Power"
---------------------------------------------
If Heidegger could write so eloquently and think so mystically about
that which in the present era is so unmentionable -- Being -- , if
Heidegger could say that Being "comes into presence" in the mode of
"enframing," the animating impulse of technology, if he could speak
of Being as containing both a "danger" and a "saving power" and speak
evocatively of the "turning" so necessary to transform the danger
into the saving power, perhaps that is because Heidegger's thought is
itself a "turning," a "lightning-flash" which illuminates human
beings to themselves, and which does so not by surrendering to
calculative thinking or by retreating to spurious forms of idealism,
but by looking deeply and meditatively into the danger of technology,
by "thinking" technology to its roots in metaphysics.
Hyper-Heidegger, then, a thinker who makes of himself both a "danger"
and a "saving-power," who makes of the effort of reading Heidegger
both a form of "unconcealedness" and "openness." If Heidegger could
dismiss as illusory thinking the pretension that "man has mastery of
technology," claiming instead the opposite that human beings are set
in place as a condition of possibility for the development of
technology, [4] if Heidegger could only speak of the human essence in
terms of its deep entanglement with the question of technology, that
is because Heidegger's thought is the "clearing" that he thought he
was only prophesying. To read Heidegger is not so much a matter of
meditating on the "question of technology," but the much more
dangerous possibility of becoming entangled with the question of
Heidegger. Not Heidegger as a historically proximate philosopher with
a certain biography as a determinately local German thinker
projecting the "pathways" of the Black Forest onto the "world
picture", but Heidegger as that "glancing" taking us immediately into
the dangerous mysteries, not of Being, but of hyper-being, into the
impossible metaphysical claims of a form of being that only exists in
the language of fatal oppositions: calculation versus meditation,
world versus earth, ordering versus revealing, business versus art.
Refusing the safety of a strictly monistic determination of the
question of being, Heidegger was always a hyper-metaphysician, making
of being an enigmatic sign, a crossing-over, a "solitude" between the
identify of "world" and the difference of "earth." For him,
~incommensurability~ is the essence of technology, and hyper-being
the song-line of the deeply conflicting impulses that animate
technological destining.
The question of Heidegger necessarily speaks to the human essence. If
Heidegger is correct, the discourse, first of capitalism, then of
capitalism in its hyper-phase as virtuality, is the story of the
presencing of hyper-being, with ourselves as both its active
participants and necessary conditions. This is not a story of
fatalism or catastrophe, far from it since Heidegger claims that the
latter are themselves no more than the "historiographical"
representations of technological consciousness, but the story of
"destining", of learning a certain "comportment towards technology"
that draws the saving-power out of the danger of technology. In the
strange labyrinth of history, could it be that the question of
Heidegger is also a "turning," a way of looking deeply into the
danger as the first tentative steps towards the presencing of another
destiny of technology. Heidegger went to his death with the constant
admonition that we are "uninterpreted signs." [5] Could it be that
interpreting Heidegger is the necessary encryption of the codes of
technology, that until now neglected interpretation of the
"uninterpreted sign" that is digital being? But, if that is so, if
Heidegger is the necessary interpretation of technological destining,
then wouldn't that also make Heidegger's thought a form of "valuing,"
a will to power projecting itself across the world picture in the
language of thought? Wouldn't Heidegger's destiny, then, be an
artistic one: simultaneously fully implicated in the question of
technology while different from it, an artist of the "yes and no?"
Out of place in his time, a thinker sensitive to the loss of the
autochthonous in the culture of technicity, Heidegger transformed the
language of "rootlessness" [6] into a central premise of the strife
in modern subjectivity. For him, the challenge and impossibility of
the modern technical project was its starting-point in "being held
out into the nothing." Camus' absurd. The gods have retreated into
the shadows. The meaning of technicity lies close at hand, yet
remains concealed in the shroud of calculative forgetfulness. No
certain past, no actual present, only a future-time split open by the
animating energy of the will to technology: cultural "rootlessness"
as the central feature of modern technical being. Indeed, if
contemporary subjectivity can move with such volatility between the
"malice of rage" and the solace of healing, then this would only
indicate that strife is the modern language of rootlessness. This,
then, is the modern fate: "being held out into the nothing" with no
clear way of returning to oneself as an abode or dwelling in
proximity to the ancient language of the "holy." [7] And yet if we
cannot think of the self as an abode or dwelling, then what remains
is only the desolation of homelessness and its certain result -- the
"malice of rage". For Heidegger, as earlier for Nietzsche who in _On
the Genealogy of Morals_, spoke evocatively of modern being rubbing
itself raw on the bars of "civilized" culture, the "malice of rage"
is the true malignancy of technological culture. That this malignancy
can sometimes be distracted, even to the point of forgetfulness, in
the form of technological exteriorizations of the human sensorium
and, at other times, temporarily appeased in the sacrificial language
of ethnic scapegoating, does not dispense with the sense of strife
central to technical being. If we are an "uninterpreted sign"
projected into the future and concealed from the past, then the
malignancy at the core of technicity might itself, if intensified by
thinking, be compelled to reveal its essence. Which is, of course,
the value of contemplating Heidegger: a thinker so proximate to the
contemporary technical condition that his thought is itself a field
of strife, motivated from within by a malice of rage directed against
his own expulsion from the polity of conventional political opinion
and yet, who in the bitterness of this exile and undoubtedly against
his own preference for the rootedness of the "German folk," became a
vehicle by which the forgotten language of metaphysics -- the
homeward-bound language of the pre-Socratics -- speaks again to
beings held out into the nothing.
In contemplating Heidegger, we also return to ourselves as
"uninterpreted signs." His writing is the future of the past.
Philosophy of Technology
------------------------
All that is merely technological never arrives at the essence of
technology. It cannot even recognize its outer precincts. [8]
Make no mistake. Heidegger does not "think" technology within its own
terms. Quite the contrary. Repeatedly he insists that technology
cannot be understood technologically because, in opening ourselves up
to the question of technology, we are suddenly brought into the
presence of that which has always been allowed to lie silent because
it is the overshadowing default condition of our technical existence.
Heidegger is relentless in making visible that which would prefer to
remain in the shadows as the regulating architecture of contemporary
existence. For example, Heidegger notes that today, we can only think
technology from the midst of the howling center of the technological
vortex, that while we can note that the dominant tendency of
technology is towards the "objectification of earth" and the
"objectification of (technical) consciousness" [9], we can never be
confident that in thinking the consequences of technologies of
objectification that our thought itself has not already been set in
place as a necessary "turning" of the technological spiral. And while
Heidegger will note that the key ethical consequence of the
relentless objectification of earth and sky and water and flesh is
"injurious neglect of the thing," [10] he always makes the parallel
claim that thought itself always has about it a form of neglect, that
thought, however critical, always conceals and unconceals, that
"injurious neglect of the thing" in the mode of order of willing and
doing may also have about it the doubled language of human destining.
Thinking Heidegger from the virtual present, from the perspective of
the "shadow cast ahead by the advent of this turning," [11] that he
could only intimate who cannot be fully ambivalent on the ultimate
meaning of technology as "injurious neglect of the thing." Who, that
is, cannot brush thought against that doubled possibility of
injurious neglect, that such injurious neglect may be, in equal
parts, a brutalizing consequence of the dynamic language of
(technical) ordering and willing and the deepest seduction of
technology? In this case, if the price to be paid for the unfolding
of (our) technological destiny is "injurious neglect of the thing" to
the point of gutting human subjectivity of its silences, its most
essential elements of individual reflection, of thoughtfulness, then
is it not now manifest that such injurious neglect of oneself is the
deepest fascination and most charismatic promotional feature of
virtual capitalism? The virtual self, therefore, as a wireless game
with accelerated technical consciousness moving at the speed of
injurious neglect.
Consequently, Heidegger's specific contribution to understanding
technology consists of a unique, evocative and comprehensive
description of technological experience as a single human process
originating in the metaphysics of "enframing," driven forward by the
animating energy of the "will to will," resulting in a culture of
"profound boredom," [12] and possessing art as its possible
"turning." Folding together future and past, Heidegger's theory of
technology assumes the form of a general theory of civilization
which, beginning with the basic assumption that technology cannot be
understood solely in the language of the technological, traces the
genealogy of "planetary technicity" to its ancient roots in a way of
being that, expanding from its origins in the mythic legacy of the
west, comes to represent human destiny. As human destiny, technology
can neither be refused nor simply affirmed because of its
inextricably ambivalent nature. Left unquestioned, technological
experience reduces life to a "standing-reserve," in the
"unconditional service" of the will to technique. And yet if the
"question of technology" cannot be asked without a fundamental
inquiry into the mythic roots of technology as destiny, then it must
also be said that the (hyper)reality of technology cannot be denied
without a fateful loss of that which is fundamental to humans qua
humans. For better and for worse, in boredom as well as in anxiety,
the question of technology as destiny means that it is only by
intensifying technology, by "thinking" technique to its roots in
ancient mythology and, thereupon, to its future in the expanding
empire of "planetary technicity" that we can hope to elucidate the
dangers and possibilities of being human in the dawning age of the
post-human. Heidegger's "question of technology" is also a way of
coming home to the neglected question of the meaning of life in the
technodrome.
The Politics of the "Standing-Reserve"
--------------------------------------
Heidegger's famous essay, "The Question Concerning Technology," can
only be read now in terms of philosophical anthropology. Against its
own intentions which were focused on stripping away history from the
question of technology and, thereupon, grounding the question of
technology in the language of its founding metaphysics, this essay
has in the forty years since its authorship been reclaimed by the
riddle of history. Reclaimed, that is, not in the sense of
obsolescence -- a theory of technology now superceded by accelerating
developments in the present age of wireless and bio-genetic invention
-- but reclaimed in the deeply anthropological sense that Heidegger's
analysis of the question of technology is an uncannily accurate
diagnosis of the present human situation.
Writing from the perspective of a mid-twentieth century historical
period bracketed by the rise to dominance of mechanical technologies
of extraction and the overpowering presence of atomic weapons,
Heidegger's view of technology, while focused on mechanical culture,
only finds real theoretical and ethical purchase with the advent of
electronic and, thereupon, digital culture. In a way that foreshadows
contemporary theories of technology, from Virilio's vision of
cybernetic technology as a "war machine" operating in the language of
the control of "eyeball culture" and McLuhan's grim vision of the
"externalization" of the central nervous system in electronic culture
to Baudrillard's theorisation of the mass simulation of human desire,
Heidegger does that which is most difficult. Almost as a precession
of his own theory, his analysis ~presences~ technology, drawing out
the animating impulses of techno-culture in such a way as to compel
the "world picture" of technology to fully reveal itself. Refusing to
think technology separately from the question of human destiny,
Heidegger's thought always hovers around two conflicting impulses in
the technological world picture: first, the tendency towards
"enframing" by which the dominating impulse of contemporary
technology pirates the human sensorium on behalf of a globally
hegemonic technical apparatus; and, second, the tendency toward
"poeisis" by which an art of technology, variously expressed in
language, poetry, the visual arts, speed writing, an aesthetics of
digital dirt, and new media art could draw out of the world picture
of technology as destining a different future for techne, a future in
which technology once again has something to say, to "unconceal,"
about the relationship between technology and alethia (truth).[13]
Indeed, what is so inspiring about Heidegger's doubled vision of
technology is its uniqueness in simultaneously running parallel to
the cutting edge of new digital technologies and doing so in such a
way as to plunge the "question concerning technology" back into its
classical origins as a essential expression of being itself. While
other theorists have "thought" technology within and against the
modernist and now, postmodern, epistemes, Heidegger's special gift to
those intent on deciphering the question of technology is a dramatic
double refusal: refusing, at first, to think technology within
strictly contemporary terms by insisting that the language of
technique is derivative from another, more hidden, "presencing" of
being that hides itself in the shadows of thought; and refusing to
think technology as technology, insisting that technology is at its
inception never strictly technological but metaphysical.
Consequently, the curiosity: Heidegger's "The Question Concerning
Technology" makes of the dynamic drive to planetary technicity a
probe for unconcealing a more fundamental "mode of being," a mode of
being which, until now, may have purposively retreated into the
shadows in the spectral form of "oblivion of being," but which under
the artistic "revealing" that is Heidegger's method is finally forced
to confess its ancient secrets. In Heidegger's vision of technology,
we are always standing midway between the unfolding future of the
drive to technological domination and the revelation of the classical
genealogy of the question of technology. Both genealogist and
futurist -- artist and craftsman -- Heidegger's probe of the "world
picture of technology" is always enunciated in the doubled language
of that which he seeks to expose -- the twin words of provocation and
revelation, "challenging-forth" and "poeisis." He is instructive to
meditate upon not simply for his dramatic political and cultural
conclusions concerning the destiny of technology, but, more
decisively, for the deep method of his thought. Always equal to the
object of his writing -- planetary technicity -- ,Heidegger not only
claimed that technological experience was, above all, a ~method,~ but
in his own writing paralleled the world picture of technology as
method by making of his own thought a method of technological
revelation. In meditating upon Heidegger, we are suddenly brought
(technically) close to that which is (metaphysically) distant. His
mind splits the atom of technology. His thought sequences the DNA of
the question of technology.
In Heidegger's thought, the twin elements composing the atom of
technology in its classical origins and which, until now have
wandered the "desolation of the earth" separate and at war, these
twin elements of provocation and poeting, calculation and meditation,
space and time, are finally reunited in a new experimental moment of
fusion. The Heideggerian method solves the riddle that it sought only
to reveal and, in doing so, provides an ethics of technology, an
ethics that has something fundamental to say about the unfolding
future of planetary technicity because the Heideggerian project is
technology. Beyond the specific historical details populating each of
Heidegger's writings on technology, from the atomic weaponry of "The
Question Concerning Technology" and the theoretical physics of "What
is Metaphysics?" to the bio-genetics of _The Fundamental Concepts of
Metaphysics_, Heidegger brings to the project of thinking technology
a mode of expression simultaneously ancient and post-human, equally
at home in the question of being and not-being. And if at the end of
his life, Heidegger abandons the comfortable illusions of
existentialism that are the condition of possibility of _Being and
Time_, that is only because faithful to the method of
"challenging-forth into the ordering of the standing-reserve" [14]
that is the hallmark of the technological surgery upon the human
condition, Heidegger does not, in the end, spare his own thought from
the bitter lessons of his diagnosis. This is one thinker with the
courage to make of his own theory of technology a model of technicity
with such intensity and determination that his thought challenges
technology to the death. Challenges, that is, the world picture of
technology to circle back on itself, to engage the conflicting
impulses towards "harvesting" and "poiesis" in their most primary
expression of being in Heidegger's "way of thinking." Without
exaggeration, the ~alethia~ -- the truth -- of Heidegger is, at once,
the ~alethia~ of technology. Resolving the limits and creative
intensities of Heidegger's vision of technology is much more than
another perspective external to technology. To think Heidegger is
also to presence the interior limits of a mode of (technical) being
that seduces by its radical impossibility: revelation without
actualization, calculation by abandoning justice to the oblivion of
being. The question of Heidegger is proximate to understanding the
twenty-first century.
Notes:
------
[1] Heidegger, _The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World,
Finitude, Solitude_. In this text, Heidegger provides the theory of
completed nihilism: its fundamental attunement -- "profound boredom;"
its method -- the disciplinary practices of bio-genetics; its
dominant cultural sign -- terminal drifting towards generalized
"indifference."
[2] See in particular, Heidegger's reflections on the historical
destiny of the German "folk," in his _Die Selbstbehauptung der
deutschen Universitat_, "Rektoratsrede," Breslau: W.G. Korn, 1933.
[3] Martin Heidegger, _The Question Concerning Technology_, "The Word
of Nietzsche," p.102. "In the willing of this will, however, there
comes upon man the condition that he concomitantly will the
conditions, the requirements, of such a willing. That means: to posit
values and to ascribe worth to everything in keeping with values. In
such a manner does value determine all that is in its Being."
[4] Martin Heidegger, _Nietzsche, "The Will to Power"_ p.197. Beyond
the question of technology, Heidegger argues that the will to will
that is the essence of technological destining always requires that
human and non-human nature be reduced to the function of
"standing-reserve." Thus, for example, in Nietzsche, Heidegger
describes the essential movement of the will to power as gathering
into itself means for the "preservation" of power. "Therefore,
enhancement of power is at the same time in itself the preservation
of power." In is in this sense that Heidegger describes the technical
condition of human subjectivity as "standing-reserve" in _The
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays_, p. 23. In his
essay, "On the Question of Being," Heidegger notes: "The reduction
that can be ascertained within beings rests on the production of
being, namely, on the unfolding of the will to power into the
unconditional will to will," _Pathmarks_, p. 312.
[5] Martin Heidegger, _Basic Writings_, "The Origin of the Work of
Art," pp. 140-212. For Heidegger, the importance of art in the
technological milieu was precisely to open the question of technology
to a different form of interpretation, not only the logic of
"calculability" but also the revelation of poetry.
[6] Martin Heidegger, _Pathways_, p.258. "Homelessness so understood
consists in the abandonment of beings by being. Homelessness is the
symptom of the oblivion of being. Because of it the truth of being
remains unthought."
[7] Ibid; "What is Metaphysics," p.93. "Being held out into the
nothing -- as Dasein is -- on the ground of concealed anxiety makes
the human being a lieutenant of the nothing."
[8] Martin Heidegger, _The Question Concerning Technology and Other
Essays_, p.44.
[9] Ibid., p.100. In "The Word of Nietzsche," Heidegger draws the
conclusion from technological objectification as destiny: "Man,
within the subjectness belonging to whatever is, rises up into the
subjectivity of his essence. Man enters into insurrection. The world
changes into object. In this revolutionary objectifying of everything
that is, the earth, that which first of all must be put at the
disposal of representing and setting forth, moves into the midst of
human positing and analyzing. The earth can show itself only as an
object of assault, an assault that, in human willing, establishes
itself as unconditional objectification."
[10] Ibid., p.48.
[11] Martin Heidegger, "The Turning," in _The Question Concerning
Technology and Other Essays_, p.41.
[12] Martin Heidegger, _The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics_,
p.162. "Profound boredom, its being left empty, means being delivered
over to beings' telling refusal of themselves as a whole. It is thus
emptiness as a whole." Intensifying Nietzsche's admonition that man
has grown tired of himself, Heidegger asks: "Has man in the end
become boring to himself? -- as the question in which we ready
ourselves for a fundamental attunement of our Dasein." (FCM, p. 161.)
[13] Writing of the "grounding-attunement," Heidegger states: "In the
first beginning: deep wonder. In another beginning: deep foreboding."
Martin Heidegger, _Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)_,
translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999. (p.15).
[14] Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," p.20.
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* Mailing address: CTHEORY, Concordia University, 1455 de
* Maisonneuve, O., Montreal, Canada, H3G 1M8.
*
* Full text and microform versions are available from UMI, Ann Arbor,
* Michigan; and Canadian Periodical Index/Gale Canada, Toronto.
*
* Indexed in: International Political Science Abstracts/
* Documentation politique international; Sociological Abstract
* Inc.; Advance Bibliography of Contents: Political Science and
* Government; Canadian Periodical Index; Film and Literature Index.
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