Î think the problem is one of epistemology versus
metaphysics. When psychologists study attributions of
belief, they don't care about the "real" nature of
beliefs, or even whether they "really" exist, as
philosophers like Churchland and Stich do. Rather,
they're interested in people's everyday understanding
of beliefs. Similarly, people studying God concepts
don't usually make claims about the "true" nature of
supernatural beings, and anthropologists studying
beliefs about witchcraft don't make claims about
whether witchcraft is a real causal force.

I do, however, think that while beliefs about the
location of objects is a good starting place, it might
be interesting to look at attributions of different
kinds of beliefs as well, particularly ones that
aren't clearly true or false (moral beliefs, etc.).

Cheryl Browne

---------------------------------------
Cheryl A. Browne, M.A.
Department of Psychology
University of Texas at Austin
801 E. Dean Keeton St.
Austin, TX 78712

Email: [log in to unmask]
Phone: (512)471-1227

--- Tim Maroney <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> on 6/21/02 4:54 AM, Justin Barrett at
> [log in to unmask] wrote:
>
> > such a report is not the place to wax
> philosophical about belief.
>
> I think this is a damaging attitude, and one that is
> addressed at some
> length in Patricia Churchland's "Neurophilosophy."
> One can't do good
> cognitive psychology without dealing with the
> philosophical issues
> surrounding the purported entities one is studying.
> In the case of the paper
> at hand, though, I did not feel that this attitude
> was present, and I only
> suggested that a more detailed examination of the
> concept of "belief" would
> be called for. I suggested particular reasons for
> this, to which you have
> not chosen to respond.
>
> --
> Tim Maroney    [log in to unmask]




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