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CRITICAL-MANAGEMENT  September 2001

CRITICAL-MANAGEMENT September 2001

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Subject:

Daily news alert

From:

Ken Friedman <[log in to unmask]>

Reply-To:

Ken Friedman <[log in to unmask]>

Date:

Sat, 22 Sep 2001 10:46:08 +0100

Content-Type:

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Dear Colleagues,

Those who seek timely news on the world situation may wish to
subscribe to the free daily intelligence alert from Stratfors.

Current issue here.

Ken Friedman


___________________________________________________________________


                             S T R A T F O R

                     THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY

                         http://www.stratfor.com
___________________________________________________________________

                                                   21 September 2001

THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

   -> ON OUR WEBSITE TODAY:

       * Intel-Sharing a Snag for Coalition
       http://www.stratfor.com/home/0109212330.htm

       * U.S. Measures May Incite Domestic Terror
       http://www.stratfor.com/home/0109212300.htm

       * U.S. May Be Refocusing on Iraq
       http://www.stratfor.com/home/0109202000.htm
__________________________________________________________________

The New Republic Online: D.C.'s smartest magazine brings its
commentary to the Net. We attack the day's biggest stories from
any angle we see fit, puncturing the conventional wisdom. Check
in this week for articles about the Iraqi connection to last
week's attacks, the vulnerabilities of the Taliban, and why our
therapeutic culture may be America's greatest liability.

TNR Online: Read it every day.  www.tnr.com
___________________________________________________________________

Intel-Sharing a Snag for Coalition

Summary

The United States and Europe will comprise the core of an
emerging global anti-terrorism coalition. But the highly
sensitive nature of intelligence-gathering and the pursuit of
national priorities will make for an uneasy transatlantic
partnership. The result will be enhanced, but still limited,
sharing of intelligence as the European Union and United States
pursue their own priorities.

Analysis

Prime ministers from throughout the European Union met in
Brussels Sept. 21 for an emergency anti-terrorism summit. The
leaders were set to discuss a range of proposals meant to improve
coordination of law enforcement and anti-terrorism activities
within the union, as well as the European Union's role in the
emerging global coalition against terrorism.

The structure of that coalition -- including who will lead it and
how information will be shared among its members -- is currently
under debate in both Washington and Brussels. Both the union and
the United States will seek control over operations and
intelligence, but both sides will be reluctant to fully disclose
their own information and capabilities. Without the ability to
control the use of sensitive intelligence, such as how and when
operations will be launched, countries like France and Germany
will be reluctant to share their most important intelligence.

As in the past, U.S. and European intelligence agencies will
share varying degrees of information, depending on national
priorities and levels of trust. The coalition will be more
effective at providing political cover for its various members --
diversifying blame for any actions the coalition takes -- than at
creating a formalized structure to fight terrorism. The structure
and trust required for most critical aspects of covert
operations, such as tight control of information and coordinated
action, will take years to develop, during which time terrorists
could continue to slip through the cracks.

The fiery attacks on New York and Washington Sept. 11 forged a
consensus to fight terrorism that might otherwise have taken
decades. European nations previously resisted American efforts to
broaden NATO's mission to include fighting terrorism. Those
efforts included a failed attempt in 1999 to extend Article 5 of
the North Atlantic Treaty for that purpose, the Financial Times
reported Sept. 19.

But soon after the World Trade Center towers collapsed, Europe
united to invoke for the first time that same article, which
calls for joint action in response to an attack on one alliance
member.

As evidence of terror cells operating in Germany, England and
France mounted and unconfirmed reports of planned attacks in
Brussels and elsewhere spread, the European Union quickly reached
consensus to decisively address the threat of strikes on
continental soil.

While national leaders threw their weight behind an anti-
terrorism coalition, interior and justice ministers finalized a
package of 37 measures to enhance the Union's internal
coordination. These include the creation of an anti-terrorism
unit within Europol, tougher border and financial controls,
union-wide search and arrest warrants and greater flexibility for
extradition. This package was taken up at the Sept. 21 summit.

Despite historically close relationships between the United
States and Europe and consensus on both sides for the coalition,
there are significant barriers to intelligence-sharing across the
Atlantic.

Besides a myriad of logistical hurdles, Europe wants to be an
equal partner with the United States in this war, sharing evenly
in intelligence and operational control. The United States will
resist such a structure, choosing to share intelligence
selectively as it sets its own priorities. European intelligence
bodies likewise will resist sharing their most sensitive
intelligence with the United States.

Europe is concerned that the international campaign against
terrorism will be fought on American terms and will subjugate
European interests and authority. They resent U.S. President
George W. Bush's unilateralist foreign policy and also feel
empowered by Washington's recent retreat from the stage in areas
such as the Balkans and the Middle East.

Soon after the invocation of Article 5, French officials began
emphasizing the need for consultations before any military
action. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder told the German
parliament Sept. 20 that "alliance obligations correspond with a
right: namely the right to information and consultation."

European officials have delivered with increasing frequency the
message that intelligence-sharing is a two-way street. A high-
level EU delegation went to Washington Sept. 20 to discuss the
nature of that cooperation. In a news conference with U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell following the meeting, Louis
Michel -- foreign minister of Belgium, which currently holds the
rotating EU presidency -- repeatedly emphasized the need for
information-sharing and called for "permanent, timely and
comprehensive consultations at all levels."

Though negotiations over operations and control of the coalition
have been conducted at a low volume publicly, they cut to the
heart of Europe's relationship with the United States. This is a
complex relationship that mixes intense support and cooperation
with distrust and competition.

These same factors will guide intelligence-sharing in the
coalition. While the United States, Canada and Britain already
pool intelligence, other EU and NATO members -- notably France --
do not regularly share their secrets with the United States.
France has always been keenly sensitive to issues of national
sovereignty, particularly in a closely guarded area like
intelligence. Although priorities will certainly differ within
the union, they will shift more substantially across the Atlantic
-- leading to conflicts over when and how to act on intelligence.

European officials are keenly aware of Washington's intelligence
shortcomings and believe that on balance, they possess far better
intelligence. European countries -- including Ireland, Spain,
France and Germany -- have significant experience in dealing with
domestic terrorism. European intelligence can also better track
Al-Qa'ida cells active in Europe, as well as any banking and
financial transactions they make.

The United States also needs European intelligence in foreign
locations where it has limited access -- including Pakistan,
Sudan, Algeria, Kashmir, Lebanon, Indonesia and north and west
Africa. Finally, Washington needs Europe to help forge and
maintain a wider coalition, particularly with key partners in the
Middle East.

Europe, meanwhile, would like access to U.S. intelligence and
satellite technology. It also needs the United States, along with
Britain, to play the military heavy. Taking a backseat in direct
military operations will alleviate domestic pressures in France
and Germany and will also allow them to be more effective as
liaisons with coalition members in the Middle East.

For any long-term anti-terrorism coalition to succeed, there must
be an appropriate structure and a core of trust that allows for
the sharing of intelligence across governments. These will take
years to develop and will hinder the speed and effectiveness of
anti-terrorism operations.

The best hope may be that the European Union successfully
coordinates its internal law enforcement and intelligence
mechanisms. With the evaporation of continental borders and the
coming common currency, the arguments for continental Europe to
coordinate its own intelligence are much more compelling than
arguments to share it with the United States.

Unified and effective intelligence could put Europe on more equal
footing with the United States -- a goal the Continent has sought
for decades.
___________________________________________________________________


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