On being Critical
I thought I would reply to Mike¹s important post, though I suspect due to
the conclusions I draw this may well be the last contribution I make.
Having just received Chris' reply, I find myself perhaps not as isolated in
my thinking as I thought I may be, nevertheless it is clear that to use
perhaps an apt metaphor, there is obviously much clear blue water between
Mike¹s and my perception of Œcriticality¹ in this context. Of course, as
Chris notes, the very concept of critical thinking is an eternally contested
one, yet in my view it can be identified with certain principles for most
academics and intellectuals whose work is founded on western (post)
Enlightenment philosophy.
Firstly, while my own world view is undoubtedly grounded in the
post-Hegelianism of the Frankfurt School, I would disagree with Chris that
this body of work is alone in sharing this critical orientation.
Post-structuralism also seeks to follow a similar path in that, and this is
my first main point, along with Critical Theory it establishes as its object
of criticism the dominant concept of reason or rationality that underpins
the current social, political and economic configurations of western
societies.
Central to this understanding of Œcriticality¹ therefore, is the realization
that ideals such as objectivity, neutrality and the autonomy of the knowing,
constitutive, subject are themselves manifestations of a dominant mode of
rationality, one which is both temporally and spatially specific. Or to put
it more simply, it is the values that Mike champions which are themselves
ideologies in the Œcritical¹ sense of the term, rather than in the liberal
formulation that Mike, quite legitimately, invokes.
Reflexivity, therefore, is not simply about researchers being aware of and
interrogating their biases, but engaging with the realization that the very
instruments of that interrogation are themselves constituted by, and
constitutive of, the mode of rationality they aim to Œcritique¹. This is
important in relation to what Chris noted about Adorno¹s conception of
immanent critique. While for Adorno there was no longer, in a world consumed
by the reifying consequences of humanities conflation of progress with
domination, any remaining foundations on which to undertake the kind of
transcendent critique that Mike offers us, the possibility of immanent
critique was considered to be perhaps the only hope remaining to practice
the kind of reflexivity that is so often championed in contemporary social
science. I have to agree with Mike therefore, that clearly there are
defining differences between a critical approach that adopts such
principles, and one that understands what it is to be critical in its
liberal sense, that of simply the Œquestioning of everything¹. Indeed, much
of what has been offered in the way of response to Mike¹s contributions,
have in my view, attempted to demonstrate such reflexivity and immanence and
this is why the apparent incommensurability has become so visible..
Most notably, the standards of the western powers have been scrutinized in
relation to the values, or rationality, they espouse and has, in turn, been
found wanting. The west and its supporters invoke the principles of
international law, yet they have ignored or broken it on numerous occasions.
They invoke the sanctity of at least non-combatative life, yet take it when
it serves what they consider to be higher cause. They decry terrorism as a
crime against humanity, yet train, support and even undertake terrorism when
deemed strategically beneficial. They champion world civilization, yet tear
up international treaties when they do not serve the narrow national
(economic?) interest. As Adorno noted of course, immanent criticism will
always remain dependent on a vestige of transcendent critique. Terrorism is
an evil, thus we are motivated to undertake such immanent criticism in an
attempt to expose and undermine the rationality that ensures its continued
credibility and propagation in the world. Immanent critique abhors
relativism, indeed as method it exposes its ideological consequences. This
is true if its object is capitalism of communism, Christianity or Islam. Yet
we cannot ignore the global power relations that structure their
expressions, they are not to be approached neutrally.
Another dimension to critical thinking I personally would adhere to is the
dialectical principle of totality . We cannot analyze or theorize events
outside the totality of social relations that constitute their meaning
(remembering that it is a totality that we cannot somehow step out of).
Mike¹s recollection about this experience in the Vietnam war represents what
is undoubtedly a harrowing personal experience, and a genuinely torturous
ethical dilemma. The problem is, do we simply treat it is as such and look
to individualized moral laws to help guide us, or do we seek to understand
and critically evaluate the global conditions that necessitate he find
himself in such a situation. This is not to suggest that we can ever be free
of having to make such decisions, naïve humanism is not, as they say, my
bag. However, critical thinking if it is to be truly critical, while not
ignoring the specific, must realize its dialectical relationship to the
wholeŠ.and as a noted in earlier mail, for Hegel, the real can only be
rational when the rational has become real.
On reflection though, I am perhaps no longer convinced that there is much to
be gained from such discussions on a list such as this. Certainly, there
have been some every informative (if highly vitriolic exchanges) on number
of other academic lists, and perhaps that is where this kind of debate
belongs. Not working in a business/management department I am often Œribbed¹
by colleagues who consider terms such as Œcritical management¹ to be simply
oxymoronic. In some respects, I am reluctantly staring to agree with them.
Indeed, indulging in my own bit of immanent critique for a second, it would
seem that most of the posts I have received from fellow list members in the
States (but also some UK) have, on the whole, failed to even understand
their own values of Œobjectivity¹ and ¹neutrality¹. When I point out that
the UK and Europe has suffered terrorism for years but we have been
encouraged to talk to the terrorists, especially by numerous US
administrations, I am accused of being anti-American. When I suggest that we
must remember that terrorists are often rational, if desperate people, I
am called an apologist or a pacifist. If I express by incredulity at the
apparent lack of critical analysis in the US press about the role the West
has played in the directly nurturing Middle East terrorism, I am called a
communist. Yet, this is not ideology, this is objectivity: This is not an
understandable response to a national tragedy the like of which has never
been visited the US mainland before, this is the defence of western
civilization. I am left wing, you are neutral. I use Adorno (a cultural
elitist and Marxist to boot), you use Popper (perhaps the most overrated
mind of the 20th century), I say tomatoŠ..
Perhaps this is a project we must leave to future generationsŠ
Philip Hancock
Lecturer in Sociology and Philosophy of the Social Sciences
School of Social Sciences
Glasgow Caledonian University
Cowcaddens Road
Glasgow
G4 0BA
Tel: 0141 331 3492
Fax: 0141 331 3439
E-Mail: [log in to unmask]
WWW: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/p.g.hancock/
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