Apologies for cross posting

Please find attached details of a one day symposium for Bayes's Theorem on
Saturday 10 March 2001 at the British Academy in London.

Full details can also be found at www.britac.ac.uk.


The British Academy
 <<...>> 
Bayes's Theorem

A one-day symposium

Saturday 10 March 2001
at the British Academy, 10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1

Bayes's Theorem is a powerful but controversial tool for assessing how
probable specified evidence makes some hypothesis.  It claims that the
probability of a hypothesis h on evidence e and background knowledge k (the
posterior probability of h) is equal to the probability of e given h and k
(the predictive power of h), multiplied by the probability of h given only k
(the prior probability of h), divided by the probability of e given only k
(the prior probability of e). The prior probability of e is its probability
if h is true is multiplied by the prior probability that h is true, plus its
probability if h is false is multiplied by the prior probability that h is
false.

Representing by P(h/e & k) the posterior probability of h, by P(e/h & k) the
predictive power of h, by P(h/k) the prior probability of h, and by  (e/k)
the prior probability of e, Bayes`s Theorem then reads 

P(e/h & k) P(h/k)
P (h/e & k) =         ______________________________________

P(e/k)

Thus suppose that we have background knowledge k that a certain coin has
with equal probability either a bias of 2/3 in favour of landing heads, or a
bias of 2/3 in favour of landing tails. Let h be the hypothesis that it has
a bias of 2/3 in favour of landing heads.  Suppose we toss it four times and
all these tosses are heads (e).  Bayes's Theorem then tells us that this
evidence gives a probability of 16/17 to the hypothesis h.

We may not be able to give exact numerical values to the terms on the
right-hand side of Bayes's Theorem, but so long as we can give rough values,
we can give a rough value to the left-hand side. So perhaps we can use it to
assess (roughly) the probabilities, not merely of simple statistical
hypotheses, but of scientific theories, historical claims and world-views.
Yet to apply it at all, we need to be able to ascribe prior probabilities to
hypotheses.  But can we do that in an objective way, even when we are
dealing with simple statistical hypotheses and have some substantial
relevant background knowledge from observation?  And what about when all our
observational evidence is included in e  - are there a priori criteria for
ascribing prior probabilities? Or must the prior probability of a hypothesis
measure merely a given person`s initial degree of confidence in that
hypothesis? This symposium will investigate whether Bayes's Theorem has any
philosophical justification at all, whether it has application in
statistical science, in the law-courts, and in assessing the probability of
world-views such as theism. There will be opportunity for discussion
following each paper.

Attendance at the conference is free, and all those interested are welcome
to attend, but it is essential to register in advance. In order to register,
please complete the slip overleaf and return it to Angela Pusey at the
British Academy, 10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH (telephone: 020
7969 5200; email: [log in to unmask]). If you would like to have buffet
lunch at the Academy at a cost of £12 per person please indicate this on the
form, and enclose a cheque made payable to the British Academy.

PROGRAMME

10.00 am        Coffee and registration
SESSION I

10.30 am        Introduction by Professor Richard Swinburne, FBA

11.00 am        Bayes's Theorem: The Philosophical Issues
                Professor Elliott Sober, Professor of Philosophy, University
of Wisconsin, Madison

12.15 pm        Lunch

SESSION II: Chairman: Dr Jeremy Butterfield, FBA

1.30 pm Bayes's Theorem and Statistical Science
                                Professor Colin Howson, Professor of
Philosophy, London School of Economics 

SESSION III: Chairman: Professor Hugh Mellor, FBA

2.45 pm Bayes's Theorem  and Weighing Evidence by Juries
                Professor Philip Dawid, Professor of Statistics, University
College London

4.00 pm Tea 

SESSION IV: Chairman: Professor Michael Redhead, FBA

4.30 pm Bayes's Theorem, Miracles and Theism 
                Professor John Earman, Professor of Philosophy, University
of Pittsburgh
The British Academy

Bayes's Theorem

A one-day symposium

Saturday 10 March 2001
at the British Academy, 10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1

Please register me for the Bayes' Theorem symposium 

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ADDRESS 	

	
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I would like lunch at the Academy and enclose my cheque for £12 
(made payable to the British Academy)   YES / NO







 <<...>> 

The British Academy

10, Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH
Telephone: 020 7969 5200
Fax: 020 7969 5300
Web site  <http://www.britac.ac.uk>