This essay appears as a rehash of similar 'refutations' regarding an
evolving 'ecological logos' brought on by an increase in the science of
ecology. What I mean by 'ecological logos' is an account of human occupation
on earth as part of a larger whole. The emphasis of placing importance on
'values' which are not specifically anthropocentric, if they arise from a
new understanding of the importance of the components that make up the
biosphere, the hydrosphere, the atmosphere, and the geosphere, is that it is
relevant and critical to the sustainability of all of earth's 'culture.'

Specifically 'anthropocentric perspective and values' are in fact
'artefacts' which are well known and understood by moralists. These values
as they are known are often 'defective' since the consequences of upholding
many of the these values and perspectives often lead to 'dependency',
'depletion', 'exhaustion' and 'overexploitation.' Gray is making a claim
here that the 'ecocentric' or 'biocentric' perspective excludes these
artefactual values and perspectives he denotes as specifically
'anthropocentric'. He writes:

'That we habitually assume characteristically anthropocentric perspectives
and values is claimed by deep ecologists to be a defect. And as a corrective
to this parochialism, we are invited to assume an "ecocentric" (Rolston
1986, Callicott 1989) or "biocentric" (Taylor 1986) perspective. I am not
persuaded, however, that it is intelligible to abandon our anthropocentric
perspective in favour of one which is more inclusive or expansive.' Gray,
http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html

The problem with this assumption is that the neither Rolston, Callicot nor
Taylor are asking for human values to be abandoned. Rather they specifically
are asking for other values which are not specifically human to be valued.
One can use the anology of a symphony concert to get the point across. It is
a specifically human value to cherish Beethovans ninth symphony is it not?
This is not a specifically animal value, but rather a specifically human
value that is appreciated by a 'subset' of humans. Indirectly the symphony
could be appreciated by animals: whales may enjoy the sonnances, the
chimpanzee may enjoy Dvorjak's 'Ebony Suite' and who knows perhaps Loons may
enjoy this symphony. However the issue is that there are many non-specific
animal values that both humans and chimpanzees can enjoy. Namely these
'animal values' include clean water, clean air, and an environment that is
fear of predators such as bounty hunters, and MIG aircraft dropping bombs in
the rice paddies.

It is really difficult to say what is specifically an 'anthropocentric
value' and which is 'non-anthropocentric value' and since Gray does not
attempt to define what he means by the two values, it is impossible to
critique his critique on 'deep ecology' nor 'biocentric' philosophies. It
would appear to me that the music of the Garifundi is an amalgam of the
forest, the spanish quitar, and the entertwined forest dependent culture of
the Honduras, and thus is not specifically an anthropocentric value.

I hear the sound of Canticleer and Pertelot in the early morning hours of
the village. Roosters crow all night long in some villages. The Alpaca's and
the Vicunas are 'semi-wild' in the Sierras, as are the 'wild burro' and the
'mustangs' in the western parts of North America. Neither of these species
represent any 'anthropocentric' values by themselves. The Vicuna once in the
past was a 'specifically human value' for humans because of it's valuable
hair. The horse in the US and in Canada once was nearing extinction due to
the advent and use of automobiles. The car in the 1960's replaced the horse,
and at one time there were very few horses used at all for work or play.

The same may be said regarding the use of some 'geo-values' like lead in
pipes, and mountains in general. In the past lead was highly valued for
plumbing, for medicines, etc., and now the use of lead in plumbing is highly
discouraged. Mountains were once the anti-thesis of civilizations. Nothing
of any good was said about mountains by Europeans until the later half of
the 19th century. Now mountains are vacation destinations for skiers and
hikers, and the less avid outdoors types. Today mountains are becoming the
fastest growing industry due to their steepness, and in-accessibility, as
well as their beauty. It is needful to remember that mountains like those
that occur in Yosemite Park were made into parks to protect their values
from human industry, or specifically human values. Today Yosemite Park
generates well over $100 million per year in direct revenues to the
California state. Mountain climbing was not practiced by any humans for fun
nor profits until the later part of the 19th century. Today mountain and
rock climbing is one of the fastest growth industries, perhaps surpassing
all other activities. When the idea of rock climbing is raised as an
recreational pursuit, then it must be recognized that there are differences
of opinion on the value of the rocks. For some human valuer, the idea of
climbing an unclimbed peak is not a particularly savory one. For the
afficionado, the idea of climbing an unamed and unclimbed peak is very
savory indeed. It is therefore specious and uncritical to assume that the
'deep ecologist' or the 'biocentric' person is arguing for
'non-anthropocentric' case against the specifically human. By application of
simple reasoning it would appear therefore that the 'non-anthropocentric'
value is a value that is uniquely shared by several if not many species, not
to fail to mention the specifically non-living. It is difficult to separate
'animal values' from 'anthropocentric' values since even most hominids share
human values. Hominids share their love of trees with humans, dogs share
their love of trees with humans <the pee on them, and obtain shade from
them, and they like to fetch sticks of wood, or pull sleighs made from wood,
and they like the heat from the wood used in campfires or homes>.

So my question is what is a 'specifically anthropocentric value' that is not
specifically also an animal value?

Certainly a dog would prefer Will Rogers or Hank Williams to 'Rotterdam
Techno'! Which is more human, and which response is specifically more
non-anthropocentric? The thin slice that prefer Rotterdam Techno <20,000
beat per minute> may include bees, and humingbirds, but I also prefer the
cicada even if they make more noise in the forest.

It was deep ecologist Naess that argued for a sharing of values. He argued
for the cultivation of sheep and Grizzly bears. He figured that the sheep
and bears needed each other in terms of maintaining the health of the soil.
This arguement is similar to Leopold who realized that deer need wolves in
the wild.

It can be said with certainty that the natural abundance of such disease
vectors as the mosquito and the deer tick are the contributing cause
primarily to the presence of Lyme disease and malaria in the human
population. The only persons that are resistant to these diseases are
persons are those that have a natural immunity, or are genetically capable
of resisting the disease <sickle cell anemia, childhood acquired immunity,
etc.). The arguement that HIV and other diseases are of no value is to also
suggest that the human immune systems is of no value. To suggest that the
human immune system is of no value is also to suggest that sexual
reproduction is of no value. To suggest that sexual reproduction is of no
value is to suggest that only those organisms without immune systems are of
value. This is the arguement that supports valuing bacteria and yeasts since
these organisms have no immune systems. These simply organisms do not
require an immune system because they are short lived, and the environments
they inhabit do not have UV light. Only organisms living in an environment
where there is UV light require an immune system, sexual reproduction, etc.
Here is what Gray believes about bacteria. He claims these organisms should
not be valued. The reductionist, pop science approach appears non-sensical.
Because there are bacteria on the earth, some of which are directly
beneficial to humans, some are essential, and while some bacteria are life
threatening, bacteria represent a very early stage of evolution, a stage
which has persisted. From an ecological perspective bacteria are immensely
valuable because they have assisted the human immune system in defending
itself from UV light, from being trapped in an evolutionary 'cul-de-sac' so
to speak. Human digestion would be practically impossible without bacteria.
The use of quantitative descriptions to argue in favour of not valuing
nature is also without appeal. How could a scientist comprehend his line of
reasoning here? I cannot....


'Consider some extreme cases: should we be concerned about the fate of the
planet several billion years hence, or about the welfare of bacteria? I
think not. Such concern would be pointless and misdirected for the simple
reason that there's nothing we can do to affect the fate of the planet in
the very long term, or to seriously disrupt the welfare of single-celled
creatures. Bacteria have been the dominant life form on the planet for more
than three billion years-about five sixths of evolutionary history-and will
almost certainly continue long after the demise of our species. It is often
said that we live in the Age of Mammals; but, as Gould has pointed out, it
is now, as it has always been, the Age of Bacteria. There are more e. coli
in every human intestine than there have ever been homo sapiens.
Multicellular life is a comparatively recent arrival in the biosphere,
having evolved only within the last half billion years or so.' Gray,
http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html

'...the fact that in a million years nothing will matter, does not matter
now. That is to say, the (alleged) future insignificance of the present
entails the present insignificance of the future, and hence the present
insignificance of the future insignificance of the present.'Gray,
http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html