From: Progressive Response [mailto:[log in to unmask]] Sent: Tuesday, December 04, 2001 11:00 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Israel's Plan, UN/Afghanistan, Neoconservartives, Iraq
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The Progressive Response 4 December 2001 Vol. 5, No. 41
Editor: Tom Barry
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The Progressive Response (PR) is a weekly service of Foreign Policy in
Focus (FPIF)--a "Think Tank Without Walls." A joint project of the
Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies, FPIF
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Tom Barry, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the
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Foreign Policy In Focus. He can be contacted at <[log in to unmask]>.
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I. Updates and Out-Takes
*** ISRAEL'S TRUE INTENTIONS IN REMOVING ARAFAT ***
By R. S. Zaharna
*** NEW U.S. COURTSHIP OF UNITED NATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN ***
By Ian Williams
*** NEOCONSERVATIVES SHAPE NEW U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ***
By Jim Lobe
II. Outside the U.S.
*** AMERICA'S TALIBAIZATION? ***
By Mushahid Hussain
*** IT'S THE OCCUPATION ***
By Sam Bahour and Michael Dahan
III. Letters and Comments
*** DEEP BETRAYAL ***
*** KEY CONSIDERATION OMITTED ***
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I. Updates and Out-Takes
(Editor's Note: While the hawks in Washington are scheming to take the war
on terrorism to Baghdad, the Ariel Sharon administration in Israel is
taking the war on terrorism to another Middle Eastern government: the
Palestinian Authority. Sharon says that in going after the Palestinian
leadership in retaliation for the recent suicide bombings--which came in
retaliation for a round of extrajudicial killings by Israeli security
forces--Israel is fighting the same war that the Bush administration
launched after September 11. In Israel, the hawks rule; and in Washington,
despite Powell's attempts to maintain a moderate spin on America's new war
effort, the hawks are circling for new kills. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan,
the war continues, as the humanitarian crisis mounts. Once the war is "won"
and the aerial bombing ceases, the U.S. wants to leave the less politically
rewarding task of peacekeeping and reconstruction to the United Nations. In
this issue of the Progressive Response, three FPIF experts examine the new
dimensions and consequences of America's war on terrorism.)
*** ISRAEL'S TRUE INTENTIONS IN REMOVING ARAFAT ***
By R. S. Zaharna
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF Global Affairs Commentary, posted
in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0112arafat.html .)
It may be time--yet, then it may be too late--for Israel to confess to its
true intentions in the Palestinian territories. The sustained and myopic
focus on the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, has little to do with
stopping "terrorism." What removing Arafat will do is induce a Palestinian
civil war and, by extension, give Israel a pretext for re-occupying the
Palestinian territories. The campaign behind this strategy has been
ongoing, but it has rapidly intensified since the U.S. military action in
Afghanistan. As the U.S. focuses its efforts on Osama bin Laden, Israel
appears to be making parallel moves against Arafat.
By keeping the focus on Arafat and intensifying its focus through the new
association of "terrorism," Israel was able to further downplay the role of
its military occupation and the new measures introduced to control the
Palestinian population. In fact, Israeli actions in early spring 2001
clearly suggest that Israeli actions to "maintain security," had a dual,
longer-term, strategic purpose. First, the Israelis, by cordoning off the
major Palestinian towns from each other and constructing a network of check
points and trenches, were able to effectively isolate major segments of the
Palestinian population from each other. The "power" of the Palestinian
Authority was reduced to noncontiguous pockets of limited control.
Second, the Israelis began incursions into Palestinian-controlled
territories, bulldozing areas of land bordering on jointly controlled
Palestinian-Israeli territory. Again, the pretext was security; the
Palestinian homes and territory were being used as a staging ground for
attacks against Israelis. The effect, however, was that Israel created a
convenient staging ground for itself should it find it perhaps necessary to
launch a more sustained military attack in the future. The repeated
incursions into the Palestinian-controlled territory had the additional
affect of numbing the shock factor of such military action within
international public opinion.
Third, the Israelis began a direct assault on Palestinian leaders. The
first assassinations began as early as November 2000. After initial
American and international pressure, they subsided briefly only to be
renewed with greater intensity in the late spring. In August, after
extensive reports of civilian deaths, again the assassinations came under
international censorship. Then came September 11. The debate, like other
political and ethical considerations, fell silent.
None of the Israeli tactics have reduced Palestinian "violence" or
increased Israeli security. In fact, they have had the opposite effect. The
tightened Israeli control around the Palestinian towns has paralyzed the
Palestinian economy, creating an increasingly desperate population. The
military incursions have undermined the Palestinian Authority's power to
protect Palestinian land or lives, and have systematically erased the
diplomatic gains from Oslo. The Israeli assassinations of Palestinian
leaders have emboldened to a new breed of Palestinian youths, who draw
parallels from the Israeli action, which to the youths, legitimizes
reciprocal retribution.
What these Israeli tactics have done is perpetuated the cycle of violence.
However, when viewed from the perspective of the ongoing campaign to hold
Arafat responsible, all violence--whether Palestinian or Israeli--becomes
associated with him. This is the beauty of an effective media campaign. So
long as one can control perceptions through intensify and downplay
techniques, the reality of the situation on the ground is meaningless. It
is the perception that matters: Arafat is responsible for the violence.
This assessment of Arafat's ability to control the Palestinian population
and stop Palestinian "violence," has been spelled out specifically and
repeatedly in intelligence analysis throughout the Middle East, Europe, and
the United States. Jane's Intelligence Digest, one of the premiere military
intelligence sources, stated unequivocally "As JID has warned for months,
Arafat will not be able to deliver because he does not control the
situation on the ground" ("Middle East Peace?" June 15, 2001).
If Arafat is not able to "control the violence," why is there continued
pressure on him to do so? If one looks at the campaign strategically, the
end result is the same. So long as Arafat is perceived as being responsible
for the violence, pressure can be placed on him to stop the violence.
If Arafat does yield to Israeli and American pressure to arrest all
Palestinian militants (who are perceived by the Palestinian population as
legitimately resisting Israeli occupation) Arafat will be removed from
power and a Palestinian civil war will likely ensue. However, if Arafat
does not arrest all militants, Israel can continue and even intensify its
tactics against the Palestinians, eventually removing the Palestinian
leaders themselves. Again, the result would be a state of internal
instability that parallels a civil war, requiring Israel to move into the
territories.
Ideally, for the Israelis and the U.S., it is preferable that the
Palestinian leader be removed through an internal rebellion from his own
people than if Israel is "forced" to remove him. However, if Arafat does
not go against his own people, Israel will claim that because Arafat is
doing nothing to stop Palestinian attacks that Israel has no choice but to
protect its own security; Israel must remove Arafat. Either way, Arafat is
removed from power, resulting in a state of instability that gives Israel
the pretext for reoccupying the Palestinian territories to insure Israel's
security.
Thus far, Arafat has yielded to the pressures of his own Palestinian
constituency rather than those from the U.S. and Israel. Israel is now
facing the least desirable option of removing Arafat itself. However, the
current American attacks in Afghanistan and focus on bringing bin Laden to
justice have provided an emotional climate for Israel to not only take such
action but also legitimize it.
In Israel's assassination policy of targeting Palestinian "leaders," the
distinction between Palestinian "leaders" and "leadership" is strategic.
Once it becomes acceptable to systematically target and assassinate
Palestinian leaders associated with "terrorism"--in the name of Israeli
security--the leap to targeting and assassinating the Palestinian
leadership, i.e. Arafat, is not that difficult to make. In recent days,
that leap has been made.
The comments of Sharon and Bush over the weekend in the "war on terrorism"
are not seemingly and uncannily similar; they are identical. Neither
envisions an immediate end to terrorism, but both have clearly identified
the source and actions needed to fight terrorism. For Bush, it is Osama bin
Laden. For Sharon, it is Yasser Arafat. And, as Bush also indicated, the
sooner the better.
(R.S. Zaharna <[log in to unmask]> is an assistant professor of public
communication at American University and served as a media analyst for the
Palestinian Delegation to the Washington peace talks (1991-93).)
Also See Related FPIF Analysis
The Bush Administration & the Israeli-Palestinian Stalemate
By Stephen Zunes (October 2001)
http://www.fpif.org/papers/stalemate.html
Israel's Policy of Targeting Terrorists: Implications for the U.S.
By R.S. Zaharna (September 2001)
http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol6/v6n32exjud.html
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*** NEW U.S. COURTSHIP OF UNITED NATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN ***
By Ian Williams
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF Global Affairs Commentary, posted
in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0111afghanun.html .)
Since September 11, the United Nations has gained a rare prominence in
Washington's calculations. Of course it did once before, when Iraq invaded
Kuwait--but that was more like a one-night stand turned date rape than a
long-term relationship. This time, it could be a more durable courtship,
based on more modest and realistic expectations on both sides.
Of course, we are not talking about selflessness on the part of the various
players in Washington. But what one hopes is pragmatic appreciation of the
consequences of September 11 and the usefulness, indeed indispensability,
of the United Nations as an institution for framing the multilateral
responses necessary to international terrorism. After initial restive
comments from some of the die-hard unilateralists like Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, the U.S. was careful to return to the Security
Council for a resolution to provide legal cover for its attack on the
Taliban. The Bush administration also welcomed and supported the
appointment of Lakhdar Brahimi as Kofi Annan's Special Representative for
Afghanistan. To show it was serious, the administration even made the
promised back-payment of $583 million in dues.
At the same time no one can accuse the UN of hubris. Throughout his first
term, Secretary General Kofi Annan has been careful to ensure that the
organization is seen as a useful facilitator rather than an independent
player. He has continued this low-key role over Afghanistan, which in an
odd way has made the organization indispensable for finding solutions
there. It is a role played with great finesse by Special Representative
Brahimi, the author of a cautionary report last year on UN peacekeeping and
its limitations, who from the beginning of his new task has taken
considerable pains to downplay the UN's future role on the ground in
Afghanistan. He and the UN Secretariat neither desire nor envisage an East
Timor or Kosovo nation-building exercise, let alone the repetition of
Somalia or Bosnia.
In the end, as so often, the UN is as effective as the U.S. wants it to be,
and Washington has both domestic and foreign public opinion reasons to want
as durable a settlement in Afghanistan as possible. Diplomats and UN senior
staff have modest ambitions for the country. From the beginning, they did
not expect to build Shangri La in the Himalayas, but rather to avert the
very worst outcomes that they feared were all too likely.
It is very likely that for the very reasons of neutrality that gave the UN
the task of pulling together the factions, the organization may well have
more involvement on the ground than it wants when it comes to rebuilding
the country. Certainly in the major cities there is the possibility of some
kind of military presence that counts on some form of UN mandate--and maybe
even as UN forces. For the good of Afghanistan and for the future of
nation-building, it will be extremely important that the operations are
planned carefully for optimal results rather than being dumped on the UN.
If the continuing "war against terrorism" is to have international
credibility and support, then the reconstruction of Afghanistan cannot be
too egregious a failure. So there is every expectation that the NATO powers
will offer the necessary financial and military resources. For example, UN
humanitarian operations are likely to need some form of security presence
if the Somali experience of looting is not to be repeated. However, the UN
caution about being drawn in will be justifiably compounded unless any
presence on the ground has the public and unequivocal backing of the United
States. The U.S. may not need major forces there, but the lesson of the
Balkans is that it should offer credible guarantees of them if any of the
Afghan parties step out of line. Given the U.S. public's and the DOD's new
post-September 11 willingness to support U.S. overseas military operations,
this may well be easier than in the past.
(Ian Williams <[log in to unmask]>, UN Correspondent for The Nation, is
also the author of "The UN for Beginners.")
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*** NEOCONSERVATIVES SHAPE NEW U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ***
By Jim Lobe
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF Global Affairs Commentary, posted
in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0111hawk.html .)
It's all but official. Despite strong opposition from Arab allies, not to
mention our NATO partners in Europe, it seems we're headed for Round 2 of
the 1991 Gulf war against Iraq. Not only are U.S. officials once again
stepping up their rhetoric against Baghdad, but President George W. Bush
himself last Monday issued an ominous three-word answer to the question of
what happens if Saddam Hussein does not permit UN inspectors back into his
country. "He'll find out" was the terse reply.
For weeks since the September 11 terrorist attacks, internal warfare raged
between the Pentagon and the State Department over widening the war on
terrorism to Iraq, even if there was no firm evidence linking Saddam
Hussein to the attacks. With the apparent success of the U.S. military
campaign in Afghanistan, the balance now appears to be tilting strongly
toward the wider-war faction, as Bush's words, not to mention those of
other top administration officials, suggest.
This circle of hawks is backed outside the administration by a network of
veteran Washington hands whose political savvy, talent for polemics, media
contacts, and lust for ideological combat have made them a formidable force
on foreign policy since the Vietnam War. With roots in the Scoop Jackson
faction of the Democratic Party, these "neo-conservatives" are decidedly
aggressive when it comes to supporting Israel, particularly Likud; mostly
hostile toward the United Nations; often contemptuous of European "elites;"
and absolutely convinced of the fundamental moral superiority and
redemptive mission of the United States abroad.
Outside the administration, members of this group include such
personalities as former UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, "End of History"
guru Francis Fukuyama, former CIA chief James Woolsey, syndicated columnist
Charles Krauthammer, and Weekly Standard editor, William Kristol, to name a
few.
Allied with more traditional Republican unilateralists, like Rumsfeld, many
of these same neo-cons--initially organized as the Committee for the
Present Danger--played critical roles in the mid-1970s in killing ditente
with the Soviet Union. During the 1980s, when most of them held senior
posts in the Reagan administration and others created the Committee for the
Free World, they were the staunchest supporters of violent anticommunist
crusades in Afghanistan, Angola, and Central America. Orphaned by Bush Sr.,
who found their propensity for moral outrage and their affinity for the
Likud threatening to his brand of Realpolitik, they stewed and chafed and
moaned about a "New World Order" that wasn't as "unipolar" as it should be.
Some even campaigned for Clinton.
Since 1997, their extra-governmental guise has been the Project for a New
American Century (PNAC). Like the Committee on the Present Danger 25 years
ago, this group--whose two dozen founding members included Rumsfeld,
Cheney, Wolfowitz, Libby, and Abrams--sees its main enemies as the same
pin-striped set at the State Department; overly cautious and conservative
military brass; and intelligence analysts who believe that facts should not
be tailored to suit policy preferences or paranoia.
While ardent supporters of U.S. military intervention, very few neo-cons
actually served in the armed forces, and an even smaller number have ever
been elected to public office. Many, like its current director, Gary
Schmitt, are veterans of congressional committees or the national security
Bureaucracy. When not in government, they generally have perched at
high-priced law firms or right-wing think tanks, notably the American
Enterprise Institute--where Perle has long been especially active.
PNAC's vision, as articulated by its founders and associates,
anti-apologetically favors a Pax Americana backed by superior military
power and a will to confront--unilaterally, if necessary--any emerging or
potential regional or global power before it can threaten Washington's
interests or position. Its core ideas appear to be based in large part on a
1992 Pentagon strategy document drafted by Wolfowitz and Libby that was
drastically toned down at the insistence of Bush Sr.'s top foreign policy
aides, Brent Scowcroft and James Baker, before its final publication. It is
a vision that is clearly at variance with the more modest and
multilateralist sentiments of the vast majority of the American public,
according to polls taken over the past decade.
As Bush Jr.'s war on terrorism completes its work in Afghanistan, the
debate over Iraq will almost certainly intensify both within and outside
the administration. The outcome's implications, however, go far beyond Iraq
or the larger Arab world, because the vision that lies behind the drive for
Baghdad is essentially imperial and unabashedly hegemonic. The stakes for
the future U.S. role in the world could not be higher.
(Jim Lobe <[log in to unmask]> is a contributing editor at Foreign Policy
in Focus and a journalist with Inter Press Service, an international news
agency.)
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II. Outside the U.S.
*** AMERICA'S TALIBAIZATION? ***
By Mushahid Hussain
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF Global Affairs Commentary, posted
in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0111talibanization.html
.)
When President Bush launched the bombing attacks on Afghanistan, he termed
the war against terrorism as "upholding and defending American values."
These "American values" were broadly defined as justice, freedom, human
rights, and the rule of law. Conversely, he criticized the Taliban for
their "intolerance, bigotry, absence of human rights, and lack of any
democratic norms promoting the rule of law."
However, in the past few weeks, with the Taliban on the run, it seems that
some of the recent changes altering the character of the American state,
particularly attitudes toward civil liberties and human rights, may be more
inspired by a Taliban-like mindset than two centuries of tradition rooted
in the American Revolution. A series of changes in U.S. laws have given
unprecedented powers to the American President and law-enforcing
institutions to violate constitutional rights and established legal
traditions, with a Clinton Cabinet official, Robert Reich, expressing alarm
that "we can find ourselves in a police state step by step" since "the
President is by emergency decree getting rid of rights that we assumed that
anyone within our borders legally would have."
Recent actions that have caused understandable concern:
7 Some 1182 persons living in the U.S., almost entirely Muslim, continue to
be detained without charges and without being told what their crime is
since the September 11 attacks;
7 Under the USA Patriot Act, suspects can be indefinitely detained without
charges for up to 6 months, with police and the FBI given wide-ranging
powers to conduct searches of homes and offices, intrude into the privacy
of financial transactions, and intercept phone, mail, and Internet
communications;
7 Some 5,000 young men, between ages 18-33, who legitimately entered the
U.S. from Muslim countries after January 2000 will be questioned by the FBI
for possible connections with the terrorists who hijacked the 4 planes on
September 11, thereby spreading alarm and fear since they could treated as
suspects or even potential terrorists;
7 To top it all, on November 13, the day Kabul fell, President Bush,
declaring an "extraordinary emergency," decreed the establishment of
special military tribunals to try non-Americans within the U.S. and
overseas who allegedly are involved in committing acts of terrorism. These
handpicked military courts, operating in secrecy and dispensing with
constitutional rights, can impose a death sentence, without even the right
of appeal.
Three adverse consequences will flow from these actions. First, such powers
assumed by the Bush administration in the name of combating terrorism not
only violate universally accepted standards of fundamental rights, but they
damage America's image as a defender of freedom and human rights.
Second, these actions are tantamount to altering the democratic character
of the American state. What kind of country will emerge from this
Talibanization of the United States, where millions of citizens (at least
the 7 million Muslims, for starters) would be living in constant fear of
the midnight knock that can come any time? Fear and paranoia would extend
to the citizenry at large, creating an almost permanent state of siege
within the United States.
Finally, the timing of these actions is a recipe for disaster for the
American relationship with the Muslim world, given the perception of the
actions as Muslim-specific. Given the war in Afghanistan, many Muslims, in
the words of Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, would be led
to believe that "it is beginning to look more and more like a war against
Muslims."
(Mushahid Hussain <[log in to unmask]> is an Islamabad-based columnist
and analyst.)
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*** IT'S THE OCCUPATION ***
By Sam Bahour and Michael Dahan
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF Global Affairs Commentary, posted
in its entirety at:
http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/0112occupation.html .)
In the wake of the horrific suicide bombings in Israel over the past 48
hours, hawkish Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon made his address to the
nation as he simultaneously increased, by yet another step, Israel's part
of the violence in the ensuing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.
Sadly, no end is in sight and it is likely to get worse, much worse. If
this statement sounds like a broken record, it's because it is.
The suicide attacks, brought on by the deplorable Israeli policy of yet
another state-sanctioned extra-judicial assassination of a Hamas member
last week, have brought Israelis and the Palestinians to the brink of total
war.
Some things in life are either right or wrong. Slavery and Apartheid were
wrong. Not wrong until African Americans proved their worthiness of
freedom. Not wrong until South Africans reached the brink of annihilation.
No. These historical flaws were not partially wrong; not debatably wrong,
they were outright outcasts to humanity, each worthy of abrupt termination.
The Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem
joins these ranks, albeit this historic wrong comes during an era of media
clips, political spin, and satellite TV. Nevertheless, the time has come
for the world community to bring Israeli occupation tumbling down, and with
its fall will be the start of the end of the breeding grounds that suicide
bombers feed upon.
More and more voices are being heard within the Israeli leadership to
either kill Arafat or to remove him from the area, and to "topple" the
Palestinian Authority. Most Israelis are now firmly convinced that there is
absolutely "no partner" for peace, nor is peace possible. Naively, the
Israeli public is taking security refuge in the graphic missile attacks on
Palestinian cities while forgetting that for each missile fired into
Palestinian neighborhoods, more and more potential suicide bombers make the
decision to take innocent lives while taking their own. Destroying Arafat's
helicopters will not bring hope to the growing number of Palestinians who
have equated life under occupation to death.
(Sam Bahour is a Palestinian-American living in the besieged Palestinian
City of Al-Bireh in the West Bank and can be reached at
<[log in to unmask]>. Michael Dahan is an Israeli-American political
scientist living in Jerusalem and can be reached at <[log in to unmask]>.)
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III. Letters and Comments
*** DEEP BETRAYAL ***
Stephen Zunes ["Why the U.S. Didn't Overthrow Saddam Hussein," at
http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0111gulfwar.html ] misrepresents the issue
at the end of the Gulf War. It was not a choice between ending the war, as
President Bush did, and marching on Baghdad. Rather, the outbreak of revolt
in southern Iraq, followed shortly by the Kurdish revolt in the north,
posed this issue at the beginning of March 1991: should the U.S. and its
allies support the rebels or Saddam? Although the U.S. did not formally
side with the regime, effectively they allowed it all as the means to crush
the rebellion, and stood by, within earshot of the slaughter, while this
happened.
If, instead, they had blocked the movement of the Republican Guard into
Basra and other cities, and had denied Saddam's forces the use of
helicopter gunships, the revolt would have gathered momentum. Successful
revolts in the south and north of Iraq would have encouraged opposition
within the regime's central Sunni heartlands, and possibly within the
regime itself. We don't know, of course, how the issues would have been
posed, concretely, in the course of such a struggle, how violent it would
have been, or what degree of American intervention would have been needed
to ensure success. We do know that there were plenty of Iraqis prepared to
challenge Saddam in his moment of weakness at the end of the war, and that
the tragedy of Iraq in the past decade is largely due to the fact that they
failed. It is difficult not to see Bush's decision as a deep betrayal of
the Iraqi people, whom he had encouraged to overthrow Saddam.
- Martin Shaw <[log in to unmask]>
Professor of International Relations & Politics, University of Sussex
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*** KEY CONSIDERATION OMITTED ***
Although I agree with the thrust of Stephen Zunes' argument about "Why the
U.S. didn't overthrow Saddam Hussein" in 1991, Zunes omits a key
consideration: Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Although the U.S. may
have known that Iraq's nuclear program had not progressed to the point of
fielding a weapon, it may equally well have known of Iraq's possession of
operational biological weapons capable of wreaking havoc among American
troops and the populations of U.S. allies, including Israel; and the U.S.
certainly knew of Iraq's huge arsenal of chemical weapons, including
supertoxic nerve agents, which were in the field as a fully integrated
component of the Iraqi war machine, and one which had been used extensively
in the war with Iran.
Deterrence apparently worked on both sides: Iraq did not use chemical or
biological agents, and the U.S. did not carpet-bomb or march on Baghdad.
But deterrence does not work if you leave your opponent with nothing to
lose. There is no reason to assume that CW rockets and artillery would not
have been used to slow an American advance toward Baghdad. Although the
U.S. would still have prevailed, fighting on a CW battlefield would have
cost the U.S. hundreds if not thousands of casualties.
A decade later, Iraq has been forced to give up its WMD arsenal, and while
much has been made of the possibility of clandestine efforts to
reconstitute some of this capability, there is no evidence that Iraq has
rebuilt the massive industrial complex that supported its chemical and
biological arsenal. Thus, there is little reason to doubt that Iraq remains
effectively disarmed, at least with respect to its former capability to use
WMD in a battlefield role.
The U.S. now threatens to attack Iraq to punish it for noncooperation with
the UN inspections regime, and for presumed efforts to rebuild its WMD
capabilities. Baghdad has in fact excluded arms inspectors for several
years, and prior to that Iraqi compliance with the UN was partial at best
and was marked by many evasions. It now becomes clear why Saddam considered
these weapons sufficiently valuable to warrant behavior that made it easier
for Washington to justify continued sanctions and bombing. The possession
of chemical and biological agents, whether at the level of a battlefield
capability or, as might more plausibly be the case today, at the much lower
level of a terrorist capability, must seem to Iraqis their best guarantee
against an all-out U.S. attack, even as it seems to Americans the most
compelling reason for targeting Iraq in "the next phase of the war on
terrorism."
The U.S. thus presents Baghdad with an absurd ultimatum: Disarm, or we will
attack you. Americans may consider it obvious that "good behavior" by Iraq
would prevent the U.S. from establishing a case for war, but it would be
very understandable if Iraqis failed to see it this way, given the
unremitting hatred continually expressed in our media and by our government
officials, given the bombing and sanctions that continue more than a decade
after the liberation of Kuwait, and given the record of U.S. manipulation
of the inspections to justify continuation of the sanctions and even as a
cover for military espionage in preparation for bombing. Nothing that is
known about Saddam Hussein suggests that he would not consider the
maintenance and expansion of whatever WMD capabilities he may have today to
be a matter of the highest importance. The more the U.S. threatens and
demands cooperation with a renewed inspections regime, the more essential
it may seem to Iraqis that they maintain their deterrent capabilities.
- Mark A. Gubrud <[log in to unmask]>
Physics Dept., University of Maryland, College Park
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