From: Progressive ResponseTo: [log in to unmask]
Sent: 21/11/01 20:08
Subject: Colombia, War's 2nd Phase, WTO


************************************************************************
Click http://www.fpif.org/progresp/volume5/v5n39.html to view an
HTML-formatted version of this issue of Progressive Response.

************************************************************************

------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
The Progressive Response            21 November 2001           Vol. 5,
No. 39
Editor: Tom Barry
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-

The Progressive Response (PR) is a weekly service of Foreign Policy in
Focus (FPIF)--a "Think Tank Without Walls." A joint project of the
Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies,
FPIF
is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to
"making
the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing
citizen
movements and agendas." We encourage responses to the opinions expressed
in
the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For
more
information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting
the
FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/, or email <[log in to unmask]> to
share
your thoughts with us.

                **** We Count on Your Support ****

------------------------------------------------------------------------
-


I. Updates and Out-Takes

*** U.S. COLOMBIA POLICY: DRUGS AND TERRORISM ***
By Tom Barry

*** BUSH'S WAR: PHASE TWO? ***

*** DOHA DREAMS ***
By John Gershman, Interhemispheric Resource Center


II. Outside the U.S.

*** INDIA: THE NATURAL ALLY AND THE TACTICAL ALLY ***
By Ninan Koshy


III. Letters and Comments

*** LEAVE AFHANISTAN IN CHAOS ***

*** 40% ON TARGET ***

*** EXPLAINING WHY ***


------------------------------------------------------------------------
-

I. Updates and Out-Takes

*** U.S. COLOMBIA POLICY: DRUGS AND TERRORISM ***
By Tom Barry

A new war--the "war against terrorism"--that the U.S. launched in
response
to the September 11 attacks now overshadows the other prolonged war in
which the U.S. has officially been engaged since the 1970s: America's
"War
on Drugs." In its early years, the war against drug production,
trafficking, and use was largely a metaphorical war. "Just Say No" was
its
call to battle. However, as drug flows increased and drug-related crime
spread from the inner cities into America's heartland, the campaign
against
drugs became increasingly militarized.

On the U.S.-Mexico boundary, U.S. customs and border patrol officers
armed
themselves against drug runners and traffickers. Joining the new war on
drugs in the borderlands, the U.S. military took charge of aerial
surveillance and the U.S. National Guard established a military presence
on
the ground. South of the border, the Pentagon took on the drug war as
part
of its own mission. Initially, the U.S. government treated drug control
mostly as a police and judicial effort, working mainly with national
police
and judiciaries in Mexico, Colombia, and elsewhere throughout the
hemisphere. Quickly, however, this police work was turned over to the
armed
forces, working in concert with U.S. military trainers and funded by
U.S.
military aid.

Today, America's war on drugs is much more than a metaphor. The U.S. is
training and financially underwriting the armed forces in Latin American

countries that produce and export illegal drugs, and U.S. military
contractees and U.S. soldiers are involved (in training, logistical, and

intelligence capacities) in wars against guerrilla forces in Colombia.
More
than seven of every ten dollars that goes to Colombia for drug control
is
earmarked for the country's security forces. Other declared U.S. foreign

policy concerns, such as human rights, have been overshadowed by
America's
drug war. President Clinton, for example, invoked a "national security
interest" waiver in his last year in office permitting U.S. military aid
to
Colombia despite the failure of the government to demonstrate
improvements
in human rights practices by the military.

It's too early to say how the new war on terrorism will affect the
three-decade-long war on drugs. One clear danger, however, is that U.S.
involvement in Colombia and the Andean region may be caught in a mixed
metaphor--using the new language of the war on terrorism to bolster the
failing war against illegal drugs.

The policy debate over the U.S. role in Colombia is already a messy one.

That's because the executive branch has not been forthright about its
deepening mission in the Andes--to what degree is U.S. involvement a
drug
war and to what degree are broader geopolitical and geoeconomic
interests
dictating escalating aid and intervention. Also complicating the policy
debate is the sensitivity of skeptics or opponents of the current U.S.
policies in the Andes to charges that they are soft on drugs. As a
result,
even some of those with strong reservations about the effectiveness of
the
drug war and about "mission creep" do not oppose new budget
authorizations.

The lack of clarity about what really drives U.S. policy and how success

will be measured make honest debate difficult. Peter Rodman, assistant
secretary of defense for international affairs, captured the fuzzy
character of U.S. policy in Colombia in a recent press conference. When
questioned by reporters about where U.S. policy was heading, he said: "I

think we as a country are not quite sure where we're heading... I think
there's a consensus that there's an important American interest, but
there's not necessarily a consensus about what the right way to serve
that
interest is."

Skittish about criticisms of "mission creep," the Bush administration
has
carefully avoided defining its policies and programs in the Andes in the

traditional language of geopolitics and geoeconomics. That's odd,
because
the Andes is a region--with Colombia at its center--that is beset with
the
kind of geopolitical and geoeconomic concerns that have previously
guided
U.S. interventionist policy in Latin America. A strong case could be
made
that drug-related and political violence in Colombia do threaten vital
U.S.
interests by endangering the political and economic stability in a
region
so close to home. The U.S. administration has stayed even farther away
from
articulating a nation-building argument for the U.S. presence--although
that is exactly what some observers say the U.S. is doing with its
programs
to "professionalize" the security forces and strengthen the
judiciary.  Keeping to safer ground, the Bush administration has honed
the
official position that its aid packages are focused exclusively on
stopping
drug flows. However, the designation of the two leftwing guerrilla
armies
and the main rightwing paramilitary force as "terrorist" organizations
now
figure into the administration's appeals for continuing congressional
and
public support for its policy in the Andes.

Mounting an effective opposition to Plan Colombia and the new Andean
Regional Initiative has proved difficult--not only because U.S. policy
is
so ambiguous but also because there are no good models for an
alternative
policy approach. Nongovernmental advocacy organizations and the
religious
community--both of whom are closely connected to civil society
organizations in the region--have successfully raised concerns about
human
rights abuses, environmental side-effects, and the fundamental failure
of
the drug war to halt drug exports to meet illegal U.S. demand. They have

also played an important role in keeping the U.S. committed, at least
rhetorically, to peace negotiations.

But policymakers who acknowledge the flaws and negative impacts of the
current U.S. policy ask: what is the alternative? Clearly, the
government
cannot let illegal drug flows unimpeded into the United States.
Moreover,
can the U.S. government abandon Colombia and Colombians to the
drug-related
and political violence that threatens to destabilize a region so close
to
our own country? Without good answers to these questions, the focus of
critics and skeptics has been to address the worst side-effects and
shortcomings of U.S. policies--such as human rights abuses by the
security
forces, failure to vigorously condemn the rightwing paramilitary units,
the
human and environmental impacts of coca eradication programs, and, to
some
degree, the displacement of peasant farmers. To a limited extent, the
U.S.
government has addressed these critiques, and in its recent regional aid

program has increased the soft side of its involvement--with new
commitments to democracy strengthening, civil society assistance, and
alternative development. But the military aid and training continue to
be a
major thrust of U.S. policy in the Andes, and the blood and drugs
continue
to flow.

Advancing an alternative policy in the Andes is no easy political task.
At
a minimum, it means declaring the war on drugs a failure and then
persuading the public and policy community that demand-oriented
approaches
must be the centerpiece of a new drug policy. Such a policy must accept
that use of narcotics and mind-altering drugs will always be with us.
"Just
Say No" programs have a place in drug education and prevention
strategies,
but these need to be complemented with a major new commitment to
harm-reduction and treatment programs. Most observers now readily admit
that the drug problem is mainly a demand rather than a supply problem.
However, a serious demand-based strategy requires more than new
demand-reduction and treatment programs. Decriminalization the personal
use
of illegal drugs--along with the necessary regulatory programs--is an
essential part of the solution to the violence and corruption resulting
from the high profits and costs that now characterize the international
market in illegal drugs. Given prevailing public opinion and the current

policy environment, serious consideration of drug decriminalization is
considered a nonstarter inside the Beltway.

Recently, there have been signs that the public--seeing the failure of
the
drug war--is ready to consider proposals to decriminalize the personal
use
of drugs, especially when closely combined with education,
harm-reduction,
and medical treatment programs. Ending the war on drugs by eliminating
the
high profit margins of drug trafficking would go a long way to
addressing
the violence in Colombia and elsewhere in the Americas.

Even if the drug war were to succeed in stopping drug production and
trafficking in Colombia, the U.S. government and foreign policy
advocates
would still face a crisis in the Andes that the U.S. must address as a
hemispheric leader. Widespread political violence in Colombia did not
start
with drugs, and will not end with their elimination. Any alternative
policy
agenda must consider solutions to this persistent political violence and
to
related political problems resulting from the elite control of
governance
in Colombia. If political stability and broad economic progress are U.S.

goals, then the U.S. must be prepared to commit itself to development
solutions that directly address rural impoverishment and marginalization

while narrowing the stark income-distribution disparities endemic to the

region. Today's challenge is not unlike the political-economic ones
unsuccessfully faced by the Alliance for Progress in the 1960s. Clearly,

the development proposals favored by most governments in the
hemisphere--mainly increased economic integration and trade
preferences--are inadequate. But neither do policy reformers have a
well-developed development agenda capable of attracting public and
policy
support.

At least to some extent, U.S. policy in the Andean region is a typical
case
of policy inertia--in which administration officials and lawmakers are
parroting the political jargon that's in their briefing books. To some
extent, they believe that this is a policy about drugs or that it will
eventually work. Although many policymakers question the effectiveness
of
the drug war, they reluctantly approve new drug war budgets for lack of
alternative strategies. Recently, even pro-aid congressional members
have
conceded that the government's "source-country" control strategy is not
working as promised. The question before the American public and
policymakers is just how long they will tolerate this policy inertia.

Colombia is a policy conundrum. There are no clear answers, but it's
past
time for an honest and thorough policy debate.

(Tom Barry <[log in to unmask]> is codirector of the Global Affairs
Program
at the Interhemispheric Resource Center.)


------------------------------------------------------------------------
-

*** BUSH'S WAR: PHASE TWO? ***

(Editor's Note: From the beginning, the Bush administration warned that
its
war against terrorism wouldn't be restricted to Afghanistan. With the
Taliban fleeing, and the manhunt for Osama bin Laden intensifying, the
administration is laying the groundwork for phase two of a war that may
span the globe. The administration's right-wing undersecretary for arms
control, John Bolton, singled out Iraq and a few other countries as
sponsoring germ warfare programs at an international conference on
biological weapons, while the DOD's Rumsfeld and National Security
Adviser
Rice also signaled that Iraq's Saddam Hussein may be the next U.S.
target.
As part of our new series of Frequently Asked Questions, FPIF editors
raise
concerns about this possible new target of the war on terrorism. For
other
FAQs, see http://www.fpif.org/faq/index.html.)

* Will Iraq Be the Next Target of the War on Terrorism? *

There has been some pressure by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz
and others within the administration for a dramatic escalation in the
ongoing air strikes against Iraq--and perhaps even a full-scale invasion
to
topple the government of Saddam Hussein. Despite leaks to the media
about
alleged evidence of contact between an Iraqi intelligence officer and
one
of the hijackers of the doomed airplanes, U.S. officials from
Vice-President Cheney on down have consistently stated that there is no
indication of any official Iraqi connection to the events of September
11.
British and Israeli officials have reaffirmed that same position in
recent
days. Given the history of the decidedly secular Baathist regime's
savage
suppression of Islamists within Iraq, close links between Baghdad and
bin
Laden and his followers are extremely unlikely. State Department
allegations of Iraq's "support for terrorism" have largely been limited
to
links between secular and mostly inactive Palestinian groups such as Abu

Nidal, and attacks on Iraqi dissidents abroad.

The deliberate spread of the deadly anthrax virus by unknown persons has

led to speculation that Iraq could somehow be connected with these
attacks.
The United States exported the initial anthrax spores to Iraq during the

1980s as part of an approved, legal trade deal. Since that time,
successive
U.S. governments have expressed concerns that Iraq may be developing
biological weapons. Unlike Iraq's chemical and nuclear potential, which
was
destroyed during the Gulf War and the subsequent inspections regime,
biological weapons development is difficult to detect. There are
conflicting reports regarding the level of sophistication necessary to
process the anthrax, which was first detected in early October, but
there
is as yet no evidence to suggest that it has come from Iraq or any other

foreign government.


Other FPIF analysis on Iraq:

Open-Ended War
By Michael Klare (October 9, 2001)
http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0110war.html

Why the U.S. Did Not Overthrow Saddam Hussein
By Stephen Zunes (November 2001)
http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0111gulfwar.html

The Gulf War: Eight Myths
Stephen Zunes
http://www.fpif.org/papers/8myths/index.html


------------------------------------------------------------------------
-

*** DOHA DREAMS ***
By John Gershman, Interhemispheric Resource Center

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF Global Affairs Commentary,
posted
in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0111dohaconc.html.)

Desperate to prevent a repeat of the Seattle debacle two years ago,
while
also eager to show unity in the face of the September 11 attacks, the
U.S.,
the European Union (EU), and the WTO Secretariat cobbled together an
awkward agenda for the next two years of discussions and negotiations
under
the auspices of the WTO.

The "Doha Development Agenda," which resulted from the recent WTO
ministerial meetings in the port city of Doha in Qatar, provides a "work

program" for the WTO and its various working groups and committees until

the next ministerial meeting in 2003. The Doha agenda is probably the
last
gasp for effective efforts by the so-called Quad (Canada, U.S., EU, and
Japan) to dominate trade talks. This time the developing countries, and
India in particular, fought harder than ever before. Next time China
will
be a full member of the WTO, and it might become even harder for the
Quad
to engage in its backroom deals and arm-twisting.

Some pro-liberalization media, such as the Economist, insist upon
trumpeting Doha as a new round. If it is, it's not like any other.
Previous
trade rounds began with a clear set of inter-related issues and with a
more
or less clear set of objectives with regard to negotiating on those
issues
(namely, reducing barriers to trade, harmonizing technical standards,
etc.). In contrast, there is no explicit linkage between issues in the
Doha
agenda--issues are moving on parallel tracks. Second, many of the
decisions
involve tweaking the agendas of ongoing agendas, such as agriculture and

services, rather than launching into whole new areas of negotiations.
Third, in many of the issue areas, there is a distinct lack of consensus

with regard to the goals of the negotiations. In the statement on
agriculture for example, the declaration commits to comprehensive
negotiations on improving market access, reductions of export subsidies
and
cuts in trade-distorting domestic support programs, but all "without
prejudging the outcome of the negotiations."

Negotiations on the relationship between WTO rules and multilateral
environmental agreements and other trade-environment issues are also
qualified as "without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations." The
four
new issues--investment, competition policy, government procurement, and
trade facilitation--are scheduled to be a focus of a new round to be
launched at the fifth ministerial in 2003, but only with a "written
consensus" from member countries. These qualifiers indicate that Doha
has
just passed the buck on the most contentious and controversial issues to

future negotiations. The Doha agenda is not an agenda of neoliberalism
triumphant.

Despite its name, the Doha Development Agenda does not foreground the
demands of the developing countries--with the partial and limited
exception
of a stronger statement on the primacy of public health over patents for

medicines. Developing countries had hoped to get stronger commitments on

what they identify as "implementation issues." These include anything to
do
with the developing countries' commitments under the WTO to date:
assessing
the costs of liberalization on their economies, obtaining financial
resources for covering the costs of complying with existing and future
WTO
provisions, as well as holding the OECD countries accountable for all of

their commitments on market access in textiles and cuts in agricultural
subsidies.

The failure of the Doha agenda to seriously address developing country
concerns may create new opportunities for other fora, such as the
meetings
on UN Financing for Development and the Rio +10 meeting scheduled for
next
year, to provide spaces for new thinking on trade and development
issues.
Civil society groups, in a statement released at Doha, have targeted
those
summits as targets for initiating a "process that would lead to proper
regulation of the global economy." The tactical alliance that emerged
between civil society groups and developing countries over the TRIPs
issues
was a positive development that might be transferable to other issue
areas.

In short, Doha "succeeded" by conventional measures if the metric is
simply
having a declaration that everyone signed, irrespective of the internal
contradictions and qualifications within it. Doha largely failed to
address
effectively the ongoing development concerns of developing countries and

failed to resolve the WTO's crisis of legitimacy that dates to the 1999
Seattle Ministerial. Doha's dreams may yet prove inadequate to the
challenges the WTO faces.

(John Gershman <[log in to unmask]> is the co-director of the Global
Affairs program of the Interhemispheric Resource center and the
Asia/Pacific editor for Foreign Policy in Focus.)


------------------------------------------------------------------------
-

II. Outside the U.S.

(Editor's Note: FPIF has a new component called "Outside the U.S.,"
which
aims to bring non-U.S. voices into the U.S. policy debate and to foster
dialog between Northern and Southern actors in global affairs issues.
Please visit our Outside the U.S. page for other non-U.S. perspectives
on
global affairs and for information about submissions at:
http://www.fpif.org/outside/index.html.)

*** INDIA: THE NATURAL ALLY AND THE TACTICAL ALLY ***
By Ninan Koshy

In the vaguely defined international coalition in the "war against
terrorism" India and Pakistan occupy perhaps the most uncomfortable
positions. Pakistan was an ally of the United States during the cold
war,
and India, a significant leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, was seen as
an
obstacle to U.S. goals and objectives. Throughout the 1990s U.S.
relations
with India warmed, while they cooled with Pakistan. Prior to September
11,
Pakistan, an authoritarian regime, was one of three countries to
recognize
the Taliban, and its intelligence services had close ties to the
Taliban.
India, on the other hand, was a democracy, and had ties to the
anti-Taliban
Northern Alliance. By warming up to Pakistan in the aftermath of the
attacks, the U.S. has reversed the tilt toward India for which it had
assiduously worked for some three years, favoring its "tactical ally"
(Pakistan) over its "natural ally" (India). The Indian government
appears,
however, to be sacrificing its traditions of non-alignment and support
for
international law in order to rebuild an alliance with the United
States.

The Indian government appears to have been quite pleased when a senior
U.S.
official called India the U.S.'s "natural ally" on the eve of Indian
Prime
Minister A. B. Vajpayee's visit to the U.S., echoing the sentimental
phrase
first coined by India itself. However it was disappointed that there was
no
specific reference to cross-border terrorism in Kashmir (read from
Pakistan) in the joint statement issued on November 10th following the
first ever summit between President George W. Bush and the Prime
Minister.
The Indian prime minister offered unsolicited and unlimited cooperation
with U.S. military operations in the war against terrorism even though
large numbers of Indians opposed such cooperation.

The Indian government's official position is that India has long been
involved in fighting terrorism, especially of the Osama bin Laden
variety,
via Pakistan. For some time now India has been trying to convince the
U.S.
that the major continuing terrorist threat to both the U.S. and India
emanates from the same or closely related sources--namely Islamist
terrorism in Southwestern and Central Asia. In the official Indian view,

the result of the September 11 attacks is that the U.S. has joined India
in
the struggle against terrorism, not the other way around. Indirectly
endorsing Samuel P. Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" thesis as he
has
done on several occasions, Prime Minister Vajpayee told the United
Nations
General Assembly on November 10th, "We in India know from our own bitter

experience that terrorists develop global networks driven by religious
extremism." Vajpayee was essentially repeating what he had told the U.S.

Congress last year about religious wars: "In our neighborhood in this
twenty-first century, religious war has not been fashioned into, it has
been pushed to be an instrument of state policy." India seems to claim
the
copyright for the mission statement on terrorism.

In the context of the war in Afghanistan, the hostility between India
and
Pakistan will be played out on three main fronts. One of course is
Kashmir.
The obsession of both governments with the militancy in Kashmir hides
the
fact that the Kashmir problem is basically one of democracy and human
rights, and has a history that pre-dates the emergence of the armed
insurgency against Indian rule in 1989. The hostility between India and
Pakistan has increased since September 11 and saber rattling has reached

new levels on both sides. Both use the same jargon to describe their
military postures: "highest alert" and "readiness to meet any
eventuality."
While India is keen to get cross-border terrorism in Kashmir on the
international agenda, it still argues against "internationalizing the
Kashmir problem"--i.e., holding international discussions on the demands

for self-determination on the part of Muslims living in Kashmir.
Meanwhile,
Pakistan calls guerillas in Kashmir freedom fighters and accuses India
of
state terrorism. There is no movement in the debate as it repeats the
classic refrain relating terrorism and political violence: "one person's

terrorist is another person's freedom-fighter."

Another front is Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Pakistan is worried that
Israel is now increasing intelligence and military cooperation with
India.
Interestingly, India's Defense Minister George Fernandes has given a
"safety certificate" for Pakistan's nuclear weapons saying that those in

charge are all responsible people. Until recently, Indian officials had
hinted that Pakistan's nuclear weapons were not safe.

Finally, the rivalry between the two countries also will come to the
fore
in the hard negotiations regarding post-Taliban Afghanistan whenever
that
emerges. Pakistan is keen to exclude India from the negotiations and
points
out that India is not among the "Six Plus Two" established in 1997 to
support UN peace efforts. The forum includes six of Afghanistan's
neighbors--China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan--as well as Russia and China.

Pakistan is concerned about India's relationship with the Northern
Alliance, as it fears it will be used as a proxy to promote India's
interests in Afghanistan. India has actively supported the Alliance for
the
past few years, along with Iran and Russia. Although the Indian
government
firmly denies allegations that its army officials joined the U.S. army
in
aiding the Northern Alliance, its senior officials have visited the area

several times. It is a safe guess that any intelligence gathered from
these
trips has been shared with the U.S. military following the September 11
attacks. While India's role in the present war is obviously limited, the

Bush administration is keen to have a long-term military alliance with
India. The Indian government, while refusing to use the term "military
alliance," concedes that there are proposals on a "new strategic
framework"
and "expanded defense cooperation."

Pakistan's predicament is understandable. It had no choice but to join
America's war. Otherwise it would have been indicted along with the
Taliban. But India's case was different. It could have supported efforts
to
bring the perpetrators of the September 11 terror to justice under a
framework of international law. But it was absolutely unnecessary for
India
to have offered unconditional support to the Bush administration's war
in
Afghanistan. In keeping with its tradition and on the basis of a careful

assessment of the situation, it had a responsibility to give leadership
to
nations and peoples who wanted to avert this catastrophic war. It had a
chance to stand up for peace and it blew it.

(Ninan Koshy <[log in to unmask]>, an Indian analyst, is the former
director
of International Affairs, World Council of Churches and visiting fellow
at
the Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School.)


------------------------------------------------------------------------
-

III. Letters and Comments

*** LEAVE AFHANISTAN IN CHAOS ***

I believe the U.S. has a history of jumping into bed with whomever we
feel
we can use, and our Allies are left without support when we up and
leave.
We are not a good nation to be an ally with and have not been since
WWII.
When we are through in Afghanistan, we will walk away and leave them in
chaos; it is our national policy nature. This is sad, but true, and
while
we want to focus on "highjinks" of past presidents, where is the
accountability of the Bush administration. I much prefer Clinton's dirty

little sexcapades to what the current administration is doing, both at
home
and abroad. Where are you now, Fred Thompson, Newt Gingrich, Rush
Limbaugh,
who will speak for us, the American people?

- Dave Pruett

*** 40% ON TARGET ***

"Asking Why" (at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0109why.html) is a most
interesting article and probably 40% on target as to the real reason for

the attack on New York, but I hold the opinion that the never-ending
support by the USA of Israel in spite of their blatant disregard for the
UN
resolutions and their continued occupation of all lands adjacent to
their
designated territory, coupled with the constant USA veto of any UN
attempt
to get Israel to withdraw and curb the building of Jewish settlements on

forcefully occupied Arab land is the root cause for the attack on the
USA.
Regarding the undemocratic Arab states, I have never seen or heard of
any
dissent from Arab people that they are dissatisfied with the system they

live under apart from the Taliban system. Most people in the
oil-producing
countries enjoy a better education and health system than we do
ourselves.
Pity that Israel has the USA by the short and curlies.

- Alan Currie <[log in to unmask]>

*** EXPLAINING WHY ***

I was trying to find out more about the reasons behind the terrorist
attacks for a class debate in college, and nowhere explained it to me
better than "Asking Why" by Michael Klare (at
http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0109why.html)! Straight-forward, easy to
understand, and very thought provoking. And no biased slant either. Well

done and thanks a lot. Keep up the good work.

- Jennifer Menzies <[log in to unmask]>


------------------------------------------------------------------------
-

Please consider supporting Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF). FPIF is a new

kind of think tank--one serving citizen movements and advancing a fresh,

internationalist understanding of global affairs. Although we make our
FPIF
products freely available on the Internet, we need financial support to
cover our staff time and expenses. Increasingly, FPIF depends on you and

other individual donors to sustain our bare-bones budget. Click on
https://secure.webburner.net/fpif/donate/index.html to support FPIF
online,
or for information about making contributions over the phone or through
the
mail.

           ***** We Count on Your Support. Thank you. *****

------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
The Progressive Response aims to provide timely analysis and opinion
about
U.S. foreign policy issues. The content does not necessarily reflect the

institutional positions of either the Interhemispheric Resource Center
or
the Institute for Policy Studies.

We're working to make the Progressive Response informative and useful,
so
let us know how we're doing, via email to <[log in to unmask]>. Please
put
"Progressive Response" in the subject line. Please feel free to
cross-post
the Progressive Response elsewhere. We apologize for any duplicate
copies
you may receive.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-

To subscribe or unsubscribe to the Progressive Response, go to:
http://www.fpif.org/progresp/index.html and follow the instructions.

To subscribe directly, send a blank message to:
[log in to unmask]

To unsubscribe, send a blank message to:
[log in to unmask]

************************************************************************************
Distributed through Cyber-Society-Live [CSL]: CSL is a moderated discussion
list made up of people who are interested in the interdisciplinary academic
study of Cyber Society in all its manifestations.To join the list please visit:
http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/cyber-society-live.html
*************************************************************************************