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CAPITAL-AND-CLASS  2001

CAPITAL-AND-CLASS 2001

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Subject:

Taliban and War

From:

Kai Holt <[log in to unmask]>

Reply-To:

Kai Holt <[log in to unmask]>

Date:

Wed, 21 Nov 2001 23:23:18 -0000

Content-Type:

text/plain

Parts/Attachments:

Parts/Attachments

text/plain (278 lines)

It is clear that the Taliban has been forced to flee from most cities
and towns.
It is clear that it has been a much weaker, less cohesive force, than
popularly
understood. The Taliban had been successful in taking over much of
Afghanistan as a result of defections based on bribery of opposition
commanders
or defections caused by jumping onto the winning side. It is clear that
such a force could not
sustain cohesiveness in the face of the massive military onslaught of
American
imperialism supported by its allies. That the Taliban sought to maintain
its
defence of 90 percent of Afghanistan in the face of this onslaught  is
an
indication of the political, military and strategic limitations, even
stupidity, of the Taliban.
Indeed more extraordinary was the success of the Taliban in holding
stationary
positions for so long under the pressure of massive and intense air
strikes of
its infrastructure and defence lines.

The Taliban leadership demonstrated extraordinary incompetence
strategically
that has led to the crumbling of its lines of defence, loss of Taliban
fighters
through fatalities and injury and the serious decline in morale and will
to
fight.  As I said some weeks ago they should have retreated, in an
organised fashion, from the towns and cities in the plains to the
mountains. In
that way their forces would have retreated in tact thereby increasing
their
chances of maintaining a challenge to the enemy from their position in
the
mountains. Running along side this strategic redeployment of forces they
should
have retained Taliban undercover cells in all the cities and towns.
These cells
would have the function of providing intelligence and engaging in IRA
like
attacks on US personnel operating from these centres.

This action along with action from their positions in the mountains
would have
led to bodies bags returning to the US. The steady flow of US cadavers
back to
the homeland could have been propagandistically exploited to highlight
the
reactionary nature of US imperialism's military adventure in
Afghanistan.
Because of the absence of fixed positions and their integration with the
civilian community US imperialism would have found it much more
difficult to pin
the Taliban down. You cannot use B52 bombers on undercover hit squads
within the
cities. This was why the IRA was relatively effective.

Along with this the Taliban would have had to organise itself
politically within
urban and even rural centres. As an organised political force they would
elaborate economic and social policies. In this way they would increase
their
popular support. As a political force they would enter into institutions
within
the towns and cities to organise opposition against imperialist
intervention.
Under these conditions the Taliban could build for itself a social base
thereby
providing itself with deep roots within the different layers of the
Afghan
masses. They would mobilise the growing political power to exploit the
adverse
economic and social conditions to expose the failure of imperialism to
meet the
economic and social needs of the impoverished and oppressed masses in
Afghanistan. To meet with success they would have to shed their
ludicrous
chauvinism that requires women to imprison their bodies in those
sinister
looking burkhas.

Under these conditions a significant Taliban opposition could be
developed that
would, in a sense, pose a challenge to the presence of imperialism in
Afghanistan. Even now it is not impossible for Taliban to reorganise
itself
along such lines. However I have little hope of this kind of growth in
political
consciousness occurring within its ranks.

It may be a correct strategic move for the Taliban to redeploy their
forces away
from Kandahar. The result will be that some kind of alternative Pashtun
force
will occupy the vacuum. They should preserve under cover cells in that
city --for the reasons already outlined above. It is clear that an
alternative
Pashtun force dominating Kandahar will render conditions more difficult
for the
Northern Opposition and the US. They cannot with justification bomb a
city that
is no longer under Taliban rule. On the other hand it may be even
possible that
a Taliban element can continue to participate in the administration of
the city
under another name. This would make conditions even more difficult for
imperialism.

Concerning Kundiz the Taliban have created their own trap. It is of
little use
if forces there fight to the death. This event wont achieve anything
militarily.
At present they should rather than hold their position their try and
break, if
possible and make their way across to the protection of the mountains.
The
mountains are the key. However perhaps this is what they are now trying
to
achieve. If they cannot do this they should negotiate surrender under
the
auspices of the UN or Pakistan. In that way many of these fighters may
be able
to eventually join up with their comrades in the mountains to pursue the
struggle. Fighting to the death can only be option when there are no
other
alternatives. If possible Taliban special units should mount a offensive
that
draws the attention of the besieging opposition forces away from  Kundiz
providing the encircled Taliban with the opportunity to break out and
seek
refuge in the mountains.

They should have also shed potential defectors stripping them of their
armoury.
It is better to have a leaner and meaner force than a force containing
substantial
treacherous elements. I say this subject to such a strategy being
feasible.

Given too that Pakistan had withdrawn its backing for the Taliban its
position
was even more untenable --it was only a matter of time. It would appear
that
Musharraf's decision to leave Pakistan on an international diplomatic
tour was a
clear indication that he had ensured his position before leaving home.
This trip
was a clear signal that the game was up for Taliban as far as Pakistan
was concerned.
Clearly there had been agreement that the army and the intelligence were
full
square behind him.

This meant that all assistance to Talliban and OBL had been cut off.
This
found expression in Pakistan instructing Taliban not to use its embassy
in
Pakistan to give any more news conferences. The complete shut off of aid
by
Pakistan would have been experienced as a severe blow, the state that
created
and nourished the Taliban. The Taliban and OBL were now completely
isolated.
They were increasingly looking like loosers as the bombs relentlessly
rained
down
on their positions. Consequently elements within the Taliban defected to
the
other side for the same reasons as they had defected to the Taliban some
years
before --cash and the desire to be with the victors.

That the hard core of the Taliban persisted with their maximalist policy
under
these conditions indicates the absurdly unreal nature of their politics.
Saddam

Hussein and Milosevic showed the same limitations. These regimes
demonstrate
their extremely limited and bankrupt nature at the subjective
level --crass
stupidity. How can these tiny regimes, so dependent on outside powers
for their
existence, believe they can successfully resist the USA the strongest
power in
the world. Only regimes inflicted by blind stupidity can be engulfed by
such
illusions. The point is that the Taliban might still be in power had it
been
prepared to recognise that its history and limitations required it to
cooperate
with the powers that created and sustained it. Instead blinded by the
reactionary subjectivism of its own Islamic ideology it persisted in
conducting
itself as if it constituted a world historic force that it just was not.

The problem is that these moronic regimes provide the US with the
opportunity to flex its muscles in such a way that the working class
invariable
end up as the victims. It is because of this that the Western working
class must
begin to wake out of its comatic condition and begin the task of
organising
itself as a class to resist and challenge US imperialism.

It is clear that Islam both in general and in its fundamentalist form is
 a
reactionary ideology. Its increasing influence among the downtrodden
Asian and
Palestinian masses is an indication of their growing despair rather than
their
growing political development. Its growing influence among the masses is
an
index of the bankruptcy of Stalinism and reformism --its inability to
advance
the needs of the masses. Consequently the masses turn to reactionary
idealist
ideology such as Islam. All that Islamic fundamentalism has achieved is
more
pain, suffering and oppression of the masses by imperialism. Indeed it
is not
for nothing that the imperialist bourgeoisie have encouraged its growth
as a
means of undermining the conditions for the emergence of class
consciousness
among the working class. Indeed it has even been said that Israel has
encouraged
Islamic fundamentalism as a means of undermining radical secular
nationalism
that might hinder Israeli designs.

It may be possible for the Taliban and OBL to continue their reactionary
struggle by retreating to the mountains to conduct a guerrilla campaign.
In the
end this will lead to even more instability, pain and suffering of the
masses in
Afghanistan. In the end, like all such movements, it can achieve nothing
positive for the masses.

There is little or no information provided as to what the economic and
other
policies of the Taliban are. This is probably because the Taliban has no
such
coherent policies. This is another problem. We don't even know what kind
of
economic policies, if any, they have implemented. All we get is
relentless
religious rhetoric that is no more than garbage. Even with their foreign
policy
is a non policy. They substitute religious to quasi religious garbage
for
foreign policy. They don't make any clear distinction between US
imperialism and
the working class of the US. Instead they talk about attacking and
defeating the
US --as if the US working class are not also oppressed by US capitalism
too.

Over and above all this they never make their actions and intentions
intelligible to the Western working class. This rendered more vulnerable
to attack by
imperialism. The Taliban and OBL are the classic example of all a regime
should
not do if it does not want to render itself an easy target for
imperialism. They
wiped out the support of half of the masses within Afghanistan by
transforming
women into an invisible social category.

Please excuse the unedited character of this hastily written posting.


Karl Carlile
Be free to visit the web site of the Communist Global Group at
http://homepage.eircom.net/~beprepared/

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