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Sent: Wednesday, September 26, 2001 10:43 PM
Subject: 5462-Stephen Shenfield/JRL RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL SUPPLEMENT No. 2
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27 September 2001
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[Note from David Johnson:
DJ: I very much encourage those readers with serious research
interests in Russia to help support Stephen Shenfield with
content for the JRL Research and Analytical Supplement. Please
see Stephen's note below. This can be a valuable resource for
Russian studies. The first issue of the RAS was JRL#5425 dated
September 4.]
********
JRL RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL SUPPLEMENT
Issue No. 2
October 2001
Editor: Stephen D. Shenfield
[log in to unmask]
CONTENTS
--------
Introducing the issue
ECONOMY
1. Document: The Ishayev Report
2. Small business after the crash
POLITICS
3. The State Duma in the 1990s
4. Regime change in a mainly rural region
(Saratov Province)
5. Political parties in the Komi Republic
SOCIETY
6. Education in the new Russia
7. Russians among Russians
EPIDEMIOLOGY
8. Contamination of the water supply
RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS
9. Russian opinion on NATO expansion
10. Putin and the Southern Caucasus
HISTORY
11. Industrial management under war communism
---------------------------------------------------------
INTRODUCING THE ISSUE
Welcome to the second issue of the Research and
Analytical Supplement. There were some very encouraging
responses from readers to the first issue. Your reactions
are always welcome.
Most of the first issue, and all of this issue, has been
prepared by myself. I very much hope that this will
cease to be the case from the third issue onward, when
some of the pieces promised by various colleagues finally
start to arrive. If you have any ideas about
contributions that you might make to future issues, then
please share them with me. I am looking for brief, clear,
and accessible informative or analytical pieces from
colleagues anywhere in the world, both scholars and
people with relevant practical experience.
The structure of the RAS is becoming clearer. Every issue
will contain at least two pieces under each of the four
headings: Economy; Politics; Society; and Russia and its
Neighbors. Various other headings may appear, but not
necessarily in every issue: Inter-Ethnic Relations;
Demography; Epidemiology; Ecology; Culture; Military
Affairs; History; and so on.
Besides continuing with topics covered in the first two
issues, I plan to introduce a number of new topics in
forthcoming issues. It may be useful if I indicate some
of these, just in case anyone feels moved to contribute
pertinent pieces:
Youth culture
Peoples of Siberia
Why did the Soviet system collapse?
Russian-Jewish relations
Please feel free to suggest other topics as well.
If you wish to send text in Russian, then please send it
directly to me at [log in to unmask]
ONLY if you are
using a Mackintosh computer, as I do. If you are using an
IBM computer, then please send any Russian text to my CDI
colleague Sasha Grigoryev, who also has an IBM computer.
He will print it out and mail it on to me. Sasha's e-mail
addresses are: [log in to unmask] and
[log in to unmask] In this way we shall avoid the
technical difficulties that arise when sender and
recipient use different makes of computer. In either case
please use the KOI-8 code.
Stephen D. Shenfield
---------------------------------------------------------
ECONOMY
1. DOCUMENT: THE ISHAYEV REPORT
SOURCE. Gosudarstvennyi sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii.
Rabochaia gruppa po podgotovke strategii razvitiia
Gosudarstva do 2010 goda [State Council of the Russian
Federation. Working Group for the Preparation of a
Strategy for the Development of the State to the Year
2010]. Strategiia razvitiia gosudarstva na period do
2010 goda [Strategy for the Development of the State in
the Period to 2010]. Moscow, 2000.
Note. This report, prepared by a group of nine prominent
Russian economists* under the leadership of Viktor
Ishayev (governor of Khabarovsk Province), was presented
to the State Council in November 2000. It is important
both for its substantive analysis and proposals and as
an expression of an influential -- though not, at least
yet, predominant -- sector of Russian elite opinion.
Extensive extracts from the report have already appeared
on JRL in translation. My synopsis is based mainly upon
the first three chapters of the report, which set out
the general strategic conception of the authors. The
remaining chapters apply this conception to specific
areas of economic and social policy. A few comments of
my own are added inside square brackets.
I have used a Russian text of the report, kindly
supplied by Rachel Douglas, Russia and Eastern Europe
editor of the Executive Intelligence Review. The title
page of this text is decorated with various handwritten
annotations. "Eto skoreye yerunda [This is probably
nonsense]," someone has scribbled, evidently without
bothering actually to read it. Another reads: "The
document can be removed from consideration."
I invite readers, especially economists, to contribute
brief critiques of the Ishayev report for inclusion in
future issues of the RAS. -- SDS
* A. R. Belousov, S. Yu. Glazyev, A. G. Granberg, V. V.
Ivanter, Ya. I. Kuz'minov, P. A. Minakir, A. D.
Nekipelov, A. N. Shokhin, M. M. Tsikanov.
Synopsis:
The authors of the report define the strategic goal as
follows: "to turn Russia into a dynamically developing
economic power that by means of efficient labor, business
initiative, and consistent and rational economic policy
secures average European living standards under Russia's
specific natural, climatic, and geographical conditions."
This requires a high rate of growth based on investment
in the structural and technological modernization of the
economy. Growth, however, is not an end in itself, but
must be geared to enhancing the people's welfare and the
country's international competitiveness. "Growth for the
sake of growth" will exacerbate the social crisis, and
may jeopardize continued growth and the state itself.
Russia's statehood can be strengthened only if the
current polarization of values and living conditions is
replaced by a new consensus anchored in a greatly
expanded middle class. A strong state requires the
consolidation of the whole of society. Attempts to
strengthen the state by consolidating only the business
and political elite are doomed to failure. [This, by
implication, is what Putin is currently trying to do.
-- SDS]
In the sphere of values, a "traditionalist" stratum
oriented toward collectivism, egalitarianism, and state
paternalism confronts a "modern" stratum who stress
pragmatism and short-term personal success, with both
alienated from the state (for different reasons).
In the sphere of living standards, the top fifth of the
population has maintained or exceeded the pre-reform
level, with 5--7 per cent reaching Western standards,
while at the bottom two-fifths are below subsistence
level and 15--20 per cent destitute.
The result is a divided society in many ways like the
societies of the Third World. People lack any incentive
to work hard or exercise entrepreneurial initiative.
Russia cannot afford the burden of the paternalistic
state. Trying to keep it going indefinitely is a dead end
or "quiet death under social anesthesia." But a
"subsidiary" state that provides only minimal social
services is also infeasible, as such a state would lose
all legitimacy in the eyes of the traditionalist part of
the population. What is needed is an intermediate type of
state based on social partnership, which under present
conditions only the state itself is capable of mediating.
Transition to paid and unsubsidized social services
should be gradual and in line with the rise in real
incomes.
Social partnership is to take the form of a social
contract between the state (at central, provincial, and
local levels), business, and society. Society will
receive basic social guarantees, while business will be
guaranteed property rights, a favorable business climate,
and state support in dealing with the outside world.
[An attempt was made under Yeltsin to institutionalize
such a trilateral partnership on the German model, though
to little effect. -- SDS]
The goal should be a middle class comprising at least
50--55 per cent of the population, with no more than
10--15 per cent remaining below subsistence level. The
middle class consumption standard will include good
accommodation, a dacha, a car, lots of consumer durables,
and access to good education and health-care. This
presupposes a 70--80 per cent increase in the average
consumption level.
To achieve this outcome, the following goals must be
met by 2010:
1. Increase real incomes by at least 75 per cent.
2. Reduce the number of people with incomes below the
subsistence minimum by two-thirds.
3. Increase state social expenditure in real terms by at
least 60 per cent.
In addition, the average pension must reach the level of
the subsistence minimum by 2003.
To achieve these goals annual economic growth must
average at least 5--6 per cent. As output of primary
resources cannot grow faster than 2--3 per cent per
year, the efficiency of their use must increase by at
least 2--3 per cent per year.
For this an investment breakthrough is crucial. Capital
investment must at least double by 2010, i.e. grow on
average by at least 8--9 per cent per year. Investment
is to be concentrated in the following areas:
1. New technologies best adapted to competition on the
world market
This refers primarily to dual-purpose technologies in
the military-industrial sector. Specific areas are
telecommunications, aerospace, high-quality metallurgy,
and the production of special means of transportation.
2. Key sectors suffering from under-investment, in
particular agriculture and electricity
Investment must not be wasted in reproducing outdated
technology. It is especially important to modernize
machine-building. [Gorbachev began his reform efforts in
1985-6 by prioritizing modernization of machine-building.
It was called "acceleration" (uskorenie). An enormous
job. -- SDS]
Three stages are envisaged:
1. Over the next 2--3 years output can be increased by at
least 25--30 per cent (8--10 per cent per year) simply by
fully using existing productive capacity. This potential
will be lost if not exploited in the near future.
Domestic demand must be bolstered to absorb this
increased output. Russia's foreign debt repayments need
to be reduced accordingly. This should be achieved by
negotiating restructuring, because default has
unpredictable consequences. [And what if Western
creditors refuse to cooperate? -- SDS]
2. From 2003, with the exhaustion of reserves, growth
will slow to 2--4 per cent per year for a period of 2--3
years. However, the quality of this growth will be
higher, as it will be based on newer technology. (The
slowdown is avoidable only if the rate of growth of
investment exceeds 25 per cent per year.)
3. From 2005 the growth trajectory will stabilize at a
rate of at least 5 per cent per year, provided that the
Russian economy can be protected from world market
fluctuations.
The military-industrial, agro-industrial, and
infrastructural complexes should remain the exclusive
responsibility of the state.
The state should give financial support to rural areas
in providing access to gas and electricity, road
building, education, and health-care. The processing and
distribution of agricultural products needs to be
de-monopolized. A civilized market in land should be
created by state patronage of a network of land banks.
The state must secure the reliable functioning of
systems of heat and electricity supply, and of pipelines,
roads, railroads, and ports. Care must be taken to ensure
that any privatization programs do not destroy the
coherence of Russia's infrastructure or infringe on the
basic rights of the population. [This does not exclude
the possibility of privatization, which seems
inconsistent with the earlier statement that
infrastructure should remain an exclusive responsibility
of the state. -- SDS]
The structural policy of the state must have a regional
as well as an industrial dimension. The aim should be to
reduce the current excessive differences between rich and
poor regions to an acceptable level, and to secure the
viability of the North, the Far East, and some other
strategically important regions, even where their
depopulation is expedient from a purely economic point
of view.
[A general criticism. While the report emphasizes the
need for clear priorities, so many ambitious goals are
set that investment and budgetary resources would most
likely be dissipated and fail to achieve the desired
effects. The authors do not seem prepared to draw a sharp
distinction between those things that are really urgent
and vitally essential and those that are merely highly
desirable. While many specific points made in the report
are compelling, and while we need to know more about the
underlying calculations to make a proper assessment,
there is ample reason to doubt whether the strategy
proposed in fully feasible. -- SDS]
---------------------------------------------------------
ECONOMY
2. SMALL BUSINESS AFTER THE CRASH
SOURCE. Izmenenie povedeniia ekonomicheski aktivnogo
naseleniia v usloviiakh krizisa: Na primere melkikh
predprinimatelei i samozaniatykh [Change in the Behavior
of the Economically Active Population Under Crisis
Conditions: A Case Study of Small Entrepreneurs and the
Self-Employed]. Moskovskii obshchestvennyi nauchnyi fond
nauchnye doklady 119 [Moscow Public Science Foundation
Report 119]. Moscow, 2000.
This booklet by a group of Russian researchers (the main
report is by Leonid Bliakher, Anton Karpov, and Ella
Paneiakh) is a product of a study of small businesspeople
in three cities: St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, and
Khabarovsk. Biographical interviews were conducted with
75 individuals, mainly engaged in trade and services, in
addition to a focus group and consultations with tax and
legal experts.
Respondents were found to belong to four main personality
types:
* "Unfortunates" forced by circumstances to engage in
trade, which they experience as a humiliating denial of
their own [Soviet-era] ethical values
* "Conformists" who automatically follow prevailing
customs, whatever those may be at any particular time
* "Players" who treat business lightheartedly as an
enjoyable game
* "Professionals" who take pride in their business
skills and seek a life worthy of themselves
The "unfortunates" and "conformists" tended to be older
than the "players" (average age 29) or the
"professionals" (average age 35). The "professionals"
were also the most highly educated of the four groups.
The initial reaction of respondents to the financial
crash of August 1998 was one of moral shock, but about
half managed to reorient themselves to the new situation
and even saw some positive aspects in the crash.
Which factors explain the ability of some small
entrepreneurs to recover and the inability of others?
First of all, it depended on where they lived. In St.
Petersburg and Novosibirsk half or more recovered, but
nobody made it through in Khabarovsk. The reason was that
businesses in the first two cities were able to take the
place in the consumer market left vacant by the fall in
imports from the West. (Western imports were initially
blocked by the collapse of the banking system; they also
became too expensive as a result of the devaluation of
the ruble.) However, in the Far Eastern city of
Khabarovsk this place was occupied by goods from China,
South Korea, and Taiwan.
Secondly, those businesses with significant physical
assets fared better than those with little capital or
with a high proportion of their capital in the form of
money. For example, shuttle traders -- people who buy
goods abroad to resell at home -- suddenly found
themselves without enough cash to pay the greatly
increased cost of traveling to their usual destinations.
The plight of such people was exacerbated by the fact
that small entrepreneurs in Russia have no access to
credit through official government or commercial
channels. They can get loans only from moneylenders with
ties to organized crime, who lend for very short periods
at exorbitant interest rates (typically 10 per cent per
month).
---------------------------------------------------------
POLITICS
3. THE STATE DUMA IN THE 1990s
SOURCE. Dzheffri Gleizner and Pol Cheisti. Rossiiskaia
gosudarstvennaia duma: struktura, deiatel'nost' i
evoliutsiia v period 1993-1998 godov [The Russian State
Duma: Structure, Activity, and Evolution in the Period
1993-1998]. Moscow: Tsentr konstitutsionnykh issledovanii
Moskovskogo Obshchestvennogo Nauchnogo Fonda [Center for
Constitutional Research of the Moscow Public Science
Foundation], 1999.
In this booklet Jeffrey Gleisner (University of Leeds)
and Paul Chaisty (Oxford University) examine the inner
workings of the State Duma (the lower house of the
Federal Assembly, Russia's parliament) between 1993 and
1998. The analysis focuses above all on the way the
Council of the Duma -- the small inner council of
fraction leaders and committee chairs that organized the
work of the Duma -- was formed and functioned.
Besides the division of Duma deputies into political
fractions, there was a persisting division between
fraction leaders and committee chairs that was largely
independent of political affiliation. Those deputies who
were most deeply involved in committee work developed a
corporate self-perception as responsible legislative
"professionals" whose efforts were constantly disrupted
by the irresponsibility and amateurism of other deputies.
The authors sympathize with this stance, observing that
"the chronic disorganization of the legislative process
... raises the question of the effectiveness of the
fractions' leading role."
As in other countries, Duma committees formed close ties
with corresponding government departments, sometimes
promoting their interests in opposition to other
departments (for instance, helping to increase their
budgetary allocations).
The framers of the 1993 Constitution constrained the
powers of the Duma to ensure that it would not be able to
challenge the authority of the executive in the way that
its predecessor, the Supreme Soviet, had done. By 1998,
however, despite its internal divisions, the Duma had
"achieved a level of influence in the political system
exceeding its constitutional prerogatives." The
government was finding it harder and harder to run the
country without the Duma's consent.
"These tendencies," conclude the authors, "may of course
be regarded as temporary consequences of the weakness of
the president that a strong and energetic president will
reverse. On the other hand, we are possibly witnesses of
an irreversible process that sooner or later will lead
to a redistribution of constitutional prerogatives in
favor of the Duma." Now that the "strong and energetic
president" has arrived, we might add: "probably later
rather than sooner."
---------------------------------------------------------
POLITICS
4. REGIME CHANGE IN A MAINLY RURAL REGION
(SARATOV PROVINCE)
SOURCE. V. Gel'man, S. Ryzhenkov, M. Brie. Rossiia
regionov: transformatsiia politicheskikh rezhimov
[Russia of Regions: The Transformation of Political
Regimes]. Moscow: Izd-vo "Ves' mir," 2000, chapter 3
(authors Vladimir Gelman, Sergei Ryzhenkov, and Igor
Semyonov).
Note. This book, the product of collaboration between
Russian and German scholars, is the culmination of a
decade of Russian and Western research on the politics of
Russia's regions. Successive issues of the RAS will
include summaries of the chapters presenting the six case
studies (Saratov, Nizhny Novgorod, Volgograd, Ryazan,
Ulyanovsk, and Tver Provinces), followed by a
discussion of the overall theoretical findings. SDS
The late Soviet period provides the starting point of the
analysis. Power in Saratov Province was concentrated in
the hands of the First Secretary of the provincial party
committee, a post occupied from 1959 to 1976 by Shibayev.
The First Secretary stood at the apex of a network of
unformalized patron-client relations that linked party
officials at various levels to the directors of
collective and state farms (the so-called "agrarians").
Political scientists call this kind of setup a
"patrimonial regime." All important decisions were made
by Shibayev and an informal clique of associates in the
sauna following games of volleyball. If you lived in
Saratov Province and had political ambitions, you had
to play volleyball.
This pattern was typical of mainly rural regions.
(Elsewhere, of course, it might not be volleyball that
mattered, but perhaps tennis, Yeltsin's favorite game.)
More industrialized regions might possess a more
pluralistic power structure, because the directors of
large industrial enterprises were responsible directly to
central ministries and therefore enjoyed a certain
autonomy vis-à-vis the regional party boss. This enabled
them to constitute a second pole of power at the regional
level.
The late-Soviet political regime in Saratov Province was
broken up in the perestroika period. This was not a
result of successful pressure from below, as it was in
some other regions: Saratov never had a very strong
"democratic" movement, largely because it never had an
influential intelligentsia. (In February 1990 Saratov
"democrats" held a public meeting against the party
leadership, but the latter was able to organize a more
impressive counter-meeting.) Change came to Saratov
Province when Gorbachev lent his backing to new figures
such as the chicken factory manager Golovachev, who
became chairman of the Saratov City Council, thereby
destroying the cohesion of the regional elite. Officials
and enterprise managers in the city of Saratov,
supported by the local "democrats," came to constitute
an opposition to the old leadership, whose base was the
agrarian lobby. This opposition, however, proved too
heterogeneous to hold together for long, and the bipolar
structure soon gave way to a multipolar system of
shifting and cross-cutting alliances.
Unfortunately, the potential for lasting democratization
inherent in the newly pluralistic structure of power was
wasted because no serious attempt was made to build
effective formal (i.e., rule-based) political
institutions. Instead pluralism took the form of a
chaotic "war of all against all" in which all players
relied on informal strategies that impeded the search for
acceptable compromises, producing general insecurity and
uncertainty about the future. Changes in the formal
political structure -- the disbanding of the party
apparatus in the wake of August 1991 and then the
abolition of the Soviets in October 1993 -- had little
effect on the real power struggle, which proceeded
through informal channels.
In February 1992, Yeltsin appointed a deputy of the
State Duma by the name of Belykh head of the provincial
administration. Belykh (also manager of a chicken
factory) belonged to none of the rival factions and was
intended as a compromise figure. He was able to act only
by allying himself with one or another elite group, and
his maneuvers only added confusion to the situation.
The scene was thereby set for the rise of a new
strongman, Ayatskov, who after a series of intrigues was
appointed by Yeltsin as head of the provincial
administration in April 1996. Ayatskov (now elected as
provincial governor) has been able to gather all
resources and levers of power in his own hands, and has
restored a patrimonial regime based on informal
patron-client relations. Opposition forces, fragmented
and weakened by the prolonged internecine struggle, have
been marginalized: of the 35 deputies of the provincial
Duma elected in 1997, only one was an oppositionist.
In the view of the authors, patrimonial regimes cannot be
transformed into democracies purely through their inner
dynamics. If for some reason the position of "boss" is
left vacant for a time, the result is an institutional
vacuum that persists until a new "boss" succeeds in
re-stabilizing the system. Only consistent and skilled
intervention from without can prevent this outcome. Such
intervention might hypothetically have come from Moscow,
but neither the Gorbachev nor the Yeltsin leaderships
had policies adequate to the task. Indeed, the authors
question whether the central political elite even regards
democratization in the provinces as being in its
interests.
---------------------------------------------------------
POLITICS
5. POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE KOMI REPUBLIC
SOURCE. Viktor Kovalev. "The Quasi-Party System in the
Regions: The Case of the Republic of Komi and the
Overall Situation in Russia," Russian Politics and Law
[a journal of translations published by M. E. Sharpe:
see http://www.mesharpe.com/rup_main.htm], March--April 2001,
pp. 45-64. Originally: Rubezh 2000, no. 15, pp. 211-30.
Taking the Republic of Komi as a case in point, the
author argues that with few exceptions Russia does not
have real political parties but merely "quasi-parties":
i.e., organizations that call themselves parties but are
no more than fronts for specific governmental,
commercial, or even criminal structures. The public
understands that parties as such do not play an
important role: in a survey conducted in Komi in spring
1996 just 1 per cent of respondents placed parties among
the entities having a strong influence on the political
situation.
One type of quasi-party that has appeared in some
regions with a cohesive local elite is the "party of
power" created by the regional authorities to serve
their interests. Such a party was formed in Komi in the
fall of 1998 as a coalition of several "democratic"
movements. Its name, "Transformation of the North,"
suggests that it was created in imitation of
"Transformation of the Urals," which supports Eduard
Rossel, governor of Sverdlovsk Province (but without the
measure of autonomy enjoyed by the latter).
The author sets out a "matrix" of possible relationships
between parties and regional elites. Real parties may
develop where the regional elite is divided and there is
an open struggle for power, provided that the public is
widely involved in the intra-elite power struggle. "This
variant," adds the author, "is hardly ever encountered
in practice."
--------------------------------------------------------
SOCIETY
6. EDUCATION IN THE NEW RUSSIA
SOURCES
Jeanne Sutherland. Schooling in the New Russia:
Innovation and Change, 1984--95. London and New York:
Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1999.
Stephen L. Webber. School, Reform and Society
in the New Russia. London and New York: Macmillan and
St. Martin's Press, 2000.
One of the neglected areas that I'd like to cover in
the RAS is Russian education. I started with these two
books by British scholars. There is some overlap
between them, but each has a different main focus.
Jeanne Sutherland (wife of the late British ambassador
to the USSR Iain Sutherland) focuses on change in
teaching methods in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
while Stephen Webber examines the functioning of the
educational system as a whole in post-Soviet Russia.
From the 1930s through the mid-1980s Soviet education
was rigorous -- American researchers had drawn public
attention to its high standards in math and science in
the wake of the sensation created by the first sputnik
but centralized, standardized, and conformist in
spirit, allowing little scope to experimentation or
creativity. During perestroika educational innovators
were better placed to promote their ideas, and even to
try them out in selected "author schools." To a large
extent these were the same ideas, rediscovered and
revived, of exploratory learning and democratic
relations between teachers and pupils that had been
popular in the 1920s. How well they worked out in
practice depended, as elsewhere, on whether teachers
had the qualities needed to use them effectively.
In the 1990s the decentralization of control over
education has given teachers even more opportunity to
pursue their own ideas, especially in the new private
schools. But many teachers feel at a loss when left to
their own devices and would prefer to have greater
guidance. Moreover, the whole issue of teaching methods
has lost salience as teachers face new and unfamiliar
problems arising from the post-Soviet transition.
The most obvious problem is the severe shortage of
resources, including long delays in the payment of
teachers' own salaries -- for it is not only control
over the schools that has been transferred to
ill-prepared local authorities, but also and above all
financial responsibility. In addition, teachers have to
cope with all the aggravated social ills that affect
youth.
One disturbing consequence of these pressures has been
the growing practice of "otsev": the expulsion of
troublesome pupils from the schools (Webber, pp.
180-189). The way to "otsev" was opened by the 43rd
article of the 1993 Constitution, which guaranteed free
education only up to 9th grade (age 15). This legalized
exclusion only from the senior grades, but the practice
soon began to be applied at lower levels, with even some
9-year-olds being expelled. Moreover, the practice did
not disappear when President Yeltsin finally responded
in late 1994 to public outrage by issuing a decree to
close the legal loophole.
In summer 1994 it was reported that 1,700,000 children
of school age had not attended school over the previous
two years. By early 1998 the figure had reached
2,800,000. A 1996 survey of dropouts found that 38 per
cent said they had left school through expulsion (likely
an underestimate, as some must have felt embarrassed to
admit the fact). Only 23 per cent said they left school
to take a job. Apparently a greater proportion of boys
are expelled than of girls, who tend to be better
behaved.
Steps are being taken by the Putin administration to
restore universal education. Perhaps readers in Russia
will provide a more up-to-date assessment?
--------------------------------------------------------
SOCIETY
7. RUSSIANS AMONG RUSSIANS
SOURCE. V. V. Gritsenko. Russkie sredi russkikh:
problemy adaptatsii vynuzhdennykh migrantov i bezhentsev
iz stran blizhnego zarubezh'ia v Rossii [Russians Among
Russians: Problems of Adaptation of Forced Migrants and
Refugees from the Countries of the Near Abroad]. Moscow:
Institut etnologii i antropologii RAN [Institute of
Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of
Sciences], 1999.
The author analyzes relations between two groups of
Russians: (1) long-term residents of Volgograd and
Saratov Provinces in the Volga region; and (2) people
forced in recent years to migrate to Russia from other
post-Soviet states. About a fifth of Russian migrants
from the "near abroad" have resettled in the Volga
region. 120 interviews were conducted with members of
each group.
The demographic impact of the in-migration is ambiguous.
In principle, the author welcomes the infusion of new
blood, especially as the migrants (90 per cent of whom
come from Central Asia) are on average somewhat younger,
more active, and better educated than the long-term
residents. The increase in the population of the two
provinces through migration has compensated for
population loss arising from the excess of deaths over
births. However, the jobs available in the areas of
resettlement do not correspond to the qualifications and
expectations of the migrants.
The difficulty of finding suitable jobs -- or any jobs
at all -- impedes the adaptation of the migrants to
their new country of residence. Despite no longer
feeling welcome in the ex-Soviet republics where they
used to live, 69 per cent of the migrants interviewed
felt nostalgic for their former republic of residence,
which they still regarded as their "true homeland."
Against the background of growing unemployment,
competition in the labor market fuels tensions between
the two groups. Were it not for the fact that both
groups consist of ethnic Russians, one would be inclined
to call these tensions "inter-ethnic." Each group thinks
of itself and of the other group as possessing quite
different characteristics. The migrants see themselves
as hard-working, energetic, responsible, intelligent,
and independent, while they see the long-term residents
as lazy, rude, unreliable, dependent, envious, and prone
to abuse alcohol. The long-term residents agree that the
migrants are energetic and hard-working, but also see
them as arrogant, obstinate, impudent, and cunning,
while describing themselves as hard-working too, as well
as kind and patient.
In general, although the long-term residents can hardly
deny that the migrants are Russians they still feel that
they are alien. They resent Russia having to shoulder
the whole burden of resettling them. Many (37.5 per
cent) say that Russia should demand compensation from
the migrants' former republics of residence. The
migrants themselves are less inclined to seek
compensation (17.5 per cent).
--------------------------------------------------------
EPIDEMIOLOGY
8. CONTAMINATION OF THE WATER SUPPLY
SOURCE. Oleg Lar'ko and Vladimir Barshev, "The Water of
Our Anxieties," Russian Politics and Law [a journal of
translations published by M. E. Sharpe: see
http://www.mesharpe.com/rup_main.htm], March--April 2001,
pp. 85-91. Originally: Rossiiskaia gazeta 7/14/2000,
p. 27.
There are now over 40 outbreaks of bacterial and viral
infection annually in different parts of Russia
traceable to contamination of the water supply (2--3
times more than a decade ago). Common water-borne
diseases include meningitis, intestinal typhoid, and
dysentery. Nematodes (threadlike worms) and other
parasites infest the water supply of many cities.
The main sources of contamination are:
1. Waste from local industry. Effects depend on the type
of industry involved. Examples: Nitrogenous and chlorine
compounds in Kemerovo's water cause nephritis, hepatitis
and birth defects. Aluminum in the water of Novgorod
Province suppresses the central nervous and immune
systems in children.
2. Herbicides, pesticides, and other chemicals used in
local agriculture.
3. Pollutants precipitated from the atmosphere and
washed into rivers and lakes.
4. Worn-out water pipes that frequently burst and allow
sewage and industrial waste to penetrate the water
supply. At least 3 per cent of water pipes need to be
repaired annually, but for over ten years the rate of
repair has been under 1 per cent. 60 per cent of pipes
need replacement.
5. Water often stands stagnant in the pipes, aiding the
growth of microflora. The greatest threat comes from
blue-green algae, which mutate in response to chemical
contamination. Many strains excrete substances with
carcinogenic, mutagenic, and immune-suppressant
properties. Algae are not destroyed by chlorination,
boiling, or other methods of disinfection currently
in use.
Russia's water supply does not contain the requisite
quantities of fluorine and iodine. This is one cause of
the poor condition of people's teeth: 90 per cent
suffer from dental caries and many teeth are lost at an
early age. None of the fluoridation systems installed
in 26 cities during the Soviet period is now working.
(The US is setting up equipment to fluoridate the water
at the Mozhaisk station free of charge.) Nor is iodine
added to the water supply.
A major cause of the neglect is that responsibility for
water supply has been transferred to local authorities
that do not provide adequate funding. About $2 billion
are needed to upgrade the water supply infrastructure
of Moscow alone. Decentralization also impedes
coordinated action. Thus a reservoir drawing on a clean
source was built in Saransk, but was nonetheless
contaminated by pollution from Penza, located upstream.
--------------------------------------------------------
RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS
9. RUSSIAN OPINION ON NATO EXPANSION
SOURCE. William Zimmerman. Survey Research and Russian
Perspectives on NATO Expansion. Post-Soviet Affairs
[http://www.bellpub.com/psa/index.htm], Vol 17 No. 3,
July-September 2001, pp. 235-261.
How strongly are Russians opposed to NATO expansion? Do
they really care that much about it? William Zimmerman
(University of Michigan) tackles these questions on the
basis of evidence from surveys of the Russian public and
policy elites conducted between 1995 and 2000.
Substantial majorities of both elites and the general
public view NATO expansion unfavorably. About two-thirds
oppose the entry into NATO of former Soviet allies in
Central-Eastern Europe, while 75--80 per cent oppose the
entry of the Baltic states and CIS countries. A larger
proportion of elites than of the general public are
against NATO expansion, but the difference is only
4 or 5 percentage points.
A very strong correlation is found between attitude to
NATO expansion and general political orientation. Thus
dividing members of policy elites into four political
categories, one finds 95 per cent of "socialist
authoritarians" (the group remaining closest to
Soviet-era perceptions of the world) hostile to the
Baltic states joining NATO, but only 68 per cent of
"liberal democrats" taking the same view. Nonetheless
it is sobering that fewer than a third even of this,
the most Western-oriented of the four groups, don't
mind the Baltic states joining NATO.
Perhaps the most striking finding pertaining to the
general public is the widespread ignorance of the
actual situation. In a 1997 survey, out of 32 per cent
who SAID that they were "aware of the plans for NATO
expansion to the East," about half (47--56 per cent)
believed that the Baltic states were already members
of NATO.
--------------------------------------------------------
RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS
10. PUTIN AND THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS
SOURCE. Pavel Baev. Russia Refocuses Its Policies in
the Southern Caucasus. Harvard University, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Caspian Studies Program
[www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/sdi]. Working Paper Series
No. 1, July 2001.
Dr. Baev is senior researcher at the International Peace
Research Institute (Oslo, Norway), editor of the journal
"Security Dialogue," and author of several books on the
post-Soviet Russian military. In this paper he considers
how Russian policy in the Southern Caucasus has changed
under Putin.
Baev argues that geopolitical motives no longer play an
important role in the calculations of Russian policy-
makers. They have given way to short-term economic
considerations. This facilitates the resolution of the
prolonged dispute over the interstate demarcation of the
waters and seabed of the Caspian Sea.
Some old policies remain in place, but the motives
underlying them are now different. Russia still seeks to
hold back the development of its Caspian neighbors' oil
resources, but no longer for the purpose of impeding the
consolidation of their independence from Russia. The
goal is simply to keep world oil prices high.
Connected to the shift away from geopolitics is a
reassessment of Russian views of Turkey, no longer seen
(as it was in the 1990s) as a serious threat to Russia's
interests in the Caucasus.
Putin has no interest in creating any kind of Caucasian
community or collective security mechanism (such as
Shevardnadze's "Caucasian Home"), preferring separate
bilateral relations with each country. Within this
framework he is ready to make certain compromises, as
shown by his negotiations with Azerbaijan. (He visited
Baku in January 2001.)
Contrary to the expectations of many, the war in
Chechnya has not made Russia more assertive in the
Caucasus as a whole. It has rather distracted Putin and
his colleagues from working out any overall strategy
toward the region, a task for which in any case they
lack the necessary expertise. "Moscow," concludes Dr.
Baev, "will remain quite passive in the Southern
Caucasus" -- and ill-prepared for possible crises there.
--------------------------------------------------------
HISTORY
11. INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT UNDER WAR COMMUNISM
SOURCE. I. Rapoport, "Poltora goda v sovetskom glavke"
[One and a Half Years in a Soviet Main Administration],
pp. 112-25 in Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii. Tom 2
[Archive of the Russian Revolution. Vol. 2]. Moscow:
"Sovremennik," 1991.
Note. "War communism" (as it later came to be called)
was the period immediately after the revolution of
October 1917, when the Soviet regime made its first
attempt to implement centralized management of the
national economy. The attempt was abandoned in 1921
with the introduction of a regulated market economy
under the New Economic Policy (NEP).
War communism is a rather neglected period in the
study of Russian economic history. The only substantial
study in English is the book by Silvana Malle (now at
the OECD), The Economic Organization of War Communism,
1918-1921 (Cambridge University Press, 1985).
Below I translate the first few pages of a memoir that
provides a vivid impression of how the system of war
communism worked -- or didn't work. It was written in
Riga (Latvia) in 1921 soon after the author's departure
from Russia. From the beginning of 1919 until September
1920 he had worked as a "specialist" in a Soviet agency
of industrial management -- specifically, in the
Administration of Woodworking Industry of the Main
Forestry Committee. The account has a special appeal
to me because I myself used to work as a government
statistician in Britain in the 1970s, but I hope it
will be of interest even to those who do not have
experience of this kind. Please let me know whether you
would like me to continue the translation in future
issues of the RAS. -- SDS
The Administration [in which I worked] was in charge of
all the enterprises engaged in the processing of wood
in the whole of Soviet Russia, including Ukraine,
Siberia, and the Caucasus. The total number of
enterprises under its control was about 2,000. The
exact number was unknown. Even more uncertain was the
number of workers in these enterprises. According to
one set of data, the figure in the summer of 1920 was
44,000, but according to another set of data pertaining
to the same period it was 120,000. Both figures were
cited indiscriminately as official data, and used as
the basis of reports, decrees, and instructions.
As for which factories were working, and which were at
a standstill and why, only intermittent and problematic
information was available. Only in the summer of 1920
did we succeed in making factory managements tell us
which factories had been destroyed by fire, and I must
give them their due: we were flooded with replies. The
Center knew even less about what exactly the few
functioning factories were making and how. The
overwhelming majority of factories gave no reports
either of output or of how they used the wood and the
billions of rubles with which they were provided on
demand, according to the norm and above the norm.
One cannot say, however, that the central agencies did
not try to collect data. Quite the reverse: the Main
Forestry Committee, its Administration of Woodworking
Industry, and all the departments and sub-departments of
the latter were continually devising the cleverest
report forms. So were the Central Statistical Committee,
the Accounting Department of the Supreme Council of
National Economy, and so forth. All these forms aimed at
being exhaustive and scientifically precise. Some of
them were not on ordinary sheets of paper, but spread
over several sheets stuck together. The forms were all
sent out, accompanied by categorical orders to complete
them and threats to bring in the Cheka [secret police].
A few weeks later they would reach the sawmill. The
person in charge there was semi-literate at best and
could not make head or tail of these contradictory
forms. Even at the few larger enterprises that had some
educated staff, they could not cope with all the forms
that the Center rained down upon them.
Here is an example of the consequences. On January 3,
1920 each Main Administration received a most urgent
telephonogram from Larin, demanding by no later than
1 pm on January 5 a report on the branch of industry for
which it was responsible, including number of factories
(functioning and non-functioning), number of workers and
employees, quantities of materials used, amount of wood
processed, and amounts of money spent. A tempting reward
was offered for completing the work on time: each person
involved would get 2 pounds of sugar and a quarter pound
of tea.
So we "mobilized" our staff and stayed late into the
evening. First we contacted the Department of Statistics
and Economics of the Main Forestry Committee, which was
supposed to get telegrams from the factories about the
progress of work twice a month. However, they had
information from only 5 of the 2,000 factories, and even
from them only for certain months of the year. All the
others had sent in no reports...
But the higher-ups were demanding a report, and 2 pounds
of sugar for the new year's holiday was no small
temptation. We used "logic" to compile the report. We
took the approximate number of factories, intuitively
estimated the number of functioning machines, then
multiplied by 25 to get the number of workers, and in
the same brilliantly simple way derived all the other
figures we needed. The report was presented to Larin
two hours before the deadline. Together with other
reports compiled according to the same recipe, it
provided the basis for deliberations -- as I heard from
participants -- at sessions of the Presidia of the
Supreme Council of National Economy and of the Council
of People's Commissars.
A similar incident occurred in the spring of 1920. After
Arkhangelsk was captured [from the British, intervening
in the Russian civil war], the chairman of the Main
Forestry Committee, Lomov, whose main talent was his
ability to talk at any time, on any subject, and at any
length, was sent there to organize the Soviet North.
When he returned to Moscow, Lomov asked for a report on
the condition of the Russian woodworking industry. It
was I who had to compile the report, and I dreamt it up
as I had the report for 1919. However I might have
wished to take a more conscientious approach, that was
impossible, and there was no way out of preparing some
kind of report. Soon after this a delegation of English
workers came to Moscow. One of its members, Parcell,
being himself a woodworker, visited the Main Forestry
Committee and was handed a copy of the same report. I
don't know what Parcell did with it when he got back to
England...
It was felt necessary to show our esteemed guest not
only papers, but also the products of Soviet industry.
He was taken to a case in which was displayed a splendid
collection of spools for textile factories...
Unfortunately the Englishman took one of the spools in
his hands. I recall his smile and the embarrassment of
his guide when we saw on the back of the spool the
trademark of an English firm.
If this was how well-informed the Administration was
about the work of its enterprises, then it is not
difficult to imagine how well-founded were all the
"production programs" and "assignments" for the future.
It is not surprising that even the Presidium of the
Supreme Council of National Economy, when confirming
these programs, took a critical attitude toward them,
automatically cutting the proposed programs and budgets
of the Main Administrations to amounts several times
smaller. So the Main Administrations would trick the
Presidium by multiplying their proposed budgets by the
corresponding factor. For example, the Handicrafts
Department of the Administration asked for 44 billion
rubles for 1920; it got 6 billion...
Here is another example that illustrates the level of
understanding of the real situation on the part of the
leaders of Russian industry. In August 1920 a
"production program for 1920-21" was prepared. It turned
out that the requirements for processed wood declared by
the most important central agencies alone (requirements
derived, of course, by the usual Soviet method) exceeded
by a factor of two the maximum possible output, on the
implausible assumption that all factories would be able
to function and would be provided with raw material.
When this was explained to one of the leaders of the
Main Forestry Committee, Kabanov, he solved the problem
very simply: "Well then, we'll have to order that the
additional factories needed be built without delay." In
order to appreciate fully this sentence, you have to be
aware of the pitiful condition of the existing factories
and the complete lack of materials and technology.
Under these circumstances, the central management of
industry amounted to the compilation and re-compilation
of all imaginable organizational, production, and
construction plans, lengthy but random correspondence
about particular issues that had surfaced, and the
resolution of conflicts between local bodies.
[Translation for purposes of individual study only.]
*******
-------
David Johnson
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