alison,
When it is raining, you think, "It is raining". Why? Because this is the
logical relation. Everything we think accords with logic in establishing a
logical relation to a logical form. I don't how you conceive logic to be
only partial to language. In expressing an emotion or in expressing a
certain idea, we do it through a logical channel. If I am cold,
Logic "tells" me that I should use this sign that is agreed upon to
indicate this state of being. Language does not tell me this, logic does.
Language is simply an arbitrary symbolic system and if there are language
rules, they are derived from logic. Of-course tautologies and
contradictions do not make sense; only because of what logic is. A "round
square" is illogical, that is why it is a contradiction. Language is the
simply the symbolic structure and it seems that you confuse it with Thought
when you say poetry may be "language expressing itself". Language itself
disguises Thought because it does not allow us to see the underlying
structure of Thought, because language itself (as a symbol) bears no
necessary structural relation to Thought.
"propositions" might behave logically, language itself does not behave
>logically.
Well to begin with I doubt language "behaves" at all and, in any case, this
statement is meaningless. Propositions are a part of language and as such
what makes propositions illogical is the Intention of the user. The signs
themselves are endowed with meaning and when used logically become logical
statements.
"He also criticises the "modern" tendency to treat
>"the laws of nature" as inviolable explanations"
You still suppose that I am talking about the laws of nature, which I am
definetly not. I am talking about how we perceive the world and nature and
with how we express our Intentions. Language is the primary manifestation
of logic and the reason that I say this is that we must think and in order
to think we must use language. Language is means, it is essentially
arbitary as to nature of its particular symbols. the very possibility
of "meaning" "symbol" is the provision of Logical Relation. When we think
we perform logical relations to logical forms. That we can use any type of
symbol to express these logical forms and relations, shows that language
itself is subservient and arbitrary to the Logic of Thought.
daniel
On Fri, 16 Feb 2001 07:46:49 +1100, [log in to unmask] wrote:
>>The last sentence is particularly telling. Logic tells us how to say
>>things. That in language, it goes without saying that we obey logical
>>principles may make it difficult to see how dependent we are on logic. I
do
>>not say, "the leaves were in the tree" because it would be illogical. This
>>is basic. But there are no language rules that tell me this. I know this
>>because of logic. This is a necessity that language naturally accords to
>>and therefore it works a ground for language and a limit to language. I
>>can't see why this is difficult to appreciate?
>
>Wittgenstein's statement seems to be saying, rather, that logic is a very
>partial quality of language and, perhaps, not even the most important;
>and also very clearly that logic bears relationship to signs only, not to
>reality. Certainly, logic is not the quality which matters most in
>poetry, which is perhaps primarily _expressive_ language; or perhaps,
>language expressing _itself_ (if one is Valery, or W being alogical). In
>another place, W discusses tautology and contradiction, both staples of
>poetry, for example, which he says do not make _sense_.
>
>I have some notes from Tractatus, but not the book.
>
>When Wittgenstein says: "The limits of my language are the limits of my
>world", he immediately follows it with "We cannot think what we cannot
>think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either... The philosophical
>self is not the human being, not the human body, not the human soul, with
>which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of
>the world - not a part of it."
>
>Now, I am not entirely sure how W separates the "metaphysical subject"
>from the human body and soul: how can there be such a thing? but it is
>very clear that he is discussing the subject and subjectivity, especially
>when he tells us that "so too at death the world does not alter but comes
>to an end" (only for the subject, obviously); and the limits he is
>approaching are those the French so love to call the Other. And also
>when he suggests that solipsism is the truest way to apprehend reality.
>He is talking about the borders of the _self_, as he construes them.
>
>The model of reality within language is for Wittgenstein a "proposition".
> "Everyday language", he says, "disguises thought"; so that while
>"propositions" might behave logically, language itself does not behave
>logically.
>
>He says that "belief in the causal nexus is superstition", which you
>might take note of. He also criticises the "modern" tendency to treat
>"the laws of nature" as inviolable explanations, as God and Fate were
>treated by earlier peoples, and says "the wisdom of the ancients is
>clearer, insofar as they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while
>the modern system tries to make it look as everything were explained."
>
>This is an argument which is so at odds with what you're saying, I wonder
>that you quote Wittgenstein to support you.
>
>> since my words are simply not
>>getting through
>
>Your words are "not getting through" because they don't make "sense". So
>it's very difficult to argue with them, and very easy to get irritated,
>
>Best
>
>Alison
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