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-David Pearson]
Environmental ethicists are also faced with the problem of =
articulating why *collections* of individuals (e.g. oak trees, =
ecosystems, or whatever) would have "intrinsic value," as opposed to the =
individuals themselves, or even just the subjective experiences of those =
individuals being intrinsically valuable.
So . . . there's a lot there in David's question. Any thoughts, =
comments?
Jim T.
I was just reading Being and Nothingness, a selection on value. To me =
value is the term that needs clarification. When I read that an object =
in nature can or cannot possess value I am actually not able to =
conceptualize what is actually meant by that proposition. To me it is =
meaningless. Value is the most poorly explained philosophic concept in =
my opinion. My understanding is that value is derived from a supreme and =
primary value.=20
The further classification of values into finer divisions of value is =
okay for the purposes of discursive reason; however the term value is =
not discursive, in fact value is 'undifferentiated thought', it is =
'intuition' and it is emotion.=20
The ontological nature of value means in essence that there are no =
separate entities; all nature, all existents are authentically one; and =
from a strict logical analysis of life, it can be proved [with some =
shadow of a doubt] that all life originated from a single organism. When =
the topic of speciation arises, when the thematic treatment of =
environmental rights, etc., is broached, I sense that most philosophers =
unanimously agree on the nature of value. It is conceptually impossible =
to believe in an object possessing value; value is much deeper than =
simply assigning arbitrary designations onto innocent life. Justice for =
instance is value; there are no objective treatments of justice that I =
know of. Emerson has written that 'truth is the summit of being; the =
application of which is justice.' Sartre writing on value has this to =
say about value: "...what is the being of the self: it is value."
If there was anything Good itself in nature, all other entities in =
nature would be limited by that good, and precisely there would be some =
Bad; there would be one Bad Crocodille and the rest would be anything =
but Bad. I can tell after reading Dominque Lapierre's "City of God" =
there is no place where the good 'ones' do not exist in principle and in =
effect. Can God be found in the market? The intelligent answer is no. =
God is found everywhere.=20
Sartre agrees on the primacy of value. He writes that knowledge of an =
object is not value and knowledge of an object occurs before value is =
felt. For example, being an environmental scientist does not in myself =
automatically a confer a value for environmental justice.=20
"Value therefore is not known at this stage since knowledge posits the =
object in the face of consciousness....Value is nowhere and everywhere." =
=20
This nowhere sense of value must imply the existence of a supreme and =
originary value, or pre-archic orginary value; a supreme value =
transcends the ego-centric self conception which limits the conception =
of the good that value is oriented to. The supreme and primary value, as =
a concept, is sublime, a concept that is difficult to unfold, like =
romance, because it cannot be understood through an act of conceptual =
unfolding.=20
Probably the most misunderstood term in philosophy and critical =
thought is 'value' and there are very few adequate explanations or =
definitions of what is value. When I think of value I am left with =
nothing else to think of but 'intuition' and 'emotion' or feelings. =
Certainly all persons have a sense of value, life has value, because =
there is something good about being alive, and being content; however =
not in any absolute sense is a mere statement adequate with regard to =
value; life has normative value, and can never be exhausted on a =
terminal or teleological value.=20
Sartre writing on the ontological definition of value says that =
"...what is the being of the self: it is value." So being, the =
ontological definition of the self, is nothing other than value. =
Equivalent terms for value are feeling, emotion, and intuition. To be =
consistent with this hypothesis would demote the cognitive which is the =
opposite of value to a lessor significance in terms of the acquisition =
of knowledge, of the knowing. However Mind, or nous, for the ancient =
Greeks was coextensive with the universe, the body without organs =
[Timaeus]. The body without organs was formed from Mind. The term nous =
also means for these early philosophers intuition, or nondiscursive =
thought. Thought is the sole activity of a mind, and Mind.=20
=20
There is nothing else to compare with the idea of the universal self, =
other than value. This is a purely positive - rather than a negative - =
and completely non-rational definition of the self. Value cannot be =
reduced to the value of the objective qualities of the materials that =
constitute and embody the self, the person's labour, or property, but =
rather to the existence of the self as a centre of feeling: =
'teleological centers' or intrinsic value. Psychology, however, does not =
specifically support an ontological definition of the self as value, but =
rather claims that the self, the ego, is a hypothetical substance. There =
is nothing what so ever hypothetical about value: it is the most real in =
experience and cannot be disputed as for its being certain. There are =
accessory to the self, psychic entities that are not the self: id, and =
superego, and their correlative terms in other scientific 'assessments' =
of the subject such as the collective unconscious, the anima or animus =
of the individual consciousness. The pathology of idification is itself =
one process whereby the injustices of today are enacted, rather than =
solely enacted in concept. Murder is big business for fiction writers, =
and the movie industry. The danger that Sartre refers to is the =
'limitation of being' which narrows the being of the self to anything =
else but value. If the self is nothing else but a region where value is =
felt as immediate and indeterminant, even as a lack, consciousness is =
dispersed, coextensive within the ontic realm.
Psychic value is characterized as an 'affective state' [cf. joy or =
sorrow with the accompanying ideas of an external cause. Spinoza, =
Ethics]; therefore it is value which is immediate and indeterminant; =
value does not derive itself from a 'social definition' of what value is =
unless there is an understanding which is not precisely grounded in =
Being. On the contrary, social constructions arise from opinions, and =
opinions lack the certainty of feeling; however the certainty of feeling =
is not something that constrasts absolutely with differentiated thought. =
Each differentiated thought is attended by the emotive, undifferentiated =
thought. The ground of being therefore is unconditioned; the ground of =
being is vital, dynamic, fluid and personal. The element of the =
intersubjective arises with the definition of the self as value. I have =
a self that perceives the self that 'is'. My assertion arises from my =
understanding of myself having a will. I need not even disclose to =
myself - if I chose- whether I even need to think or believe that my =
will is free. This is not what I think about, but rather what is in my =
own 'comportment' <dasein> regarding my future, and what I need to do =
and have.=20
A self can only value what is not 'itself' and this lack is what is =
called desire and passion. Unbridled passion is precisely a strong =
emotion. I may suffer from some type of cognitive impairment as a result =
of an organic brain disfunction; I may lose my way when my sense of =
sight is no longer adequate during the night; and I may become aphasic =
not being able to express my inner thoughts well to others nor to =
myself. All along the way I am valuing each and every moment of =
perception, and consciosuness. In fact I am a composite of selves: the =
ego, the social and the universal [Arne Naess, Deep Ecologist]. I can =
even do something for others: this is love.=20
Sartre goes onto explain that moralists have failed to adequately =
grasp the meaning of the self as value since value is unconditionally =
being and not being. The self as being is also value which is =
unconditionally being and not being. That is, he means self as =
conceptually indistinct from the universal sense that the universe =
imparts on my consciousenss as a single entity, possessing life, as =
categorically the universal self, the universe, or the organless body =
that encircles humanity. The self in this respect is non-differentiated, =
mystical, and moved by affective states. This being which is value and =
not value is the 'normative existent' or what is otherwise termed =
nebulously as life, the vitalistic element. The natural and perfect =
compliment to existentialism is mysticism, as a way to pure knowledge of =
the self as value <thymos>, and innocence; the science of being wants to =
know nothing about nothing. Nothing gives primacy to Being. The logic of =
this proposition cannot be expressed in a sentence even though it is =
semantically correct. Being has primacy because it is thrust out into =
nothing. The ontology of silence is the ontogeny of the eternal return =
since time (excepting Aristotle's definition of time as a linear sere or =
circular line indicating succession) is what being inhabits; being =
neither exists in space nor time, but rather being inhabits space and =
time; and there are different conceptual modes of time, or forms of =
temporality, just as there are different forms of spatiality. Prenatal =
life has nothing for us to recall because there was no space within the =
womb; there was motility, there was the warm, the fluid warmth of an =
oceanic existence, but there was nothing to recall about my prenatal =
life. I could reach out and touch the most distant part of my environs, =
my surround.=20
Time may be directly intuited or it may be conceptual [James]. =
Concepts defeat time, concepts are the perfect and constitutive elements =
of an economy of reciprocity versus an economy of the circular exchange; =
the original affluent society was barefooted.=20
Sartre states that "value is beyond being" since being inhabits both =
space and time. Ontic or phenomenal value is not the value that is =
itself limited, but something else, perhaps it is an artifact, a =
representation, or materialized value separated out, derivative of the =
exchange.=20
Sartre admits that human value is specifically human in that this is =
how "value arrives in the world." This is the global context of the =
environs, the surrounds; and this meaning for value is specifically =
situated within culture, credo and which grants the ability to =
'transcend' beyond being, or the present as prescence and approach the =
absence of being in the beyond. What does this beyond being really =
mean?
"... the meaning of being for value is that it is that toward which a =
being transcends its being; every value-oriented act is a wrenching away =
from it's own being toward -. Since value is always and everywhere the =
beyond of all transcendings, it can be considered as the unconditional =
unity of all transcendings of being."=20
Additively
"Thus value taken in its origin, or the supreme value, is the beyond =
and the for of transcendence....Value is the self insofar as the self =
haunts the heart of the for-itself....it is the absent in-itself which =
haunts being-for-itself.....if we start by considering it as presence to =
itself, this presence immediately is solidified, congealed to itself."=20
"Value haunts freedom."=20
I take it here that freedom is haunted by an awesome presence which =
is felt as a lack, as lack value.=20
chao
john foster
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