I'm surprised no one picked up on this. Tony wrote (and Tony, I'm not
picking on you, I just find the following curious):
> There is an ethics of terrorism that excludes attacks on human life,
>restricting it to property. The activists who blew up the math building in
>1970 (?) thought no one was inside. Their intelligence was faulty (perhaps
>in both meanings of the word); they did not intend to kill anyone. But they
>did, and one was sentenced to Attica and died in the rebellion there. So you
>could say he paid for his mistake, but his intention was revolutionarily
>pure: to destroy the facility that did the development work for making
>napalm, as a demonstration against the war that would financially hurt the
>university establishment but not kill anyone.
You write here that there is an "ethics of terrorism" that excludes attacks
on human life and restricts such attacks to property. But I thought you
have been saying all along that terrorism directed against property is
either a non sequitur or a category mistake?
How can an ethics of terrorism restrict itself to attacks against property
when the concept "terrorism" itself can *only* apply to acts of violence
against people? Perhaps this is simply carelessness on your part; or else
I am not reading something correctly. But are you being consistent here
with your own use of the term "terrorism"?
Jim
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