A thesis on method [Response to Jean Schneider, part 3]
--Summary begins-
On April 17, Jean Schneider posted a long, compact series of fundamental
questions on the nature of the philosophical doctorate. Addressing these
issues required a lengthy response.
One issue remains from the second part: method. Here, I point to the
freedom of method. In a Ph.D. thesis, one is required to choose a method,
justify the choice, describe the method, and report its use. That is an
issue of structure in the doctoral dissertation. This structural
requirement places no limits on the choice of method.
--Summary ends--
Contents:
(48) Varieties of research methods
--
Copyright © 2000 by Ken Friedman. All rights reserved. Permission to quote
in part or in full granted with proper attribution and acknowledgment of
sources.
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On April 17, Jean Schneider (000417) posted a long, compact series of
fundamental questions on the nature of the Ph.D. addressing these issues
required a lengthy response.
This weekend, I posted the second of two replies. The second reply
addressed the form and structure of the doctorate with emphasis on the
Ph.D. It provided a model of the thesis and offered noes on pedagogy and
learning.
It has come to my attention that the original note that occasioned Jean's
response (Friedman 000414) mentioned method. Jean briefly alluded to method
in his post. I did not address the issue of method. This post will do so.
In "Thesis 19: The nature of the philosophical doctorate" (Friedman 000414:
unpaged), I wrote, "There are hundreds of acceptable research methods and
research paradigms. For the Ph.D., what is required is that one choose
among those that permit explicit clarification and generalizable findings
that others can use. No one suggests that there is only one way. We do call
for selecting among those ways that allow others to draw on and apply the
findings at a distance, that is, ways that depend on the clarity of the
published results rather than depending on the tacit transmission of
first-hand knowledge through apprenticeship and craft means."
Jean Schneider's (000417: unpaged) response addressed the question of the
thesis and the question of method in one query, asking "Do you see the
course book as the model of the Ph.D then? . . . But 1/there is an ongoing
normalization of materials and descriptions that makes first-hand knowledge
quite marginal."
The issue of "normalization of materials and descriptions" also points to
method.
Here, I will offer a few brief comments. The full answer requires a massive
bibliography that will only interest those who are seriously interested in
reading about method.
In the early part of the last century, method was far more restricted than
it is today. In a cogent essay on methodology, Herbert Blumer (1969: 1-60)
addressed many of the problems that we face in design research. One central
problem was the tendency of social scientists to confuse method with the
notion of using advanced quantitative procedures.
Blumer wrote (1969: 24) "Today, 'methodology' in the social sciences is
regarded with depressing frequency as synonymous with the study of advanced
quantitative procedures, and a 'methodologist' is one who is expertly
versed in he knowledge and use of such procedures. He is generally viewed
as someone who casts study in terms of quantifiable variables, who seeks to
establish relations between such variables by the use of sophisticated
statistical and mathematical techniques, and who guides such study by
elegant logical models conforming to special canons of 'research design.'
Such conceptions are a travesty on methodology as the logical study of the
principles underlying the conduct of scientific inquiry."
Blumer's point is that it is the goal of research to study and to
understand an empirical world. The empirical world must determine the
methods of study. The methods of study do not establish the constitutive
nature of the empirical world.
Blumer (1928) wrote his own doctoral thesis on issue in method. Throughout
his career, he was deeply troubled by the tendency of social scientists to
emulate other sciences in inappropriate ways. One problem, to which this
gave rise, in fact, was an instrumental view of method that effectively
stripped social science of its conceptual meaning. One of Blumer's (1931)
first important articles, "Science without concepts," focused on this
problem. The problem of inappropriate method was to form a running theme
through a career that lasted nearly half a century (f.ex., Blumer 1940,
1954, 1956, 1980).
Blumer's case is to the point here because of his profound insistence on
methodological flexibility and his insistence on the existence of an
empirical world that constitutes a reality of some kind outside the
observer. This empirical reality makes narrow positivism or instrumental
quantitative representation impossible.
Blumer reached a profound level of respect in his profession - professor at
Chicago and at Berkeley, Editor of the American Journal of Sociology, and
President of the American Sociological Association. Even so, he still
carried his argument against inappropriate methods and narrow
methodological views.
Blumer's arguments - and those like them - had a profound effect. These
arguments and the growing circle of scholars with wider views became an
important influence on the growth of new methods and new methodological
perspectives that have come to characterize developments of the past three
decades. The world we seer today is nothing like the world of social
science in the 1950s or even the 1970s.
Other traditions flourished in Europe all along. Nevertheless, by the end
of Blumer's career, the often-rigid methodological frame of social science
in America also began to shift and change.
Social science now draws on a rich, sophisticated range of research
methods, qualitative and quantitative both. A quick review of the
literature turns up a field so vast that one simply cannot speak about
"normalization of materials and descriptions." One can start with the
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) _ Handbook of Qualitative Research _, 650 pages
with 36 chapters elucidating a rich range of methods, perspectives, and
applications. A few minutes browsing my book shelves and reference list
turns up dozens more, all within one of several accepted streams of social
science research (f.ex. Alvesson, Mats and Kaj Skoeldberg 1994; Argyris,
Putnam and Smith 1985; Babbie 1983; Bauman 1978; Boisot 1987; Galtung 1967,
1972; Gergen 1978; Glaser and Strauss 1967; Johannessen, Olaisen and
Friedman 1997; Lincoln and Guba 1985; Morgan 1980; Olaisen 1985; Robson
1993; Rock 1979; Scheffler 1982; Schutz 1970; Suppe 1969, 1977, 1978).
These books cover a wide territory, but they don't yet delve into
ethnography, ethnomethodology, anthropology, and other traditions with
equally rich methods. Nor into the interpretive and qualitative research
methods used in marketing, consumer behavior, user studies communication
studies and more. And that's without looking into the postmodern and
post-structuralist traditions.
A comprehensive survey by field, subfield, rubric, and specific method
would turn up several hundred usable methods in social and behavioral
sciences alone.
Moving over to quantitative research traditions in the social and
behavioral sciences, you will also find a huge and robust range of methods.
More important, we know a great deal more about how to use quantitative
research appropriately than we did when Blumer wrote his critique.
Beyond this, we have the research traditions and methods of all the fields
and disciplines on which design research draws.
Design is an interdisciplinary and integrative process constituting a
professional field and an intellectual discipline. The six-domain model of
design (Friedman 000418) clarifies the nature of design as a discipline.
Design draws on (1) the natural sciences, (2) the humanities and liberal
arts, and (3) the social and behavioral sciences and as a field of practice
and application drawing on (4) human professions and services, (5) creative
and applied arts, and (6) technology and engineering. If this model is
reasonable, this also opens the design field to methods from all these
sources.
To date, only one scholar has attempted a survey of the rich scope and
scale of design research methods. Pirkko Anttila (1996) describes the
variety of methods can be applied to design research, demonstrating the
uses of dozens of specific methods from a wide range of disciplines. She
shows their application in design research, and she proposes a systematic
series of tests and choices on the basis of which the individual researcher
can adopt, apply and - if need be - adapt specific methods.
Anttila's pioneering work must be extended in years to come to offer design
research - and doctoral candidates - an encyclopedia of methods on which to
draw.
Three problems of method in design research parallel the problems that
bothered Blumer (1969: 24) with such "depressing frequency."
First is the tendency to equate robust method with normative standards and
even with positivism. To call for methodological understanding and clear
explanation of chosen methods is not normative or positivistic. It is the
heart of the research endeavor. It permits others to understand what a
researcher has done, how it has been done and why. It permits others to
study the method as well as the results. It permits others to use the
method to examine the data again allowing each to reach - or disagree with
- the original findings. This is even somewhat possible with nonrepeatable
or irreproducible projects. Moreover, this is even possible with postmodern
or hermeneutic methods. The issue is allowing others to understand the how
and why of what a researcher has achieved. None of this is normative. It is
a simple request that the researcher makes an appropriate choice, telling
us what he or she has done and why it is appropriate.
The second issue is the tendency of design researchers to generalize and
universalize one or two methods or methodological traditions for all design
research. This cannot be done.
During the past year I have heard it asserted that since the central
problem in design research involves this or that [fill in the blank], the _
only _ methods we need are . . . qualitative . . . hermeneutic . . .
ergonomic . . . and so on.
No single method is adequate for all the research changelings of our field.
A method that is well suited to a specific challenge becomes inadequate
when applied inappropriately.
All the qualitative testing in the world isn't worth a bit of simple,
engineering analysis when we need to test the tensile strength of an
artifact that must bear a specific load to do its job.
All the data points in the world on hue, saturation and value won't add up
to an answer when we need to know whether a specific color accords with or
offends the traditions of a specific culture.
Neither engineering analysis nor anthropology will help us select a polymer
with specific properties for a defined purpose. This is the task of
chemistry or material science.
Moreover, none of these will help us discover what paint lasts best on a
given kind of wood. For this, we can use research methods that have been
used by carpenters and artisans for at lest two thousand years.
The point is that there is no single method. There are thousands of
methods. By knowing that they exist and learning how to use some of them,
we can address the problems with which specific methods can help us to
derive answers.
The third issue is the methodological poverty of design education and
design research training.
I understand that undergraduate studio design courses do not emphasize
research methods. Once a course leads to an M.Des., however, research
becomes an issue. The problems of voodoo research in design companies will
become a problem for our entire field, and sooner rather than later.
At the Ph.D. level, methods research is fundamental. It makes no sense to
worry about the "normalization of materials and descriptions" of research
methods for students who get nearly no methods training at all. It
particularly makes no sense given the rich treasury of methods on which
they might draw.
I estimate that it is possible to identify and describe at least 2,000
specific research methods that are applicable to different specific
problems in design research. Given that range of choice, the problem of
normalization is no problem at all. Quite the contrary, we have more
choices to make than researchers in nearly any other field.
Our problem is the opposite of normalization. Our problem is developing a
foundation of skills on which to make the right choices. And it is linked
to the need to understand enough about those choices to engage the right
kinds of teams and colleagues for all the necessary research methods that
we may, ourselves, not be prepared to handle.
This third problem is a significant challenge to our professors and program
heads. Here, there are a few reasonable requirements.
We must all develop a richer sense of method, and a deeper understanding of
the methodological challenge. Methodology is the general study of method.
It is a study distinct from the study and application of any one method. In
this, the work of Pirkko Antilla is unique in our field. Prof. Antilla has
made it the work of several decades to understand, summarize, and outline
the challenge of methods study for design research. It is not possible for
most of us to become a Pirkko Antilla. It is necessary for us to follow her
lead.
This, too, is why most universities insist that professors in
research-based disciplines must themselves be active, publishing
researchers. If our professors are to manage programs that award research
degrees and supervise design research, they must be researchers themselves.
A growing number of university-based design schools are now establishing
regulations governing doctoral supervision and the composition of doctoral
committees. These regulations increasingly require that artistic professors
must either hold an earned doctorate or demonstrate proof of research
capability if they are to supervise research programs as distinct from the
artistic programs to which they were originally appointed.
One task of scholars in a research discipline is studying, understanding,
and teaching method. To meet this challenge, design departments have work
to do.
This post is a brief answer - yes, brief - demonstrating that we have no
risk of the "normalization of materials and descriptions" in our field.
Demonstrating the full range of choices and opportunities is the work of a
book, or several.
References
Alvesson, Mats and Kaj Skoeldberg. 1994. Tolkning och refleksjon:
Vetenskapsfilosofi och kvalitiv metode. Lund: Studentliteratur.
Anttila, Pirkko. 1996. Tutkimisen taito ja tiedonhankinta. Taito-, taide-,
ja muotoilualojen tutkimuksen tyoevaelineet. Helsinki: Aakatiimi Oy.
Argyris, Chris, Robert Putnam and Diana McLain Smith. 1985. Action Science.
New York: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Babbie, E. R. 1983. The practice of social research. Third edition,
revised. Belmont: Wadsworth.
Bauman, Zygmunt. 1978. Hermenutics and Social Science, New York: Columbia
University Press.
Blumer, Herbert. 1928. Method in social psychology. Chicago: University of
Chicago. Unpublished doctoral dissertation.
Blumer, Herbert. 1931. "Science without concepts." American Journal of
Sociology, 36, 515-533.
Blumer, Herbert. 1940. "The problem of the concept in social psychology."
American Journal of Sociology, 45, 707-719.
Blumer, Herbert. 1954. "What is wrong with social theory?" American
Sociological Review, 19, 3-10.
Blumer, Herbert. 1956. "Sociological analysis and the 'variable'." American
Sociological Review, 21, 83-90.
Blumer, Herbert. 1980. "Mead and Blumer: the convergent methodological
perspectives of social behaviorism and symbolic interactionism." American
Sociological Review, 45, 409-419.
Blumer, Herbert. 1969. Symbolic Interactionism. Perspective and method.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
Boisot, Max H. 1987. Information and organizations. London: Fontana.
Denzin, Norman K. and Yvonna S. Lincoln, editors. 1994. Handbook of
Quantitative Research. Thousands Oaks: Sage.
Friedman, Ken. 000414. "Thesis 19: The nature of the philosophical
doctorate." DRS. Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2000 05:09:20 +0200
Friedman, Ken. 000418. "What I HAVE NOT said.... Precision, please. [Short
post. 843 words]." DRS. Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2000 11:18:37 +0200
Galtung, Johan. 1967. Theory and Methods of Social Research.
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo.
Galtung, Johan. 1972. Empiricism, criticism, constructivism: three
approaches to scientific activity. Paper presented at the Third World
Future Research Conference. Bucharest, September 3-10.
Gergen, K. J. 1978. "Toward generative theory," in Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 36, 1344-60.
Glaser, Barney G. & Anselm Strauss. 1967. The discovery of grounded theory.
Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.
Johannessen, Jon Arild, Johan Olaisen and Ken Friedman. 1997. Clarified
Subjectivity. Contributions to a Philosophy of Science for Information
Science. Syllabus for the Nordic Research Course in philosophy of science
for library and information science. Copenhagen, Gothenburg and Oslo: The
Royal Danish School of Library Science, Gothenburg University School of
Library and Information Science and the Norwegian School of Management.
Lincoln, Yvonna and Egon Guba. 1985. Naturalistic Inquiry. New York: Sage.
Morgan, Gareth. 1980. "Paradigms, metaphors, and puzzle solving in
organization theory," in Administrative Science Quarterly, 25 (December)
605-622.
Olaisen, Johan. 1985. "Alternative paradigms in library science: The case
for paradigmatic tolerance and pluralism,"in Libri, 35 (2)129-150.
Robson, Colin. 1993. Real World Research. A Resource for Social Scientists
and Practitioner-Researchers. Oxford: Blackwell.
Rock, Paul Elliott. 1979. The Making of Symbolic Interactionism. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Scheffler, Israel. 1982. Science and Subjectivity. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Schneider, Jean. 000417. "Re: Thesis 19: The nature of the philosophical
doctorate." DRS. Date: Mon, 17 Apr 2000 07:43:53 +0200
Schutz, A. 1970. On phenomenology and social relations. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Suppe, Frederick. 1969. Studies in the Methodology and Foundation of
Science. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Suppe, Frederick. 1977. The Structure of Scientific Discovery. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press.
Suppe, Frederick, ed. 1978. The Structure of Scientific Theories. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press.
Ken Friedman, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Leadership and Strategic Design
Department of Knowledge Management
Norwegian School of Management
+47 22.98.51.07 Direct line
+47 22.98.51.11 Telefax
Home office:
+46 (46) 53.245 Telephone
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