STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
CX-00-706
Julienne Goins,
Appellant,
vs.
West Group
Respondent.
Filed November 21, 2000
Reversed and remanded
Stoneburner, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 9818222
Joni M. Thome, Attorney at Law, 8400 Lyndale Avenue South, Suite 7,
Bloomington, MN 55420 (for appellant)
Patricia A. Bloodgood, Susan E. Ellingstad, Lockridge, Grindal, Nauen,
P.L.L.P., 100 Washington Avenue South, Suite 2200, Minneapolis, MN 55401
(for respondent)
Considered and decided by Stoneburner, Presiding Judge, Foley, Judge,* and
Mulally, Judge.**
S Y L L A B U S
Appellant established a prima facie case of direct sexual orientation
discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act by showing that she was
denied use of the women's restroom in the workplace based on the fact that
her female self-image is not traditionally associated with her biological
maleness. Whether the work environment that resulted in and from
appellant's exclusion from the women's restroom was sufficiently hostile to
be actionable is a question of fact inappropriate for resolution by summary
judgment.
O P I N I O N
STONEBURNER, Judge
Appellant Julienne Goins challenges the district court's grant of summary
judgment to her employer on her claims of intentional sexual orientation
discrimination and hostile work environment under the Minnesota Human
Rights Act. Because the district court erred in its application of the law
to the sexual orientation discrimination claim and because material
questions of fact exist with regard to the hostile work environment claim,
we reverse. We also reverse the district court's order compelling Goins to
answer questions regarding her anatomy because such discovery is not
relevant to her claims.
FACTS
When appellant Goins was born on April 15, 1973 she was designated *male*
on her birth certificate. Through childhood and adolescence Goins was
considered male, but she was confused about her sexual identity. In 1994
after counseling, she began taking female hormones. By the summer of 1995
Goins began to consistently present herself as female. In October 1995 a
Texas court granted her petition to legally change her name from Justin
Travis Goins to Julienne Hannah Goins. The Texas court order states that it
constitutes authority for a change of gender from *genetic male* to
*reassigned female* on any and all documents, including but not limited to
Goins's birth certificate and Texas driver's license. [1] Although Goins
has not had elective surgery to alter any part of her anatomy, the parties
do not dispute that Goins sincerely and consistently identifies herself as
female.
In May 1997 Goins began working for West Group in Rochester, New York,
where she worked for five months without incident. During the summer of
1997 she visited West's Eagan facility on four occasions. She agreed to
relocate to Minnesota
and began working at the Eagan facility on October 6, 1997.
Before Goins started work at Eagan, a group of approximately four women
told Lewis Freeman, Director of Shared Services Human Resources for the
Eagan facility,
that they were uncomfortable with Goins using the women's restroom because
of their belief that Goins is biologically male. There is no evidence that
any of the complainants
have ever been in the women's restroom at the same time as Goins. No one
has ever alleged any inappropriate conduct by Goins in the restroom or
elsewhere.
In response to the expressed concerns and Freeman's own belief that Goins
is biologically male, Freeman immediately told Goins that she could not use
the women's restrooms. She was directed to use either of the facility's two
single-occupancy
restrooms, which are not designated as men's or women's restrooms. One of
these restrooms is located in the lobby of the building where Goins worked
and the other is in a nearby building.
Goins opposed the directive and voiced her disagreement. She proposed
education and communication with co-workers to address their concerns. She
refused to use the designated restrooms, partially in protest and partially
because she found the restrooms inconvenient and dirty. Goins refrained
from eating or drinking during the day to avoid having to use any
restroom. Occasionally Goins used the women's restroom. In November 1997
Freeman warned Goins that if she continued to use the women's restroom she
would be disciplined. Freeman also told supervisors that it was incumbent
upon them to enforce the restroom policy.
Goins wrote to a West Human Resources representative in Rochester, New York
that she felt harassed at the Eagan facility because of the restroom
policy. The Rochester representative referred her back to the Eagan
supervisors, who were already aware of the policy and to whom she had
already expressed her complaints of discrimination and harassment.
West does not dispute that Goins was qualified to perform her work. In
fact, on January 12, 1998 West offered Goins a promotion and a $4,000
raise. But Goins, who had received another job offer on the same day,
declined and submitted her resignation. In her written resignation Goins
stated that although she left her employment with West voluntarily, she
resigned because of the unwelcome, stressful environment created by the
restroom policy.
Goins brought this lawsuit against West alleging sexual orientation
discrimination and hostile work environment in violation of the Minnesota
Human Rights Act. The district court granted West's motion to compel Goins
to answer discovery regarding her
genitals and later granted West's motion for summary judgment on the
discrimination and hostile work environment claims. Goins appeals the grant
of summary judgment to West and the order compelling discovery.
ISSUES
1. Did the district court err in granting West's motion for
summary judgment on Goins's intentional sexual orientation discrimination
claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act?
2. Did the district court err in granting West's motion for
summary judgment on Goins's hostile work environment claim under the
Minnesota Human Rights Act?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion in granting
West's motion to compel Goins to respond to discovery about her genitals?
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. On appeal from summary
judgment, this court asks two questions: (1) whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact and (2) whether the district court erred in its
application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.
1990). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
against whom judgment was granted. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761
(Minn. 1993). This court will affirm a grant of summary judgment if it can
be sustained on any ground. Winkler v. Magnuson, 539 N.W.2d 821, 828 (Minn.
App. 1995).
I.
Goins contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
on her sexual orientation discrimination claim because it misapplied the
relevant law. We agree. The Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) prohibits an
employer from discriminating
against an employee in terms, conditions, facilities, or privileges of
employment based on sexual orientation. Minn. Stat. §363.03, subd. 1(2)(c)
(1998). The statue defines sexual orientation to include:
having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not
traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or femaleness.
Minn. Stat. § 363.01, subd. 45 (1998). The parties agree that Goins is a
member of this protected class.
The district court rejected an analysis of a direct claim of discrimination
and used the McDonnell Douglas v. Green formula for establishing a prima
facie case of indirect discrimination. The district court concluded that,
in order to make a prima facie case of indirect discrimination, Goins had
to show: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was
qualified to use the women's restroom; and (3) that adverse employment
action was taken against her based on her status as a member of the
protected class. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.
Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973); Diez v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 564 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Minn. App. 1997), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 1997).
In applying McDonnell Douglas, the district court focused on whether Goins
is *qualified* to use the women's restroom. After a thorough discussion of
non-jurisdictional case law on same-sex marriage, [2] the district court
found that a person's sex remains as designated on the birth certificate,
based on genital assessment at birth. See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204,
210-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.
2d 499, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio
Prob. Ct. 1987); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230-31 (Tex. App.
1999). The district court reasoned that because Goins was designated male
on her birth certificate and admits she has not undergone surgery, she must
be biologically male, and therefore *unqualified* to use the women's
restroom despite her undisputed female self-image. Finding her unqualified
to use the women's restroom, the district court concluded West had not
taken adverse action against Goins based on her status as a member of a
protected class and that, therefore, Goins failed to make a prima facie
case of indirect discrimination. [3] The district court erred by applying
the formula for indirect discrimination because Goins has established a
direct claim of discrimination under the MHRA.
The MHRA is unique in prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of
self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one's biological
maleness or femaleness. See Minn. Stat. § 363.01, subd. 45. The statute
prohibits discrimination on the basis of the inconsistency between anatomy
and self-image. West denied Goins use of the women's restroom in disregard
of her undisputed female self-image. The district court agreed with West
and held that, as a matter of law, anatomy alone makes Goins a man and that
her self-image is irrelevant to the issue of restroom use. The district
court held that Goins can only use the women's restroom by demonstrating
anatomy consistent with self-image. The MHRA, however, does not require an
employee to eliminate an inconsistency between self-image and anatomy; it
protects the employee from discrimination based on such an inconsistency.
Goins has made a prima facie case of direct discrimination under the MHRA
by showing that she was denied the use of a workplace facility based on the
inconsistency between her self-image and her anatomy. The burden-shifting
framework of McDonnell Douglas was not reached by the district court but
was addressed by the parties. Once Goins made a prima facie case, the
burden shifted to West to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for denying Goins's use of the women's restroom. West asserts that it has a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to prohibit Goins from using the
women's restroom. West argues that Goins is a man and that an employer may
legitimately segregate restrooms by sex. See Minn. Stat.
§ 363.02, subd. 4 (1998) (excepting restrooms from prohibition against
sex discrimination in a place of public accommodation). Even if the
exception for sex discrimination regarding restroom use applies to
restrooms in the workplace, [4] the exception is for sex discrimination,
not for sexual orientation discrimination. West argues that it legitimately
discriminated on the basis of sex. But Goins argues that West illegally
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. Given the unambiguous
wording of the MHRA, West has failed, at this stage of the litigation, to
present a non-discriminatory, legitimate defense to Goins's prima facie
case of sexual orientation discrimination.
West argues that it is not required to accommodate Goins's desire to use
the women's restroom, relying on dictum in Cruzan v. Special School
District No. 1, Department of Human Rights, File No. 31706 (August 26,
1999). This administrative decision, while not precedent, expresses the
enforcement agency's view that an employer who allows restroom use based on
self-image rather than anatomy does not thereby commit a violation as to
other workers. The MHR Commission dismissed the claim of a
coworker who objected to use of the women's restroom by an employee who had
changed self-identity from male to female. In dictum, the MHR Commission
stated that the MHRA *does not require accommodation because of sexual
orientation.* Neither Goins nor the subject of the complaint in Cruzan
requested an accomodation from the employer. The Commission did not
elaborate on the issue of accommodation. West and the district court
incorrectly interpreted this dictum as a ruling by the Commission that an
employer can deny use of the women's restroom to an employee who has
changed identity from male to female. Cruzan does not provide West with a
legitimate basis for denying Goins use of the women's restroom facility.
Because Goins made a prima facie case of direct sexual orientation
discrimination in the workplace and West failed to assert a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its policy, summary judgment was inappropriate.
II.
The district court's grant of summary judgment on the hostile work
environment claim was based primarily on the erroneous conclusion that
Goins failed to make a prima facie case of sexual orientation
discrimination, which led the district court to conclude that Goins failed
to make a prima facie case of hostile work environment.
The elements of a prima facie case of hostile work environment are: (1) the
employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to
unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sexual orientation;
(4) the harassment
affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
timely and appropriate remedial action. See Williams v. Metropolitan Waste
Control Comm'n, 781 F. Supp. 1424, 1426 (D. Minn. 1992).
The conduct must be so severe or pervasive that it alters the conditions of
employment and creates an abusive work environment. Johns v. Harborage I,
Ltd., 585 N.W.2d 853, 861 (Minn. App. 1998). The work environment must be
*one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that
the victim in fact did perceive to be so.* Id. (quotation omitted). The
totality of the circumstances, including the *nature, frequency, intensity,
location, context, duration, and object or target* of the conduct,
determines whether the severity of the conduct rises to a hostile
environment. Klink v. Ramsey County by Zacharias, 397 N.W.2d 894, 901
(Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 1987), reversed on other
grounds by Cummings v. Koehnen, 568 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 1997). The district
court found as a matter of law that West's conduct was not sufficiently
severe to create a hostile work environment. This conclusion was based, in
part, on the district court's factual determination that West acted
reasonably.
Goins disagrees that the policy of excluding her from the women's restroom
was reasonable and alleges that West stigmatized her in the workplace by
denying her use of the women's restroom. It is undisputed that coworkers
monitored and reported on Goin's restroom use and discussed her biological
status. Goins states that she worked in an environment of *frequent staring
and glaring.* West threatened Goins with discipline if she continued to use
the women's restroom and required supervisors to monitor her restroom use.
Goins alleges that she refrained from eating or drinking during the workday
to avoid using the restroom and that she eventually sought and accepted
other employment to escape the hostile environment at West. The evidence in
this case raises a genuine issue of material fact of whether the harassment
was sufficient to give rise to a hostile work environment, making summary
judgment inappropriate. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372,
1379 (8th Cir.1996) (finding genuine issue of material fact in harassment
case precluded summary judgment); see also Strauss v. Thorne,
490 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 1992)
(*If reasonable persons might draw different conclusions from the evidence
presented, summary judgment should be denied.*) (citation omitted).
The district court also found that Goins did not report the harassment to
her supervisors and therefore West could not have known that Goins
considered the working environment hostile. See Johns, 585 N.W.2d at 862.
An employer is liable for sexual harassment if the employer had actual or
constructive knowledge of a hostile working environment and took no prompt
and adequate remedial action. Id. There is evidence in the record that West
had actual knowledge that Goins considered the work environment hostile.
West knew that employees discussed Goins's biological identity and
monitored her bathroom use. Goins alleges that she was outspoken in her
complaints to management about the restroom policy. There is at least a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether West had actual or
constructive knowledge of a hostile work environment, making summary
judgment inappropriate.
III.
Goins contends that the district court erred in granting West's motion to
compel her to answer discovery regarding her genitals and to provide her
medical history. *[T]he trial judge has wide discretion to issue discovery
orders and, absent clear abuse of that discretion, normally its order with
respect thereto will not be disturbed.* Shetka v. Kueppers, Kueppers, Von
Feldt & Salmen, 454 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn. 1990). Information which can
have no possible bearing on the determination of the action on its merits
is not discoverable. Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 560, 68 N.W.2d
649, 657 (1955). The parties agree that Goins's female self-image is
inconsistent with her anatomy. The MHRA does not place a burden on
employees to prove consistency between self-image and anatomy, it protects
an employee from discrimination based on the inconsistency. The district
court found the requested discovery relevant because it held that only by
proving she had female genitals (or at least an absence of male genitals)
could Goins qualify to use the women's restroom. Because we have rejected
that standard for establishing a prima facie case, the discovery relating
to Goins's genitals is irrelevant and the discovery order is reversed.
D E C I S I O N
An employee who is denied use of a workplace restroom facility because of
an inconsistency between the employee's female self-image and the
employee's anatomy states a prima facie case of sexual orientation
discrimination under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act. Material fact questions exist concerning the employee's
claim of a hostile work environment. Summary judgment on the discrimination
claim and the order compelling discovery are inappropriate.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
Dated: November 15, 2000
Footnotes
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment
pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
** Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota
Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn.
Const. art. VI, § 10.
[1] This court does not decide whether the Texas court order granting Goins
a name change is determinative of her legal sex, but considers the order as
evidence that Goins has self-identified as a woman since 1995.
[2] The legislature has clearly stated that the prohibition on sexual
orientation discrimination contained in the MHRA shall not be construed to
authorize same-sex marriage.
Minn. Stat. § 363.021(4) (1998). Right-to-marry cases rely primarily on the
definition of marriage as an institution solidified by reproductive and
sexual functioning tenets, and are not relevant to the determination of
restroom use in the workplace under the
MHRA.
[3] The district court referenced an employer's need to regulate misconduct
and voyeurism as justification for basing restroom use on genital anatomy
rather than self-image. There is no evidence, however, to support a
conclusion that employees whose
self-image conflicts with anatomical male or female features are likely to
be voyeurs or commit inappropriate acts. There is no evidence of any
misconduct, questionable motivation or doubt about Goins's true
self-identity. Goins is not presenting herself as
a man who merely likes to dress as a woman. The presumptions relied on by
the district court illustrate the need for a more fully developed
evidentiary record.
[4] Neither party disputes an employer's right to maintain separate men and
women's restrooms in the workplace.
Part54.001
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