Keith wrote
>MABS practice is based on (usually unstated) ontological assumptions, that
>only individuals exist, and that macrosocial entities do not exist.
>(...) MABS goes further ...: MABS explicitly models AGENTS, but does
>not explicitly model social entities (groups, institutions,
>norms/conventions/rules conceptualized as collective entities, not
>simply shared psychological entities). These collective entities
>are not considered to be "real" and are not considered to be capable
>of causal power: "epiphenomenal." MABS methodology is
>epiphenomenalist about the social.
>
I am not sure that MABS can really be imputed this strong
individualist stance. In Multiagent Systems (MAS) and in MABS, social
structures are modelled as emerging from aggregates of agents that
share a common world. But this is not equal to stating that emerging
social structures do not exist! Analogously, to state that
cooperation evolves from a variety of interactional strategies is not
equal to say that it does not exist.
>This is not purely a philosophical issue, but is directly relevant to
>current MABS practice. Imagine if MABS accepted a different ontology:
>sociological realism--collective phenomena are real. If so, a MABS would
>have to explicitly simulate not only the participating agents, but also the
>collective phenomena as independently existing entities, with their own
>causal powers.
Again, I have problems in understanding what is being said here.
Obviously, collective phenomena exist independent of "specific"
agents, but they are not independent of agents in a more general
sense. However, this is *not* to deny that social structures have
their own causal powers. I referred precisely to these causal powers
when I said (I think Alan Dean got it exactly) that agents'
(different) mental states can be predicted only if one models both
the agents and the social structures, and if one has a theory of
*how* (not only why) social structures affect the agents from which
they emerge.
Scott, a rather clear example of this is offered by the structures of
social dependence (cf. Sichman et al., 1994, Proc. of ECAI). Much
alike what Cook and Emerson hypothesized in the 60s, dependence
structures allow to predict whether agents will find partners for
exchange or not, and therefore how likely it is that they will form
the corresponding mental states. But for a full simulation-based
account of this phenomenon (which Cook and Emerson could not
provide), three things are required
1. a model of the dependence structures
2. a model of the agent
3. a theory of how dep-structures may affect agents' beliefs, goals,
plans, and actions.
ross
Rosaria Conte
National Research Council, Institute of Psychology, V.LE Marx 15, 00137 Roma.
Division "AI, Cognitive and Interaction Modelling"
PSS (Project on Social Simulation) - voice:+39+06+86090210;fax:+39+06+824737
email: [log in to unmask] - http://ip.rm.cnr.it
University of Siena - Communication Sciences - "Social Psychology"
PLS, NOTICE THAT MY EMAIL ADDRESS HAS CHANGED: YOU MAY WANT TO UPDATE
YOUR ADDRESS BOOK. THANKS.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|