I have been at a conference since last Tuesday and so I will respond to
several postings of interest.

1. RE the idea of publication.  

Different options: I would be happy to draft a brief statement of my
position, if the editor decides to go that route.  I also think it would be
a fine idea to co-author an introductory piece in which we state our common
ground, and then to author brief statements of where we differ, to follow.
And as before, if the editor thinks an edited discussion would be of
interest to readers, I am happy to touch up and add references to my postings.

2. RE the question of common themes.  Our discussion has not been very
closely related to Bruce's original article.  I agree with the first two of
Scott's proposed themes, but the discussion has been more directly relevant
to MABS practice than Scott's phrasing implies.  Here is how I would
restate Scott's first two themes (which I believe are the major themes): 

(1) what is the proper relationship between sociology and MABS?  Alan
started the debate with an offhand philosophical question about whether
groups were "real" or not.  I elaborated this idea, and made my initial
claim that MABS cannot be successful without a close relationship with
sociology, partly in order to address such questions and their relevance
for MABS.  This was followed by Scott's response that MABS doesn't
necessarily need sociology.   The ensuing debate about the role of
sociology has been the single most central theme of this thread.  (Note
that our subject line has been "The relevance of sociology" for some time
now.)

(I think this is what Scott means by "top down" and "bottom up")

(2) is it ever appropriate for a MABS to explicitly model any entities
other than individual agents?  If so, when is it, and how do we determine
when; e.g., by reference to sociological data or theory, or through our own
engineering concerns?  Phrased this way, this theme is in part a subtheme
of (1).  As I recall, most postings responded in the negative; only a few
of us have argued against methodological individualism.  In my postings, I
have repeatedly claimed that MABS do not explicitly model social entities,
and I have challenged the community to provide me with examples of
simulations that do model social entities, with only a few examples
provided in response.  Only a few participants have sided with me that MABS
might sometimes be required to explicitly model social entities (notably
Ross Conte, and Bruce in his last posting).  Thus I disagree with Alan's
3rd posting on the 11th, in which he characterized "very many of the
postings" as holding to Durkheimian sociological realism.  But my memory
may be faulty, and the editor will be able to determine this after
rereading the postings.  

(Scott describes this theme solely in terms of sociological theory, but in
my postings I have been explicit about the direct relevance to MABS.  Also
note that the phrasing here emphasizes how themes (1) and (2) are closely
related; this way, the published summary would have a single central focus,
and it would remain focused on the practical implications for the MABS
community, rather than straying into sociological theory proper.)


Scott's themes (3) and (4) are not addressed in any of my postings.  I
don't think they are nearly as central as the above two, but they do appear
in a few postings.  I propose that we focus on the above two themes, as I
do not think there has been much disagreement on the list about (3) "should
theory drive application or vice versa" and (4) "what is the goal of
simulation."  To the extent that we have debated these points, that debate
falls under theme (1), "What is the proper relationship between sociology
and MABS".

3. The "Durkheim" thread started by Alan on the 11th.  Yes, you are exactly
right, the goal of my philosophical argument is to provide a justification
for Durkheim's methodological stance RE "social facts" (being external to
individuals and constraining individuals).  However, my argument diverges
from Durkheim in that I am not realist concerning social facts: I don't
think they "really exist," but that sociologists (and MABS modellers)
nonetheless may have to proceed AS IF they existed.

I have an article under review, in which I interpret Durkheim as an
emergence theorist.  The article is titled "Durkheim's dilemma: Toward a
sociology of emergence."  In brief, I claim that Durkheim's argument for
the social fact is based in a theory of emergence in complex systems, and I
reinterpret his works (especially "Rules of the sociological method") in
terms of contemporary theories of emergence and complexity.

4. Alan's comment, in a different posting on the 11th, RE the reductionist
stance of the neuroanatomists and of the Churchlands.  Yes, there is
controversy among philosophers (the Churchlands are philosophers too, by
the way).  The Churchlands are known for holding to one of the most extreme
statements of the mind-breain identity theory, one that is "eliminativist"
with respect to mental properties and terms.  Needless to say, the
neuroanatomists like this idea.  However, the great majority of
philosophers of mind disagree with them and are on the side of
"nonreductive materialism."

R. Keith Sawyer
Assistant Professor
Program in Social Thought and Analysis
Washington University
Campus Box 1183
St. Louis, MO  63130
314-935-8724



http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~ksawyer



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