There are so many useful analogies, that I would imagine
that social scientists would be having similar discussions,
with and end result being that 1) many levels of phenomena
exist, 2) these levels can be inter-related, and 3) each
level answers a different set of questions. The collection
"Individual-Based Models and Approaches in Ecology" (eds.
DeAngelis and Gross) is yet another analogy in the field
of ecology. They have similar discussions on the utility
of models. Most tend to agree that while the ecological
atoms, and their simulations, will have positive
ramifications on ecology, one should not ignore the effects
at each level. The extreme view of reductionism ignores
cognition, linguistics and many other features that inhabit
our minds, mediating the brain with the "real world." The
anti-reductionists are likely to be more forgiving of
reductionism, warning that we should not throw away theory
and models for aggregate phenomena. A few years ago, I
worked in an NSF Particle Science Center, and watched which
models were used by each physicist and material scientist.
Sometimes, a researcher would focus on Monte Carlo and
thermodynamics for the aggregate energy-based conformations
of polymers. Another person would run molecular dynamics
simulations to test interfacial conditions. They compared
notes and performed cross-validation. Newton's laws
are still useful, despite the space-time scales demarcating
their optimum utility. The key has to be - work together
on both levels for an integrative approach.
-paul
-------------------------------------
Paul Fishwick, University of Florida
CISE Department, Bldg. CSE 301
PO Box 116120
Gainesville, FL 32611
web: http://www.cise.ufl.edu/~fishwick
email: [log in to unmask]
phone + fax: (352) 392-1414
=> -----Original Message-----
=> From: [log in to unmask]
=> [mailto:[log in to unmask]]On Behalf Of Keith Sawyer
=> Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2000 11:17 AM
=> To: Alan Penn; [log in to unmask]
=> Subject: RE: The relevance of sociology
=>
=>
=> >The argument sounds a bit like the one between cognitive psychology and
=> >neuroanatomy where the former say 'how can one possibly 'explain' all
=> >previous theoretical abstractions of cognitive psychology
=> through neurons
=> >and connections?', (all sorts of dubious philosphical traps
=> about 'multiple
=> >instantiability' usually follow) and the latter respond, 'well thats all
=> >there are so we better get to it...' Transposed into our field,
=> all there
=> >are are individuals and the constraints on their
=> interrelationship (space,
=> >language, intergenerational knowledge transfer etc.) so any explanatory
=> >theory must be reducible at some stage to mechanisms based on that.
=>
=> This analogy is an instructive one. Philosophers of mind (and empirical
=> researchers) have spent at least 40 years arguing whether psychology
=> reduces to neurobiology, and if not, then why not. I am working on a
=> philosophy of social science article, in which I take the philosophy of
=> mind arguments for "nonreductive materialism" and develop them into a
=> position I call "nonreductive individualism." The consensus among
=> philosophers of mind is that the mental is not reducible to the physical.
=> Surprisingly given the obviousness of the analogy, no philosophers of
=> social science have yet drawn out this analogy.
=>
=> R. Keith Sawyer
=> Assistant Professor
=> Program in Social Thought and Analysis
=> Washington University
=> Campus Box 1183
=> St. Louis, MO 63130
=> 314-935-8724
=>
=>
=>
=> http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~ksawyer
=>
=>
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