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CYBER-SOCIETY-LIVE  2000

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Subject:

[CSL]: CPSR Answers Computer-Based Voting Technology Questions

From:

John Armitage <[log in to unmask]>

Reply-To:

[log in to unmask]

Date:

Fri, 17 Nov 2000 08:04:29 -0000

Content-Type:

text/plain

Parts/Attachments:

Parts/Attachments

text/plain (344 lines)

[Forward from RRE. John.]

=======================================
From: Phil Agre [mailto:[log in to unmask]] 
Sent: Friday, November 17, 2000 7:26 AM
To: Red Rock Eater News Service
Subject: [RRE]CPSR Answers Computer-Based Voting Technology Questions


[I've enclosed a statement from Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility (CPSR) about the faulty voting technology that is
causing problems in Florida.  I've reformatted it to 70 columns.

Here are some related URL's:

Problem "Chads" Likelier in Democratic Areas
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36760-2000Nov16.html

Furiouser and Furiouser
http://www.dailyhowler.com/h111500_1.shtml

11th Circuit Gets Voter Suit on Hand Count in Florida
http://www.law.com/cgi-bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+FTContentServer?pagename=law/View
&c=Article&cid=ZZZRWEUPLFC&cst=1

Questions and Answers About the 2000 Presidential Election
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/programs_vrep_election2000.html

Miami-Dade Considers Full Recount
http://www.salon.com/politics/wire/2000/11/16/miami_dade/

search page for Texas State Code (use simple/Boolean search)
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/statutes/statutes.html

Texas State Code, chapters on vote recounting
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/statutes/el/el021200.html#el005.212.005
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/statutes/el/el012700.html#el046.127.130
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/statutes/el/el021400.html#el011.214.042

Texas Republican Wins Hand Recount in State Race
http://news.excite.com/news/r/001115/11/politics-election-texas-dc

Laws on Manual Counts Vary Widely Around US
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7134-2000Nov12.html

Order Denying Emergency Petition
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/election2000/harrisvjudgesorder.pdf

Textbook Case of Self-Censorship
http://www.freedomforum.org/first/outrage.asp

Palm Cards Misled Haitian Voters into Voting for Bush, Activist Charges
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/daily/detail/0,1136,36000000000126886,00.ht
ml

180,000 Votes for President Were Invalidated in Florida Due to Errors
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/daily/detail/0,1136,36000000000127419,00.ht
ml 

Court TV Online -- Decision 2000
http://www.courttv.com/national/decision_2000/

Comparison of Precinct Return Data between Duval County and Lee County
http://www.netrinsics.com/DuvalVsLee/

Lost Votes?
http://orlandosentinel.com/elections/lost.htm

Nannies and Professors Giving Gore Civics Lessons
http://www.observer.com/pages/frontpage5.asp

Suit Questions Bush-Cheney Claim to TX Votes
http://www.gopbi.com/partners/pbpost/epaper/editions/tuesday/news_16.html

Thanks to everyone who contributed.]

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE).
You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use
the "redirect" option.  For information about RRE, including instructions
for (un)subscribing, see http://dlis.gseis.ucla.edu/people/pagre/rre.html
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

Date: 15 Nov 2000 20:43:17 -0000
From: [log in to unmask]
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: CPSR Answers Computer-Based Voting Technology Questions

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR), a public
interest organization that focuses on the benefits and risks to
society of computer technology, offers the following answers to
frequently asked questions about computer-based voting technology.

Q: Why do vote counting systems produce different totals when the
ballots are recounted?  Shouldn't machine counts and recounts of
ballots produce repeatable, reliable results?

A: Many people have wondered why a computerized vote-counting
system would have any significant inaccuracies.  Some have publicly
speculated that such variation must be the result of deliberate human
action.  Some people believe that computerized counts will always be
more accurate than human counts, because of inevitable "human error".

However, computerized vote-counting systems are complex, prone to
several kinds of error.  Well-designed vote-counting systems minimize
these errors.  Some systems, particularly older systems, are not
so well-designed, and are more prone to error.  To illustrate this
problem, we will describe some reliability problems with the oldest
type of computerized ballot still in use, the Vote-O-Matic(tm).
This system was once very popular and is still used in many places,
including 15 Florida counties: Broward, Collier, Dade, Duval,
Highlands, Hillsborough, Indian River, Lee, Marion, Osceola, Palm
Beach, Pasco, Pinellas, Sarasota, and Sumpter.

The following describes reliability problems associated with one phase
of the elections process: gathering ballots and running them through
readers.  Problems may occur in other phases, included materials
design and printing, polling place administration, voter education,
and vote tally software.  By focusing on this one phase, we do not
imply that the other phases are trivial.  Conducting elections is
demanding work, in all phases.  Also, this paper focuses on errors.
Elections frauds certainly have arisen in the history of American
politics, but to our knowledge no fraud has been alleged in the ballot
counting process for this election.  Some level of error is inevitable
when counting Vote-O-Matic ballots, however.

CPSR has been studying Vote-O-Matic-type vote counting systems for
over ten years.  Experts, including CPSR's own project personnel,
have concluded that the Vote-O-Matic system has inherent accuracy
limitations.  Furthermore, careful manual counting of Vote-O-Matic
ballots should always be more accurate than machine counts.

The Vote-O-Matic system uses as a ballot the Hollerith punch card,
also known as a "computer card." This once-common card is roughly 3"
by 7", with small rectangular holes.  For Vote-O-Matic cards, each
hole in the card represents a vote for one candidate (or in favor
or against a ballot measure).  The ballot is counted by feeding it,
short-side first, into a reader.  (The card is made with one corner
clipped, so that the correct end of the card is fed in first.) The
reader has lights and sensors.  When a hole passes over the sensor,
light shines through, and the hole is read as a vote.

Hollerith cards were used for the 1890 census, and millions and
millions of critical activities between then and the 1970's.  Thus,
one might expect the Vote-O-Matic system to be extremely reliable.
But important differences between the standard Hollerith card and the
Vote-O-Matic card make the Vote-O-Matic far less stable and reliable.
There are three main problem areas:

 - ballots
 - ballot reader machines
 - what happens when a ballot reader reads a ballot

* Ballots

The ballots use essentially the same card size and hole positions
that IBM adopted in 1924 soon after they bought Hollerith's company.
However, the cards are not the same.  Hollerith's approach was
to punch a hole in a solid piece of paper.  Vote-O-Matic cards are
pre-punched.  Each square "chad" is held in place by a small wad of
paper fibers at each corner.  The vote then makes a hole by pushing
the chad out with a round stylus.  However, sometimes a chad will
be partly punched out or will snag on something and be pulled out,
creating what is known as "hanging chad."

Hanging chad can be attached at one, two, or three corners.  Chad
attached at one corner are usually torn off by the card reader or
in handling.  Chad attached at two corners are also often torn off,
unless the two corners are on the side of the chad that is fed first
into the card reader.  Then, often, the chad will be forced back
into the hole, only to flap open again later.  chad attached at three
corners are also usually forced closed by the card reader.  Handling
the cards can also change the status of hanging chad.  Some studies
have been done on chad, but there are many independent variable and
complicating situations, so the preceding is a generalization.

These pre-punched cards are also reportedly sensitive to changes
humidity.  The reasons have not, to our knowledge, been studied, but
it is likely because the chad loses and gains moisture faster than
the bulk material.  Thus taking a box of Vote-O-Matic cards from an
air-conditioned room to a humid evening to another air-conditioned
room will have unpredictable effects.  It may take the cards some time
to settle down after the ordeal.

The pre-punches also make the cards less rigid than a normal Hollerith
card, and thus more prone to bending.  Bent cards often cause problems
during reading.  The trailing edge of the card is uneven, because of
tabs from where the write-in tab was detached.  The faces of the card
are not as smooth as a regular card, again due to the pre-punches.


* Ballot Reader Machines

So far as we know, there are no longer any manufacturers of Hollerith
card readers.  High-speed card readers have a lot of precision parts.
Existing readers must be periodically rebuilt, but many companies no
longer exist and the remaining manufacturers, so far as we know, no
longer offer maintenance contracts on the units.  Elections is about
the last market left for Hollerith card readers.  Elections companies
buy up equipment from counties as they move away from Vote-O-Matic
systems, and sell it jurisdictions still using Vote-O-Matic.

Elections aren't a particularly hard life for a card reader, since
a reader is only used for a few days a year.  Still, the readers
eventually need to be rebuilt, which elections companies do with
a dwindling supply of spares, hangar queens, and whatever rebuild
protocols they devise.  Still, some parts age more on calendar time
than with use.  As the readers age, they become less reliable and more
prone to error and breakdown.


* What Happens When a Ballot Reader Reads a Ballot

Ideally, a stack of ballots is sucked one-at-a-time from the input
hopper to the output hopper of a card reader, each being counted
accurately.  However, sometimes two cards are sucked through.  This
is probably because pre-punching makes small ridges on the bottom of
the card, and an identical pattern of small troughs on the top.  The
ridges tend to get caught in the troughs.  Also, feed mechanisms have
to be engineered with consideration of the air cushion between the
cards, as one moves relative to the other.  This air cushion will not
have the same properties for Vote-O-Matic cards as for normal cards,
due to surface roughness.  For whatever reason, misfeeds happen.

Hanging chad can flip open and closed.  Detached chad can become stuck
in the feed path, increasing double feeds and misfeeds.  Detached chad
can jam two cards together, increasing misfeeds.  In some machines,
detached chad can jam over the light or sensor, causing holes to
not be read until the chad blows out of the way.  Detached chad can
migrate from one card to the next.

Chad that was not detached before, but merely buckled or only
detached on one corner (which counts as "not an open hole" in many
jurisdictions) can catch on other cards and become hanging chad or be
torn loose.

The read process can be quite traumatic to a Vote-O-Matic card.


Q: Is counting ballots by hand more or less reliable than counting
them by machine?

A: A human count of Vote-O-Matic cards should almost always produce
a significantly more accurate result than automated reading.  People
cannot count cards as quickly as a card reader, but a card reader is
much more limited than a person in how it can handle and read a card.
Any damage a card has sustained can confuse a card reader or cause
it to malfunction.  People are better able to deal with such problems.

Unfortunately, reading a Vote-O-Matic card by machine changes the
card.  Cards that have had one or more trips through a high-speed card
reader will appear different to a human reader than they would have
when freshly punched by the voter.

Erik Nilsson, an election technology analyst for CPSR, believes that
the Vote-O-Matic system should be replaced.  "For a quarter century,
election experts have been calling for the Vote-O-Matic system to be
retired.  The results of the 2000 election show that it is now time
move beyond this temperamental antique."


Q: Would Internet voting solve this problem?

A: Internet voting is often suggested as a solution to election
counting problems, but has many problems of its own, for example:

- If people voted from home, it would be very difficult, perhaps
impossible, to assure that those who vote are who they say they are.
Someone could vote for one of their family members, for example.

- If people vote from home rather than in a polling place, vote
secrecy and privacy could be compromised.  Elections in many
democratic societies, including the U.S., are based on the promise
of secret ballots, where only the voter knows who he or she voted for
(unless he or she chooses to tell others).

- A home-based Internet-based voting system would favor people who
have computers and Internet connections at home.  Such amenities are
not possessed by all citizens in the U.S.

- Purely electronic ballots leave no paper trail, so electronic
subversion of voting records could be difficult or impossible to
detect.

- Voting from home could destroy the sense of shared civic
responsibility and pride that most people clearly feel when they go to
an actual polling place to vote.

On the other hand, Internet voting could offer the following
advantages:

- Customized presentation of voting choices, for example
voter-selected font size
- Reliable vote tabulation
- Access for the disabled, and rural
- Can handle large numbers of voters

Computers, of course, can and will be used in elections.  One approach
that could provide the advantages without many of the disadvantages
would be to provide Internet terminals in polling places.  Voters
would come to the polling place and identify themselves, as they
always have.  Vote-O-Matic and other outdated, unreliable systems
would be replaced by more current technology.  Each polling place
would have a "manual" backup system on site, for when the network
connections or computers fail (as they surely will) or when a voter is
simply unable to understand how to use the computer.

A home-based Internet voting system is completely out of the question
until access to the Internet in the U.S. is universal.  Until
such a time, adopting a home-based Internet voting system would
be unconstitutional.  Today we are far from universal access.  For
example, in some urban poor districts, 14% of households lack even
basic phone service, much less Internet connections.  On some Indian
reservations, the percentage of phone-less households is even higher:
40%.
        
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility was founded in the
early 1980s by computer scientists and engineers who were concerned
about the use of computer technology in military applications,
particularly the Strategic Defense, or "Star Wars", Initiative.  In
the mid-1980s, the organization branched out to include other issues,
such as electronic privacy, freedom of speech, and the use of computer
technology in elections.

For further information, please visit CPSR's website: 
http://www.cpsr.org/issues/voting.html or contact the CPSR office 
at 650-322-3778  or   [log in to unmask] to be directed to experts in the
area of Internet voting.

Susan Evoy   *   Managing Director                     
http://www.cpsr.org/
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
P.O. Box 717  *  Palo Alto  *  CA *  94302         
Phone: (650) 322-3778    *
Email: [log in to unmask]   

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