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Subject:

INTELLIGENCE: [int-free] INT 116 summary

From:

John Armitage <[log in to unmask]>

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Mon, 8 May 2000 08:59:30 +0100

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-----Original Message-----
From: Intelligence [mailto:[log in to unmask]] 
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Subject: [int-free] INT 116 summary


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  INTelligence http://www.blythe.org/Intelligence
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                        SUMMARY VERSION
INTELLIGENCE                                ISSN 1245-2122
N. 116, 1 May 2000
Every Two to Three Weeks
Next Issue on 15 May 2000
Publishing since 1980

Editor
Olivier Schmidt
(email  [log in to unmask];
web  http://www.blythe.org/Intelligence)

TABLE OF CONTENTS, N. 116, 1 May 2000

FRONT PAGE

GREAT BRITAIN/LIBYA - LEAKED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS p.1

TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNIQUES

CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES) p.2
NEW US MILITARY TECH IN THE NEWS p.3
US COAST GUARD - New Weapons & Tech. p.4
BACK DOORS - Microsoft Will Clean It Up ... Again. p.5
FASHION - Wearable Tech. p.6
WEB - Recent Postings. p.7
BOOK - Open Source Guru Speaks Out. p.8

PEOPLE

USA/RUSSIA - EDMOND POPE p.9
USA - Kevin Mitnick. p.10
NORTHERN IRELAND - COLIN WALLACE p.11
IRELAND - JOHN GILLIGAN p.12
FRANCE - Jean-Charles Marchiani. p.13
FRANCE - Alexandre Adler. p.14
SWEDEN - Anders Eriksson. p.15
MIDDLE EAST - Ayman al-Zawahiri. p.16

AGENDA

COMING EVENTS THROUGH 15 JUNE 2000 p.17

INTELLIGENCE AROUND THE WORLD

USA - CHINESE EMBASSY BOMBING BLAME MISSES REAL TARGET p.18
    - BROOKLYN RAPPER SUES FOR ANTI-IRISH BRIT PSY-OPS p.19
    - CUSTOMS GETS ITS OWN GAO "INTRUSIVE SEARCH" p.20
    - LAPD RAMPART STATION SCANDAL MOVES ON p.21
    - LEE CASE & SILICON VALLEY GIVE FBI BAD PRESS p.22
    - IRAN COUP, IRAQI EVACUEES & ED WILSON HAUNT THE CIA p.23
    - NSA IN THE NEWS ... OFFICIALLY p.24
    - State Loses Laptop with "Thousands" of
          SCI Documents. p.25
CANADA - CSIS "CRACKS UP" AS COPS GET "MAFIABOY" & DAD p.26
GREAT BRITAIN - GATHERING EVIDENCE AGAINST
          FRU WHISTLE BLOWER p.27
              - ISC HITS MI5 HOLA DECISION & GCHQ PAYS UP p.28
              - OPPRESSED MINORITY OF FREEMASONS p.29
IRELAND - MI5'S GARDA ASSETS p.30
FRANCE - EXTENDING "SECURITY" BEYOND AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST p.31
NETHERLANDS - NEW "COMPREHENSIVE" EAVESDROPPING LAWS p.32
GERMANY - CHECHEN & STASI AFFAIRS TROUBLE THE CALM p.33
EU - COPS, EUROPOL & ENCRYPTION EXPORTS UP FRONT p.34
CROATIA - Different political conceptions of spying. p.35
RUSSIA - NO KGB PHOENIX FOR CIS REPUBLICS p.36
SOUTH AFRICA - BUILDING A REGIONAL SPY POWERHOUSE p.37
INDIA - LINING UP ALLIES AGAINST PAKISTAN p.38

---------------------------------------------

Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 1


GREAT BRITAIN/LIBYA

LEAKED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS


The British government's campaign of attrition against former
MI5 agent, David Shayler has involved court injunctions against
the British press and broadcasting media, threats of legal
action against American Web sites (on Yahoo and  Geocities),
court orders demanding that files and private correspondence be
made available to the Scotland Yard Special Branch
investigating alleged breaches of the 1911 Official Secrets Act
(INT, n. 113 10), the brief detention of Mr. Shayler's
girlfriend, Annie Machon, and the heavy-handed arrest of
Kingston University student, Julie-Ann Davies, last month in
connection with the posting of a MI6 CX report on the Internet.
Despite concern about this campaign, expressed privately by a
number of Labour MPs, including the Foreign Secretary, Robin
Cook, MI5 director-general, Stephen Lander, and MI6 boss,
Richard Dearlove, supported by senior officials at the heart of
the intelligence establishment, have persuaded Home Secretary,
Jack Straw, MP, to "stay the course". Their case has been
strengthened considerably by the latest classified report to
appear on the Internet, this time taken from the files of the
Security Service itself, much to the embarrassment of Mr.
Lander who is convinced that this particular document can be
traced to the Paris doorstep of Mr Shayler.

The top-secret MI5 report, with the designation "UK Eyes A" is
a detailed assessment of the intelligence career of Khalifa
Ahmad Bazelya, head of the Libyan Interests Section (LIS) in
London from July 1993 until December 1995,
  ...(cut)...
The information in the report, detailing Bazelya's activities
in London, is sourced to MI5 contacts within the LIS, HUMINT
surveillance, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the
"revolutionary student" community, the Libyan dissident
community in Britain, and telephone intercepts -- referred to
as "telecheck information" -- a previously unknown system for
filtering phone traffic to trace, identify and record important
calls. During his 30 months in Britain, Bazelya handled a
network of "spies", paid between oe500 and oe800 "per agent per
month" from a "political budget". These included: Mohammed
Abdelhakim Daib, an Egyptian who reported on Syrian, Libyan and
Egyptian dissidents; Wasfi Bin Issa, a British-based Libyan
businessman who was on the "locally engaged staff" at the
Libyan embassy in the 1970s; Nasr Abdelnasser Abdrabah, who met
Bazelya regularly and "volunteered information on dissidents"
and passed on details, in September 1995, "about the identities
of Muslim fundamentalists involved in disturbances in Benghazi,
who had been arrested by Sudanese security", one of whom was
resident in Britain; an Iraqi-Kurd who was in regular contact
with the Bazelya "since at least January 1994" and visited
Tripoli on a number of occasions.
  ...(cut)...
Bazelya was also in telephone and fax contact with ESO general
secretary Muhammad Niama, with Lieutenant Colonel Abdullah
Senussi (brother-in-law of Colonel Qadhafi); with Captain
Abdulsalem Sadma, the "de facto and deputy head of the ESO", in
October 1993, according to MI6; with senior ESO officer Khaled
Mabruk; and with intelligence operative Mustafa Zaidi, an agent
"with a history of violence in Europe" who was refused a
British visa in July 1995.
  ...(cut)...
This disclosure has once again highlighted a major headache for
British government lawyers worried about the use of the
Internet to publicize official secrets. Among MI5's main
worries about the disclosure of the contents of the Bazelya
document is its exposure of MI5 working methods. Little can be
done about that now, but British intelligence will be urgently
looking to prevent further material appearing on the Internet.
British authorities, assisted by various US agencies, have
tracked down and make representations to American ISPs which
have posted the MI5/Bazelya document, titled "Libyan
Intelligence Service Activity in the UK". The precise nature of
these approaches remains somewhat opaque but there is no doubt
that in some cases, they have been highly effective. The
document has been posted on at least two sites: cryptome.org
and www.mathaba.net. A few days after its first appearance on
Cryptome, John Young, who runs the New York-based site,
received a letter forwarded from his ISP, Verio, originating
from a "British Intelligence Agency" asking Young and Verio to
remove the document from the site. Mr. Young declined, noting
that such "an informal request, not a court order, is
insufficient reason to remove the document which provides
significant public information". Sonia Rector, a senior Verio
official, broadly support Young's position, and expressed
amazement that "A British intelligence agency would directly
request Verio to remove a document without providing written
legal authority to do so".
  ...(cut)...
On Good Friday, Young reportedly told ZDNet UK, an Internet
magazine, that he did not believe that posting the document,
which he said was sent to him anonymously, was illegal under US
law. Within 24 hours the Alternative Republican Bulletin Board,
a Web site run by opponents of Sinn Fein, had published the
address of a mirror site, where the document continues to be
available to surfers world wide. It is reportedly still
available at:
http://www.libreopinion.com/mathaba/news1/z0416ukeyesA2.htm
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2555003,00.html?c
hkpt=zdnnstop
http://www.bytecenter.com/members/bbs/RepublicanAlternative/ind
ex.cgi?

---------------------------------------------

Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 2


CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES)


The 15 April issue of "Crypto-Gram", written by Bruce Schneier
<http://www.counterpane.com>, has an excellent report on the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) which is the forthcoming
encryption standard that will replace the aging DES. In 1996,
the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
initiated the AES program and, in 1997, sent out a public call
for algorithms. Fifteen candidates were accepted in 1998 and
whittled down to five in 1999. In early April, the Third AES
Candidate Conference was held in New York (INT, n. 112 19), and
attenders presented 23 papers and held 12 informal talks, as
NIST prepares to make a final decision concerning AES later
this year. Several of the algorithms took a beating
cryptographically, according to "Crypto-Gram". RC6 had the
worst results: two groups were able to break 15 out of 20
rounds faster than brute force decryption. Rijndael fared
somewhat better: seven rounds broken out of 10/12/14 rounds.
Several attacks were presented against MARS, the most
interesting breaking 11 of 16 rounds of the cryptographic core.
Serpent and Twofish did best: the most severe Serpent attack
broke 9 of 32 rounds, and no new Twofish attacks were
presented. Schneier, author of the "Crypto-Gram" article,
admits that he is also one of the author's of Twofish.
  ...(cut)...
---------------------------------------------

Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 9


USA/RUSSIA - EDMOND POPE


On 5 April, in Moscow; Russian FSB officers detained US
businessman, Edmond Pope, 53, claiming he was stealing
scientific secrets. A Russian accomplice was also arrested. The
press mentioned plans for a missile to be deployed on
submarines. A FSB statement said it confiscated "technical
drawings of various equipment, recordings of his conversations
with Russian citizens relating to their work in the Russian
defense industry, and receipts for American dollars received by
them." On 7 April, the US embassy in Moscow identified Pope by
name which the FSB had not done. Reports soon emerged that Pope
was the head of a private security firm and had earlier worked
for US intelligence. ABC television said Pope was a retired US
Navy captain who spent much of his career working in naval
intelligence.
  ...(cut)...
On 20 April, FSB revealed that Pope was seeking plans for a new
kind of underwater missile fired by submarines which can
reportedly achieve speeds of up to 100 meters per second. Pope
is currently confined in Lefortovo prison. Western experts
believe the missile to be the most effective submarine weapon
available. This is a misnomer since it is not a question of a
missile but a torpedo which travels twice as fast as anything
the West has. Western intelligence has been seeking it for
several years and it's called "Shkval" (squall; see "Torpedoes
- Double Speed with Porous Second Skin", INT, n. 18 7). What is
known is that it produces a high-speed and high-pressure stream
of bubbles from its nose and skin which coat the torpedo in a
thin layer of gas and allows it to travel at extremely high
speeds, for an object in the water. Apparently its propulsion
system is rocket-based -- not propeller-driven -- and guidance
is a problem, particularly at 360 kph underwater. Pope cannot
be defended in any way as a scientist or businessman since the
technology has only military applications (at present) and,
indeed, strategic military applications. In short, doing what
Pope was doing, without diplomatic cover, was extremely
dangerous, but the target was extremely important. The fact
that the US embassy in Moscow released his name may be an
indication that someone in Washington is going to "cover" Pope.
Otherwise, he may spend a long time in prison.

---------------------------------------------

Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 15


SWEDEN - Anders Eriksson.  Head of the Swedish Sakerhetspolisen
(SAPO) internal security service (INT, n. 65 12 & n. 71 42),
Anders Eriksson, is leaving his job and no successor has been
found. The Justice Ministry denies that he was fired. Eriksson,
appointed as head of the Security police in 1994, was under
contract to head the SAPO at least until the end of June 2000.
He left in April, taking a holiday until end of May, and then
Justice is supposed to find him another job which will have to
be a top job. Last autumn Eriksson said that he was already
tired of the job and wanted to leave.
  ...(cut)...
---------------------------------------------

Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 18


USA

CHINESE EMBASSY BOMBING BLAME MISSES REAL TARGET


  ...(cut)...
Even some of those who accept the American assurances that the
bombing was accidental say they believe that blame has not yet
been shared by all of those who contributed to the mission.
That is clearly the opinion of Patrick Eddington, former action
officer at the CIA Central Targeting Support Staff (CTSS) from
May 1994 to February 1996 whose job it was to select targets,
check them out and forward them to the Pentagon. The CTSS
existed as late as October 1999, six months after the embassy
bombing, according to Eddington, and it was the CTSS' job to
take care of such operations. CTSS work has reportedly been of
very high quality in the past, although the CIA and the press
have not mentioned it, and if there was a target vetting
failure, Eddington clearly places the blame on "a fundamental
failure of senior and midlevel CIA managers to make use of an
established target vetting process."

Eddington's statements clearly contradict those of the CIA
which never mentioned the CTSS, claimed there was no target
vetting process in place and that the CIA never suggested
targets. The open question is what Tenet and his managers did
with the CTSS and why they avoid talking about it now. A
related question is why the major press is only repeating
Tenet's line and not digging into Eddington's information and
the CTSS which was mentioned in the "Los Angeles Times and
"Defense News". We guess it "just doesn't fit the Langely
picture".

---------------------------------------------

Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 22


USA

LEE CASE & SILICON VALLEY GIVE FBI BAD PRESS


The computer files at the heart of the case against the former
Los Alamos scientist, Wen Ho Lee, were given higher security
classifications last year only after he was fired in the midst
of an espionage investigation at the weapons laboratory. At the
time Dr. Lee down-loaded the files onto his computer, they were
not classified but designated "protect as restricted data"
(PARD) which the FBI has conceded as a low security level. Dr.
Lee's lawyers say "the indictment is deceptive" and takes the
case out of the category of "crown jewels", "worse than the
Rosenbergs" and "change the strategic balance" as conservative
"securicrats" have claimed.
  ...(cut)...
---------------------------------------------

Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 26


CANADA

CSIS "CRACKS UP" AS COPS GET "MAFIABOY" & DAD


On 17 April, the "Globle and Mail" caused a hubbub by reporting
that the "Canadian Security Intelligence Service has shuffled
some of its most senior staff" and ... it had "obtained a list
of the secret spies' names." The newly appointed officers
reportedly included the new head of the counter-intelligence
division, the head of the Toronto regional office and the
agency's officer in Washington who deals with the FBI and CIA.
It was, of course, the latter part of the statement that
worried the accident-prone CSIS. But that was only "kid's
stuff" compared to what was coming.

Two days later, the same daily reported that Michel Simard, a
34-year RCMP and CSIS veteran and head of a group of CSIS
agents suing the federal government, had been suspended
indefinitely after going public with complaints about leader-
ship and morale problems at CSIS. He was suspended on 13 April,
two days after a media interview describing the agency as a
"rat hole" and claiming that senior CSIS officers "don't know
what's going on in the service." He heads a group of 120 cur-
rent and former CSIS intelligence officers who created a firm,
X MP Fund, to launch a lawsuit against the federal government
for millions in back pay and bonuses they insist the agency
owes them. The lawsuit reportedly amounts to a "near-mutinous
situation".

A few days later, the Security Intelligence Review Committee
(SIRC) released its intelligence oversight report doubting the
CSIS had the skills to accomplish its latest mission probing
mobsters, money-launderers and other organized criminals. The
SIRC was not even sure CSIS, responsible for catching ter-
rorists and foreign spies, should be investigating the criminal
underworld. "The very germane issue of whether CSIS should be
involved in this area, given its current mandate, remains open
for the committee at this time," according to the report. Such
activities has long been the domain of the RCMP and other po-
lice agencies.
  ...(cut)...
---------------------------------------------

Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 31


FRANCE

EXTENDING "SECURITY" BEYOND AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST


We have previously mentioned French intelligence cooperation in
setting up security in Egypt, a country formerly reliant on
Russia for training and equipment in intelligence, security and
defense (see "France - Exchange Terrorists for Tourists with
Egypt, INT, n. 81 21, & "France - 'Boxing-In' Israel & 'Boxing-
Out' the US", int, n. 88 13). Another country, also reliant on
Russia, is now talking about a "united strategy" with France to
combat terrorism: India. France's previous attempt to "expand"
outside its "backyard" in Africa was only partially successful.
In 1997, France set up and trained Japan's Special Assault Team
(SAT; see "France - Japan Moving Out of US 'Backyard'", INT, n.
65 34), but it didn't manage to get Japan on board for
reconnaissance satellite spy business (INR, n. 88 13).
  ...(cut)...
COMMENT  --  Among other things, the Indians might be interes-
ted in is France's anti-terrorism expertise developed while
fighting against Algerian bombing campaigns over the past few
years. India has a similar problem with Pakistan and many Pa-
kistan-inspired local rebel groups in India. But before French
specialists from DST internal security, DGSE foreign
intelligence and DRM military intelligence move in, there is a
"sensitive question" of a few other forgotten French "free-
lance specialists" rotting away in India under house arrest
because they got caught diving in waters off an Indian military
base in Kerala on 11 December 1995. Specialists say wait and
see if Philippe Elle, 47, and Francois Clavel, 62, are
released, like their four teammates in March 1997, before
stating that Franco-Indian security cooperation has entered a
new era. Seems like good advice.

---------------------------------------------

Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 36


RUSSIA

NO KGB PHOENIX FOR CIS REPUBLICS


On 20 April, at the President Hotel in Moscow, CIS intelligence
chiefs and security ministers got together to discuss fighting
international terrorism and establishing a CIS anti-terrorist
center. The meeting, opened by Russian President Vladimir
Putin, voted unanimously to appoint Russian Major General Boris
Mylnikov, Senior Deputy Director of the FSB Department for
Fighting Organized Crime, head the center. FSB director,
Nikolai Patrushev, who introduced Mylnikov to journalists,
reported the results of the meeting. Mylnikov stated that the
"center will be located in Moscow and its main task will be to
carry out coordinated activities of special services and
special units for fighting organized crime and, in particular,
to create a corresponding data base, while units of the
security structures will not be included in the personnel of
the center."

Two weeks previously, on 4 April, "Segodnya" journalists,
Andrei Soldatov and Kirill Frolov wrote an excellent study of
the disintegration of the former Soviet KGB and the resulting
evolution of CIS intelligence services before this recent
effort to reestablish CIS "center". According to them and most
experts, it is now almost impossible to restore the structure
of intelligence cooperation between the CIS countries. On 31
March, four members of the Shanghai Five (Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) got together in Astana and
pompously announced foundation of a CIS Anti-Terrorist Center
before the Moscow meeting. But these measures are too late,
"catastrophically late", according to most experts and actual
intelligence cooperation across post-Soviet territory is out of
the question. None of the CIS agreements on cooperation signed
over the past few years is working now and the past has left a
legacy. Those republics where Soviet anti-terrorist agencies
were stationed are strong in this field even now, according to
the report. But those republics that did not have anti-
terrorist agencies on their territory are still weak in this
area ten years later, such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
  ...(cut)...
---------------------------------------------

Intelligence, N. 116, 1 May 2000, p. 37


SOUTH AFRICA

BUILDING A REGIONAL SPY POWERHOUSE


Head of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) Department for
Counter-Espionage (CE), Hilton "Tim" Dennis, who replaced Billy
Masethlha at this post last Decmeber, has reportedly been
promoted to lead the NIA's sister foreign intelligence service,
the South African Secret Service (SASS). According to certain
specialists, this move augers "interesting times" to come since
Dennis has made extensive use of the sister department
responsible for surveillance against local politicians,
journalists and many diplomats in the executive capital,
Pretoria, and the legislative capital, Cape Town. As head of
the foreign spy service, Dennis is expected to transfer some of
his "CE culture" and usher in a period of more purposeful
surveillance of foreign diplomats and domestic opponents of the
ruling coalition of the African National Congress (ANC) and the
South African Communist Party, foremost the Democratic Party
and the Pan Africanist Congress.
  ...(cut)...
Surveillance tasking is done by eight departments including CE,
and SASS which, like their military counterparts, Chief Staff
Intelligence, have focussed on East Africa and France.
Previously headed by another Nhanhla confidant, Gabriel Mtembu,
its active Pretoria staff numbers around forty. Surveillance is
coordinated out of the satellite town of Centurion in the
Kiepersol (Cabbage tree) building that also houses CE on Astra
Circle. Often the butt of SASS and NIA jokes as the "Kiepersol
Kasternades - Cabbage Patch Capers", the tenants have decided
to get serious about their own security. Three swivel cameras
within tinted balls suspended from white supports have been
installed under the eaves at three of the four corners,
focussing on Botha Avenue, the N1 highway, and nearby access
roads. Staff have been told not to park openly in ranks
outside, must now park among the public and hoboes near the
liquor store in the adjacent shopping complex and walk across
to their red brick office block. Many doing vehicular
surveillance find this unnecessarily compromising, although
some seeking access over weekends without their cell phones can
now use the two public phones recently installed outside the
liquor store and the phone booth (number 27 12 667 1210) well
situated with a line-of-sight position on the outside parking.
Mtembu's replacement feels that suspected foot surveillance on
the "Cabbage Patch" by Russian SVR and French DSGE operatives
has compromised the watch on foreign intrigues, which would
seem to be a reasonable supposition.
  ...(cut)...
---------------------------------------------
<END OF FILE>

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