The Week in Europe
by David Jessop

On April 25th in Havana the Cuban Council of State took a decision that will
have far reaching implications for both Cuba and the Caribbean in their
future relations with the European Union (EU).

At the meeting the Cuban Government decided to "retire" its application to
become a signatory to the successor arrangement to Lomé IV. Up to then, Cuba
had hoped to be able to join the 71 African Caribbean and Pacific states
(the ACP) in signing the new ACP/EU partnership agreement in Suva, Fiji on
June 8. However, after participating fully as observers during the
negotiating process in Brussels and having received unanimous endorsement of
their application by the whole ACP group, circumstances arose which led the
Cuban Government to decide that it could no longer seek to accede to the new
arrangement.

The reasons for this are complex. As this column has previously suggested,
unanimity among European Union (EU) member states on the Cuban application
seemed by late April to be unlikely. Some countries such as France, Spain,
Italy and Germany were positive. They had proposed that the EU relationship
with Cuba might better advance if dialogue were to be conducted within the
post Lomé development framework. This they suggested might be more
productive than exchanges based on achieving the political conditions
contained in Europe's common position on Cuba as this seeks to offer an
enhanced relationship in return for prior changes in civil society. However,
other member states were not so sure. In particular, Britain, the
Netherlands and Denmark were not prepared to agree to Cuban accession at
this time. Although the question had not been formally discussed in any EU
Council, at least one Member State had let it be known that the conditions
agreed for Cuban ACP membership at an EU Council meeting in June 1998, had
not been met.

The first public sign of concern about what was happening in Europe came on
April 25. Then Havana informed the EU that it was not willing to receive a
delegation from the present EU troika (Finland, Portugal and France). The
official explanation was Cuba's anger about the way a number of EU member
states had voted at the UN Human Rights Commission. Cuba's response also
related to its belief that certain EU nations were seeking to use the visit
to determine whether the terms for accession to the successor agreement to
Lomé IV had been met. Cuba rejected this approach on the basis that there
should be no linkage between the agreed reason for the visit - an assessment
on progress on the common position - and Havana's desire to become a member
of the ACP group.

But behind the cancellation of the Troika visit and the withdrawal of Cuba's
post Lomé application lies a further, more complex web of political
concerns. 

It seems that on the European side, those member states intending to object
or raise questions about Cuba's accession, were driven by other
considerations. These in part related to concerns expressed by the United
States; a fear of the resurrection of transatlantic trade disputes; possible
damage to bilateral relations with the US in a year in which a new President
would be elected; and a fear that new threats might emerge to the World
Trade Organisation waiver required for the new Suva Convention, if Cuba were
to be a signatory. 

On the Cuban side, it appears there were also difficulties. There was
concern amongst some in Havana who had originally argued that by becoming
signatories to a Convention which contained political conditions Cuba was
doing something it had never done before. That is to say it was about to
cede a degree of sovereignty and political control to a third party, which
in this case would be the European Union. This position it seems may have
coincided with other differences over the extent to which Cuba should rely
on its own resources or seek, over time, benefits through closer integration
into the international economic community. Against this background, the
probability of European rejection of Cuba's application seem to have tipped
the political balance towards those who believe in self-reliance and that
the post Lomé  application should never have been made. 

Despite the negative outcome of the post Lomé process for Cuba, its
ministers have made clear that it will not affect its desire to deepen its
relationship with the rest of the Caribbean region. It will continue to
negotiate what is known as a partial scope agreement on trade with Caricom
and seek to relate its positions at the WTO and elsewhere to those of the
region. Cuba has also let it be known that its future is in the Caribbean
region as a Caribbean nation.

Few in the European Union who were intending to raise objections to the
Cuban application seem to have analysed closely the implications of Havana's
decision to withdraw its application or to have seen the illogicality of
their case. Instead of broadening the opportunities for dialogue with Havana
on matters of concern, the EU nations raising objections have narrowed
serious contact to a bilateral level. So much so that it may now be
individual European nations desire for trade advantage which determines the
velocity at which Cuba's future relations with Europe develop. 

Worse still, Cuba is now the only country in the Americas which has no
formal basis for a relationship with the EU. The rejection of dialogue on
the common position and the withdrawal from the post Lomé arrangements means
that the framework for EU/Cuba relations is damaged and Europe divided.
Despite improved bilateral relations with a number of key EU member states,
the opportunity for a new Cuban dialogue with the Union as a whole has
passed, along with whatever leverage Europe believed it might have.

It is unlikely that Cuba will ever again agree to be drawn into a
multilateral arrangement that offers a mix of benefits in return for
accepting political conditionalities. The decision to go down the post Lomé
route was not lightly taken in Havana any more than was Cuban withdrawal in
the face of the probable European rejection of its application. Although
some in Europe believe that the Cuban application can be resuscitated in a
matter of years the application is dead. The same opportunity for the EU
will not arise again. 

The decision is a setback for the ACP and the Caribbean. Many Governments
saw the possibility of Cuban accession as an opportunity to not only
complete the Caribbean integration process but as a basis on which real
weight could be given to the region's case in international trade
negotiations yet to come.  

Among Caribbean ministers there is a real sense of an opportunity lost and a
questioning of the way in which Europe still has influence over the region's
future. Cuba's continuing externally enforced isolation and its withdrawal
from inclusion in the ACP is a small but important moment in history. It
should give pause for reflection. 

David Jessop is the Executive Director of the Caribbean Council for Europe.
May 12th, 2000




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