The Mensheviks' Critique of Bolshevism and the Bolshevik State  
 
"I often remember a funny conversation which was, however, 
significant for me...when I was taking [university] courses, I talked with 
a classmate who condemned the members of the People's Will for 
murdering people. I didn't know her very well, so I had to be cautious, 
and I said, 'Of course, killing is bad, but it ultimately depends on your 
point of view.' And she said so sadly, 'That's the whole problem, how 
to get that point of view.'"  
 
Lydia Dan, quoted in The Making of Three Russian Revolutionaries    
 
Bryan Caplan  
Econ 199  
Grossman    

 
Introduction  

 
There are two primary questions with which study of the Mensheviks' 
struggle against the Bolsheviks must begin. First: Which of the 
Bolsheviks' policies did the Mensheviks' oppose? Second: On what 
ideological grounds did this opposition depend? The second question 
is particularly crucial if one wishes to demonstrate that the Mensheviks 
offered their contemporaries a viable alternative to both the czarist 
monarchy and the Bolshevik dictatorship. It is also important to 
examine this question if one wishes to show that the Mensheviks have 
valuable lessons for modern Russia. Answering the first question tells 
us about historical fact, about what did happen; answering the second 
question allows us to extrapolate our knowledge of the Mensheviks to 
counterfactual and hypothetical cases, to what could have happened 
in the past or what might happen in the future. 
 
>From a different perspective: a universal claim such as: "The 
Mensheviks would have established a democratic society and 
respected civil liberties," cannot rest upon a particular claim such as: 
"In 1918, the Mensheviks opposed the suppression of dissident 
newspapers." The particular claim is consistent with a wide body of 
principles in conflict with the universal claim. For example: "Dissidents 
should not be suppressed in 1918, but in some years it is quite 
admirable to do so." Instead, it is necessary to study the ideological 
foundation of the Mensheviks' opposition to the Bolsheviks' policies, 
and see how they deduced their practices from their theories. Only 
with this full context in mind will it be possible to judge the possibilities 
that the Menshevik movement had and the lessons that it offers to the 
present. 
 
With these standards in mind, it will be argued that the disputes 
between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, both in theory and in practice, 
were dwarfed by their shared devotion to orthodox Marxism. Their 
disagreements can be best explained as differences in attitude and 
emphasis rather than basic principles.  Both factions accepted the 
establishment of Marxian socialism as an ideal goal, and both rejected 
individualist political theories that demanded toleration of dissent and 
pluralist democracy as a matter of principle. Instead, the Mensheviks 
rested their opposition to repressive Bolshevik policies on secondary 
theorems in the Marxian system, and would have supported dictatorial 
policies under different circumstances. Many Mensheviks 
demonstrated a surprising tolerance of Bolshevik policies. In fact, 
some were so in sympathy with the Bolsheviks that they voted with 
their feet and joined the Bolsheviks just as Lenin's authoritarianism 
was becoming most obvious. 
 
The major theme of this essay, then, is that the differences between 
the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks have been overrated. Their 
differences may be better explained as variations upon shared Marxist 
themes than major differences. The magnitude of their philosophic 
disagreement, not the emotional intensity of their internecine disputes, 
is the proper yardstick for comparing and contrasting each 
movements' likely effects upon a society under its sway. In the context 
of the full range of political ideologies, this magnitude is a small one, 
and the effects of both movements if one came to dominate a society 
would have been similar. 
 
 
Brief Review of Relevant Marxist Concepts  
 
 
Both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks described themselves as "orthodox 
Marxists," so it seems important to have a basic understanding of their 
shared Marxist theories. Then it will be possible to understand how the 
two factions could disagree with each other yet share a common 
reverence for Marx. Four themes that recur throughout the debates of 
the Russian Marxists are: the economic interpretation of history, the 
stage theory of social development, the class struggle, and their 
"positive" as opposed to "negative" or "bourgeois" view of human 
freedom. Let us briefly elaborate upon each. 
 
The economic interpretation of history argues that economic or 
technological changes, changes in the means of production, are the 
"ultimate" determinants of a society's condition. Ideas, philosophy, 
religion, and sociology are not independent variables, but must be 
traced back to changes in the methods of production. Quoting Marx: 
"The social relations are intimately attached to the productive forces. 
In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of 
production, and in changing their mode of production, their manner of 
gaining a living, they change all their social relations. The windmill 
gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the 
industrial capitalist."1  
 
In Marx's view, therefore, social change must ultimately be explained 
by changes in the means of production, not by individual action or 
ideas. And, because technological progress follows a predictable 
course, history should also be predictable, governed by scientific laws. 
According to Marx, these laws state that history is divided into different 
periods or "stages," feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism 
being the four final stages. And, since capitalism comes between 
feudalism and socialism, it is quite  impossible to jump from one to the 
other. Instead, a society must pass through each in due time.2 Until 
humanity reaches the communist stage, Marx believed, each historical 
period would be characterized by what he termed "class struggle." 
Different social groups have incompatible interests, while members of 
the same social groups have similar interests, so the natural tendency 
is for classes with conflicting interests to strive to thwart and exploit 
one another. Each stage of history ends when a previously 
subordinate class attains power and becomes the new exploiting 
class. And, because it is an historical law that ruling classes do not 
give up their power voluntarily, one should expect changes in power 
relations to be accompanied by violence, by some sort of class war. 
Thus, when socialism replaces capitalism: "The proletariat will use its 
political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the 
bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of 
the state, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class"3 A final 
element in Marx's system that tends to derail analysis of the 
Mensheviks and Bolsheviks is Marx's theory of freedom. He clearly 
does not accept the individualist, "bourgeois," theory of freedom that a 
person is "free" if he is left alone, if he is not aggressed against. As 
Marx states: "And the abolition of this state of things is called by the 
bourgeoisie, abolition of individuality and freedom! And rightly so. The 
abolition of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, and 
bourgeois freedom is undoubtably aimed at. "By freedom is meant, 
under present bourgeois conditions of production, free trade, free 
selling and buying. 
 
"But if selling and buying disappears, free selling and buying 
disappears also. 
This talk about free selling and buying, and all the other 'brave words' 
of our bourgeoisie about freedom in general, have a meaning, if any, 
only in contrast with restricted selling and buying, with the fettered 
traders of the Middle Ages, but have no meaning when opposed to the 
communistic abolition of buying and selling, of the bourgeois 
conditions of production, and of the bourgeoisie itself."4 The 
implications of this viewpoint are quite interesting. First, buying and 
selling - free exchange among consenting adults  - is not an aspect of 
freedom, but an obstacle to it. True freedom exists when such 
exchanges are "abolished," presumably with violence. Second, 
"freedom" does not include the "freedom to be a member of the 
bourgeoisie." Instead, Marx's freedom appears when the bourgeoisie 
is "abolished." Once again, this appears to imply violence, since the 
bourgeoisie could hardly be expected to abolish itself voluntarily. In 
short, the Marxist view of freedom, rather than assuring protection for 
those who do not fit into the Marxist pattern, sanctions their 
suppression. 
 
 
The Early Menshevik-Bolshevik Debates and the 1903 Schism  
 
 
Given this admittedly oversimplified background, we may now jump to 
the early stages of the Russian Marxist movement. The first major 
attempt to unite Russian Marxists occurred in 1898, when a congress 
of Russian socialists met in Minsk and announced the formation of the 
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). This fell apart when 
the czarist police captured the members of the party's Central 
Committee a few weeks later.5 The next important step came in 1900 
and 1901 when Lenin, Martov, Plekhanov, Axelrod, and other 
revolutionary socialists began publishing two Marxist periodicals: 
Iskra, a popular weekly, and Zaria, a more theoretical journal.6 This 
phase is interesting because the future Bolsheviks and Mensheviks 
were acting jointly. Lenin and Martov, among others, vigorously 
attacked various "deviationist" factions, such as Economists and 
Revisionists, and revealed a shared tendency to equate ideological 
disagreement with intellectual dishonesty. Thus, Martov wrote, "The 
struggle between the 'critics' and 'orthodox' Marxists is really the first 
chapter of a struggle for political hegemony between the proletariat 
and bourgeois democracy. In the uprising of the bourgeois 
intelligentsia against proletarian hegemony, we see, hidden under an 
ideological mask, the class struggle of the advanced section of 
bourgeois society against the revolutionary proletariat." Compare this 
to Lenin: "Hence, to belittle socialist ideology in any way, to deviate 
from it in the slightest degree, means the strengthening of bourgeois 
ideology."7 Martov and Lenin also voiced similar views about the 
"spontaneously" emerging labor movement, stating that it would shift 
the workers' attention from changing the social system to changing 
their relative position within the existing system. Some form of 
authoritarian paternalism would, under such circumstances, be 
justified. As Haimson describes Martov's view: "In the face of the 
'treachery and violence of the reactionaries,' it was their [Social 
Democrats'] duty to temporarily 'organize the movement from the top 
down so as to insure the careful selection and training of its 
members.'"8 The first obvious break in the ranks of the avowedly 
"orthodox" Marxists occurred during the second congress of the 
RSDLP in July 1903, when a debate betweeen Lenin and Martov 
precipitated a full-fledged schism. Interestingly, the debate was not 
even over the proper aims of the party. Plekhanov wrote the following 
program of ultimate demands, which, according to Landauer, was 
approved without controversy: "By replacing the private ownership of 
the means of production with public ownership and by introducing a 
planned organization of the processes of production in order to 
safeguard the welfare and the many-sided development of all the 
members of society, the social revolution of the proletariat will put an 
end to the division of society into classes and thus will liberate all the 
oppressed humanity as well as end all forms of exploitation of one part 
of society by another. 
 
"An essential condition for this social revolution is the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, i.e., the conquest by the proletariat of such political 
power as will enable it to quell all opposition by the exploiters."9 
Instead of arguing about these propositions, quite authoritarian in their 
concrete implications (Who will "plan" the processes of production? 
How can the proletariat simultaneously "quell all opposition by 
exploiters" and "end all forms of exploitation by one part of society by 
another"?), the debate broke out over the proper method of achieving 
these goals. Even the differences over the proper means were not 
particularly great. As Getzler explains, "both [Lenin and Martov] 
wanted a centralized party. But as soon as they turned to consider 
how completely the party should be centralized, how its centralism 
should be organized, and above all who should man and control its 
centre, they turned by degrees from partners to opponents."10 What 
were these two different conceptions of the party? Lenin expressed his 
views in his famous essay "What is to be Done?" In his opinion, the 
party should consist exclusively of full-time revolutionaries. These 
professional activists would necessarily be under strict control of the 
central committee of the party, which would make every effort to 
maintain the orthodoxy and ideological purity of Social Democracy. 
Important decisions would be made by the central committee.  On the 
other hand, Martov believed that the party should include politically 
interested workers, peasants, and intellectuals as well as full-time 
revolutionaries. And, given this broader definition of a "party member," 
discipline and orthodoxy would be less strict than under Lenin's 
system. 
 
The actual schism came about when Lenin exploited the voting 
system at the congress to achieve a formal approval for his plans. 
Following debate and disagreement between Martov and Lenin on the 
party membership question, minority factions of the RSDLP walked 
out of the congress. This walk-out left a disproportionately large group 
of "hards," i.e., adherents of the Leninist conception of the party. 
There were twenty Leninist delegates with a total of twenty-four votes. 
This gave his faction a majority. Lenin's forces then barred Martov and 
Potresov from addreessing the congress, expelled Axelrod, Zasulich, 
and Potresov from the editorial board, and elected a Central 
Committee of Leninists. Martov refused to serve on the new editorial 
board.11 The second congress adjourned on August 23, 1903, with all 
the important aspects of Lenin's program in place. Since Lenin's 
faction held a majority of the votes for a brief moment, they quickly 
dubbed themselves "Bolsheviks," or "Majorityites." Their opponents 
were called Mensheviks, or "Minorityites." The question that now faced 
the the Mensheviks was: How do we differ from the Bolsheviks? To 
split solely on organizational grounds would seem trivial indeed. 
Haimson aptly summarizes this curious dilemma: "Already, the 
Martovites were searching for some doctrinal grounds upon which to 
base their opposition, and at first this search was difficult, not so much 
because such differences were absent, but because they were still so 
subtle and had been buried and evaded for so long."12 Eventually 
Menshevik writers came to justify their break on the grounds that 
Lenin's conception would make the party a "mechanistic centralist" 
one. It would exclude revolutionary elements of the  proletariat who 
unfortunately were not fully enlightened. It would also stifle political 
initiative. Hence, the Mensheviks spurned Lenin's belated peace 
offerings. 
 
Next, Plekhanov, who originally sided with Lenin, tried to reunite the 
divided factions of the party. He had not changed his mind, but 
believed that the issue was not worth splitting over. Lenin, now firmly 
dedicated to wiping out the Menshevik deviation, proceeded to break 
with Plekhanov, stating, "I am now fighting for the CC [Central 
Committee] which the Martovites also want to seize, brazened by 
Plekhanov's cowardly betrayal."13 Over time, the Mensheviks came to 
re-define their doctrinal differences in a more sophisticated and 
technical way. Martov and Akselrod discovered a full-fledged 
contradiction in Lenin's system. As Martov and Akelrod explained it, 
the subjective goal of Social Democracy was to advance the political 
maturity and independence of the proletariat. Lenin's objective 
method, however, was to create a class of revolutionary intelligentsia 
to dominate the proletariat. Lenin's means, then, was incompatible 
with his end, because his method of advancing the proletariat actually 
wound up by ruling it. Naturally, Lenin counterattacked.  He repeated 
his earlier arguments, then denounced the "anarchistic, individualistic" 
character of the Mensheviks' opposition to ultra-centrism. The 
spontaneous flailing of the masses, unguided by a sound and sturdy 
Marxist vanguard could never represent the march of history. In short, 
without the Leninist party, the workers would, at best, develop mere 
"trade-union consciousness" and would never work to attain true 
socialism. 
 
Plekhanov, the senior member of the Iskra board, rebuked Lenin. In 
fact, Marx claimed exactly the opposite of what Lenin was claiming: 
not only were the masses capable of achieving proletarian 
consciousness all by themselves, but they would do so inevitably, 
since economic forces are the ultimate determinants of ideas and 
actions.14 By November of 1903, Plekhanov turned against Lenin, 
and invited Martov, Akselrod, and other Mensheviks back to Iskra's 
board. Lenin resigned but was not expelled from the party. Now, under 
Plekhanov's leadership, the Mensheviks rejoined the moderate 
Bolsheviks to form a single party.15   Analysis of the Debates and 
Schism The early debates between the future factions of the Russian 
Marxists and their subsequent schism illustrate their similarity nicely. 
At no point did any faction openly challenge any of the basic 
postulates of Marx. Indeed, they considered Marx to be an 
authoritative guide to the truth. Both factions of the party willingly and 
freely voted for Plekhanov's statement of the ultimate demands of 
Social Democracy cited above. Both factions favored some form of 
centralized party: Lenin leaned towards one-man rule, while Martov 
felt more comfortable with some kind of collective leadership. Lenin 
wanted a carefully regulated party membership, while Martov was 
more tolerant, more concerned with admitting enlightened members of 
the masses. 
 
There were other differences between the Bolsheviks and the 
Mensheviks that surfaced at this time. For example, Getzler states 
that Martov "reproved Plekhanov for his cynical rejection of democratic 
principles at the party congress and told him that he should at least 
have added that 'so tragic a situation was unthinkable as one in which 
the proletariat to consolidate its victory would have to violate such 
political rights as, e.g., the freedom of the press.'" Also, the 
Mensheviks' opposition to Lenin's ultra-centralism reveals some 
concern for free voting and pluralism that could obviously not exist in a 
Leninist party. 
 
Still, this dispute over the status of civil liberties and free voting could 
by no stretch of the imagination be transformed into the heart of the 
Menshevik-Bolshevik dispute. There was no important argument over 
Plekhanov's statement of principles, which are staggeringly 
authoritarian in their implications.  If one studies Plekhanov's 
statement (cited above), one can see that it was not a watered-down 
body of vague generalizations that anyone could agree with.  Instead, 
it stated explicitly that the RSDLP intended to abolish private 
ownership of the means of production with "planning of the productive 
processes." Such planning necessarily implies the existence of 
planners who do the planning; in short, of some kind hegemonic 
system that would impose its views upon the entire society. Similarly, 
Plekhanov's program stated plainly that a dictatorship of the proletariat 
would have to seize control of the state and quell all opposition.  This 
was not controversial among the delegates to the congress, who 
ratified it quickly and turned to other matters. If the issue of civil 
liberties and competetive voting were truly important to the 
Mensheviks, why did they fail to demand a prominent and explicit 
affirmation of their values in Plekhanov's statement? A reasonable 
hypothesis is that Martov and his fellow Mensheviks were not 
concerned about civil liberties and democracy in a serious way. While 
they thought that civil liberties and democracy were good in theory, did 
not want to argue about it. In fact, they were quite willing to cooperate 
with other Marxists who openly scorned these values. 
 
Further support for this interpretation comes from the remainder of the 
debates. 
At no point did Martov or any other Menshevik demand that Lenin's 
faction guarantee their support for political freedom. The proper 
structure of the party was the issue that dominated the debates. The 
Mensheviks' conception of the party was more sympathetic to civil 
liberties and democracy than Lenin's, but it was hardly the thrust of the 
Mensheviks' argument. Instead, they favored their kind of party 
because it would advance the cause of Social Democracy, as 
enunciated by Plekhanov, more efficiently than Lenin's system (which 
would alienate almost everyone). As Martov put it, "the wider the title 
of party member is spread, the better. We could but rejoice is every 
striker or demonstrator, when called to account for his actions could 
declare himself a party member.16 Lenin denounced Menshevik 
conceptions of the party as "anarchistic" and "individualistic," but this 
was mainly name-calling rather than serious criticism.  Martov and 
Akselrod, for example, did not concentrate on the dictatorial character 
of Lenin's party. Instead, they made technical philosophical 
arguments. They argued that there was a contradiction between the 
subjective goal of enlightening the proletariat and the objective means 
of ultra-centralization. Plekhanov, likewise, chastised Lenin for 
implicitly denying the inevitability of the proletarian revolution. Since 
the proletariat, driven by the laws of history, was destined to overthrow 
capitalism and establish Marxian socialism, it was incorrect for Lenin 
to argue that an elitist revolutionary party was necessary to groom the 
proletariat before it could attain this goal. 
 
If the Mensheviks were advocates of civil liberties and democracy, 
their behavior up to the schism reveals that they were among the most 
anemic and apathetic advocates of political freedom in history. They 
belonged to a party of which a major faction had open contempt for 
such concerns. While in that party, they did not make a big issue out 
of their differences. They cooperated freely with avowed authoritarians 
to achieve social change. They were able to endorse Plekhanov's 
statement of principles without a large debate. Their most vigorous 
argument against Lenin's theory of the party was that it was an 
inefficient means for achieving socialism. In sum, while some 
Mensheviks voiced minor interest in political freedom, it was near the 
bottom of their agenda. We shall see how much that agenda changed 
as the Menshevik movement matured. 
 
 
Bolshevik-Menshevik Conflict to the February Revolution  
 
 
Wartime reveals interesting facts about the Mensheviks and the 
Bolsheviks.  Under critical and intense circumstances such as those 
provided by war, one can observe the similarities and differences of 
their respective positions and the reasons behind those positions. As 
history would have it, both factions of Russian Marxism were alive and 
active during both the Revolution of 1905 and World War I. It is to 
these phases of Menshevik-Bolshevik debate that we will now turn. 
 
The Revolution of 1905 was preceded by the outbreak of thee Russo-
Japanese War. Martov was particularly vocal in denouncing this war, 
and hoped that it would end with a negotiated peace. He supported 
neither government, saying, "We are international socialists, and 
therefore any political alliance of the socialists of our country with any 
class state whatever, we regard as betrayal of the cause of 
revolution." His slogan was "peace at any price." Getzler remarks that, 
"there was also an element of humanitarian pacifism in him even if he 
would not explicitly admit it."17 Perhaps, but the thrust of Martov's 
argument against the war was that it was a conflict between ruling 
classes and as such contrary to the interests of the proletariat of both 
nations. The position of Lenin and the Bolsheviks was similar. 
 
The Revolution of 1905 followed the Russo-Japanese War. This 
revolution was not led by the RSDLP, but both factions were intensely 
interested in it. Both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks generally agreed with 
Marx's view that in a country such as Russia, still ruled by an absolute 
monarch and without a large proletariat, the revolution would not be 
socialist in character. Instead, at this stage of historical development, 
it was necessary for the bourgeoisie to seize power from the czar and 
establish a liberal democratic regime favorable to their own interests. 
The proletariat would gain somewhat from this shift, but the main 
beneficiaries would be the bourgeoisie itself. Once the bourgeois were 
firmly in command, they would clear the road for the impending 
transition to socialism.18 There were many variations and differences 
within this paradigm. Potresov looked upon a government of, for, and 
by the bourgeoisie with satisfaction. He was confident that the 
bourgeoisie would allow political freedom and sweep away the 
remnants of czarist feudalism. Plekhanov was less enthusiastic. He 
agreed that it was historically necessary for the bourgeoisie to hold the 
reins of power for a while, but disliked it nevertheless. Still, he 
believed that the bourgeoisie would grant everyone political freedom 
so long as they were not frightened by radical movements. Martov was 
more hostile to the bourgeoisie, arguing that they were timid and 
conservative and therefore interested in a compromise with the czar. 
 
All these factions basically agreed that the proletariat could best 
advance its interests by throwing its support behind the bourgeoisie 
and refraining from any attempt to establish socialism before its time. 
Lenin and his fellow Bolsheviks were ambivalent. They agreed that the 
bourgeoisie was a progressive force in society, then appended that 
socialists should only support the bourgeoisie until it developed its 
own political program and organizations. Then, the duty of socialists 
changed: socialists should advance the more radical program of 
socialism rather than the half-hearted program of liberal democracy.19 
Most of the Russian Marxists were unwilling to participate in the 
democratic government that the revolution temporarily established. 
Getzler explains this position succinctly: "To govern in coalition with 
liberals and democrats would be to renounce their class opposition to 
the existing order, to accept responsibility for bourgeois policies, and 
even to find themselves in conflict with the masses of the 
proletariat."20 Moreover, both Martov and Lenin believed that the time 
was not yet ripe for socialist parties to seize power for themselves. 
They must limit themselves to assisting the bourgeoisie against the 
autocracy. There was an important exception to this rule. If the 
bourgeoisie proved too timid and weak to seize power, then the 
socialist parties would have to do so in their place. Given that most 
Marxists agreed that the Russian bourgeoisie had a history of timidity 
and weakness, this exception is more important than it seems. 
 
Once the 1905 Revolution created parliamentary organizations, the 
Mensheviks tended to favor improving the workers' position by 
changing the laws democratically; the Bolsheviks were less friendly 
towards such means. Some of the demands that the Mensheviks 
made in 1906 included the creation of unemployment insurance, the 
eight-hour day, and municipalization of land. The Mensheviks were 
afraid of the full-fledged nationalization of land; this measure would 
surely strengthen state power, and, as Martov put it, "so long as the 
capitalist mode of production prevails, state power will always be 
bourgeois."21 By opposing the nationalization of land, the  
Mensheviks differed with both the Bolsheviks and non-Marxist 
socialists such as the Social Revolutionaries. 
 
Concurrently, inter-party disputes gradually led to an official split 
between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. At the fifth congress of 
the RSDLP in 1907, the division between the two wings was obvious. 
The Mensheviks opposed revolutionary activity because it would 
endanger parliamentary institutions under which the proletariat had 
won impressive gains. Trade unions were legal, and the new 
government respected the freedom of the press and the right of 
assembly. Some Mensheviks wished to make Social Democracy an 
umbrella party which would include labor unions, socialists, and 
cooperatives of all types. 
 
The Bolsheviks took a very different position: Social Democrats 
should try to inflame the masses by denouncing the moderation and 
weakness of the Duma.22 Between the 1907 conference and the final 
schism of 1912, three distinct factions appeared amongst the RSDLP: 
the moderate Mensheviks, the revolutionary Mensheviks, and the 
Bolsheviks. The moderates devoted themselves to peaceful reforms 
and cooperation with the labor movement. They favored the abolition 
of the illegal portions of the party apparatus. The revolutionary 
Mensheviks included Plekhanov, Martov, Dan, and Trotsky. They liked 
the legal gains that socialism had made but also wanted to preserve 
the illegal party structure. Lenin and the Bolsheviks denounced the 
reformist trend running through Menshevism and repeated their 
demands for the centralized and revolutionary party described by 
Lenin in his "What is to be Done?" These factions were able 
cooperate successfully until 1912, when the party congress invited 
some deviationist factions to attend the London conference in order to 
unify the party. Lenin was particularly outraged by this compromise.  
Through skillful political maneuvering, Lenin split off his faction from 
the rest of the RSDLP, then proclaimed his faction to be the complete 
"true" RSDLP. 
 
Trotsky tried to bring Lenin back into the fold and failed. World War I's 
sudden beginning overshadowed the drive to reunite Russian 
Marxism.23 World War I challenged the world-view of orthodox 
Marxists. They were internationalists, who believed that struggle 
between nations distracted workers from the real struggle between 
classes. Yet most socialists in Europe chose to support their 
respective national governments. Naturally, this seemed like a great 
betrayal. And, as a corollary, any faction that remained internationalist 
demonstrated the genuineness of its orthodoxy and virtue. 
 
Most of the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks remained devotees of 
internationalism; as a consequence, they grew together during the 
war. Three distinct positions sprang up in their ranks. The first was a 
pro-Russia position called "revolutionary defensism." These came 
from Plekhanov's section of Menshevik camp. At the other extreme 
was Lenin, who advocated "revolutionary defeatism," i.e. the defeat of 
"his" native government by the Germans. Martov favored a position 
between these extremes: immediate negotiated peace without 
annexations or indemnities. Lenin respected Martov's opinion but 
denounced the defensists vigorously. Martov, while theoretically 
sympathetic to Lenin, distrusted him as a person; at the same time, 
Martov refused to condemn pro-war socialists without reservation. He 
disagreed with them but forgave them because he thought that they 
were mistakenly obeying the will of the masses.24 Let us compare 
and contrast the positions of Lenin and Martov. Lenin believed that the 
war was an expression of capitalist imperialism. It was a struggle 
between ruling classes and therefore opposed to the interests of the 
masses.  Lenin hated the czarist government so much that he said 
that he would prefer a German victory to a Russian victory. Yet he did 
not condemn the war for its massive destruction of innocent life; to his 
mind, the true revolutionary was not in any sense a "pacifist" or 
"humanitarian." He sought to use the war to destroy capitalism and 
improve his faction's position vis-a-vis other socialist organizations. 
Lenin explained the pro-war nationalist stance of other socialists as a 
deliberate betrayal of the masses. Hence, he refused to deal with 
defensists on any terms. 
 
Martov agreed with Lenin that the war was an expression of capitalist 
imperialism, a struggle between ruling classes and contrary to the 
interests of the masses. Unlike Lenin, Martov believed that since all 
nations were partially in the wrong it was incorrect to desire the victory 
or defeat of any combatant. He was morally appalled at the horrors of 
war. Therefore he favored, "the speediest possible termination of the 
war and the most radical steps in the direction of disarmament." Given 
this, he obviously did not plan to use the war to advance the cause of 
socialism; he wanted to end it at once. Martov believed that pro-war 
socialists had been swayed by the patriotic masses, and yearned to 
persuade his fellow socialists that they were wrong.25 Martov wanted 
socialists to take an active part in the peace negotiations. As he wrote 
with Lapinsky, "Only in the event that peace is conquered through the 
pressure of the popular masses, and is not the result of a new 
conspiracy of predatory diplomacy and reactionary cliques after 
universal exhaustion, only then will socialism and democracy be sure 
to assert their influence on the peace settlement and the future order 
in Europe." He believed that a reunited international socialist 
movement, standing up in favor of a negotiated peace, could lead the 
post-war struggle of the proletariat for political power. The proletariat's 
struggle for power would begin in the most advanced capitalist 
countries. Backward areas like his native Russia would still need to 
pass through their bourgeois democratic phase before they would be 
ready for socialism.26 Analysis of the Conflict to the February 
Revolution Since the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks only emerged as 
distinct parties after 1903, it might be unreasonable to expect sharp 
differences between them before that break. Perhaps only after the 
break did they develop their distinctive ideologies and political 
programs. In this case, the student of the Mensheviks could chart their 
evolution and argue that their initial differences with the Bolsheviks 
were the first step on a long road of intellectual growth. The crucial 
question then becomes: Did Menshevism develop a distinct identity as 
an ideology and a movement after 1903? The correct answer is a 
qualified No. Almost all of their post-1903 battles with the Bolsheviks 
were either foreshadowed by earlier debates or minor arguments over 
tactics. Both factions continued to religiously interpret all events and 
strategies through the categories invented by Marx in his philosophical 
writings.  Both continued to uphold Marxian socialism as an ideal goal. 
For all the emotion of their arguments and frantic inter-party political 
maneuvering, their initial differences were minor and did not grow 
appreciably over time. 
 
Most Bolsheviks and Mensheviks shared the same theories about war 
and social development. In both the Russo-Japanese War and World 
War I, most of them agreed that socialists should not support any 
government in international disputes, because wars are conflicts 
between ruling classes, all of whose interests are opposed to the 
proletariat's. The real "war" was being waged internally in each nation 
by the exploiting classes against the exploited classes.  On this issue, 
both factions agree with Marx that workingmen have no country. 
 
The main difference between the anti-war Marxists is that Martov and 
his followers added a humanitarian pacifist element to the above 
Marxist criticism, while Lenin did not. Martov, then, was convinced that 
war was bad as such, so he wanted to end it immediately with victory 
for none. Lenin believed that war could be a catalyst for revolutionary 
change, so he hoped for the defeat of his own government by the 
more historically advanced nation of Germany. 
 
Both factions also agreed that all social development must follow the 
same route. It was impossible, in their opinion, to leap from czarist 
autocracy straight to socialism. Instead, it was absolutely necessary 
that Russia pass through an intermediate stage of bourgeois 
democracy. Most of them were not enthusiastic about this, but viewed 
it as a necessary step forward. The Mensheviks stressed that 
bourgeois democracy would bring political liberty. This might be a 
good argument that they differed from the Bolsheviks - except that the 
Bolsheviks made exactly the same argument! Quoting Lenin, "The 
democratic revolution is a bourgeois revolution. But we Marxists must 
know that there is not, nor can there be, any other path to real 
freedom for the proletariat and the peasantry than the path of 
bourgeois freedom and bourgeois progress. We must not forget that 
there is not, nor can there be at the present time, any other means of 
bringing socialism nearer than by complete political liberty, a 
democratic republic, a revolutionary- democratic dictatorship of the 
proletariat and the peasantry."27 The fact is that Marxists believed that 
socialism could only develop under bourgeois capitalism with the civil 
liberties and political freedom that accompanied it. This is not good 
evidence for the claim that the Mensheviks or Bolsheviks valued civil 
liberties on principle. One could argue, in a similar way, that these 
Marxists "really" favored capitalism just because they admitted that the 
existence of capitalism was a necessary precondition for the existence 
of socialism. 
 
Of course, there were variations upon this world-view. Mensheviks 
generally thought that the proletariat should avoid frightening the 
bourgeoisie by making radical socialist demands; Lenin took the 
opposite view. Mensheviks had more hope for improving workers' 
well-being through parliamentary democracy than Bolsheviks did. But 
both agreed that a violent revolution would eventually be necessary. 
 
Consider the final break between the two factions in 1912. What 
happened here is that the Mensheviks tried to open up the RSDLP by 
inviting minor factions to attend the party congress. The Bolsheviks 
retaliated by breaking away from the Mensheviks. Lenin then 
proclaimed his followers the "real" RSDLP and re-organized the party 
on Leninist principles. The Mensheviks tried to heal this split. They 
failed. 
 
The 1912 schism, in short, resembles the 1903 schism very closely. 
The Mensheviks, in both cases, leaned toward a broader membership; 
the Bolsheviks did not. The Mensheviks wanted a less centralized 
party; the Bolsheviks wanted a Leninist ultra-centralist party. In both 
cases the issue was the proper way to organize a party to advance the 
cause of Marxian socialism.  They split into rival factions on the basis 
of this derivative issue that seems unimportant (or at best a red 
herring) to non-Marxists. Ergo, their differences were slight in both 
1903 and 1912, and the grounds for both breaks were nearly identical. 
Mensheviks and Bolsheviks were alike in most respects whether one 
examines them at a particular party congress or over the course of a 
decade. 
 
 
Theory Becomes Practice: February Revolution to 1922 Crackdown  
 
 
When the February Revolution started, Marxists had to determine how 
they would deal with the new government. The Mensheviks voted to 
join the provisional government, over the protest of Martov.28 The 
majority of Bolsheviks, too, looked at new government with pleasure. 
Only after Lenin announced his bitter opposition to the new regime 
and struggled to rally his followers behind him did Bolshevik opinion 
turn against the provisional authorities.29 During the reign of the 
provisional government, defensist Mensheviks backed the 
government's plan to prolong the war. Martov took the opposite view - 
Russia should give up the war effort and strive for a general peace 
settlement. Lenin disagreed with both groups: in his analysis, it was 
futile to ask the bourgeois government of Russia to conclude a peace; 
instead, Russia should make a separate peace by  overthrowing the 
current government. 
 
In the interim between the February and the October Revolutions, the 
Mensheviks and Bolsheviks tried to reunite. Martov sent a concilatory 
letter to the Bolsheviks when the government cracked down upon 
them. Even though Martov criticized the Bolsheviks for their extreme 
methods, they accepted his letter with warmth. Martov thought that a 
party that included a wide range of social democrats, including 
Bolsheviks, would be a good idea. He was, in fact, mainly afraid of a 
reactionary coup that would destroy the provisional government. Only 
later did he see that the Bolsheviks were dangerous enemies of the 
democracy. 
 
During this time, the Bolsheviks were expanding in numbers, partially 
at the expense of the Mensheviks. Martov and other Menshevik 
leaders did not give full-fledged support to the new government; they 
were also unwilling to oppose it. The reason for this is clear: as 
orthodox Marxists, they believed that a period of bourgeois democracy 
must precede the socialist revolution, hence their support. But, as 
Marxists, they were enemies of bourgeois democracy and identified 
that social system as an enemy of the proletariat, hence their 
unwillingness to participate in it. The Lenin and his Bolsheviks looked 
at the situation otherwise. They went directly to the masses with 
solutions to their major problems and asked for the power to carry out 
the solutions. The Bolshevik approach proved more persuasive.30 But 
persuasion was hardly the essence of the Bolshevik strategy. In 
November of 1917, they managed to disband the preparliament and 
arrest many of its leaders. Next they began their assualt upon the 
remnants of the provisional government. In Petrograd, they built the 
nucleus of the new Soviet state. 
 
The Mensheviks were displeased by this - but hardly outraged. 
Instead, they thought that their task was to moderate the policies of 
the Bolsheviks. Also, they wanted to persuade Lenin to admit other 
parties into the new government. Some Mensheviks backed the new 
government; others did not. Both groups weighed what were, as they 
saw it, the relative benefits and costs of collaboration versus 
opposition. If they collaborated, they would be supporting an extremist 
faction bent upon thrusting Marxism upon an unprepared nation. 
However, they would also be supporting a party intent upon a socialist 
transformation of society, which, however poorly timed, seemed 
admirable. If they opposed the Bolsheviks, they would lend strength to 
reactionaries who surely had plans for a counter- 
revolution. Yet if they did not oppose them, democracy might 
disappear. Since socialism would inevitably fail unless preceded by an 
era of bourgeois democracy, the masses' feelings towards socialism 
might permanently sour.31 Most Mensheviks took a middle ground - 
they would try to persuade their fellow Marxists to adopt a more sane 
course of action.32 Two important factions existed amongst the 
Mensheviks. The larger was that of Martov. Here is Brovkin's 
summary of his position: "The party's historic role at this stage of the 
revolution, as Martov saw it, lay, on the one hand, in opposing 
Bolshevik extremist, destructive, anarcho-syndicalist, and dictatorial 
policies, and on the other, in preventing the organization by the Right 
Socialists of armed struggle against the Bolsheviks." The smaller 
faction, a coalition of the supporters of Potresov, Liber, and Dan, was 
openly hostile to Bolshevism: "To the Defensists, the Bolsheviks were 
a destructive force, an irresponsible, adventuristic, extremist clique of 
party activists who had deceived the workers and betrayed Russian 
Democracy. The Defensists portrayed the Menshevik party as the 
party of the conscious proletariat, opposed to the destruction of the 
forces of production. Consequently, the Mensheviks should seek 
alliances with other democratic forces and not with the Bolsheviks." 33 
The final vote at the Extraordinary Congress where the Mensheviks 
debated was (out of 120): Martov, 50; Dan, 26; Liber, 13; and 
Potresov, 10. Brovkin notes that even if all of the opponents of 
Martov's position had united, they would still have been defeated. 
 
Lenin's early policy was to "Seize the bourgeoisie by the throat!" as 
the Bolshevik slogan went.  He did not like the results, so he changed 
his program. 
Now he favored what he called "state capitalism." This was never 
rigorously defined, but it seemed to mean that private enterprise would 
be permitted but heavily regulated by the state. Mensheviks of all 
persuasions looked upon this favorably. Potresov attacked it as 
insufficiently capitalist; Martov and Dan were pleased by Lenin's 
change of mind, and rejected Potresov's more laissez-faire view. Of 
course, as Marxists, their opinions were explicitly based upon their 
theory of historical development which precluded a jump from their 
present state to socialism. Lenin's "Socialism now" policy was naive in 
its disregard of historical law.34 Once Lenin revealed the concrete 
meaning of "state capitalism," the Mensheviks were critical. Lenin 
advocated full government control of the economy; Mensheviks 
wanted a partnership between government, organized labor, and 
industrialists. Lenin wanted trade unions that would serve the 
government, whereas Mensheviks wanted independent trade unions. 
Both groups favored state regulation of industry, but the Mensheviks 
opposed the Bolsheviks' extreme centralization of this regulation. The 
Mensheviks favored partial denationalization of the banks and wanted 
the fixed food prices raised to encourage more food production; the 
Bolsheviks rejected these revisions.35 Let us turn to the Mensheviks' 
position on civil liberties. They certainly criticized the Bolsheviks 
persecution of people on account of their opinions, whether written or 
spoken. In fact, the Mensheviks were often on the receiving end of this 
repression. However, it appears that they mainly criticized the 
Bolsheviks for their attacks upon the non-Bolshevik socialist press. 
The Mensheviks did not favor silencing the bourgeoisie and czarists. 
Neither did they condemn the Bolsheviks on principle for punishing 
people for their opinions. This would be the acid test of their 
commitment to civil liberties. As in the 1903 debates, the Mensheviks 
gave only tertiary attention to this issue.36 By July 1919, in their "What 
is to be Done?", most of the Mensheviks had switched to what 
amounts, more or less, to a sanction of repression: they favored civil 
liberties for all parties of the "toiling masses" and asked only that such 
repression as did exist be carried out by a judiciary rather than the 
Cheka.37 As the Bolsheviks became more violent and dictatorial in 
mid-1918, the two distinct factions in Menshevism polarized and finally 
split. The larger section, guided by Martov, decided to accept the 
October Revolution as "historically necessary" and support the Reds 
in the civil war against the Whites. They criticized uninhibited 
dictatorship by Lenin because of its psychological effects upon the 
masses: while proletarians needed to develop political consciousness 
to prepare for socialism, the dictatorship bred the opposite. This 
faction decided that, for all its faults, Bolshevism was superior to a 
White victory, and therefore condemned the other faction of 
Menshevism.38 These people, the Right Mensheviks, favored a 
complete boycott of Bolshevik institutions. Mensheviks should not 
legitimize the Bolsheviks by becoming their junior partners. The Rights 
argued for parliamentary democracy, not a "soviet democracy," as a 
final goal. Interestingly, the latter plank, asserted by Liber, was 
apparently the position of all Mensheviks just a year earlier.39 Getzler 
indicates that the Menshevik majority's compromise was in part 
motivated by the defection of many Mensheviks to the Bolsheviks.40 
As the civil war intensified the Bolsheviks became progressively more 
brutal and totalitarian. This change was not mere pragmatism in the 
face of war; instead, Bolshevik theoreticians defended their behavior 
righteously. Trotsky did so publicly with writings such as "The Defense 
of Terrorism." In My Life Trotsky justified his liberal use of the death 
penalty upon uncooperative conscripts with these words: "An army 
cannot be built without reprisals. Masses of men cannot be led to 
death unless the army command has the death penalty in its arsenal.  
So long as those malicious tailless apes that are so proud of their 
technical achievements - the animals that we call men - will build 
armies and wage wars, the command will always be obliged to place 
the soldiers between the possible death in the front and the probable 
one in the rear."41 There is no small irony in the writings of Trotsky 
during and about the civil war. In tone, they resemble a debate over 
the fine points of Marxist dogma; in content they concern life and 
death for millions of human beings. 
 
It is in this cultural context that Martov, in 1919 and 1920, advanced a 
new position towards Bolshevism that he termed "semi-loyal, semi-
irreconcilable." He admitted to his fellow Mensheviks that the 
dictatorship had allowed a "thick layer of careerists, speculators, new 
bureaucrats, and plain scoundrels" to grow. The Bolshevik state had 
"ceased" to be a state of peasants and workers, but it was still 
possible (though unlikely) for the Bolshevik state to regenerate 
because of the idealists present among those in power. In the final 
analysis, the Bolsheviks were bad but a successful counter-revolution 
was worse. The militant enemies of Bolshevism among the 
Mensheviks denounced Martov's position; indeed, even moderates 
found parts of it hard to swallow. Martov's reply was simple and clear: 
"We reject the Bolshevik way of posing the question - victory first, 
reforms after - because the absence of reforms makes for defeat and 
not for victory. But we also reject your way of putting it - reforms first 
and a revolutionary assualt on counter-revolution after - because it 
may happen that nothing survives to be 'refomed" if counter-revolution 
gains a decisive victory."42 Since mid-1918, radicals amongst the 
Bolsheviks had frankly advocated killing off the Mensheviks along with 
other socialist opposition - whether Martov's "semi-loyal" brand or the 
more vociferous sort of Potresov. In July of 1918, the Bolshevik 
Lashevich stated this explicitly: "The Right SRs and Mensheviks are 
more dangerous enemies of soviet power than the bourgeoisie. Yet 
these enemies still have not been shot and are enjoying freedom. The 
proletariat must finally get down to business. The Mensheviks and the 
SRs must be finished off once and for all!"43 This began as a minority 
position and spread as the Bolsheviks entrenched themselves. The 
efforts of Mensheviks like Martov to become a legal opposition party 
crumbled. The Bolshevik leaders intensified their attacks upon 
dissenters gradually but consistently. The truces made during the civil 
war were pure pragmatism; they were broken when the Bolsheviks felt 
secure. By 1922 legal opposition all but disappeared. Mild dissent was 
still officially legal, but the Cheka arrested anyone who tried to 
exercise his rights. 
 
There was no place for Menshevism in this kind of a society: the 
Mensheviks either fled abroad, were arrested or shot, or joined the 
Bolsheviks. Their history as an active movement had come to an 
end.44  
 
 
Analysis from the February Revolution to the 1922 Crackdown  
 
 
The Revolution of February 1917 immediately changed the focus of 
Russian Marxists from the European war to the internal situation in 
their native country.  This revolution led to a string of events that 
altered the very nature of their fratricidal quarrels. Before, these 
quarrels were theoretical disputes about the fine points of Marxist 
ideology. Now they had a practical aspect as well. The Bolsheviks, as 
it turned out, were able to seize and hold center stage for themselves. 
The Mensheviks mainly reacted to what the Bolsheviks did. Yet the 
urgency and the need for swift action did not prevent the two factions 
from engaging in a wealth of philosophical dialogues. These 
controversies proceeded "dialectically"; that is, abstract "theses" about 
the proper paths were advanced, and when these paths led to 
practical difficulties, the theses were challenged with "antitheses," 
different policies designed to cope with the problems of the original 
theses. With the Bolsheviks, the final "synthesis" was full-fledged 
totalitarianism that embraced slavery, execution for contrary political 
beliefs, government ownership of virtually all productive organizations, 
and one-party rule. With the Mensheviks, the final synthesis (with 
honorable exceptions) was appeasement, half-hearted criticism, and 
an amazing double-standard that led them to believe that, in some 
sense, Lenin's dictatorship was better than old-style authoritarianism. 
For example, at first the Mensheviks supported the provisional 
government and denounced the Bolsheviks for a host of reasons.  
When the Bolsheviks ousted the Kerensky government with violence, 
the majority of Mensheviks shortly quieted down and tried to offer 
constructive criticism to those in power. When the civil war began, 
most Mensheviks backed the Bolsheviks, deeming a counter-
revolution even worse. They did so when the government's reign of 
terror was in full swing and while Trotsky wrote official defenses for 
mass murder and slavery. Surely the Mensheviks, who shared with 
the Bolsheviks a genuine desire to see their philosophic ideals made 
real, could understand that the Bolsheviks meant every word. 
 
The issue of civil liberties is another instructive instance of the 
Mensheviks' dialectical critique of Bolshevism. At first, the Bolsheviks 
mainly suppressed non-socialist expression. The Mensheviks were, in 
principle, opposed to this, but  failed to come forth and defend the 
rights of their "class enemies." Then, the Bolsheviks turned on their 
fellow socialists; to this, the Mensheviks responsed with anger. Within 
a year, however, majority Menshevik opinion accepted the 
suppression of non-socialists and asked merely that sedition charges 
be handled by the judiciary instead of the Cheka. At no point did the 
Mensheviks denounce censorship unequivocally. 
 
Landauer is especially perceptive when he analyzes the dilemma of 
the activist who translates Marxist theories into reality: "If it was 
permissible and even necessary to throw one's country for so long a 
period into the horrors of civil war and dictatorship, was it then not 
illogical to balk at the use of deceit, torture, provocation - in fact of any 
means that would speed up the revolution?. As long as the 
dictatorship of the proletariat was a matter of theoretical speculation, it 
was unnecessary to draw this conclusion. But when Marxists had 
acquired the power to be ruthless, they had to answer the question of 
the extent to which this power ought to be used. For a real dialectician, 
only one answer was possible: Everything must be done that is in the 
interests of the revolution. If Lenin did things that would have horrified 
Marx or even Sorel, it was not because of any deviation from Marxism; 
rather, it was, first, because he had made his choice between two 
conflicting tendencies in Marxism, and, second, because men of 
action have to make decisions from which philosophers can 
escape."45 Lenin's choice was totalitarianism. The Mensheviks did not 
go this far, but were willing to make a series of concessions to Lenin 
that they would not have considered if he had not been a fellow 
Marxist. Their attacks upon him, though sometimes angry and sincere, 
were half-hearted. After all, they considered him better than a counter-
revolution, and could not paint him as a heartless monster since he 
was the lesser of evils. 
 
The Right Mensheviks, it should be mentioned, were an important 
exception to these generalizations. They were militant in their criticism 
and refused to compromise with a government that sanctioned terror 
as an official policy. Even as early as June of 1918, the Right 
Menshevik Mirov wrote prophetically: "the workers are many times 
more helpless and powerless...than in the era of capitalism. Having 
proclaimed the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest 
peasantry, the Bolshevik regime has in fact turned into a dictatorship 
over the proletariat."46 Some of these Mensheviks, such as Potresov, 
even opposed Lenin's "state capitalism" on the grounds that it was 
insufficiently capitalist. To these thinkers, a period of free-market 
capitalism, as opposed to state capitalism, was an essential 
precondition for the creation of a socialist society.  The main 
weakness in their analysis was that, as Marxists, Mensheviks had to 
concede that many of Lenin's current policies would eventually be 
necessary, perhaps in a modified form. But if these policies led to 
dictatorship and economic collapse under Lenin, how could they 
possibly avoid identical results if they were tried later? Like Marx, the 
Right Mensheviks never held the reins of the state and were therefore 
able to avoid answering this difficult question. 
 
 
Recapitulation and Reply to Criticism  
 
 
>From its origins to its final elimination, Menshevism remained a 
species of orthodox Marxism, with all that it implies. The differences 
between the Mensheviks and their Bolshevik cousins existed, but 
have been overrated. Their similarities dominate any comparative 
study of the two movements. In 1903, both factions accepted 
Plekhanov's statement of principles, and split only over two 
moderately different conceptions of the revolutionary socialist party. 
This split, moreover, was not primarily motivated by the Mensheviks 
abhorrence of autocracy, but by their conviction that it would alienate 
large segments of potential allies in the quest for socialism. The 
Bolsheviks were obviously authoritarian from the start; the Mensheviks 
occasionally criticized them for this, but were still willing to cooperate 
with them in a single party. If civil liberties were a main concern of the 
Mensheviks, why didn't they choose allies who shared this concern? 
The most compelling answer is that they did not care enough to spurn 
alliances with those who disagreed. 
 
The second and final split was very similar to the first; indeed, it 
showed little evidence for the view that the Mensheviks had evolved to 
a less authoritarian point of view. The break came because the 
Mensheviks tried to start better relations with other socialist parties, 
and the Bolsheviks opposed broadening of this kind. During the war, 
the debates amongst the Mensheviks were at least as virulent as their 
debates with the Bolsheviks. When the February Revolution created 
the provisional government, most Mensheviks and Bolsheviks initially 
supported it. Only after Lenin revealed that he wanted to smash this 
new government did a tactical chasm erupt among the Russian 
Marxists. Their difference was not based upon a principled opposition 
to socialist coups.  Instead, the argument that the Mensheviks 
repeated without end was that a bourgeois capitalist phase was 
historically necessary for socialism to appear.  Ultimately, they were 
accusing the Bolsheviks more of poor timing than anything else. 
 
Once the Bolsheviks were in power, the Mensheviks split into two 
distinct camps.  The majority did not like what the Bolsheviks were 
doing, but feared counter-revolution even more. They hoped to 
become a loyal opposition party. The minority, the Right Mensheviks, 
was more radical, and eventually endorsed a violent overthrow of 
Bolshevism. They saw that the dictatorship of Lenin was more 
oppressive than the czarist autocracy had ever been. It is safe to say 
that both sorts of Mensheviks did not approve of the unflinching 
brutality of the Bolsheviks and would have done things differently. It is 
also safe to say that most of them were willing to tolerate it and that all 
of them would have endorsed some sort of dictatorship once it 
became "historically necessary." There are many possible objections 
to this thesis. In an attempt to answer them, I shall emphasize first of 
all what this thesis does not argue. It does not claim that there was no 
difference between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, or that the 
Mensheviks' leanings towards what moderns would call "social 
democracy" did not exist. It does not claim that the Mensheviks would 
have been totalitarians if they ever held the reins of power. It does not 
claim that the Mensheviks were not sincerely opposed to the 
Bolsheviks' more extreme policies. 
 
With this in mind let us consider two major counter-claims. The first is 
that the Mensheviks, in time, would have become full-fledged social 
democrats who opposed violent revolution and would have tolerated 
opposition. It is never impossible for anyone to change his or her 
mind, but there is not much evidence for this view in the Mensheviks' 
history. They never had passionate and lengthy debates with anyone 
over the virtues of civil liberties and parliamentary democracy. Instead, 
their debates were over technical issues in Marxist ideology, such as 
the proper party structure and the correct time for revolution.  They 
never showed great enthusiasm for tolerating non-socialist parties. 
The real acid test of a group's commitment to liberal values is when 
they extend tolerance to their enemies as well as their friends. The 
Mensheviks did not, and it is difficult to see how tolerance of this kind 
could be derived from Marxist philosophy. 
 
Scholars of the history of socialist thought have noted that, at least in 
modernized countries, there is a tendency for orthodox Marxist 
socialists to gradually mellow: from Bernsteinism and "revisionism" to 
Marxist democratic socialism to middle-of-the-road non- Marxist social 
democracy.47 Perhaps the Mensheviks would eventually have 
developed in the same manner if they had not been largely destroyed 
or co-opted by the Bolsheviks. Some facts support the claim that such 
a trend exists. Still, it is far from a perfect induction: witness the cases 
of the French and Italian Communist parties which have remained 
"orthodox" at least until recently. Even if this trend in the history of 
socialism correlated perfectly with the facts, it would remain a mere 
historical truth (such as the "law" that American presidents elected in 
years ending in a "0" invariably die in office - incidentally refuted by the 
case of Ronald Reagan) until justified by a cogent theory. This takes 
us outside the scope of this paper, so we will leave it an open 
question. 
 
The second major counter-claim is: the Mensheviks would not have 
used terror and would have only pursued policies that the bulk of the 
population endorsed.  This seems more reasonable than the first 
claim. If by "terror" one means mass shootings and general arrest of 
people for their opinions, one might be correct.  Even this is arguable: 
when the time was right, they surely would have favored repression 
against the bourgeoisie. Or suppose that the population was unwilling 
to go along with the pattern that Marx said was historically necessary?  
Wouldn't the Mensheviks have to admit that the revolution is above 
mere bourgeois morality and gone ahead whether the masses wanted 
to or not? In any case, this objection is not inconsistent with the 
argument of this paper. The Mensheviks certainly showed 
apprehension at the use of terror and wanted the masses to 
participate in the political process. They also embraced values that 
could conflict with these scruples. Who can say what they would have 
done if they held power? We must answer, with Landauer, that 
philosophers can escape the responsibility to decide between 
conflicting ends while men of power cannot.  Still, how complimentary 
is it to say of a political party that, "They probably wouldn't have 
resorted to mass murder and totalitarianism"? The implication is that 
they possibly would have. 
 
 
Menshevisms' Critique of Bolshevism: Its Current Relevance  
 
 
Most historians who have studied Menshevism, including Getzler, 
Brovkin, and perhaps Haimson, think that the Mensheviks had positive 
lessons for their country and the world. In his concluding tribute to 
Martov, Getzler states: "He was a fervent revolutionary pledged to the 
overthrow of the tsarist regime which he profounded hated. He was a 
democrat. He was a real socialist. He was an internationalist."48 
Brovkin ends his study of post-October Revolution Menshevism with 
an equally laudatory passage: "The Bolsheviks appeared to be heirs 
to European traditions of socialism, Marxism, and proletarian 
revolution. 
But in turning Marxism into Marxism-Leninism, they created a party 
apparatus that Marx would not recognize. Menshevik opposition and 
Menshevik testimony represent the initial attempts to dispel these 
claims and to reveal the antidemocratic nature of Bolshevism. 
Although the Mensheviks were defeated in their own day, the historical 
argument between Communists and Social Democrats over 
democracy, socialism, and the role of workers' parties continues. From 
this perspective, the Mensheviks' critique of Bolshevism in 1918 and 
their struggle for democratic socialism have not lost their timeliness 
today."49  
 
Given the thesis of this paper, it should come as no surprise that I 
disagree completely. Neither the Soviet Union nor anyone else needs 
a less bad form of Marxism. The political principles of Marx, especially 
his theory of class war and his attack on "bourgeois freedom," are the 
foundation upon which the Soviet state stands, with all its 
unspeakable cruelty and violence. Democratic apologists for Marx 
could certainly refuse to follow their ideology to its logical implication. 
But a true regeneration of a society requires not that they renounce all 
"ideals" as impossible or dangerous, but they adopt new ideals which 
are practical as well. I would suggest that the citizens of the USSR 
have a direct interest in rejecting the ideals of Marxism and embracing 
those of classical liberalism: individual freedom, private property, free 
markets, civil liberties for everyone, and the rule of law. 
 
Of the Mensheviks themselves, my overall evaluation is very negative. 
They were better than the Bolsheviks, but shared their fundamental 
errors. They never bothered to consider philosophic, economic, or 
political criticism from outside the confines of Marxism, and despite 
occasional protests to the contrary, they usually accepted Marx's 
writings as a direct revelation of absolute truth beyond testing or 
refutation. How could anything but disaster follow from this method of 
thinking about the world?  
 
One of Trotsky's critics found in him a fault that could just as easily 
describe any of the Russian Marxists: "He was an intellectual who 
never asked himself such a simple question as: 'What reason do I 
have to believe that the economic condition of workers under 
socialism will be better than under capitalism?'"50 This, I think, is the 
most damning fact of all. 
 
Notes  
1: Landauer, Carl. European Socialism (University of California Press: 
Los Angeles, 1959), p.144. 
 
2: ibid, pp.154-173. 
 
3: Marx, Karl. The Communist Manifesto (Washington Square Press: 
New York, 1964), p.93. 
 
4: ibid, pp.84-85. 
 
5: Haimson, Leopold. The Russian Marxists and the Origins of 
Bolshevism (Oxford University Press: London, 1955), pp.80-81. 
 
6: ibid, pp.117-118; Landauer, op. cit., p.422. 
 
7: Haimson, op. cit., pp.131-134. 
 
8: ibid, p.131. 
 
9: Landauer, op. cit., pp.423-424. 
 
10: Getzler, Israel. Martov (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
1967), p.77. 
 
11: ibid, pp.79-83. 
 
12: Haimson, op. cit., p.183. 
 
13: ibid, pp.186-187. 
 
14: ibid, pp.190-193. 
 
15: Getzler, op. cit., pp.86-89. 
 
16. ibid, p.79. 
 
17: ibid, p.97. 
 
18: Haimson, op. cit., p.200. 
 
19: ibid, pp.201-203. 
 
20: Getzler, op. cit., p.101. 
 
21: ibid, p.114. 
 
22: Landauer, op. cit., p.433. 
 
23: ibid, pp.433-436. 
 
24: Getzler, op. cit., pp.139-140. 
 
25: ibid, pp.138-141. 
 
26: ibid, p.147. 
 
27: Landauer, op. cit., p.429. 
 
28: Getzler, op. cit., pp.150-151. 
 
29: Landauer, op. cit., pp.577-578. 
 
30: Getzler, op. cit., pp.164-167. 
 
31: ibid, pp.171-172. 
 
32: Brovkin, Vladimir. The Mensheviks After October (Cornell 
University Press: Ithaca, 1987), p.15-19. 
 
33: ibid, pp.44-45. 
 
34: ibid, pp.80-86. 
 
35: ibid, p.103. 
 
36: ibid, pp.105-125. 
 
37: Getzler, op. cit., p.198. 
 
38: ibid, pp.184-187. 
 
39: Brovkin, op. cit., p.207. 
 
40: Getzler, op. cit., p.184. 
 
41: Landauer, op. cit., pp.716-718. 
 
42: Getzler, op. cit., pp.189-191. 
 
43: Brovkin, op. cit., p.255. 
 
44: ibid, p.98-299. 
 
45: Landauer, op. cit., pp.723-724. 
 
46: Brovkin, op. cit., p.268. 
 
47: Personal conversation with Prof. Gregory Grossman, UC Berkeley 
Economics Dep't. 
 
48: Getzler, op. cit., p.220-221. 
 
49: Brovkin, op. cit., p.299. 
 
50: Raico, Ralph, "Trotsky: the ignorance and the evil; Review of 
Irving Howe's Leon Trotsky," The Libertarian Forum, March 1979, 
p.42. 
 




Warm regards
George Pennefather

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