Chris, I'm trying to figure out where you and I differ; we've come so close
together it's getting hard to separate.

Basically my comments started in response to the idea that ecosystems were
*purposefully* self regulating. I do think that biological systems do self
regulate; I'm a big fan of Lynn Margulis' ideas about that. However, my
objection is to inferring in any manner any sort of self-awareness to
communities, or ecosystems, or any system for that matter. The
self-regulation we see is simply the way biological systems work; whether
disturbed or not. There are responses and changes which occur in response to
environmental changes in the short term which may almost seem purposeful,
but are really (IMO) just the way things are. The long-term responses, which
are so difficult for humans to "see" in any cognitive sense, are really just
random shifts within certain limits. In other words, if, say, global warming
takes place like some people think, there will be large scale global changes
in vegetation in response to massive weather changes. We can predict within
very broad limits what those changes will be, but the specific arrangement
of plants and animals (ecosystems or communities) is impossible to predict
because it will be largely random.

I read quite a bit about systems theory when I was in grad school for the
last time and I sort of concluded that the bottom line was (ala Doris Day)
"Whatever will be, will be." I wasn't impressed much by the concepts. But I
do agree that evolved interrelationships in systems give the short-term
appearance of order and stability. I'm still not convinced that it makes
much difference. There are not a lot of opposing theories in ecology,
although there are different policy interpretations. I have argued on this
list, however, that policy should pursue the conservative line and assume
that ecological theory was correct until evidence otherwise.

Are we getting close?
sb

-----Original Message-----
From: [log in to unmask]
[mailto:[log in to unmask]]On Behalf Of Chris Lees
Sent: Sunday, July 16, 2000 12:59 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: RE: Intrinsics



>Chris responds: Okay, Steve, okay, started out random. Maybe right or
wrong.
>But once the
>system is up and running, then it seems to me that coevolution, symbiosis,
>commensalism, interconnectedness, all this is a qualitative change. The
>'units
>in the system' have mutated or metamorphosed. It's no longer a random
>collection. It's self-structured."
>
>Bissell here: No, it *appears* self-structured and it is easy to understand
>as self-structured. Remember the game of "Pick-Up-Sticks" where you dumped
a
>pile of sticks on the floor and then tried to "deconstruct" the pile
without
>toppling it over? The pile is random, Right? but it appears "structured"
and
>behaves as such when you deconstruct it. But the interrelationships are a
>priori, there is no single structure in which those sticks *have* to fall.

I see what you are saying, but what I am saying, is that from an
approximately
'systems theory' view, the pile of sticks is the system, bounded by
the perimeter
of it's form, and then within the boundary are the units, defined as sticks
(or
species, or whatever). Their original relationship to one another is random.
Now, if by magic, some of the sticks transform into snakes and ladders,
then,
there has been some mysterious qualitative change, and the systems theorist
has to redefine the description of the units. Just as if the unit
were a person,
then any random couple off the street could be compared to a loving married
couple. The unit looks superficialy the same, yet there is a subtle
difference
in the connectedness, and that small difference has a large result in the
difference in the behaviousr of the couples. The net behaviour of the system
is contingent upon the relationships between the contained units. Change
the nature of the units and the whole system is likely to behave
differently.
Species can evolve interrelationships very quickly, decades, bacteria even
faster. So probably, the stickpile analogy is far too static to be
illustrative
of the dynamic involved. Perhaps a better angle on this is the ironfilings
laid randomly on a metal sheet that is then bowed with a violin bow, The
filings vibrate and migrate into clusters and emerging patterns.

>>On this list, my point is that it just doesn't matter. Whether the
>>relationships are purposeful or stochastic, are best, indeed only, ethical
>>position is to regard the relationship as having moral implications and
>>protect it.
>
>Chris continues: Oh I must disagree. How you going to protect it, if the
>model you are
>applying is wrong ? The conceived theoretical foundation that you use
>to justify any activity has major implications all the way through.
>
>Bissell responds: Isn't the basic premise of Pascal's wager that it doesn't
>matter whether the  basic concept is true or not; the moral benefits will
>occur as long as the process is consistent? Anyway, models are always
>"wrong" in the sense that models are not intended to be reality, in fact,
>cannot be reality. We make good faith stabs at useful theory and work from
>there. Isn't that the point of ethics? Trying to do the best we can is a
>confusing and largely un-understandable world?
>sb

Well, I think the "wrongness" can be of at least two kinds. It might be
because
you're using a map of the waterpipes to look for gaspipes, or it might be
that
you've got the right map for the gas pipes, but the surveyor was careless
and printed a map full of errors.
I agree that this is a very confusing and largely un-understandable world,
but we can still find a sense of trans-rational relaxation and a feeling of
belonging occasionally which is reassuring I find.

C.L.



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