The topic regarding waves collapsing is interesting from a philosophical
viewpoint. There is an interesting essay written in 1934 by Xavier Zubiri on
the new physics. 

The whole essay is published on the web at www.zubiri.org

I am certain that many members of this list will enjoy the intellectual
emotion that arises whilst reading this essay on Nature, Physics and God. I
have included a few short paragraphs to enlighten the topic of waves and
microphysics. There is a section on the photoelectric effect...here and
rather very interesting philosophical implications of the new physics. 

There are significant implications for ecosystem modelling and description
here as well due to similar observational effects on 'osscillatory'
functions in ecosystems according to the three abiotic dependencies, one
biotic dependency. 

chao, 

john foster

THE REAL BASE OF THE NEW PHYSICS

by Xavier Zubiri

This is the great discovery of Heisenberg: the uncertainty principle. Let us
again recall Bohr's atomic model. In order for this model to make sense it
was necessary for the measurement of position and velocity of an electron at
a specified moment of time to make sense too. But such measurement is
impossible, not because practically it cannot be done, but because the
phenomenon itself implies the radical impossibility of such a measurement.
In any measurement, in fact, the measuring device should not significantly
affect what it measures. But, for any measurement, it is necessary to see
the object and, therefore, to illuminate it. When we deal with objects an
order of magnitude or more greater than that of Planck's constant, the
action of light on the object is insensible. But when we deal with
electrons, the object measured is of the same order of magnitude as the
light wavelength which illuminates it, and consequently is sensibly affected
by it. In what sense? Compton demonstrated experimentally that when a beam
of monochromatic light is directed on an electron, the velocity imparted to
the electron increases as the wavelength of the incident light is decreased.
Let us suppose, then, that knowing the place occupied by the electron, we
desire to know its velocity. We should have to employ light of long
wavelength. That way, the velocity of the electron will suffer the smallest
possible change; but on the other hand, the place it occupies is now less
precisely delineated. Let us then use light of short wavelength. We now
precisely fix the position of the electron, but its {270} velocity will have
changed considerably. it is not possible to simultaneously determine the
position and velocity of the electron. Any attempt to do so will result in a
total error of at least the order of magnitude of Planck's constant. Outside
the atom, this measurement error can be totally disregarded; but inside it
is unavoidable. It makes the concepts of wave and particle lose their
meaning when we deal with quantities of the order of magnitude of Planck's
constant. The equivalence between particle and wave mechanics thus turns out
to be founded [239] in physical reality itself. Consequently it makes no
sense to ask what the real relation is between particles and waves.
DeBroglie thought at one point that this relation is such that the particle
called an "electron" moves along carried by an associated wave, docilely
following its laws of motion. This is the so-called "wave-pilot" theory. But
De Broglie himself saw the difficulties facing such a conception, even if
the wave is interpreted as a wave of probability. With the uncertainty
principle, the problem of the real relation between particles and waves
loses its meaning. Particles and waves are nothing more than two languages,
two systems of operations for describing one single physical reality. "Waves
and particles," says Dirac, "ought to be considered as two conceptual
formulations which have been shown to be adequate for describing one single
physical reality. We should not try to form a single 'common' image in which
both play a part; and it is important not to attempt to sketch out a
mechanism obeying classical laws, and with it describe the connection
between waves and particles and thus determine their movements. Any such
attempt goes squarely against the axioms in accordance with which the most
recent physics has been developed. Quantum mechanics has no pretension other
than establishing the laws which govern phenomena, in such a form that by
means of them we can determine univocally what will happen under
well-defined experimental conditions. Any attempt to plumb the relation
between particles and waves for meanings or information beyond that
necessary for the foregoing goal would be useless and senseless." {271} 

Such is the general outline of the brilliant work of Heisenberg,
Schrödinger, and Dirac: the formulation of a new symbolic mechanics of the
quantum which, as Bohr says, should be considered as a generalization of
classical mechanics. It does no violence to classical mechanics and in fact
can be compared to it in beauty and internal coherence. From this
standpoint, relativistic mechanics is the crowing glory of classical
mechanics. The proportion and nature of the contributions of each of the
three creators of the new theory has, without doubt, influenced the decision
of the Jury in awarding the 1932 prize solely to Heisenberg, and dividing
the 1933 prize between Schrödinger and Dirac. {272} 

[240] {273}

Uncertainty or indetermination seems to be what is most opposed to the
character of all scientific thinking. Planck, therefore, indignantly rejects
this concept; to renounce determinism would be to renounce causality, and
with it, everything that has constituted the meaning of science from Galileo
up to the present day. If our measurements on the atom are indeterminate, it
would seem to say that our manner of investigating it is likewise
indeterminate. Indeterminism, if it exists, would be for Planck a
characteristic of the present state of our science, but in no way a
characteristic of things themselves. 

And secondly, in response to Planck, it is not true that the idea of nature,
in the physical sense, is the idea of the nature of things simpliciter. In
fact, Galileo's great work consisted in distinguishing these two ideas and
attempting to give physical sense to physics. This task had been fully
prepared in the ontology of Duns Scotus and Ockham, but was only realized
explicitly and in mature form in the work of the Pisan thinker. For Galileo
there is a radical distinction between nature in the sense of nature of
things and nature in the sense of physics; and analogously, a distinction
between causality as an ontological relation, and physical causality. The
latter seeks to measure variations; the former, to discern the origin of the
being of things. This distinction has sufficed to the point that an
uncontrollable variation, i.e. something which does not vary at all in our
experience, has no physical meaning; such, for instance, is the supposition
that the universe is characterized by uniform rectilinear motion. Physics
cannot occupy itself with {289} the origin of things, but only with the
measurement of their variation; it is not an etiology, but a dynamics. Force
is not the cause of being, but the reason for changes in state. In this
sense, inertial movement does not require any force. So, not only is it
untrue that the idea of cause gave rise to modern science, but in fact
modern science had its origin in the exquisite care with which it restricted
this idea. That renunciation was for the representatives of the old physics
the great scandal of the epoch. How is it possible for physics to renounce
explanation of the origin of all movement? This heroic renunciation,
nevertheless, engendered modern physics. Hence it is not permissible to
whisper of scandals in the face of Heisenberg's principle; it is rather
necessary to faithfully examine the situation and see if it [254] does not
give to physics its ultimate stroke of purity. 























At 03:43 PM 7/12/00 +0100, Chris Lees wrote:
>
>>>The eminent physicist John Wheeler said, some decades ago, that
>>>no phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon.
>>>He was referrring to the collapse of the quantum wave by conscious
>>>observation.
>>>Do wolves collapse the quantum wave ?
>>
>>Interesting. Does this question lead to a falsifiable hypothesis? Suppose
>>we were to propose the hypothesis: Observation by a wolf does not collapse
>>the wave function. Is there an experiment we can do to test it?
>>
>>Sadly, I don't remember the details of how observation collapses the wave
>>function, so I can't say. But it doesn't seem impossible that there is a
>>test.
>>
>>You can perhaps see where I'm going with this. If it turned out that only
>>observation by humans would do, that might tell us that there is something
>>unique about us. But if wolves could do it as well, what then? How about
>>rats, or flies? How about observation by a computer vision system?
>>
>>Chris
>
>Hmm. I do have a quantity of text concerning details of the wave function
>collapse. There's plenty on the Web. As far as I can gather, there is no
>consensus among the most advanced thinkers in this area as to how we can
>best comprehend what is going on. If we take your hypothesis, I'd feel fairly
>confident that minds superior to my own might devise such an experiment. I'd
>guess it requires total command of the kind of mathematical expertise that
>gave us Bell's Theorem, Aspect's experiment, and similar feats, which tend
>to baffle most of us, myself included.
>How about interaction/observation by DNA ? Somehow there needs to be a
>reconciliation between these notions and the organic form of the biological
>body. If 'out there' is so 'real', how do we account for people who are born
>limbless, or who subsequently lose a limb, being able to still feel that limb ?
>Things exist 'in the mind' or 'in the brain' which do not have an 'objectively'
>observable corresponding counterpart. And that comes from what we inherit
>biologically, genetically. So if the organic form of what we take to 
>be our body
>can be predetermined in some way, and all sensation is founded in brain
>activity, in complexity which so far defeats all comers, well, philosophy ought
>to come to the rescue here, and offer guidance as to how we could frame the
>questions in a style which might illuminate.
>
>C.L.
>



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