Hello John & Jim,

John, you made some very interesting comments in your 5 July post.  I wish
to ask clarification of a few points.  Jim, you importantly focus on
Minteer's paper.  I understand, but think that the discussion is helpful for
me at least.

Jonh, you wrote:
Robin Fox writing in "Kinship and Marriage" maintains

"In many societies, both primitive and sophisticated, relationships to
ancestors and kin have been the key relationships in the social structure;
they have been the pivots on which most interactions, most claims and
obligations, most loyalties and sentiments, turned. There would have been
nothing whimsical or nostalgic about genealogical knowledge for a Chinese
scholar, a Roman citizen, a South Sea Islander, a Zulu warrior or a Saxon
thane; *it would have been essential knowledge because it would have defined
many of his most significant rights, duties and sentiments. In a society
where kinship is supremely important, loyalties to kin supersede all other
loyalties, and for this reason alone ***kinship must be the enemy of
beaucracy***."

Ray here:
[I assume that "beaucracy" is a typo for "bureaucracy".]  I do not
understand why kinship is placed in opposition to bureaucracy.  Why pick
that particular term?  And isn't the kinship organization just another form
of bureaucracy?
---------------

Later John said:
So getting on to my point regarding kinship, and consanquinity it should be
rather obvious to know that kinship means "simply the relations between kin,
i.e. persons related by real, putative or fictive consanquinity. [Fox]." Fox
says that pinning down consanquinity is "difficult of course and our own
scientific notions of genetic relationship are not shared by all peoples and
cultures. Who does, and who does not count as 'blood' kin, varies
considerably."

Ray here:
Historic cultural differences in views of relationships are important for
understanding different possible views.  But I wish to follow up on the
"scientific notions of genetic relationships".  I am wondering about the
implications from initial results from the Human Genome Project.  For
example:

1.  Between humans, DNA differs by only 0.2 percent (1 in 500 letters),
which takes into account that human cells have two copies of the genome.

2.  Human DNA is 98 percent identical to that of chimpanzees.

It seems to me that one could draw a *tentative* conclusion that
science/genetics supports the view that chimpanzees have kinship with
humans.  *If* that were to hold up, shouldn't ethicists be considering the
implications of incorporating chimpanzees into the domain for
human/anthropocentric ethics?  Furthermore, if animals such as chimpanzees
can qualify by genetics for kinship, what genetic basis might exist for
excluding other life-forms?

Now when we recognize that our non-human kin require a "healthy" ecosystem
for survival, it seems that we have an ethical basis for care of the
ecosystem itself.

This seems to be what you are saying in your following paragraphs especially
those relating to work of Joseph Campbell.

Well, just some musings on your post.
----------------

Jim commented in part on John's post as follows:
Terrific. I'm all for discussion of Bantu proverbs (does Callicott discuss
them? It's unclear from John's post <s>). But let's just not lose sight of
the original discussion: which had to do with Ben Minteer's analysis of
foundationalist environmental ethics, and the limitations/drawbacks of the
same. Norton echoes Minteer's point in the passage that I just quoted. I
just want to make sure that we "keep our eyes on the prize" and that we're
all "singing off the same song sheet" (these are just some old "Banter"
proverbs).

Ray here:
I agree we need to "keep our eyes on the prize".  But, for me the comments
from John and everyone else helps me to understand the issue between Minteer
& Callicott.  You see, Jim, I don't have all the background that you have.
So I take a little longer - maybe I'll never get there, but I'm trying! :-)
And as we go along, thoughts come to my mind that I need to get in better
perspective.
-----------------

Then, Jim, you said:

The one thing I think I *do* agree with, however, is your final statement,
"The land ethic is 'philanthropy' not misanthropy," but ONLY in the sense
that I see the land ethic as being primarily underwritten by an
anthropocentric system of aesthetic values--*not* by a foundationalist
reliance on inherent value, intrinsic value, or whatever. In that sense, I
probably disagree with Callicott and side with Norton--even though
Callicott's sharply worded 1996 response to Norton's accuses Norton of
everything intellectually bad under the sun, with the sole possible
exception of out and out plagiarism of Callicott's ideas. <smile> Which of
course, are just Leopold's ideas. . . .

Ray here:
In my ignorance.   You infer that a foundational system relies "on inherent
value, intrinsic value, or whatever".  On what does "an anthropocentric
system of aesthetic values" rely?  Does not that system *have to have some
*foundation"*, just somewhat different?  I'd appreciate your
comments/clarification.
-------------

Thanks, everyone, for your patience.

Ray






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