Chris Perley piped up with:

>Great post John

Hi Chris,

Now wait just a cotton picking minute here. . . . <smile>  What's so great
about it?

If John--or anyone else--can give me just a brief, fifty words or less
(I'll give you a hundred words, just to be charitable) summary of what John
is saying here in his post, I would be very appreciative.  *Very*
appreciative.

Let's talk about Callicott some more.  At the risk of greatly
oversimplifying a very interesting story:
1) Let's grant for the sake of argument (after all, we *were* discussing
Minteer's analysis of Callicott) that Callicott is a foundationalist
philosopher committed to finding the one true ultimate moral principle or
system of moral principles.
2) In 1990 Callicott explicitly stakes out his moral monism (which supports
claim [1]) in an essay entitled "The Case Against Moral Pluralism."
3a) For Callicott, until about December 1996 (or until the publication of
his article, "Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine
Leopold's Land Ethic?"), the universal moral summum bonum was Leopold's
Golden Rule, "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability, and beauty o the biotic community; it is wrong when it tends
otherwise."
3b) After December 1996, Callicott believes in: "A thing is right when it
tends to disturb the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal
scales.  It is wrong when it tends otherwise."  (Or some such thing.)

Now, while John provides no clue as to what "Callicott (1994)" refers to,
he does provide some guideposts for us in the form of relevant quotations.
So, via John, Callicott apparently states somewhere in 1994:

4) "The biotic community and its correlative land ethic does not replace
our several human communities and their correlative ethics - duties and
obligations to family and family members, to municipality and
fellow-citizens, to country and countrymen, to humanity and human beings.
Hence the land ethic leaves our traditional human morality quite intact and
pre-emptive."

Let me now ask John (or anyone else) how Callicott--as an ethical
foundationalist and a self proclaimed moral monist--can hold principles
(3a) and (4), while at the same time keeping to his own stated ethical
parameters of (1) foundationalism and (2) monism?

After all, some traditional human morality --especially is left "quite
intact" and "pre-emptive"--allows for subduing the earth and controlling
it.  Some traditional human morality (especially if left intact and
pre-emptive) allows for the destruction of natural beauty and stability if
there is an overriding human benefit to be gotten.  Some human morality
(especially if . . . ) holds that nature is *morally irrelevant*.  Some
human morality says it's okay to fill wetlands . . . log forests . . . mine
mountains . . .  Some (most?) human morality rests ultimately on belief in
God.

Et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

The point of all this as I see it is that Callicott cannot have his
foundationalist/monist cake and eat it too.  This is Minteer's point; this
is also Bryan Norton's point in his 1995 article, "Why I am Not a
Nonanthropocentrist: Callicott and the Failure of Monistic Inherentism."
It seems to me that John's post shifts the discussion away from Callicott's
own efforts to dodge the "fascism" bullet to a discussion of Callicott's
humble inclusion of nested human moral communities within the broader
ethical confines of the land ethic.  Fine.  John can certainly make this
evasive move.  But please note that Callicott *himself* makes the same
evasive move, which (a) is the whole point behind Minteer's charge of
"slipperiness" and which (b) has been noted by philosophers other than
Minteer and me.  For example, Norton writes:

	"It is significant that Callicott shifted the grounds of the debate
over fascism from obligations flowing from attributions of inherent
value--the ontological source of normative force in his monistic theory--to
the origins of special obligations that emerge in specific communities in
biology, culture, and ecology; he differentiated the obligations according
to the intimacy of the community.  There can be multiple criteria of right
action: one stringent criterion of protectionism applicable in cases of
parents to children and a less stringent moral criterion of protectionism
that applies to the broader, ecological community.  The commitment to moral
monism recedes into the theoretical background as these special,
community-based (and presumably not universal) obligations do the hard work
of resolving conflicts that were introduced by generalization of inherent
value to species and ecosystems as well as to individuals in human
communities" (349, cite below).

Jim here: I take it that John is merely following Callicott's lead, then,
in discussing the stuff about "kinship structures in human societies," "The
Education of Little Tree," the Cowboy Junkies, Robin Fox's idea that
kinship is the enemy of bureaucracy, human bipedalism and neoteny, affinity
and consanquinity, Joseph Cambell's discussion of Tibetan tantras, family
feeling extended to animals, and Bantu proverbs, culminating in a
conclusion! (I think), e.g. when John writes:

>Thus Callicott is reflecting about as much on kinship as the enemy of
>beaucracy as he is about any 'pre-archic originary' experience that is
>emblematic in the child's relationship with an animal kin, as well as the
>Bantu poverb that "cattle beget children."

Terrific.  I'm all for discussion of Bantu proverbs (does Callicott discuss
them? It's unclear from John's post <s>).  But let's just not lose sight of
the original discussion: which had to do with Ben Minteer's analysis of
foundationalist environmental ethics, and the limitations/drawbacks of the
same.  Norton echoes Minteer's point in the passage that I just quoted.  I
just want to make sure that we "keep our eyes on the prize" and that we're
all "singing off the same song sheet" (these are just some old "Banter"
proverbs).

And  after all, since I'm probably not the "sharpest knife in the drawer"
(in which case there probably would be an occasion for some "Band-Aid"
proverbs), it would be great if John or anyone else could explain to me
John's statement:

>The idea that a large dieback of the human population is required makes a
>great deal of ecological sense for the future of one's own children.

John . . .  I just don't get it.  How does a "large" dieback of the human
population (Aiken estimated 90 percent of present human numbers?) make "a
great deal of ecological sense for the future of one's own children"?  Your
subsequent comments about the "majority of men" that you know who have (a)
had children, (b) gotten sterilized, and (c) now have scolding wives to
contend with leaves me *utterly* in the dark as to what the benefits,
ecological or otherwise, are of advocating a "large dieback of the human
population."  I hate to say it, but John . . . honestly? this just sounds
like more of your olde tyme eco-apocalyptic misanthropic environmental
religion to me. . . .

Well, okay . . . I guess while I'm at it <smile>, I might as well add that
I guess I just don't get your point, either, that setting hunting limits
for "mallard ducks" within a "bureaucracy" is "hardly different" than
"cutting the seminiferous tubule."  You explain: "Value for value in the
exchange."  Sorry, I just don't follow your drift. . . .

The one thing I think I *do* agree with, however, is your final statement,
"The land ethic is 'philanthropy' not misanthropy," but ONLY in the sense
that I see the land ethic as being primarily underwritten by an
anthropocentric system of aesthetic values--*not* by a foundationalist
reliance on inherent value, intrinsic value, or whatever.  In that sense, I
probably disagree with Callicott and side with Norton--even though
Callicott's sharply worded 1996 response to Norton's accuses Norton of
everything intellectually bad under the sun, with the sole possible
exception of out and out plagiarism of Callicott's ideas. <smile>  Which of
course, are just Leopold's ideas. . . .

Perhaps when we're done with Minteer we can move on to a substantive
discussion of Callicott's work.

Okay.  enough for now.

Jim T.

I *believe* this is everything I've cited:

Callicott, J. Baird. 1990. The case against moral pluralism. Environmental
Ethics 12 (2):99-124.
Callicott, J. Baird. 1996. Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology
Undermine Leopold's Land Ethic? Environmental Ethics 18 (Winter):353-372.
Callicott, J. Baird. 1996. Comment: On Norton and the  Failure of Monistic
Inherentism. Environmental Ethics 18 (Summer):219-221.
Norton, Bryan G. 1995. Why I am Not a Nonanthhropocentrist: Callicott and
the Failure of Monistic Inherentism. Environmental Ethics 17
(Winter):341-358.


>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: [log in to unmask]
>> [mailto:[log in to unmask]]On Behalf Of john foster
>> Sent: Thursday, 6 July 2000 01:48
>> To: [log in to unmask]
>> Subject: Re: Minteer on Callicott and intellectual slipperiness
>>
>>
>> Dear Gentle Folks,
>>
>> Callicott (1994) has also in the past made the claim of
>> misanthropy against
>> the Land Ethic. Callicott actually states that this claim is based on
>> logical inference but he in fact supports the land ethic of Leopold.  In
>> 1994 he writes " I know longer think that the land ethic is misanthropic."
>> And quoting from Leopold himself "All ethics so far evolved rest upon a
>> single premiss: that the individual is a member of a community of
>> interdependent parts.... The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of
>> the community to include soils, water, plants, and animals, or
>> collectively
>> the land."
>>
>> Callicot is agreeing with this premiss and clarifies that
>>
>> "The biotic community and its correlative land ethic does not replace our
>> several human communities and their correlative ethics - duties and
>> obligations to family and family members, to municipality and
>> fellow-citizens, to country and countrymen, to humanity and human beings.
>> Hence the land ethic leaves our traditional human morality quite
>> intact and
>> pre-emptive....Second in importance, I now think that we do in fact have
>> duties and obligations - implied by the essentially communitarian
>> premisses
>> of the land ethic - to domestic animals, as well as to wild fellow-members
>> of the biotic community as a whole. Farm animals, work animals, and pets
>> have long been members of what Mary Midgley calls the 'mixed' community.
>> They have entered into a kind of implicit social contract with us which
>> lately we have abrogated."
>>
>> Callicot further explains that we as humans "belong to several
>> hierarchically ordered communities, each with its peculiar set of
>> duties and
>> obligations...."
>>
>> The interesting conceptualization here is *hierarchical*
>> [modifying] order.
>> The term hierarchic  literally means in ancient Greek something
>> like sacred
>> principles since arche means principle. However the implication
>> is much more
>> involved than the simple assertion of an order of sacred principles
>> (ultimately in the form of patrinlineal/matrilineal systems), it means as
>> well *cosmos* since the word in Greek for order is *cosmos*, or
>> order of the
>> whole. What Callicot is attempting to describe is the reality of *kinship*
>> structures in human societies that actually extend from the primary human
>> relationships of parent-child, and child-parent and child-child,
>> and so on.

[snippage occurs here--jt]

>>
>> Thus Callicott is reflecting about as much on kinship as the enemy of
>> beaucracy as he is about any 'pre-archic originary' experience that is
>> emblematic in the child's relationship with an animal kin, as well as the
>> Bantu poverb that "cattle beget children."
>>
>> Therefore to have lots of children means lots of work in obtaining land to
>> raise cattle. And lots of work means no time for play, not time to invoke
>> the love and fascination of the gods. Thus what is indicated by Callicott
>> and many others is a form of 'friendly rivalry' which may be understood as
>> the cultivation of a sense of ecological virtue that is a moral
>> extension of
>> the feeling of family, or 'mixed' communities, since what is good
>> for cattle
>> is also good for children in the future. More time spent in leisure means
>> more time communing or visualizing the dieties who bring bliss
>> and harmony.
>>
>> The family that plays together stays together.
>>
>> The idea that a large dieback of the human population is required makes a
>> great deal of ecological sense for the future of one's own children. The
>> majority of men that I know who have had children have gone and got
>> visectomies so as to relieve themselves of having to work even harder to
>> obtain incomes to feed and cloth and educate more children.
>> Sometimes these
>> men have been scolded by their wives for now making themselves infertile.
>> This is interesting since the communitarian ethos, or what
>> Callicott claims,
>> is the moral extension of placing the land on the same
>> egalitarian level as
>> people really derives from the love of one's own children, and
>> their future.
>>
>> Placing a 'quota' on the number of one's own children by cutting the
>> seminiferous tubule is hardly different than placing a quota on the number
>> of 'mallard ducks' that beaucracy is limiting for hunters to take
>> (question
>> of sustainability and conservation of the resource) is hardly
>> different, but
>> the absurdity of not placing a quota on one's own number of offspring is
>> equally ridiculous. Value for value in the exchange.
>>
>> With 6 billion people on this earth, and growing each second, I think
>> everyone can agree: that taking pleasure from the taking of life
>> without any
>> forethought of the consequences is a refutation of the sapience and
>> intelligence of the human race. It is in the words of Fox implicating the
>> enemy of beaucracies (both corporate and state) against the feeling of
>> family. The land ethic is 'philanthropy' not misanthropy.
>>
>> john foster
>>
>>
>> >Jim T: Callicott directly considers the fact that others have
>> (mistakenly, in his
>> >view) accused the land ethic of environmental misanthropy.   After first
>> >laying out the conceptual foundations of the land ethic in his essay, he
>> >addresses the charge of misanthropy head on.  For example, Callicott
>> >writes:  "According to William Aiken, from the point of view of the land
>> >ethic, therefore, 'massive human diebacks would be good. It is
>> our duty to
>> >cause them.  It is our species' duty, relative the whole, to eliminate 90
>> >percent of our numbers.'"  Thus, Callicott adds, "according to Tom Regan,
>> >the land ethic is a clear case of 'environmental fascism' " (92).
>> >