Hi everybody,
Well, the response to my speculations about Cold War rationality (or lack
thereof) has been underwhelming to say the least. :-) But that's okay, I
am not deterred . . . .
Let me restate the argument in somewhat more forceful terms. But first,
recall that Ray Lanier asked:
>My question is: Does the field of ethics have a decision model that would
>help (not necessarily resolve) ethical issues where the facts about actions
>and consequences are subject to the condition of uncertainty?
I might have added in my previous response that some philosophers might say
that the decision model provided by John Rawls in _A Theory of Justice_
constitutes another such approach under conditions of uncertainty. The
basic argument is familiar: Rawls proposes the thought experiment of the
"original position," where justice-seeking individuals negotiate with each
other to determine fair social arrangements, all the while remaining under
a "veil of ignorance" as to their particular personal circumstances in such
a society. Rawls reasons that if the participants act rationally, they
would institute a kind of "maximin" social structure which would maximize
the well-being of the least well-off individuals. The original position
thus represents a situation of uncertainty because the actors would be
uncertain about their place in such a social arrangement.
Critics of Rawls's model have pointed out that Rawls allows no room for
probabilistic thinking under the veil of ignorance--e.g. gambling that you
would be among the best-off, rather than among the worst-off, citizens.
Thus the original position seems to require the maximin principle as its
decision rule under conditions of uncertainty, as opposed to a Bayesian
decision rule which would maximize expected (probabilistic) utilities.
John Harsanyi, for example, in an early paper reviewing Rawls's theory,
uses the following thought experiment to illustrate the problem with the
maximin principle. "Suppose you live in New York City and are offered two
jobs at the same time. One is a tedious and badly paid job in New York
City itself, while the other is a very interesting and well paid job in
Chicago. But the catch is that, if you wanted the Chicago job, you would
have to take a plane from New York to Chicago . . . . Therefore there
would be a very small but positive probability that you might be killed in
a plane accident. . . . The maximin principle says that you must evaluate
every policy available to you in terms of the *worst possibility* that can
occur to you if you follow that particular policy. If you choose the New
York job . . . you will have a poor job but you will stay alive. . . .
[I]f you choose the Chicago job then the worst possible outcome will be
that you may die in a plane accident."
Thus, Harsanyi continues, "if you want to follow the maximin principle then
you must choose the New York job. Indeed, you must not choose the Chicago
job *under any condition*--however unlikely you might think a plane
accident would be, and however strong your preference might be for the
excellent Chicago job."
"Clearly," Harsanyi concludes, "this is a highly irrational conclusion.
Surely, if you assign a low enough probability to a plane accident, and if
you have a strong enough preference for the Chicago job, then by all means
you should take your chances and choose the Chicago job. This is exactly
what Bayesian theory would suggest you should do" (595, cite below). In
other words, what a Rawlsian-like maximin approach prevents us from doing
is the conducting of ordinary "risk-cost-benefit" analyses. This leads to
irrational consequences (as in the turning down the Chicago job scenario).
What I now want to suggest is that the "Precautionary Principle," as it has
come to be known in environmental policy and elsewhere, resembles the
maximin principle in that: (a) similarly, it can prevent us from conducting
intelligent risk-cost-benefit analyses; and also (b) it similarly can lead
to irrational policy consequences.
The precautionary principle finds expression, for example, in semi-codified
form in the Agenda 21 proposals from the Rio Earth Summit. But the
precautionary principle is also taking hold in the formal policies of some
European countries, as Carolyn Raffensperger and Joel Tickner observe in
their article, "Implementing the Precautionary Principle":
"Recent international controversies regarding genetically modified foods,
beef hormones, and phthalates softeners in PVC children's toys have raised
the need for U.S. government agencies to better understand and develop a
process for implementing the precautionary principle. This process has
already begun among European Union agencies and member states, most notably
Sweden and Denmark. The precautionary principle is a fundamental principle
of environmental health policy and provides explicit guidance to
decision-making in the EU and many of its member states."
http://www.islandpress.com/ecocompass/prevent/index.html
For a general (favorable) statement about the precautionary principle and
its place in public policy, see the Rachel's newsletter for a basic
overview/definition article: http://www.monitor.net/rachel/r586.html .
Interestingly, this article cites author Sandra Steingraber, who says the
precautionary principle "suggests certain kinds of arguments that
grass-roots activists might use at the local level." I was particularly
interested to see that among the grass-roots arguments Steingraber suggests
is the idea that we have a "fundamental human right" to enjoy our
environment "free from fear":
"3) We all have a fundamental human right to enjoy our environment free of
fear. Those who put toxics chemicals into the environment --whether as
wastes or as products --deny us this human right. Almost everyone
recognizes that such a denial of human rights is wrong."
Call me crazy, but this seems like a pretty far-fetched application of
rights theory to the environment and to matters of human health. Are we
now so desirous of a sanitized existence that we are personally
guaranteeing all human beings the absolute right to be "free of fear"?
Where does such a "right" come from? Do nonhuman animals have it? <grin>
Now, don't get me wrong, I'm all for human rights, as any reader of this
list ought to know that by now. And while a certain amount of everyday,
run-of-the-mill precautionary thinking strikes me as a generally prudent
and moral strategy for getting through my day, where does it say in the
cosmic Constitution that I have a right to enjoy the world totally and
absolutely free from fear? Is this some kind of natural law? Should the
maximin/precautionary principle approach be elevated to the status of a
(the?) "fundamental principle of environmental health policy," as
environmentalists and environmental health advocates insist?
The Raffensperger and Tickner article cited above points rather
uncritically to, among other things, the controversy over phthalate
softeners in PVC plastics as an example where the precautionary/maximin
principle is appropriate. And yet consider another article on the
phthalate controversy in Europe. In "Plastic Panics and the Perils of the
Precautionary Principle," Bill Durodié, a research student at the London
School of Economics, writes with regard to the policy process in Italy:
"The impending decision by the Italian government is therefore simply the
tail end of a process formalising self-regulatory action already taken by
retailers and endorsed by regional authorities, which have been mirrored
all over Europe and more recently, in the US. The actions of Greenpeace
have been identical throughout. By a carefully timed and crafted sequence
of stunts, press releases, and often unsubstantiated scientific papers,
their campaigners have, in the manner of precocious schoolchildren, managed
to play off all the major interested parties against one another.
"Ironically, throughout this period new scientific evidence as to potential
harm has entirely contradicted the actions that were taken. There is simply
no cause for concern about the impact of phthalates in babies' toys or
elsewhere. Unfortunately, many measures by retailers and regional
governments were taken prior to the publication of the results last autumn
of a major study aimed at bringing clarity to some of the research
evidence. This indicated the risks posed to be so small 'that the
statistical likelihood cannot be estimated'. However, by applying the
so-called 'precautionary principle', now advocated by the European
Commission as a guide to all such investigations post-BSE, the CSTEE has
issued a series of opinions maintaining that there is 'cause for concern'.
"These opinions have been based upon extrapolating from the worst available
data (for one particular compound this was 10,000 times greater than the
next nearest estimate), scaled up by a further factor of 100 for safety,
and based on exposure doses and times since recognised to have been grossly
exaggerated. It was also assumed that humans would suffer from the most
sensitive adverse effects noticed in experiments upon rodents, although
even the CSTEE accept that in the case of cancer this 'may have little
relevance for humans', whilst the latest available in vivo research
indicates no effect upon reproductive capabilities. Moreover, evidence that
the majority of human consumption of phthalates comes from food has
studiously been ignored.
"But the 'race to the bottom' logic of applying the 'precautionary
principle', which encourages caution and inaction in the absence of
absolute proof of safety, thereby reversing the usual scientific burden of
proof, will mean more than the wholesale replacement of childcare articles
and toys. In countries where the campaign has been successful the focus has
now moved onto medical devices such as flexible tubing, intravenous bags,
catheters and protective gloves. These have provided billions of patient
days of acute exposure with no evidence of adverse effects even amongst the
most exposed groups, such as patients receiving dialysis for kidney
disease. Yet, companies with a vital interest at stake, and who are aware
of the enormous social benefit brought by products which are durable,
disposable, flexible, inexpensive and safe, have proven to be remarkably
defensive in their stance."
(full text at http://www.esef.org/durodie.htm )
Jim again:
In contrast to the risk-cost-benefit analysis approach that has been common
to public policy in the United States and which represents a (generally)
Bayesian approach to decision-making, the precautionary principle embodies
a maximin approach to public policy. Such (European?) precautionary
approaches seem to imply that when there is a chance of catastrophic
consequences--no matter how small the likelihood of those consequences
occurring--then we should act so as to avoid those consequences. In other
words, the precautionary principle as a decision rule for policy seems to
enshrine a "zero-tolerance for risk" approach to public policy.
Is this a good thing? These epistemological issues play an important role
in many current environmental controversies ranging from genetically
modified organisms to phthalates to global warming. In some cases, the
risks are better known than in others. But can we really hope for a
completely risk-free future? This seems unlikely to me.
We might do well to reflect upon what Harsanyi says: "If you took the
maximin principle seriously then you could not ever cross a street (after
all, you might be hit by a car); you could never drive over a bridge (after
all, it might collapse); you could never get married (after all, it might
end in a disaster), etc. If anybody really acted this way he would soon
end up in a mental institution."
Is that where environmentalists are going?
Jim T.
Harsanyi, John C. 1975. Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for
Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory. _The American Political
Science Review_ 69 (2, June): 594-606.
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