Hi Chris, John,


>Chris wrote:
>(BTW, "health" is merely a convenient term, and as it relates to an
>ecosystem is in no way a suggestion of an homeostatic metaphor - the
>ecosystem "health" relates to how ecologies function, not how individual
>humans or animals do - so claims of having "transferred the human health
>metaphor to ecosystems" is incorrect IMO".) 

This is the best thing you've said.  Perhaps the most that can be said
about a concept of ecosystem health is that it serves as a heuristic and
inspires innovative ways of approaching environmental problems.  But many
ecologists in conservation biology and/or the other applied ecological
sciences forget the figurative sense of the term and imagine that "health"
is a real quality, in a metaphysical or ontological sense.  In this latter
case, where it is intended by the biologists who use it as a *technical* or
descriptive term, is where problems are likely to occur.  As Jamieson
writes:

". . . I am dubious about the utility of 'ecosystem health' as a technical
term.  This expression may have something to recommend it as part of a
rhetorical strategy, but even here I am suspicious.  Environmentalists have
all too often been trapped by their own rhetoric, and the movement as a
whole has suffered from its use of misleading metaphors (e.g. 'greenhouse
effect,' captive animals as 'ambassadors of the wild').  Language is
important and environmentalists need to be clear about what they are
asserting" (333-4).

Ecological practitioners (and the lay public) are likely to remain unaware
of the nuances of metaphoric language, with the end result that the
reification of the concept may cause more problems in the long run than it
solves.  The history of ecology is rife with examples, from organicist
metaphors of nature as a living organism all the way on down to ideas about
diversity-stability, niche, and ecological "community".

Remember that the critics of the health concept are saying only that
nothing is really *gained* by the term's usage.  Take John Foster's example
of clearcut logging resulting in damaged salmon streams in the Pacific
Northwest.  No one is advocating bad timber practices in steeply sloped
watersheds by saying that concepts of health might not apply.  It may be
the case, however, as a pragmatic matter, that highly abstract notions of
ecosystem "health" may be far less effective and less empowering as a
motivational force for action than simpler notions that appeal to peoples'
self interest:  "your salmon are dying."  Now what are *you* going to do
about it?

And saying that it is the erosion that is unhealthy begs the all-important
question about teleology: does nature have an end?  is it "health"?  Some
of the most beautiful landscapes in the world are the result of almost
unimaginable forces of erosion: are these landscapes unhealthy?  Or
perhaps: were they healthy when they started eroding, but are healthy now?
does that notion even make sense?

Let me use another example, although at the risk of drastically
oversimplifying a very complicated situation.  (But I think the basic plot
of what follows is accurate enough.)

Yesterday was the opening day of trout season here in New York state.
There are fewer trout than there used to be.  One of the new ecological
factors around here that anglers and policy makers alike must contend with
is the alien invasion of exotic zebra mussels into the waters of the Great
Lakes "ecosystem" (whatever and where ever that is).  For years the waters
of the Great Lakes and the New York Finger Lakes have been polluted--some
lakes more so (Lake Erie) than others (Cayuga Lake).   The barnacle-like
mussels are filter feeders and cause problems on things like water intake
pipes and recreational boat propellers.  On the other hand, they are
rapidly and naturally accomplishing what the most expensive anti-pollution
technical fixes probably couldn't: cleaner water.

With the great influx of zebra mussels into the lakes now occurring,
overall water quality is improving.  Is that healthy?  Depends who you talk
to.  Anglers don't think so: overall biological productivity may go down in
the absence of excess nutrients in the water, meaning fewer fish and other
creatures.  Some native species may eventually be lost.  Cleaner water also
means accelerated plant growth at greater depths, as sunlight can now
penetrate the water column to a greater depth.  Is that healthy?  The plant
growth causes new problems, especially in some shallower navigable
channels.  On the other hand, people who depend on the lake water for their
drinking supply are likely to be pleased that the water is healthier to
consume, even though they may have to deal with those pesky zebra mussels
at the intake pipes.

All this accomplished by an alien invader.  Is the concept of ecosystem
health useful in this context?  No, not very, if at all.  Perhaps the most
we could say is that the lake is both healthy and unhealthy at the same
time.  But is that really saying much?

Now, perhaps it is the case that foresters and people accustomed to working
with plants are more accustomed to the concept: after all, the metaphor of
"health" has rather easily been applied to plants for a long time.  We find
it convenient to think in terms of a plant's "health."  Visually, we see
that plants thrive, or don't thrive.  A plant can look sickly when it lacks
nutrients or water, and we can correct the situation by feeding and
watering plants.  Foresters, too, perhaps are used to thinking in terms of
forest "health": a stand of timber can be diseased, or overcrowded, or show
visible signs of stress in times of drought or what have you. . . .  But
this usage occurs within a very discrete, concrete local context.

Ultimately, if what we are talking about is the normal and "healthy"
*functioning* of natural systems, why not stick simply to more purely
descriptive (and somewhat less problematic) functional terms?


> I think Costanza, Rapport, Norton etc were essentially arguing that
>ecosystem health is a relevant premise to an environmental ethic (P1 "We
>ought to maintain or enhance ecosystem health when we act") and then went
>on to present the various views on "health", depending on various human
>perceptions (some of them wrong) of how nature works and the
>human/environment interface.  Costanza even attempts a working
>definition.  They essentially tried to minimise the value-ladenness of the
>determination of "health" by presenting the evidence for how nature IS. 
>To some extent this is the easier premise, because it at least has some
>basis in an objective reality (ecology, human ecology and human
>environmental history) - but P1 (the ought premise) remains entirely and
>absolutely anthropocentric.  It makes a statement that "x is good" (in
>this case - ecosystem health = x).  This is a value call.  This is
>subjective.  And this is the BIG question which may need the most focus. 
>Is ecosystem health the ethical end?  I don't KNOW - but I am convinced
>that it is one that satisfies me - more so than treating individual
>components (never mind the processes that make them) of an ecosystem as
>surrogate humans in any event (tied up with the view that "health" means
>no death or physical hurt - which is an ecological nonsense). 


All the talk of how nature IS, and the subsequent identification of this
"IS" with "health," obscures the messy ambiguities inherent in the
normatively loaded concept of health.  Not to mention the messy ambiguities
inherent in the normatively loaded moral realm of ethics.

As Russow observes in her article, the quest for objectivity that lies
behind descriptions of "how nature IS" implies a correspondence model of
truth, epistemologically speaking.  That is to say, the scientific
descriptive process is seen as objective, and its results "correspond to
the way things are."   To say that the value premises *in contrast* are
necessarily subjective, anthropocentric, and up-for-grabs betrays (a) a
lack of epistemic confidence in one's normative or ethical principles and
reveals (b) a corresponding *overconfidence* in the state of one's
scientific knowledge.

Our scientific descriptions may be just as subjective as our moral
principles--indeed, maybe even more so.  For it is certainly the case that
our most basic, basic, moral principles historically have not changed all
that much over time, whereas our science constantly rolls over into new
interpretive frameworks and novel research paradigms.  This is not to say
that our scientific knowledge *doesn't* correspond to reality, just that it
is naive to think that it always does so.

As Russow notes, the Cartesian model of correspondence "is supposed to
ensure that a thing cannot be both x and not-x at the same time, an
ecosystem is not both healthy and unhealthy at once."   The reason this is
potentially problematic, she explains, is that "[p]roponents who view the
concept of ecosystem health as objective in this sense want to ensure that
there is a 'right answer' to the question 'How healthy is this ecosystem?'
" (366)  Yet there may in fact be no right answer to that question.

One doesn't need a concept of ecosystem health in John's Pacific Northwest
clearcutting example.  Perhaps all that is needed is a well developed
concept of human stupidity.  It is simply "stupid" to log the slopes over a
valued salmon creek--and we already have moral resources enough to make
that judgement without needing to introduce extraneous shibboleths like
ecosystem "health" just because that term happens to be the latest flavor
of vanilla in certain academic circles.  The now decade long debate about
"sustainability" should help convince us of that.  .  .  .



>There may be something of a circular nature between answering the question
>as to whether EH is "good", and the argument about what EH IS (from a
>basis of ecology, and environmental history).  The IS statement is
>relatively an easier issue to resolve because many of the disputes relate
>to ecological science -  even though it is fraught with practical problems
>itself.  But because it may be difficult does not mean it is the wrong
>approach.  It looks promising to me.
> 
>But if we want to be bloody minded we could argue that science is
>inseparable from ethical/value dimensions and that all knowledge is
>essentially anti-realist.  I think Costanza et al would accept that much
>of what they present involves the subjective (i.e. no ethics is
>value-neutral, and no science for that matter, but some are less grounded
>in reality than others) .  But attempting to provide at least some
>objective information into the environmental ethics debate is, IMO,
>laudable.  Far better that than people releasing minks into a foreign
>ecosystem without consideration for the ecological "health" issues
>surrounding such an act.

Totally agreed.  Although I am not sure that the appropriate conclusion
about epistemology implies an anti-realist position.  I am a realist in a
very important sense about ethics:  I think that the giving of good reasons
and the providing of supporting arguments can be a source of objectivity
without necessarily requiring a correspondence theory of ethical Truth.
Perhaps "coherence" is good enough for ethical truths.   The fact that our
moral values, intuitions, and principles can be shared and communicated
gives me reason for confidence that moral progess--whatever that
means--does occur.


>You provoke on purpose don't you Jim.  I have a vision of you sitting
>there with a smile on your dial and your tongue firmly in your cheek.
> 
>Ciao, Chris Perley

Me, provoke?     awww, c'mon.   :-)

Jim

ps. as far as I know, the only one I provoke around here is Ray Lanier.
:-))     ("double smiley")