Hi everyone,

>Jim asked
>>I am willing to listen to your account of the moral life of dogs.  Tell >me
>how I would recognize seeing a dog exercise moral judgment.
>
Jamey responded:
>Dogs quite frequently risk or give their lives to save human companions all
>the time.  Of course, you would attribute this to "instinct" we extol the
>virtue of human mothers who risk their lives for their children all the time.
>Not only that, but quite often dogs will go to great lenghths to save humans
>who are not even their companions.  Kindness and love, (I must explain to
>you), are feelings that humans and non-human beings alike express, without
>cold calculations.  You seem to need so much structure for these decisions,
>maybe because some of those feelings might not be there.

Jamey's rebuttal provided the occasion for much personal soul searching,
and so I spent some time this weekend re-reading some of my "oldies but
goodies" animal rights material.  One of the animal rights philosophers who
has spent the most time addressing the idea of nonhuman animals as moral
agents is Steve Sapontzis.  In his book, _Morals, Reason, and Animals_,
Sapontzis devotes a chapter to the subject of "Being Rational and Acting
Morally."  In that chapter, he defends the idea that animals are moral
agents.

I noted that Sapontzis gets a lot of mileage out of a quote from Mary
Midgley's book, _Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature_.   Read what
Midgley has to say about wolves (Jamey here is in good company--re: Midgley
that is, not wolves).

Midgley: "Recently, ethologists have taken the trouble to watch wolves
systematically and have found them to be, by human standards, paragons of
steadiness and good conduct.  They pair for life, they are faithful and
affectionate spouses and parents, they show great loyalty to their pack and
great courage and persistence in the face of difficulties, they carefully
respect one another's territories, keep their dens clean, and extremely
seldom kill anything that they do not need for dinner.  If they fight with
another wolf, the encounter normally ends with a submission.  They have an
inhibition about killing the suppliant and about attacking females and
cubs.  Our knowledge of this behavior rests on long and careful
investigations by trained zoologists, backed up by miles of film, graphs,
maps, population surveys, droppings analyses, and all the rest of the
contemporary toolbag.  Moreover, these surveys have often been undertaken
by authorities who were initially rather hostile to the wolf and inclined
to hope that it could be blamed for various troubles." (quoted in
Sapontzis, p. 27; Midgley pp. 25-6, cites below)

I don't know about the rest of you, but much of this language strikes me as
essentially anthropomorphic. Why is that when Adam, Jamey, Steve Sapontzis,
and others wish to make the point that nonhuman animals are moral beings,
we are treated to a long list of the *admirable* qualities of wolves and
dogs and the like, but nothing on the negative side?  I read through
Sapontzis's entire chapter, and there's much of the same: lots of anecdotal
accounts of how *good* animals are, but no real references to anything
resembling *bad* behavior.  Are nonhuman animals morally perfect?  An
affirmative answer to that question strikes me as essentially romantic.

And another thing: in Jamey's post and in Sapontzis's chapter there are
numerous references to events like dogs saving the lives of people.  For
example, Sapontzis writes:  ". . . [U]nless one is predisposed to think
that animals always act on instinct or reflex, there is at least no more
reason to think that a pet dog pulling a drowning child from a swimming
pool is acting instinctively or reflexively than to think that a human
being doing the same thing is acting instinctually or reflexively." (34)
Well, wait a minute here. . . .  Absent any *specifics* of any one
particular case where a dog has pulled a drowning child from a swimming
pool, let me speculate a bit about Sapontzis's "example" of moral agency.

The most popular dog breed in the United States at this time is the
Labrador retriever.  By some accounts, retrievers (goldens, labs, flat
coats, chessies, etc.) make up over *half* of all the dogs in America
today.  Add to that the other breeds and mixed breeds that retain some
retrieving instincts (e.g. spaniels, terriers, poodles--yes, POODLES), and
you're talking about most of the dogs out there.

Let's assume for the sake of argument that half of the drowning children
out there in the nation's unguarded swimming pools are rescued by some kind
of retriever.   How is it that Sapontzis can ignore the (seemingly obvious)
point that a dog that has been bred to retrieve (instinctively) injured and
wildly thrashing ducks and geese in the water may actually *not* be
exercising moral judgment when it takes a plunge into the deep end of the
swimming pool to retrieve a wildly thrashing, goose-sized, and drowning
child?

Let me leave that question open for discussion. Next, Sapontzis examines a
fairly common assumption in moral theory, "Only beings that are free to
choose what they will do can act morally." (31)  According to Sapontzis,
birds are *not* free but dogs *are* free; consequently, birds aren't moral,
and dogs are.  You be the judge.

Sapontzis writes:  "[Agent dependent] moral action is a sensitive response
to a complex situation, including antecedent conditions and future
possibilities, while a determined action is a blind response to an
immediate stimulus.  Therefore, only free beings can recognize and respond
to the [agent independent] moral values in a situation.  For example, if a
bird tends its young only because they have a certain smell, without
understanding that certain smells signal hunger, disease, or other needs
requiring certain responses from it if they are to survive, then that bird
is not acting morally [in an agent dependent sense].  Forced by instinct to
respond to this morally irrelevant part of the situation, the bird is not
able to respond to the morally relevant parts of the situation with a
course of action chosen for its [agent independent] moral value.
Consequently, it is incapable of acting morally [i.e. in an agent dependent
way]." (38)

Now, in contrast, here is what Sapontzis has to say about dogs:

--"Turning to the other idea, if only free beings can sensibly be held
responsible for their actions, we see that everyday practice indicates that
some animals must be free, since they are commonly held responsible for
many of their actions.  The common activity of housebreaking a dog, for
example, presupposes that certain of a dog's activities are not entirely
determined by instinct or canine nature and that praise and punishment can
be nonarbitrarily meted out to dogs.  Thus, dogs can be sensibly and fairly
held responsible for certain of their actions, which .  .  .  entails that
they are free." (38-9)

Well, the argument here seems to be: since in our daily interactions with
dogs we hold them accountable for not peeing on the floor, they must be
moral!  And since we don't interact with birds in the same way, and since
they rely on instinctive mechanisms to feed their young, birds cannot be
moral!?!  hmmmm . . . .  anybody see any problems with that line of
reasoning?

Okay, I'll let that one go for the time being as well.  Perhaps somebody
here can explain it to me.

Finally, I turned to my _Simon and Schuster's Guide to Dogs_, which
contains the breed descriptions for over 320 breeds of dog.  I figured that
whatever I may lack in the way of direct knowledge about dogs, I can always
make up for it with some quick book learning.  Right Ray?  :-)

There under entry number 66 is the Leonberger.  Check it out--a water
rescue specialist:  "The breed was established in 1846 in Leonberg in the
region of Wurttemberg by the German breeder Heinrich Essing from a crossing
of the Newfoundland, the St. Bernard, and the Great Pyrenees.  .  .  .  The
Leonberger has a lively nature and is steady, affectionate, and alert.  .
.  .  This is an outstanding water rescue dog.  Only a short period of
training is needed to augment its natural instincts.  Not only does it have
a waterproof coat, but nature has furnished it with webs between its toes
which facilitate swimming."

In contrast, let's consider the moral worth of the Rottweiler, entry number 60:
"The Rottweiler is probably descended from the Italian mastiff.  During the
Middle Ages, it was used as a herd dog.  It was bred in the German town of
Rottweil in Wurttemberg.  Practically extinct in 1800, the breed became
popular in the early twentieth century due to enthusiastic breeders
centered in Stuttgart.  .  .  .  It has been used as a herd dog and in
police work, but above all as a watchdog and bodyguard.  .  .  .  Balanced,
tranquil, obedient, brave, easily trained.  It becomes viscious only when
its master is attacked."

Is the rottweiler simply a less moral dog than the leonberger?  And what
about wolves?

Jim Tantillo

Midgley, Mary. Beast and Man : The Roots of Human Nature. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1978.
Pugnetti, Gino and Elizabeth Meriwether Schuler. Simon and Schuster's Guide
to Dogs. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980.
Sapontzis, Steve F. Morals, Reason, and Animals. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1987.