I  agree with what Maria Stella observes as a scientist. Maria Stella
observes a 'reactionary' tendency  which I agree is demonstrative. 

As I indicated earlier, many of the propositions that Jim makes are
'attitudinal'; and many of his sentences are not indicative sentences but
'imperative' sentences. A scientist reports that facts as they are presented
to her. So an indicative sentence thus is either true or false. Each
proposition can be said to represent the truth or the true, but it is up to
the scientist to 'verify' if the proposition  of knowledge regarding the
true is true, or  is in fact not knowledge but error. 

Jim consistently attempts to argue against verification of propositions. One
thing that I noticed is that he will make an opening declaration and then
post a large amount of text which is supposed to support his opening
declaration which often has no direct relationship logically nor
constructively to the following text. There is a big 'maybe' hanging there
in front of the text that follows. 

The scientist in Thoreau could inductively come to the conclusion that the
bean field was made out of 'exhausted soil'. For some reason these nine
simple pages are interpreted one way by Pollan, but the actual text of the
Bean Field in their dennotative sense have nothing to contribute to an
anthropos regarding gardening and the wild. There is a weak logical
connection to the ecocentric versus homocentric predicament. 

The perception and comment that Thoreau makes is that the concept of the
right to be is really an existential question. Who makes it right for the
St. Johnwort to be where it is? No one, and therefore who gives Thoreau the
right to remove the St.Johnswort? No one gives anyone the right. The term
right is really anachronistic in the sense that a right depends on some
'rule of law' but as we all know in nature there is no 'rule of law' so
there are no "rights in nature". 

Thoreau moreover examines a new way of living in direct contact with nature
that is semi-wild. He questions the institutional rights that society
imposes on behalf of human actions in nature. For instance, a person with
good intentions, a productive citizen tells me that "I wanted to see the
mountains. I cleared the forest away from around the house to see the
mountains because I 'felt hemmed in'. 

Of course the man has the right to clear the forest from hemming him in
since society does not have a rule against this action. But the human
clearing the forest does not stem from any existential rights to clearcut
the forest. The right of clearing  does not exist in nature. In the sciences
we do not impose rights, attitudes, and purposes onto nature. 

Life exists in nature, and if life becomes organized sufficiently, then life
will clear the forest (catepillars, defoliators, beavers, etc.)  But for how
long, and for how many hectares is not what science can determine in advance
unless there are quantitative solutions available. 

The St. Johnswort, the worm, the hunter all have an existential 'right' to
be there in amongst life simply because life is dependent on life. That is
why Thoreau questions why anyone has the right to remove the St. Johnswort.
Who am I to question the right  of the St. Johnswort to be there? 

Exactly. And that is why science is more interested in the indicative rather
than the imperative sentence/proposition. Scicentific statements are
indicative, statements by scientists however may imperative, exclamatory, or
optative. But only the indicative sentence is true of false. Sentences which
are (hence propositions) are imperative cannot be either true or false
unless there are strict rules of agreement as to what is indicated. So you
have the beginning of an ethic (indication of an ethic). So as Wittgenstein
said, the ethical is indispensible to life and he would never give up being
ethical because of science. 

Maria Stella remarks:

You are NOT asking questions Jim, you imply answers. Every question mark you
write means an argument, a rhetoric question, not a genuine uncertainty. And
ALL your questions are placed as to create doubts for always the same kind
of moral dillemas. See your own questions:

Jim Tantillo:
>> > When I pursue the seemingly pointless questions like,
>> > Is hunting violent?
>> > Is evolution morally relevant?
>> > Is death a harm?
>> > Do animals suffer?
>>
>> > I am hoping to get a little more sophisticated in my thinking about
such questions; maybe a little less certain about my presuppositions; and
hopefully on balance a bit more knowledgeable and more articulate about
*WHY* these questions/problems are difficult.
>> >
Maria Stella responds: 

> This would be honest to do if your answers to the above were not always
(or were not always implied to be):
> -No
> -No
> -No
> -No
>
> In the case you answered yes to any of the above, one would have even more
arguments in order to support these widely-sensed 'presuppositions'.
However, what you are trying to do, is not to give ANY MEANS for the
justification of such arguments, whilst you give PLENTY of means to the
reactionary side.

> In short, I am trying to say that  all the semiotics around you (and
Steve) transform all your questions to statements, arguments, opinions that
all of a coincidence, seem, sound, smell and are reactionary. They are NOT
neither innocent, nor 'questions'.
>
> Maria-Stella


"You never know where fish will go."

Molly Ivins

http://www.star-telegram.com/columnist/ivins2.htm



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