Hi Emma, hi everyone,

Emma wrote:
>My main problem with the cross over of environmental and anything else is
>that there is so much TIME spent debating what "environmentalism" is and
>there is so much infighting in the ranks that issues are clouded and nothing
>constructive acheived.
>
>I do agree with vegetarianism in principle and practice but such cloudyness
>allows others to more easily dismiss the pleas and (frankly on many
>occasions) rational arguments of environmentalists as "woolly bullshit".
>Maybe I'm wrong - maybe we need to reassess what environmentalism is today
>(its probably been done already) but I fear this would be fruitless as there
>are so many diversifications these days.
>

I agree with you that there's a lot of effort spent debating what
"environmentalism" is, but if it's any consolation at all, in the
philosophy of science this has (historically) been a prevalent phenomenon
as well--with scientists and philosophers alike concerned with and arguing
over what constitutes "good" science and "bad" science, real science from
pseudo-science, etc. etc.  A few weeks back I posted a brief email about
the idea of "boundary work": a sociological term for these types of
disputes . . . .  So it shouldn't surprise us that environmentalism as a
cultural phenomenon manifests some of the same tendencies.

I'm not so sure, however, that I agree with your conclusion that "nothing
constructive [is] achieved."  Certainly there must be *some* value in the
discussion itself?  Even though I agree with you that it can slow down
"progress" made on particular issues. . . .

Your post reminded me of something Maria-Stella wrote to the list last year
in relation to the same concerns you seem to be voicing here, only in that
case she was addressing more generally the seeming lack of progress in
philosophy.  With the list's indulgence, I'll simply copy my response to
Maria-Stella from that discussion below, as I think it is relevant here
(from  http://www.mailbase.ac.uk/lists/enviroethics/1999-07/0133.html ).

The full discussion from that time can of course be traced chronologically
in the archives by working either back or forward from this link.

Your work certainly sounds interesting, and I look forward to hearing more
about it.  Welcome to the list!

best,
Jim Tantillo

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Date: Sat, 31 Jul 1999 09:28:35 -0500
Subject: Re: Space ethics
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[Maria-Stella had written]:
>Nasty? Unwarranted? I thought your sense of ethics just poses questions
>and never ever ever ever ever reaches conclusions. But perhaps then
>ethics is not real life eh?

[Tantillo responded]:
I can understand your impatience with moral philosophy as expressed in this
reply. Iris Murdoch observes, "It is sometimes said, either irritably or
with a certain satisfaction, that philosophy makes no progress" (Murdoch
1970, 1). The "sense of ethics" one gets from listening to philosophers is
that philosophy, as you say, "just poses questions and never ever ever ever
ever reaches conclusions"

And you are not alone in holding this view. Marcia Eaton concurs:
"Philosophy has a history of asking, and not answering, questions" (Eaton
1989, 76). Philosophy is especially likely to generate such pessimistic
thoughts when it deals with controversial subjects: the morality of
abortion, for example, or of euthanasia. Hunting is a controversial subject
as well. In the various discussions that we have been having here about
hunting, I have sought not so much to articulate a "knockdown argument"
about hunting's rightness or wrongness in absolute terms as I have sought
to give a plausible account of hunting's virtues, as well as its vices, in
the course of trying to understand hunting philosophically.

That philosophy is not a "decision procedure" frustrates many people.
Economists, for example, are notoriously impatient with moral philosophers,
whom, it is sometimes supposed, unnecessarily cloud the otherwise crystal
clear waters of rational choice theory and economic decision-making.
(Perhaps it was economists whom Murdoch had in mind as deriving a "certain
satisfaction" from philosophy's vaunted futility!)  In dealing with value
issues, economists prefer simpler methods to the messy and seemingly
endless posing of questions offered by philosophers--questions that appear
to yield no clear answers. "Cost-benefit" analysis is one such simplifying
method.  It's easy: you count up all the value debits on one side of the
ledger, all the value "benefits" on the other, and Voila! your decision is
made for you by simple arithmetic.

The only problem is, ethics isn't arithmetic.  Simple words routinely turn
out to be fairly complex. The very concept of "benefits" is one of those
pesky, philosophically problematic terms that refuses to submit to such
simplifying moves.  (So is the idea of a "cost," when you think about it.)
Now of course, if we listened to or consulted with philosophers on every
economic issue, we'd never get anywhere economically . . . .  It's a good
thing to rely on economists (and ignore philosophers!) when it comes to
straightforward questions of economic value.  But it's a (fairly obvious)
mistake to force *all* value questions into economic terms simply because
it seems like the methodology in economics is or appears to be relatively
clear-cut.

You may think that my raising uncomfortable questions about Jackie
Giuliano's reasoning processes is out of line, distasteful, or
disrespectful--or dangerous, since now it looks like I'm Darth Vader and
I'm piloting the environmental ethics Death Star.  But Giuliano is the one
who's publishing this stuff in public; he (and he is a *he*--all you had to
do to find that out was simply read the article to the end, where you'd
arrive at:  "Jackie Giuliano, a writer and a Professor of Environmental
Studies, can be found in Los Angeles, California, wondering what would have
happened if callous space visitors had visited the Earth before life as we
know it evolved. Please send your thoughts, comments, and visions to him at
[log in to unmask] and visit his web site at
www.healingourworld.com" ) is the one influencing lots of peoples' opinions
on the matter--look, he even got Bissell sucked in !! <smile>  Imagine what
he could do to the minds of lesser mortals . . . .

The point of philosophy is to ask uncomfortable questions. This is not a
sign of disrespect, nor is it dangerous.  It's dangerous when we stop
asking these questions.  If all we did was ask safe, boring, and easily
answered questions, then we wouldn't be philosophers .  .  .  although I'm
not sure I'd opt for being an economist as a backup.  :-)

I'm being partly facetious here, but the point is serious.  Bertrand
Russell said the goal of philosophy was "articulate hesitation" when it
came to difficult questions--as opposed to what he felt was foolish
"inarticulate certainty."  Stanley Rosen begins his book, _The Limits of
Analysis_, with this quote from Russell as his epigraph, and I think it's
worth passing along here to the list in this context.

Russell:  "Here, as usually in philosophy, the first difficulty is to see
that the problem is difficult.  If you say to a person untrained in
philosophy, 'How do you know I have two eyes?' he or she will reply, 'What
a silly question! I can see you have.' It is not to be supposed that, when
our inquiry is finished, we shall have arrived at anything radically
different from this unphilosophical position.  What will have happened will
be that we shall have come to see a complicated structure where we thought
everything was simple, that we shall have become aware of the penumbra of
uncertainty surrounding the situations which inspire no doubt, that we
shall find doubt more frequently justified than we supposed, and that even
the most plausible premisses will have shown themselves capable of yielding
unplausible conclusions.  The net result is to substitute articulate
hesitation for inarticulate certainty."

When I pursue the seemingly pointless questions like,

Is hunting violent?
Is evolution morally relevant?
Is death a harm?
Do animals suffer?

I am hoping to get a little more sophisticated in my thinking about such
questions; maybe a little less certain about my presuppositions; and
hopefully on balance a bit more knowledgeable and more articulate about
*WHY* these questions/problems are difficult.

Part of the difference between an environmental ethicist and an
environmental ideologue is *just* this quality of "articulate hesitation"
regarding matters about which we have no real claims to certainty.  And I'm
sure it may ruffle a few feathers here to say that, but since Steve B. has
anointed me the new . . . how did you put it Steve? the new "spear catcher"
on the list? . . .  :-)

Jim


Eaton, Marcia Muelder. Aesthetics and the Good Life. London and Toronto:
Associated University Presses, 1989.

Murdoch, Iris. The Sovereignty of Good. Studies in Ethics and the
Philosophy of Religion, ed. D. Z. Philips. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1970.

Rosen, Stanley. The Limits of Analysis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.