The Week in Europe
By David Jessop

Travel almost anywhere in the world and you will find someone from the
Caribbean. So
much so, that the region's diaspora seems now to be global, due to more than
half a
century of immigration, periods of political and economic uncertainty, and
ties through 
marriage and family.

In New York, Toronto, London, major cities across the Americas and Europe,
in Africa, Australia and elsewhere, large resident Caribbean populations can
be found. While numbers vary and in some cases exceed the population of
their country of origin, in absolute terms these Caribbean citizens and
their children represent potentially, a force powerful enough to move policy
in the countries and cities in which they now live. In the same countries,
the region has strong ties with major international corporations through
investment and trade, through the millions of visitors who come to the
region each year and the companies that bring them, to say nothing of
institutional linkages through trades unions, the church, the professions
and others. All have a reason to want stability and growth in the Caribbean.

Yet despite the region having these assets and the potential to make itself
heard, the Caribbean's concerns continue to fade from the international
agenda. Why this should be is worth considering.

A starting point would be to study why and how the best organised and most
influential lobby in the world, Israel, has been the success that it is. For
reasons of history, belief, the absolute requirement that the state of
Israel survive and the centuries of persecution culminating in the depravity
of the holocaust it might not the most obvious model for the region. Yet the
manner in which Israel has organised its diaspora and created a well-funded
cause driven by passion, compassion and hardheadedness has shown that
opinion and events can be changed in its favour.

Just as successful in a different way has been the single-minded anti-Cuban
lobby mounted by the Cuban American National Foundation. Based loosely on
the Israeli model, this small group has against the odds, taken control of
the US political agenda on Cuba by making Cuba a US domestic political
issue. In doing so it has strengthened the US embargo against Cuba and held
US Presidents, policy makers and Congress in its thrall, sometimes despite
the better judgement of those who have given their public support. It has
done so through careful coalitions that make use of corporate self-interest,
family ties, political funding, the presence politically of Cuban Americans
in swing states and at times, outright coercion.

Now most probably in gradual decline as a result of it having alienated much
of US opinion over its treatment of the case of Elian Gonzalez, the Cuban
American Foundation's influence is being slowly matched by an immensely more
subtle and long-term approach encouraged by Havana. This is aimed over time
at creating a climate in the US for change and policies that will may pave
the way for the eventual normalisation of US/Cuba relations. The emphasis
here is on convincing a myriad of US and other groups with often differing
or diametrically opposed commercial, moral and or political convictions that
there are sound reasons why the US Congress and the administration must
bring the embargo to an end. 

Yet another successful but very different model that has worked against the
region's interests has been the lobby mounted by the large US banana
multinationals against the EU's banana regime for the Caribbean and the ACP.
Working in conjunction with key elements in Congress and parts of the US or
European administrations sympathetic to their message on free trade, these
companies have been able to accelerate the world trade liberalisation agenda
against the interests of small vulnerable economies. 

What if anything do these lobbies have in common and what lessons are there
for the region?  

The first and most obvious point is that need and clear objectives drive
these lobbies and that they are well co-ordinated. The second is that
although funded their real strength comes from groups of varying sizes and
persuasions convinced of the justice of the cause. The third is an
understanding that change is brought about by coalitions of interest working
together politically towards the same goals. That is to say by making use of
the influence of the community, ministers, governments, regional
institutions, religious groups, the media, corporate and civil society as
well as others sympathetic or with a vested interest.

This matter is now far from academic. The development of a powerful
Caribbean lobby in Europe and the US is now vital. Very soon the region will
face a further series of challenges to its economic survival. There are
signs that a number of EU members states and other interests in Europe and
beyond have begun to consider the future of the present preferential
arrangements on sugar.  In September 2002 a new round of negotiations
between Europe and the regions of the ACP will begin on trade
liberalisation. The WTO is looking at how to liberalise services, the
industry that represent much of the region's future. And once the US
Presidential elections are over, further moves towards global trade
liberalisation will again be on the international agenda. Quite rightly the
region and its Regional Negotiating Machinery is preparing intellectually
for these challenges but who will support the Caribbean's cause in Europe or
beyond? From where will the region's political muscle come?

Pressure groups have become a key element in the new politics of
globalisation. The region needs to develop its own if it is to set the
agenda for the Caribbean before others choose to do so. This may not fit
easily with the comfortable niceties of diplomatic life, but in any fight
for survival Governments and interested parties conduct negotiations and
diplomacy alongside appropriate actions that enhance the political agenda of
those involved in the negotiations. 

Put more brutally and over simply, might the region have been better off if,
in the early stages of the banana dispute, it had seized the agenda. That is
to say if groups of Caribbean nationals in Europe and Caribbean had acted as
French farmers do: blocking roads, seizing shipments of produce and holding
noisy vigils in capitals and outside EU and US embassies. Such an approach
would have created an early political legitimacy and the opportunity for a
co-ordinated if loose rainbow coalition to help make the region's case with
Governments more concerned about popular perception and image than justice.
These and more subtle versions are approaches that Israel, the Cuban
Americans, Cuba, the banana multinationals and many others understand. 

In a world increasingly dominated by perception, the Caribbean holds in its
own hands, solutions. By mobilising opinion and political influence in key
nations it can achieve real support in addressing the complex problems
associated with the economic changes it now faces. It may not have been the
way in which up to now it has acted, but the name of the game in Europe and
the US is now about Governments and companies and nationals creating the
right political environment to positively change policy. In a global
environment governments will not care unless caused to have to care.

David Jessop is the Executive Director of the Caribbean Council for Europe.

June 2nd, 2000 



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